

Selected Writings of Peter Charanis

Peter Charanis (1908-1985) made important contributions to understanding the history and culture of Byzantium. A Wikipedia entry ([Peter Charanis](#)) describes his life and works. The author published the 19 studies below in a variety of journals between the years 1940 and 1975.

[Internal Strife in Byzantium during the Fourteenth Century](#), from *Byzantion*, Vol. 15 (1940-1941), pp. 208-230.

[The Strife among the Palaeologi and the Ottoman Turks, 1370-1402](#), from *Byzantion*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1942-1943), pp. 286-314.

[On the Social Structure of the Later Roman Empire](#), from *Byzantion*, Vol. 17 (1944-1945), pp. 39-57.

[The Greek Historical Sources of the Second Half of the Fourteenth Century](#), from *Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January, 1944), pp. 406-412.

[The Phonikon and other Byzantine Taxes](#), from *Speculum*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Jul., 1945), pp. 331-333.

[The Slavic Element in Byzantine Asia Minor in the Thirteenth Century](#), from *Byzantion*, Vol. 18 (1946-1948), pp. 69-83.

[The Jews in the Byzantine Empire under the First Palaeologi](#), from *Speculum*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan., 1947), pp. 75-77.

[Byzantium, the West and the Origin of the First Crusade](#), from *Byzantion*, Vol. 19, ACTES DU VIIe CONGRÈS DES ÉTUDES BYZANTINES BRUXELLES 1948. — I (1949), pp. 17-36.

[The Monastic Properties and the State in the Byzantine Empire](#), from *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, Vol. 4 (1948), pp. 52-118.

[The Chronicle of Monemvasia and the Question of the Slavonic Settlements in Greece](#), from *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, Vol. 5 (1950), pp. 139+141-166.

[On the Capture of Corinth by the Onogurs and Its Recapture by the Byzantines](#), from *Speculum*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Jul., 1952), pp. 343-350.

[Aims of the Medieval Crusades and How They Were Viewed by Byzantium](#), from *Church History*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jun., 1952), pp. 123-134, in 13 pdf pages. The author examines the activities and personalities of the Vatican, European monarchies, the Byzantine Empire, the Saljuqs and their successors in the 11th-12th centuries.

[Economic Factors in the Decline of the Byzantine Empire](#), from *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Autumn, 1953), pp. 412-424.

[Ethnic Changes in the Byzantine Empire in the Seventh Century](#), from *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, Vol. 13 (1959), pp. 23-44.

[The Transfer of Population as a Policy in the Byzantine Empire](#), from *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jan., 1961), pp. 140-154.

[A Note on the Ethnic Origin of the Emperor Maurice](#), from *Byzantion*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1965), pp. 412-417.

[The Monk as an Element of Byzantine Society](#), from *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, Vol. 25 (1971), pp. 61-84.

[Cultural Diversity and the Breakdown of Byzantine Power in Asia Minor](#), from *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, Vol. 29 (1975), pp. 1-20.

Available at Internet Archive for reading online and/or downloading in various formats:

[The Armenians in the Byzantine Empire](#), by Peter Charanis (Lisbon, 1963). In this important work, the author describes the role of Armenians in the governing, military and intellectual structures of the Byzantine Empire from its beginning until the mid-11th century. Charanis describes the numerous emperors of Armenian descent, and suggests that several of the imperial dynasties were mostly or partly Armenian.

Also available: [Հայերը Բիզանդական կայսրութեան մէջ Hayere" Biwzandakan kaysrut'ean me'j](#) [The Armenians in the Byzantine Empire], by Peter Charanis (Vienna, 1966), in 148 pdf pages. This is an Armenian translation of the above work, made by Haig Berberian. *Azgayin matenadaran* series, volume 199.

Compiled by Robert Bedrosian, 2019

This material is presented solely for non-commercial educational/research purposes



PEETERS

INTERNAL STRIFE IN BYZANTIUM DURING THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Source: *Byzantion*, Vol. 15 (1940-1941), pp. 208-230

Published by: Peeters Publishers

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44168526>

Accessed: 20-05-2019 00:03 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Peeters Publishers is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Byzantion*

INTERNAL STRIFE IN BYZANTIUM DURING THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

By PETER CHARANIS

For a time it appeared that the Greeks might reestablish their dominant position in the Balkan peninsula after they had captured Constantinople in 1261 and ended the miserable existence of the Latin empire there. With Constantinople again in their hands, they were able to restore the Byzantine empire, and the foreign policy which they immediately adopted was to maintain and extend their position in the Balkan peninsula. Michael Palaeologus, the man who restored the empire, pursued this policy consistently and fairly successfully, but his successors were not only unable to maintain the advantages which he had won; they had to yield still further, until finally there was nothing left but Constantinople, itself reduced to a state of misery, and a few outlying districts.¹

The factors which contributed to the collapse of the empire were many. Incompetence in statesmanship; the constant hammerings and almost continuous invasions of the empire by the neighboring peoples, Turks, Slavs, and Latins; the control of the commercial life of the empire by the Italian cities—these were important factors in the downfall of the empire. But still more important, indeed decisive, was the

¹ There is as yet no systematic treatment of the period of the Palaeologi. The best brief general accounts are those of Charles Diehl (*L'Empire byzantin sous les Palaeologues*, in *Etudes byzantines*, Paris, 1904) and A. A. Vasiliev (*Histoire de l'empire byzantin*, Paris, 1932, II, 253 ff.). For the reign of Michael Palaeologus there is now a brief and not quite satisfactory monograph: C. Chapman, *Michel Paléologue, restaurateur de l'Empire byzantin, 1261-1282* (Paris, 1926). The work of V. Parisot (*Cantacuzène, homme d'Etat et historien*, Paris, 1845) and that of Berger de Xivrey ("Mémoire sur la vie et les ouvrages de l'empereur Manuel Paléologue," *Mémoires de l'Institut de France, Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres*, vol. XIX, part 2, Paris, 1853) are still the standards on Cantacuzenus and Manuel Palaeologus respectively. There is now also a monograph on John VII: F. Dölger, "Johannes VII, Kaiser der Rhomäer, 1390-1408," *Byz. Zeitschr.*, XXXI (Leipzig, 1931), 21-36. For the chronology of the fourteenth century see P. Charanis, "An Important Short Chronicle of the Fourteenth Century," *Byzantion*, XIII (Brussels, 1938), 335-362. For the administration see Ernst Stein, "Untersuchungen zur spät-byzantinischen Verfassungs- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte," *Mitteilungen z. Osmanischen Geschichte* II, 1. u. 2. Heft (Hanover, 1925), 1-62.

internal strife which characterized the empire throughout the fourteenth century. There was not a single reign in that century that was not disturbed by a revolution. Nor were these revolutions simply for the possession of the throne. The throne was involved, indeed, but behind the struggle for its possession lay deep social and political factors. This is nowhere clearer than in the attempt of John Cantacuzenus to wrest the throne away from John V Palaeologus. Cantacuzenus was supported by the aristocratic classes and relied also on the hesychast monks whose leader, Palamas, he favored; he was bitterly opposed by the lower classes whose leaders fought not only the aristocracy, but showed also anti-monastic feelings.^{1a} What followed was a series of popular revolts which put most of the cities of the empire in the hands of the people.

The first of these popular uprisings took place in Adrianople, October 27, 1341, after Cantacuzenus had dispatched a letter to that city in which he announced his proclamation to the throne and asked to be recognized emperor. The aristocratic element of Adrianople welcomed the news and declared promptly in favor of Cantacuzenus. Thereupon it called an assembly of the populace where the letter of Cantacuzenus was read and an attempt was made to win popular support for his cause. But instead of approval and support there were murmurs of revolt, and even open denunciations of Cantacuzenus. Those who had dared to speak openly against Cantacuzenus were insulted and whipped, and for the time being all seemed well, but the resentment of the populace smoldered underneath, and when night came it broke out into an open conflagration. This was the work of a certain Branos, a man of low social origins, who earned his living by working with the spade. Branos and a number of other conspirators went from house to house and urged the populace to revolt, promising them not only vengeance against the insolence of the rich, but also seizure of their property. In this way they constituted among the poor a considerable force with which they attacked the wealthy, the friends of Cantacuzenus. In the meantime many of the aristocracy had anticipated the uprising and fled from the city; those who remained were captured and were later sent to Constantinople, while the property of the wealthy in general was plundered and destroyed. A popular

^{1a} The best study of Gregory Palamas and the Palamite movement are the articles of M. Jugie, "Palamas, Grégoire" and "Palamite (controverse)," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, XI (Paris, 1932), 1735-1818.

regime was established, and it was recognized by the authorities in Constantinople which were still friendly to John V Palaeologus.² This regime lasted until the winter of 1345. By then most of the Thracian cities had surrendered to Cantacuzenus and the tide of the war between the two emperors was turning in his favor. A revolt by those of his partisans who were still in the city was partly successful, and the city was finally handed over to him through negotiations.³

The example of Adrianople was followed everywhere in the empire. In practically every city there was an uprising of the lower classes which remained loyal to John V Palaeologus against the aristocracy. Here is how Cantacuzenus describes the general situation:⁴

Later [after the popular revolt in Adrianople] the entire Roman empire was given to a much more savage and grievous strife. The populace everywhere considered its duty to remain loyal to the emperor Palaeologus, while the men of property were either sincerely favorable to the emperor Cantacuzenus or were accused of being so by the poor and the seditious without any proof. Most easy were the attacks against those who had money which the poor sought to seize, and who had refused to act basely like the others. The people were ready to revolt at the slightest pretext and dared the most terrible deeds, for they hated the rich for their bad treatment of them during peace time and now hoped, above all, to seize their property, which was great. The rebels were composed in the main of the most miserable of thieves and brigands, and, compelled by poverty, dared everything. Under the pretext that they were favorably disposed toward the emperor Palaeologus, calling themselves his most faithful subjects, they led the populace to follow their example.

The sedition spread throughout the Roman empire like a malignant and terrible disease, and infected many who before seemed more moderate and just. For in time of peace both cities and individuals have gentler feelings and are less tempted to commit disgraceful and infamous deeds. This is because they do not have to face conditions of dire necessity. But war which deprives men of their daily wants is a violent schoolmaster and teaches that which seemed before beyond any daring.

And so all the cities in common rebelled against the nobles. Those who were late in entering the struggle, on hearing what had been done before carried themselves to greater excesses, nay, to the perpetration of massacres. The cruelty and reckless audacity of these men were looked upon as courage, while their insensibility to the ties of blood and their lack of kindly feelings as unflinching loyalty for the emperor. The man who was violent against Canta-

² John Cantacuzenus, *Historiae* (Bonn, 1828-32), II, 175 ff. Nicephorus Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia* (Bonn, 1829-30), II, 620.

³ Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, II, 484 ff., 525 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 177-79.

cuzenus and heaped upon him base and bitter insults was considered a faithful subject; while he who was moderate both in words and in deeds and sought to do what was right was immediately suspected. Likewise, the laying of plots and the fabrication of lies and false accusations gave to one the reputation of prudent. The betrayal of one's closest relatives was covered by some fair-sounding name as if it were something good. Thus every form of wickedness made its appearance and there was nothing that the more equitable did not have to endure. For the nobles and the members of the middle class were straightway destroyed, the former either because they had been favorably disposed toward Cantacuzenus or because they did not immediately take up arms against him; the latter, either because they did not coöperate with the rebels or through envy lest they survive. Human nature, always prone to commit injustices in opposition to the laws, seemed then powerless to control its rage.⁵

The strife and conflict which reigned in every city of the empire was greater and more violent in Thessalonica as that city surpassed all others, except Constantinople, both in wealth and population. Thessalonica had always been one of the most populous and wealthiest cities of the Roman empire,⁶ and since the seventh century when the great cities of the east were conquered by the Arabs, it ranked second only to Constantinople. Its population in the tenth century has been estimated at 200,000 souls;⁷ in the fourteenth century it was still very populous;⁸ and despite the disasters of that century its population in 1423 still numbered 40,000.⁹ It declined rapidly in the next few years and when it was taken by the Ottomans in 1430 it had no more than 7,000 people, men, women, and children. Most of the inhabitants had doubtless fled or were killed in the defense of the city.¹⁰

⁵ Cf. Thucydides, III, 82.

⁶ It was known as *Megalopolis*, a term which was applied only to Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Thessalonica. Du Cange, *Glossarium Graecitatis*, s. v.

⁷ A. Adamantios, 'Η Βυζαντινὴ Θεσσαλονίκη (Athens, 1914), p. 101. Cited by A. Christophilopolos, Τὸ ἐπαρχικὸν βιβλίον Λέοντος τοῦ Σοφοῦ καὶ αἱ συντεχνίαι ἐν Βυζαντίῳ (Athens, 1935), p. 1, n. 3.

⁸ Gregoras, *op. cit.*, II, 634; Pachymeres, *De Michaele et Andronico Palaeologis* (Bonn, 1835), II, 262. At the beginning of the thirteenth century Villehardouin called Thessalonica "une des meilleures et des plus riches villes de la chrestienté." Villehardouin, *La conquête de Constantinople*, edited by Natalis de Wailly (Paris, 1874), p. 166; Nicephorus Chumnos, *Θεσσαλονικεῖσι Συμβουλευτικὸς*, ed. J. F. Boissonade, *Anecdota Graeca* (Paris, 1830), II, 143, 152.

⁹ Zorzi Dolpin, *Cronaca*, anno 1423 (MS. of the library of St. Mark of Venice, Ital. Clas. vii, cod. 794). Cited by C. Sathas, *Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce* (Paris, 1883), IV, xx.

¹⁰ John Anagnostes, *De Thessalonicensis excidio narratio* (Bonn, 1838), p. 510.

The greatness and prosperity of Thessalonica was due to its commercial activity. Thessalonica was a great international market and its annual fair, held at the time of the feast of St. Demetrius, its patron saint, was famous throughout Europe and the Near East. Merchants of every nationality, Bulgarians, Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, French, Syrians, Egyptians, and numerous others came to Thessalonica to exchange their goods. These goods were of every kind. Here is how the author of *Timarion* who lived in the twelfth century describes them:¹¹

And if you are anxious to know what it [the fair] contains . . . well, there was every kind of material woven or spun by men or women, all those that come from Boeotia and the Peloponnesus, and all that are brought in trading ships from Italy to Greece. Besides this, Phoenicia furnishes numerous articles, and Egypt, and Syria, and the pillars of Hercules, where the finest coverlets are manufactured. These things the merchants bring direct from their respective countries to old Macedonia and Thessalonica; but the Empire also contributes to the splendor of the fair, by sending across its products to Constantinople, whence the cargoes are brought by numerous horses and mules.

In the fourteenth century Thessalonica was still a great international market. The products of every land were found there.¹² And one of the most powerful and turbulent elements of its population were the mariners,¹³ some of whom were not only engaged in the legitimate transportation of commercial goods, but doubtless also in piracy.¹⁴ The mariners were organized into a guild and exerted considerable influence in the life of Thessalonica.¹⁵ There was also a

¹¹ B. Hase, *Notices et extraits de manuscrits*, IX (Paris, 1813), 171-174. I have used the translation of H. F. Tozer, "Byzantine Satire," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, II (London, 1881), 244-245. *Timarion* has also been edited and translated by Ad. Ellissen, *Analekten der mittel- und neugriechischen Litteratur*, IV (Leipzig, 1860).

¹² D. Kydonis, *Monodia occisorum Thessalonicae*, Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, CIX (Paris, 1863), 641. Migne is cited hereafter as *MPG*.

¹³ Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, II, 575.

¹⁴ D. A. Zakythinos, *Le despotat Grec de Morée* (Paris, 1932), pp. 85 ff.

¹⁵ Cantacuzenus, II, 575: ἔχουσι δὲ καὶ ἰδιόζουσαν ἀρχὴν αὐτοὶ παρὰ τὴν τῆς ἀλλοτρίας πόλεως. According to O. Tafrali (*Thessalonique au XIV^{ème} siècle*, Paris, 1913, pp. 32 f.) this guild was organized by the mariners themselves in order to protect their interests better. This is not likely. In Byzantium during the height of its power trades were organized and strictly regulated by the state. "It is least probable," says a student of Byzantine trade corporations, "that a state with such lack of political and economic liberty, such as was Byzantium,

numerous middle class which owed its fortune to commerce and industry. An ecclesiastic of the fourteenth century complains that the people of Thessalonica were more interested in sales and purchases than in the word of God. They turned the house of God, the church, into a market place, for they talked business instead of listening to the scriptures.¹⁶ A considerable portion, probably the majority, of the population of Thessalonica, however, was engaged in agriculture. Most of the inhabitants, declares Palamas in one of his sermons, spread into the country in order that they might take care of the harvest and bring in the crops. The poor were many, whereas some of the aristocracy were extremely wealthy.¹⁷

Thessalonica was violently shaken by a popular upheaval which broke out in the summer of 1342 against Cantacuzenus and his wealthy partisans.¹⁸ The revolt was headed by a group known as the zealot's because they put the interest of the people before their own private advantage. This is the definition of zealot given by one of the writers of the fourteenth century,¹⁹ but the zealots of Thessalonica are represented by their antagonists as men of low origin, indigent to the last degree, a collection of riffraff, which included not only the lowest element of Thessalonica, but also criminals from the islands

would have allowed the organization of the trades, especially those of the large cities, into powerful autonomous corporations" (Christophilopolos, *Tò ἐπαρχικὸν βιβλίον*, p. 37). When the revolt of the zealots broke out, the guild of the mariners was headed by Andrew Palaeologus, a member of the nobility and influential in the politics of the city. This may mean that the head of the guild of the mariners was designated by the government. In Byzantium during the tenth century the heads of numerous guilds were appointed by the prefect of the city (*ibid.*, p. 46). See the book of the prefect itself, edited by J. Nicole, *Le Livre du préfet ou l'édit de l'empereur Léon le Sage sur les corporations de Constantinople* (Geneva, 1893). The book has been reprinted by J. and P. Zepos, *Jus Graecoromanum*, II (Athens, 1931), 371-392. There is also an English translation: A. E. R. Boak, "The Book of the Prefect," *Journal of Economic and Business History*, I (Cambridge, 1929), 600 f. It is quite possible, however, that the guild of the mariners in Thessalonica became more or less autonomous as the imperial administration declined during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Cf. Christophilopolos, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁶ G. Palamas, *MS. gr. Paris, 1239*, fols. 182v-183, cited by Tafrali, *op. cit.*, p. 29, n. 1.

¹⁷ G. Palamas, *Homilia XXIV*, *MPG*, CLI (Paris, 1865), 333.

¹⁸ Gregoras, *op. cit.*, II, 634.

¹⁹ Thomas Magister, *Oratio de subditorum officiis*, *MPG*, CXLV (Paris, 1865), 544.

and barbarians, who incited the people to revolt in order that they might enrich themselves.²⁰ This view is not borne out by what is known of their program; nor is it true that they were drawn entirely from the lower classes. Their leaders were members of the nobility.

The revolt broke out over the attempt of Synadenus, the governor of Thessalonica and a partisan of Cantacuzenus, who was supported by the aristocracy, to surrender the city to Cantacuzenus. The zealots, using as their standard a cross which they seized from an altar, led the populace against the governor and his aristocratic supporters. Synadenus and about a thousand of the aristocracy fled from the city, while their property was destroyed and pillaged by the populace which raged for three days unmolested. They perpetrated every act, remarks Cantacuzenus bitterly, that "men who are driven on by poverty and carried away by insolence are likely to commit for the sake of wealth."²¹ The zealots seized control of the government and their regime was recognized by the authorities in Constantinople. John Apocaucus, the son of the Grand Duke Alexius who was the principal adviser of John V Palaeologus, was sent to Thessalonica as the new governor, but the real authority was exercised by Michael Palaeologus, the leader of the zealots, who became archon of the city. Many of the nobles were imprisoned or exiled; their property was confiscated.²²

A new crisis was precipitated in 1345. John Apocaucus was discontented with his position and resented the power of Michael Palaeologus. The general situation seemed favorable for an attempt to overthrow the regime of the zealots, for the war between the two emperors was turning in favor of Cantacuzenus. John, therefore, entered into an agreement with those of the nobles who were still in Thessalonica, and Michael Palaeologus was assassinated, while the other zealots, with the exception of some who managed to hide themselves in the city or were not disturbed because of their moderation, were either imprisoned or exiled. For the moment there was no violent reaction on the part of the populace, especially since John took an

²⁰ Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, II, 235, 570; III, 117; Gregoras, *op. cit.*, II, 795; Patriarch Cyrus Neilos, *Encomion*, MPG, CLI (Paris, 1865), 672; Palamas, *Homilia I*, MPG, CLI, 12 f.; Demetrius Kydones, *Letter to Isidore Glabas*, edited by J. F. Boissonade, *Anecdota Nova* (Paris, 1844), p. 276; Philotheos, *The Life of St. Saba the Younger*, edited by Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Ἀνάλεκτα Ἱεροσολυμιτικῆς Σταχυολογίας*, V (St. Petersburg, 1898), 192, 194.

²¹ Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, II, 133-135; Gregoras, *op. cit.*, II, 634 f.

²² Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, II, 257, 568-69.

equivocal attitude toward Cantacuzenus, and not only refused to surrender the city but exacted large sums of money from his wealthy partisans by threatening to expose their complicity in the assassination of Michael Palaeologus. Two factors influenced John in this decision: respect for his father, the Grand Duke Alexius, who was directing the forces of John V Palaeologus against Cantacuzenus, and fear of popular uprising. The death of his father which took place shortly thereafter eliminated the first factor, and he decided to risk the second. He called an assembly together, from which, however, the people were excluded, and the decision was taken to surrender the city to Cantacuzenus on the condition that he were kept as its governor and its municipal immunities were respected. Negotiations to that end were opened, but before they could be completed there was a violent upheaval among the people. The leadership was taken by Andrew Palaeologus, a member of the aristocracy, who was also a moderate zealot and the head of the guild of the mariners, the most powerful and turbulent element of the population. Andrew Palaeologus himself appealed to the mariners, while others harangued the people in general. There was a tumultuous uprising and the populace became masters of the city. What followed was a veritable scene of carnage. About a hundred nobles, including John Apocaucus, were slaughtered in cold blood. It was a general attack of the poor against the rich. "Here," says Kydones, "the servant pushed the master, there, the slave him who had bought him. The rustic dragged the general, and the peasant the soldier."^{22a} The leaders of the zealots tried in vain to check the fury of the populace; it did not stop until it exhausted itself. The result of this bloody popular uprising was the reëstablishment of the regime of the zealots.²³

What the character of this regime was is not very easy to determine. The writers of the period lay stress upon the destructiveness of the revolt, the fury of the populace and the sufferings of their victims, the destruction and pillage of the property of the rich, but say very little about the kind of government that the zealots established. The historian Gregoras has indeed left a description, but this description is negative rather than positive, that is, it tells what the regime of the zealots was not, rather than what it was. Here is the statement of Gregoras:²⁴

^{22a} Kydonis, *Monodia*, p. 648.

²³ Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, II, 568-582.

²⁴ Gregoras, *op. cit.*, II, 795.

The regime of the zealots "recalls no other form of government. It was not an aristocracy such as Lycurgus instituted among the Lacedaemonians to be further developed by them. Nor was it a democracy like the first constitution of the Athenians established by Cleisthenes who raised the number of tribes from four to ten. It was similar neither to the regime decreed by Zaleucus to the Epizephyrian Locrians nor to that established in Sicily by Charondas of Catana. Nor was it mixed constitution formed by the combination of two or three different constitutions, put together in such a way as to give something new, such as was the constitution of the Cypriotes or that of ancient Rome which was established, it is said, by the people after they revolted against the consuls. It was rather a strange ochlocracy brought about and directed by chance. Certain audacious individuals formed themselves into a group of their own, set it up as an authority and persecuted the rest. They led the populace by demagogic appeals to execute their will. They confiscated the property of the rich, while they themselves lived in luxury. No one was allowed to obey any of the leaders from without, while what seemed to them good had the force of law."

This statement, despite its negative and general nature, throws some light on the character of the regime of the zealots. It was a popular regime virtually independent of any outside authority. It introduced new laws while it discarded some old ones. Some connection with Constantinople was maintained, for the latter was represented by an imperial governor, but his powers were only nominal, for even the orders of the emperor were often disregarded.²⁵ Thessalonica under the zealots was virtually an independent republic.

This republic lasted until 1349, when it was overthrown by a counter revolution. The aristocratic opposition had by no means been crushed, and the triumph of Cantacuzenus everywhere in the empire brought about a conservative reaction in Thessalonica. The imperial governor, Metochites, and members of the nobility entered into a plot, and Andrew Palaeologus, the leader of the zealots and the real governor of the city, was overthrown and expelled. He tried in vain to arouse the populace, but his appeals for loyalty to John V Palaeologus was no longer effective, for the latter had made his peace with Cantacuzenus. The zealots, unable to save the situation by enlisting the support of the populace, turned to Stephen Dushan, the kral of Serbia, for aid, but this only helped to alienate still further the sympathy of the populace, and enabled Cantacuzenus and the nobles to get complete control of the city. The zealots were arrested and sent to Constantinople.²⁶

²⁵ Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, III, 104.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, III, 108 ff., 117.

Thessalonica was regarded as the teacher of the other cities in the uprisings of the populace against the aristocracy.²⁷ The popular revolt which began with the uprising in Adrianople became more intense and widespread after the revolt of the zealots. Every city east of Thessalonica and as far as Constantinople was divided into two factions: the masses who ranged themselves against Cantacuzenus, and the men of property and the garrisons who supported him. The masses prevailed everywhere, took control of the city administrations, imprisoned or cruelly executed the members of the aristocracy and confiscated their property.²⁸

The revolt of the lower classes spread also into the country. In the summer of 1342 there was an open revolt of the Thracian peasants inhabiting the villages in the neighborhood of Didymotichon.²⁹ Thrace had suffered terribly by the civil wars. It was not only ravaged by the opposing armies of the empire; it was continuously devastated by foreign marauding bands, especially Turks and Bulgarians. Most of its inhabitants had fled or were captured to be sold into slavery and those who remained were reduced to great misery. The country took the aspect of a real desert, although it is one of the most fertile regions of the Balkans.³⁰ The rebellious peasants sought to emulate the populace of the cities. They attacked the wealthy and pillaged their property. They armed themselves as best as they could, advanced against Didymotichon and threatened general destruction unless the city surrendered voluntarily. An attack by the garrison of the city, however, dispersed them, and they did not return to their homes but fled to other villages with their wives and children. Their movable property was seized and their houses destroyed.

The struggle between the populace and the nobility was not restricted to the lands of the Byzantine empire proper; it extended also in the empire of Trebizond. There the death of the emperor Basil I in 1340 ushered in a period of about fifteen years of internal strife and conflict which reduced the empire to a state of anarchy.³¹

²⁷ D. Kydones, *Letter to Phacrasis*, edited by Boissonade, *Anecdota Nova*, p. 289.

²⁸ Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, II, 297.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 287.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 186.

³¹ Sp. Lampros, "Τὸ τραπεζουντιακὸν χρονικὸν Μιχαὴλ Παναρέτου," *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων*, IV (Athens, 1907), 272 ff.; Lampros, "Ἀνέκδοτον χρυσόβουλον Ἀλεξίου Γ'," *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων*, II (Athens, 1905), 188 ff.

The conflict began over the succession to the throne, but the real cause was the desire of the nobility to reduce the emperor into impotence and concentrate all power in its own hands. There were two factions in Trebizond: the bulk of the native nobility that sought to eliminate the influence of Constantinople in Trebizond; and the Byzantine faction, composed of some of the nobility, the imperial guard, some mercenary soldiers and some adventurers from Constantinople, which sought to maintain close relations with Constantinople. But whether the one or the other faction prevailed the real aim of both was the same. In 1341 the local nobility placed Anna, the sister of Basil I, on the throne in order that they might be free to conduct the affairs of the state as they pleased.³² Anna was overthrown in the following year by the Byzantine faction which crowned John, a cousin of Basil I, only to depose him two years later in favor of his father, Michael. But Michael was virtually deprived of his powers by an agreement which he signed and swore to enforce. While he was allowed to keep the imperial insignia he promised not to exercise his authority in anything unless he first obtained the consent and approval of his advisers. In this struggle the populace took an active and violent part, and although it sometimes sided with the nobility, on the real issue it remained faithful to the imperial tradition. Popular revolts and uprisings greeted the attempts of either faction to destroy the power of the central government.³³ The populace hated the aristocracy, for it was exploited by it and its only hope of justice lay in a strong central government. A popular uprising helped Michael to regain his powers, but the aristocracy continued to struggle and it was not until 1355 that order was reestablished by Alexis III who had succeeded Michael in 1349.³⁴

The Rumanian scholar V. Tafrali, a distinguished authority on the medieval history of Thessalonica, has attributed the revolt of the zealots to two fundamental causes: (1) the deplorable economic conditions of the population; and (2) the tendency toward a more democratic spirit which began to manifest itself about that time. The latter is attributed by Tafrali to the Italian republics which exerted such an influence in the economic life of the Greek empire.³⁵ The

³² Gregoras, *op. cit.*, II, 680: *ἵνα γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐπ' ἀδείας εἴη τῆς ἀρχῆς κατορχεισθαι καὶ ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν τ' ἀκεῖ πράγματα ὅπη τὸ βουλόμενον.*

³³ *Ibid.*, II, 682.

³⁴ Lampros, "Ἀνέκδοτον χρυσόβουλον Ἀλεξίου Γ'," p. 192.

³⁵ Tafrali, *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle*, pp. 255-57. Another Ruma-

revolution of 1339 of the populace of Genoa against the aristocracy was known in Byzantium.³⁶ Indeed, there were popular uprisings everywhere in Europe in the fourteenth century—in Italy, in France, in England, in Germany, in the Netherlands. Medieval society was breaking down.

Genoese and other Italian influence doubtless played their part but these alone do not explain the democratic tendency in Byzantium. That was a part of the Byzantine tradition. Everyone knows the tumultuous popular upheavals of the early centuries of the Byzantine empire, but it is only recently that their real significance has been pointed out.³⁷ These popular upheavals were not the work of a shiftless people, interested only in the races in the hippodrome, and prone to riot at the slightest provocation. The people of Constantinople took the keenest interest in public affairs, both external and internal, organized itself into a militia which more than once guarded Constantinople against the barbarians, interfered in the conduct of the affairs of the state when it was discontented with its policies or its administration, and exerted the greatest influence in the dynastic crises of the empire. There are in the history of Byzantium, says Manojlović,³⁸ great scenes “in which the people of Constantinople played an immense and violent rôle and was the decisive factor of great changes.”

This popular tradition was temporarily suppressed during the glorious days of the Macedonian dynasty, but emerged again in the eleventh century. It was to the people of Constantinople that the last representative of the Macedonian dynasty owed their recovery of the throne from Michael V. “The populace,” says Psellos in describing

nian scholar considers the revolution of the zealots a part of the general revolutionary movement which characterized the fourteenth century both in the east and the west. G. O. Bratianu, *Privilèges et franchises municipales dans l'empire byzantin* (Paris, 1936), p. 119. I have had no access to the book of O. G. Kordatos, *Ἡ κομμούνα τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης* (Athens, 1928), but judging from his other writings Kordatos doubtless approached the problem from the Marxian point of view.

³⁶ Gregoras, *op. cit.*, I, 548; Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, III, 197.

³⁷ M. Manojlović, “Le peuple de Constantinople, de 400 à 800 après J.-C. Etude spéciale de ses forces armées, des éléments qui le composaient et de son rôle constitutionnel pendant cette période,” translated from the Croatian by Henri Grégoire, *Byzantion*, XI (Brussels, 1936), 617 ff. This work was originally published in *Nastavni Vjesnik*, XII (Zagreb, 1904), 1-91, but because of its language it was not available to most scholars.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 685.

the tumult that led to the overthrow of Michael, "was already beyond control and violently excited at the idea that it was going to seize the power from him who had usurped it."³⁹ Toward the end of the twelfth century the right of electing an emperor, hitherto exercised by the army or the senate, while the populace only acclaimed their choice, came to be looked upon as a right which, by custom, belonged to the people.⁴⁰ About the same time a new democratic tendency manifested itself. This was the calling of a kind of assembly composed of the senate, the clergy, and the commercial and industrial elements of the population. Thus in 1197 the emperor Alexius III called an assembly of the senate, the clergy, and the commercial and industrial elements of the population in order to consider a new imposition for the raising of funds to meet the demands of Henry VI whose grandiose plan of expansion included also the conquest of the Byzantine empire.⁴¹ Cantacuzenus called a similar assembly in 1347 in an attempt to ameliorate the financial conditions of the empire. In this assembly every element of the Byzantine society—merchants, soldiers, artisans, ecclesiastics, and many of the lower classes—participated.⁴²

It is in the light of this popular tradition that the uprisings of the populace in the fourteenth century must be interpreted. The usurpation of Cantacuzenus, whether justified or not, provoked a political crisis to which the populace, conscious of its constitutional rights as to the creation of an emperor, could not remain indifferent. The election of the emperor was one of the fundamental constitutional tenets of the empire down to the end, but the principle of heredity gained important ground and the nearest relative of the emperor, generally his eldest son, was looked upon as his legitimate successor.⁴³ In 1341 the legitimate successor to the throne was John V Palaeologus and it was for the protection of his rights that the populace everywhere took up arms against Cantacuzenus and his supporters. The

³⁹ Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, edited and translated into French by Emile Renaud (Paris, 1926), I, 102: Τὸ δ' ἀγοραῖον γένος καὶ ἄφρον ἤδη πὺν καὶ παρῆκεκλήντο ὡς ἀντιτυραννῆσον τῷ τυραννεύσαντι.

⁴⁰ Nicetas Choniates, *Historia* (Bonn, 1835), p. 600. See also Stein, "Untersuchungen zur spätbyzantinischen Verfassungs- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p. 7.

⁴¹ Nicetas Choniates, *op. cit.*, p. 631.

⁴² Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, III, 34.

⁴³ John B. Bury, *The Constitution of the Later Roman Empire*, in *Selected Essays*, ed. Harold Temperley (Cambridge, 1930), p. 106.

writers of the period, all of whom were hostile to the zealots, attributed the popular disturbance to the desire of the poor to pillage the property of the wealthy, but there is enough evidence, drawn from the same writers, to support the view that the populace moved primarily in order to uphold the dynastic rights of John V. The church was the bulwark of legitimacy and its bishops urged the populace everywhere to arise against the partisans of Cantacuzenus.⁴⁴ The uprisings in both Adrianople and Thessalonica did not break out until it became quite evident that the nobility were ready to turn the cities over to Cantacuzenus. The assassination of Michael Palaeologus, the leader of the zealots in Thessalonica by John Apocaucus and the nobles, left the populace unmoved⁴⁵ but the same populace rose up in revolt and massacred the nobles, including John Apocaucus, in cold blood when it was learned that they planned to surrender the city to Cantacuzenus. Likewise the overthrow of Andrew Palaeologus, the successor of Michael Palaeologus as leader of the zealots, did not arouse the populace, and his party, no longer able to appeal for the protection of John V, for the latter had made his peace with Cantacuzenus, solicited the aid of Stephen Dushan, a step which led to its final downfall.⁴⁶ It seems quite obvious, in view of the popular attachment to John V, that the dynastic issue contributed greatly to the uprising of the populace against Cantacuzenus and his partisans.⁴⁷

There is no doubt, however, that the deplorable economic condition of the population contributed to the strife and gave to it the aspect of a class struggle. In the history of Byzantium popular upheavals took the form of social struggle, especially when the empire was faced by some great crisis.⁴⁸ Cantacuzenus was extremely wealthy and his principal support came from the wealthy aristocracy which dominated and ruthlessly exploited the lower classes.⁴⁹ The forces of John V

⁴⁴ Gregoras, *op. cit.*, II, 614.

⁴⁵ Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, II, 570: δ, τε δῆμος οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πεσόντος ἡγανάκτησεν.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, III, 109. Οἱ Ζηλωταὶ δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸν δῆμον ἀγειν ἡδύναντο οὐκέτι, οὐδὲ διαρπάξαι τὰς οἰκίας τῶν ἐχόντων, τὴν προτέραν ἀποθέμενοι ὑπόκρισιν, ὥς ὑπὲρ βασιλέως ἀγωνίζονται τοῦ νέου, ἔπρασσον, ὅπως ἡ πόλις προδοθῇ Τριβαλοῖς.

⁴⁷ This view was also expressed by the Russian scholar P. Yakovenko in his review of Tafrali's book. Cited by A. A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire*, II (Madison, 1929), 397, n. 296.

⁴⁸ Manojlović, *op. cit.*, p. 705.

⁴⁹ According to Kydones some of the nobility were wealthy enough to maintain an entire army: *Monodia*, p. 645.

Palaeologus were directed by Alexius Apocaucus, a man of low origins, who relied upon the populace to break the political hold of the nobility.⁵⁰ The civil war brought ruin and destruction everywhere. The population, whose fields were devastated and their livestock destroyed, distressed by poverty and hopeless of the future, crowded the cities and turned malignant eyes upon the property of the rich.⁵¹ The misfortunes brought on by the war merely intensified, they did not create, the hatred of the populace against the rich. That hatred was already there and it was due to the insatiable desire of the aristocracy for gain at the expense of the poor.⁵² Usury was one of the great evils of the time. A group of the aristocracy had money-lending as their only vocation, and the rates which they charged were exorbitant, for their aim was to acquire the property of the debtor. The poor debtor was charged a higher interest than the rich and was at the mercy of the money lenders.⁵³ If his harvest was good they seized what was due to them without regard to his needs; if for some reason he failed to meet his obligations they invaded his home, seized him by the neck, subjected him and his wife to repeated blows and then dragged him before the judge, the latter, adds Kydones, might have rendered him justice, "but it is plain that the unfortunate had come before another thief."⁵⁴ In general, the money-lenders throttled the poor, threatened them with famine and deprived them of their goods. "Wailing and the gnashing of teeth," says Nicolas Cabasilas,

⁵⁰ Alexius Apocaucus had been brought up in poverty. He had begun his political career as an employee of the fisc and owed his political rise to John Cantacuzenus: Gregoras, *op. cit.*, II, 577; Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, I, 117; II, 89 f.

⁵¹ Gregoras, *op. cit.*, II, 673; Giuseppe Cammelli (ed.), *Demetrius Cydones: Correspondence* (Paris, 1930), p. 5; Pachymeres, *op. cit.*, II, 402; Palamas, *Homilia XIX*, MPG, CLI (Paris, 1867), 261.

⁵² Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, II, 177; *καὶ οἱ τε δῆμοι καὶ πρότερον πρὸς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἐκ τοῦ παρ' αὐτῶν ἀγεσθαι καὶ φέρεσθαι ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ τοῖς καιροῖς πολλὴν ἔχοντες ἀπέχθειαν*. The wealthy rendered the poor still poorer. Thomas Magister, *Oratio ad Niphonem Patriarcham*, MPG, CLXV (Paris, 1865), 393. *Καὶ τὰ μὲν σφέτερ' αὐτῶν (the rich) ἀτόποις ἐπαυξάντων προσθήκαις, ἐκείνους δὲ (the poor) κλάειν ἀναγκαζόντων καὶ καθιστάντων πενήτων πένητας*.

⁵³ Nicolas Cabasilas, *Oratio Contra feneratores*, MPG, CL (Paris, 1865), 745, 733, 741.

⁵⁴ D. Kydones, *Letters*, edited by Boissonade, *Anecdota Nova*, p. 258. That the courts were corrupt is attested by other writers. See for instances Chumnos, *Θεσσαλονικεῖς Συμβουλευτικὸς*, pp. 171, 174, 176.

who launched a vigorous attack against the usurers, "was the fruit of usury."⁵⁵

The poor were oppressed not only by the usurers. They were generally exploited by the rich and those in authority. The workers were deprived of their wages by their wealthy employers who promised them an ample compensation for their work but when the day of payment came beat them and drove them away empty handed.⁵⁶ They were cheated by the merchants who employed false weights and measures.⁵⁷ Their property, left unprotected, was plundered by the soldiers who were not contented with their pay. They were oppressed by the cruelty and inhumanity of the custom collectors and tax gatherers. "The poor," declared Palamas in one of his homilies, "not able to endure the cruelty and inhumanity of the tax-gatherers and the continual violence and injuries of the strong, clamor against those in authority and the army."⁵⁸

The oppressiveness of the tax collectors was one of the most serious grievances of the population.⁵⁹ Both the customs and tax collectors bought their charges and vied with each other in their efforts to bring more into the treasury.⁶⁰ But while for a consideration they were willing to reduce the taxes of those who were able to pay, they were most exacting against the poor.⁶¹ Behind the oppressiveness of the tax collectors lay the deplorable financial conditions of the empire. Toward the end of the thirteenth century the revenues of the state must have been considerably less than 1,000,000 *solidi*. At the best, says

⁵⁵ Cabasilas, *Oratorio contra feneratores*, p. 733: *νῦν δὲ ὁ κλαυθμὸς καὶ ὁ βρυγμὸς τῶν δδόντων ὁ τῶν τόκων ἐστὶ καρπὸς.*

⁵⁶ Thomas Magister, *Oratio de subditorum officiis*, p. 533 f.

⁵⁷ Palamas, *Homilia XXXIX*, *MPG*, CLI, 489 f.

⁵⁸ Palamas, *MS. gr. Paris, 1239*, fols. 284-284^v, cited by Tafrahi, *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle*, p. 109, n. 1.

⁵⁹ *Idem*; Patriarch George Cyprius, *Laudatio Andronici Palaeologi*, *MPG*, CXLII (Paris, 1865), 412.

⁶⁰ Gregoras, *op. cit.*, I, 317; II, 741. The last passage refers to a certain John Batatzes who became rich by virtue of his function as *ἀπογραφεύς*. The *ἀπογραφεύς* was a functionary who estimated the value of property and fixed the tax accordingly. Stein, "Späthbyzantinische Verfassungs- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte," p. 16.

⁶¹ Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, *La Pratica della Mercatura*, ed. Allan Evans, p. 42: "E Vuolsi avere a mente che chi fa onore a' commerciarli e dona loro alcuna cosa o danri, e a loro scrivani e turcimanni, ellino si passano molto cortesemente e sempre ragionano la mercatantia che tu metti meno ch'ella non vale."

an authority on the internal history of Byzantium, they could not have amounted to more than one-eighth of the revenues of the empire during the eighth century, although the empire at the beginning of the reign of Andronicus II was almost half as big as that ruled over by the Isaurians, while the semi-natural economy of the eighth century had given way to such a highly developed money-economy that the purchasing power of the *solidus* under the Palaeologi must have been considerably less.⁶² The shrinkage in the public revenues was in large part due to the commercial privileges accorded to foreign merchants, notably the Venetians and the Genoese, and to the tax exemptions granted to the ever increasing ecclesiastical properties. Indeed, the granting of commercial privileges to the Italian republics "became the gnawing worm of the Byzantine public economy."⁶³ While the custom revenues of Constantinople by the middle of the fourteenth century had shrunk to about 30,000 *solidi*, those of the Genoese colony of Galata went up to about 200,000 *solidi*.⁶⁴ The port of Galata was seething with activity. The "Frankish Christians who dwell in Galata," writes the Muhammedan traveler Ibn Battuta, "are all men of commerce and their harbor is one of the largest in the world; I saw there about a hundred galleys and other large ships, and the small ships were too many to be counted."⁶⁵

⁶² Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 10. There is no general agreement as to the amount of the Byzantine budget during the early periods of the empire. The Greek historian C. Paparregopoulos estimated it at 43,800,000 *solidi* annually. 'Ιστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους, ed. P. Karolidēs (Athens, 1925), IV, 36. This estimate was accepted by J. B. Bury, *History of the Eastern Roman Empire* (London, 1912), p. 219, but has been modified by A. Andreadēs who places it at no less than thirteen million, "Le montant du budget de l'Empire byzantin," *Revue des Etudes Grecques*, XXXIV (Paris, 1922). Charles Diehl has repeated the estimate of Paparregopoulos in his recent history of Byzantium. C. Diehl and G. Marçais, *Le monde oriental de 395 à 1081* (Paris, 1936), p. 502. Ernst Stein rejects the estimates of both Paparregopoulos and Andreadēs and fixes it in turn between seven and eight million: *Studien zur Geschichte des byzantinischen Reiches* (Stuttgart, 1919), p. 141, and again in his review of the article of Andreadēs in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XXIV (Leipzig, 1924), 377 ff. G. Ostrogorsky agrees with Stein: *Byzantion*, XIII (Brussels, 1938), 756. Stein's estimate is probably the more accurate, although Andreadēs has never accepted it: *Œuvres*, I (Athens, 1938), p. 565.

⁶³ Andreadēs, 'Ιστορία τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Δημοσίας Οἰκονομίας, I (Athens, 1918), 514.

⁶⁴ Gregoras, *op. cit.*, II, 842.

⁶⁵ Ibn Battuta, *Travels in Asia and Africa (1325-1354)*, tr. by H. A. R. Gibb (London, 1929), p. 160.

The tax obligations of the lower classes tended rather to increase than to diminish. There was a general increase in taxes in 1321 in order to buy off the Turks and prevent their further devastation of the country. But the only result of this policy was to increase their demands, without really stopping their incursions, and also the taxes. "Within a short time," writes the historian Gregoras, "although the territorial extent of the Roman empire had been reduced, the public revenue paid to the imperial treasury increased to 1,000,000 *solidi*."⁶⁶ The tribute paid to the Turks and to the other enemies was the heaviest financial burden of the empire and it was met principally by the small property owners and other members of the lower classes. "The entire public revenue," declares Demetrius Kydones in one of his letters, "would not suffice to pay them. It will be necessary to levy a tax in specie also on the very poor if we are to meet at least in part their insatiable demands."⁶⁷

The barbarian invasions and the civil wars, the venality of the rich and the oppressiveness of taxation brought poverty and misery to the inhabitants. The usurpation of Cantacuzenus plunged the country into another civil war and threatened, as it actually did, to further impoverish the population. Cantacuzenus was capable and had he become emperor, he might have been able to save the empire, but his attempt to seize the throne by force aroused the people to protect the rights of John V, the legitimate emperor, and his support by the aristocracy, which had exploited them for so long, further infuriated them and gave to the war the aspect of a social struggle. The "populace everywhere," writes Cantacuzenus himself, "considered their duty to remain loyal to the emperor Palaeologus," and they "were ready to revolt at the slightest pretext . . . for they hated the rich for their bad treatment of them during peace time and now hoped, above all, to seize their property."⁶⁸

Of the various popular outbreaks the revolution of the zealots in Thessalonica had definite social aims. Indeed it was charged by the opponents of the zealots that they were moved entirely by selfish motives, that they confiscated the property of the rich and the monasteries in order to enrich themselves and their friends,⁶⁹ but this is not

⁶⁶ Gregoras, *op. cit.*, I, 317.

⁶⁷ Cammeli, *Demetrius Kydones: Correspondence*, p. 11.

⁶⁸ Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, II, 177.

⁶⁹ See note 20.

borne out by what is known of their social objectives. They themselves have left us no record of these objectives, but they have been defined by Nicolas Cabasilas, one of their enemies who barely escaped with his life at the time of the revolt, who recorded them in order that he might refute them.⁷⁰

The zealots confiscated, at least in part, according to Nicolas Cabasilas, the property of the wealthy aristocracy and that of the monasteries, but they insisted that these confiscations had no other end in view than that of the public good. The property seized was used to feed and house the poor, to provide for the priests, to adorn the churches, to arm the soldiers, and to repair the walls of the city. "Is it terrible," they asked, "if, by taking a part of the goods dedicated to the monasteries, goods which are so plentiful, we feed some poor, provide for the priests and adorn the churches. That will cause them no harm, for that which remains suffices for their wants, and is not in contradiction with the thoughts of the original donors. They had no other aim than to serve God and to nourish the poor."⁷¹ They urged that the protection of the walls and the laws of the city was the most urgent of all things and asked further, "How is it not better if with this money we arm soldiers who will die for these churches, for these laws, for these walls, than if these same sums were spent in vain by monks and priests whose table and other needs are slight, for they stay at home, live in shelter and expose themselves to no danger? What injustices, do we commit if we seek to rebuild ruined houses, care for fields and villages, and nourish those who are fighting for the freedom of these?"⁷²

It is quite obvious, therefore, that the zealots had a definite social program. Their aim was twofold: to check the devastations of the

⁷⁰ This pamphlet of Cabasilas is entitled, *Λόγος περὶ τῶν παρανόμων τοῖς ἀρχουσι ἐπὶ τοῖς λεποῖς τολμωμένων*, and forms a part of *MS. gr. Paris, B. N., 1213*. It has not yet been published, but lengthy passages from it have been cited by Sathas (*Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au moyen âge*, vol. IV, p. XXVI, note 1.) and by Tafrali (*Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle*, pp. 261 ff.) and it is to these works that I refer. Not only this pamphlet, but the entire manuscript, for it contains other works of Cabasilas and some of Demetrius Kydones, should be published, and I hope to edit it as soon as the international situation permits. See further R. Guiland, 'La correspondance inédite de Nicolas Cabasilas,' *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XXX (Leipzig, 1930), 96-102.

⁷¹ *MS. gr. Paris, 1213*, fol. 246v, cited by Sathas.

⁷² *Idem.*

marauding foreign armies by building a good army; and to revitalize the life of their community by ameliorating the conditions of the poor and the downtrodden. These objectives, however, could not be accomplished without money and the zealots turned to the only source available—the property of the nobles and the monasteries. They seized these properties in violation of the laws and for that reason they were compared by their opponents to ordinary robbers. In their defense they appealed to the exigencies of the public good. “It is permitted,” they said, “to those who are in charge of public affairs to do anything when they have in view only what is useful to all.”⁷³ They felt that their conscience was clear, for they acted not for themselves but for the community as a whole. “How is it just,” they asked, “to be accused, when we act thus toward all and put nothing aside for our own use, when we neither augment our fortunes nor adorn our houses, but seek always in our expenditures to do what is useful for the governed?”⁷⁴

The zealots were thus motivated by the highest intentions.⁷⁵ They were, indeed, not free from abuses and even criminal acts, but these were incidental and not unusual in the disturbed conditions of the fourteenth century both in eastern and western Europe. What is distinctive of them is that they seem to have seen clearly that only a radical social and economic reorganization of their society could restore to it its former vigor and prosperity. The reorganization which they conceived involved the reduction of the properties of the rich nobles and monasteries for the benefit of the masses and the community as a whole. But they were in the minority and their cause became identified, in the eyes of the people, with the dynastic rights of John V Palaeologus, and when the latter made peace with his antagonist they lost the support of the populace and fell from power.

The war between Cantacuzenus and John V Palaeologus ended in February, 1347, shortly after the former entered Constantinople, when a treaty was concluded with Anne of Savoy, the empress-regent, whereby Cantacuzenus was recognized as co-emperor, but the rights of John V Palaeologus were safeguarded. One of the first measures adopted by Cantacuzenus was the restoration of all landed property confiscated during the war. And while the movable property was not returned

⁷³ *Ibid.*, fol. 246, cited by Tafrali, *op. cit.*, p. 265, n. 3.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 246v, cited by Tafrali, p. 268, n. 1.

⁷⁵ See further, *ibid.*, fol. 253, cited by Sathas.

to the original owners, they were compensated in some other way, though it is not stated of what this compensation consisted. No further steps for the solution of the social problem were taken.⁷⁶

The civil wars had left the empire in a ruinous state. The treasury was empty and the taxes were not collected. The cities had been reduced to extreme poverty either because of the internal conflict or the barbarian incursions. Cantacuzenus made an attempt to revive the financial and economic life of the empire for upon that revival depended the restoration of the power of the empire, but he was not successful. His subjects refused his appeal for voluntary contributions to the treasury,⁷⁷ while his measures to revive the commercial prosperity of Constantinople and the naval power of the empire were defeated by the Genoese of Galata.⁷⁸ Then the civil war broke out again between the two emperors; the Ottoman Turks occupied Gallipoli shortly after (1354) and Cantacuzenus, despite the fact that he had reached another agreement with his antagonist, John V Palaeologus, gave up the throne to embrace the monastic life. Up to 1354 there was some hope that the empire might still be saved; that hope was completely destroyed by the events of that year. Civil wars among the members of the family of the Palaeologi and continuous loss of prestige and territory characterized the remaining history of the empire until finally the capture of Constantinople in 1453 closed its last chapter.

Yet it had been hoped that the establishment of the despotat of Morea would enable the Greeks to eliminate the remaining Latin states in Greece and then, pushing northward, to check the Serbian power and reestablish the supremacy of Byzantium in the Balkan peninsula. "For if with the aid of God," writes Cantacuzenus, "we manage to win over the Latins of the Peloponnesus, the Catalans who inhabit Attica and Boeotia will be obliged, willy nilly, to yield to us. When this is accomplished the Roman state will extend without interruption, as before, from the Peloponnesus to Byzantium, and we can see that it will not be difficult to punish the Serbs and the other neighboring barbarians for the injuries which they are inflicting against us for such a long time."⁷⁹ The realization of this hope was made impossible not only by the civil wars in Byzantium, but also by the jealousies,

⁷⁶ Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, III, 11.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, III, 33 ff.

⁷⁸ On the Galata war see Charanis, "An Important Short Chronicle of the Fourteenth Century," p. 346.

⁷⁹ Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, II, 80.

intestine strife, and bitter opposition of the propertied nobility of the Peloponnesus against the central authority. They revolted against the despot Manuel because he had imposed a new tax for the construction of a fleet to check the Turkish pirates who had reduced the Peloponnesus into a desert;⁸⁰ they fought bitterly against Theodore I;⁸¹ and resisted stubbornly, although without success, the efforts of the emperor Manuel to fortify the isthmus of Corinth against the Turks.⁸² The despots Manuel and Theodore I revitalized somewhat the economic life of the country by settling Albanian peasants on the land, but they were hampered in every way by the ceaseless opposition of the nobility.⁸³ This nobility, according to a contemporary inscription, "breathed jealousy, deceit, strife and murder."⁸⁴ They fought the central government because they feared that its strengthening would curtail their lawlessness and impose on them new financial obligations.

Thus the strife between the nobility on the one hand and the central government supported by the lower classes on the other continued throughout the fourteenth century. Nor was it ended with the conquest of the Byzantine territories by the Ottoman Turks. It smoldered underneath and then broke out again in all its violence with the first political crisis of the Ottoman state. For social discontent was at the bottom of the civil wars among the sons of Bayazid following his defeat at Ankara in 1402. This was especially true of the struggle between Musa and Mehmed in which the lower classes, both Moslems and Christians, supported Musa. Indeed, Cheikh Bedreddin, the highest religious dignitary of Musa's army, was the leader of a vast social and religious movement, preaching a kind of communism in which he sought to unite Moslems and Christians.⁸⁵ The attempt was being

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, III, 85 ff.

⁸¹ Gabriel Millet, "Inscriptions byzantines de Mistra," *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*, XXIII (Paris, 1899), 152. Cf. D. A. Zakythinos, *Le despotat grec de Morée* (Paris, 1932), p. 127.

⁸² Mazaris, *Νεκρικὸς Διάλογος* edited by J. Fr. Boissonade, *Anecdota Graeca*, III (Paris, 1831), 178 ff.; D. Chrysoloras, *Σύγκρισις παλαιῶν ἀρχόντων*, edited by S. Lampros, *Παλαιολόγεια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*, III (Athens, 1926), p. 243; L. Chalcocondylas, *Historiarium libri decem* (Bonn, 1843), p. 184.

⁸³ Zakythinos, *op. cit.*, pp. 101 ff., 131 f.

⁸⁴ Millet, *op. cit.*, p. 152; *μεστοὶ φθόνου ψεύδους ἔριδος καὶ φόβου . . . ἢ θανατώσαι καὶ ἀδεδεσπότης μένειν*. Mazaris uses almost the same terms in denouncing the nobility of Morea: *op. cit.*, p. 178. See further Manuel, *Ἐπιτάφιος*, edited by S. Lampros, *Παλαιολόγεια καὶ Πελοποννησιακά*, III, 67.

⁸⁵ P. Wittek, "De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople," *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, année 1938 (Paris, 1938), p. 30.

made to eliminate the differences of the two religions. Already under Bayazid, a Moslem preacher of Brusa had dared to declare from the pulpit that Christ was not a lesser prophet than Mohammed,⁸⁶ and the gospel of "Barnabas," that curious mixture of Mohammedan and Christian teachings, which was written about this time,⁸⁷ may have been a product of this movement.

Musa was defeated by Mehmed in 1413, but his followers continued the struggle.⁸⁸ Cheikh Bedreddin himself was exiled by Mehmed to Nicaea, but he succeeded in escaping and passed over to Wallachia from where he sought to arouse the populace. His emissaries in the meantime were working hard both in the Balkan peninsula and in western Asia Minor, where one of them, Burgluzen Mustapham, made a communistic appeal to the populace, Moslem as well as Christian, in which he urged them to eliminate private property, and sought to reconcile their religious differences by pointing out that they worshipped the same God. He thus won a considerable following especially among the peasants of Aydin, six thousand of whom took the field, and before they were defeated they destroyed two regular armies which had been sent against them. They were finally crushed by a special force sent from Thrace under the command of the Great Vizier himself.⁸⁹ The movement led by Bedreddin finally collapsed. He himself was turned over to the Sultan and was executed in Serres.

Civil and social strife was doubtless one of the principal factors in the disintegration of the Greek empire. The empire had lost its great ideals, while its vast administrative machinery had broken down. Its people, with few exceptions, sought to promote their own narrow interest, whether they belonged to the masses, to the aristocracy, or to the imperial family itself. Under these circumstances effective resistance to the ever increasing danger from without was impossible. The only outcome was disintegration and then complete obliteration. The same fate might have overtaken the young Ottoman state if the movement headed by Bedreddin had been allowed to spread and undermine the ideals of the state.⁹⁰

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁸⁷ Lonsdale and Laura Ragg, *The Gospel of Barnabas* (Oxford, 1907), p. xlii.

⁸⁸ J. Leunclavius, *Historiae Musulmanae* (Frankfort, 1591), pp. 464-667.

⁸⁹ Ducas, *Historia Byzantina* (Bonn, 1834), pp. 111-115.

⁹⁰ Concerning the basic principles on which the Ottoman state was built see P. Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938).



PEETERS

THE STRIFE AMONG THE PALAEOLOGI AND THE OTTOMAN TURKS, 1370-1402

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Source: *Byzantion*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1942-1943), pp. 286-314

Published by: Peeters Publishers

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44168559>

Accessed: 20-05-2019 00:20 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Peeters Publishers is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Byzantion*

THE STRIFE AMONG THE PALAEOLOGI AND THE OTTOMAN TURKS, 1370-1402

By PETER CHARANIS

The most important development in the history of the Balkan peninsula in the second half of the fourteenth century was the rise of the Ottoman Turks to a position of world significance. In their rise to power, the Turks owed much to their vigor, to the statesmanship, energy, and genius of their leaders, but they owed as much, if not more, to the demoralization of the peoples of the Balkan peninsula. The civil strife among the Greeks, which they exploited with wonderful skill, proved to them particularly advantageous. It is well known how the wars between John Cantacuzenus and John V Palaeologus enabled them to establish themselves in Europe. And the strife among the Palaeologi during the second half of the fourteenth century was not a minor factor in the expansion of the Turks, but here considerable confusion still reigns. However, new information recently made available makes now possible the removal of some of this confusion.¹

The rivalry between John V Palaeologus and John Cantacuzenus ended in December, 1354, when the latter definitely renounced the throne. Four years later Matthew Cantacuzenus too abandoned the imperial title and swore allegiance to John V. John V was now sole emperor, but if his personal position had improved, that of the empire had worsened.² For the Ottoman Turks, who had taken Gallipoli in 1354, had, by 1364, deprived the empire of virtually all Thrace, including Adrianople and Dedymotichon. Moreover, it had become evident that their advance could not be checked without outside help and it was in

¹ Giuseppe Cammelli (ed.), *Demetrius Cydones: Correspondance* (Paris, 1930); S. Lampros and C. I. Amantos, *Βραχέα Χρονικά* in *Ἀκαδημία Ἀθηνῶν. Μνημεῖα τῆς ἑλληνικῆς Ἱστορίας, Τόμος Α'* (Athens, 1932-33).

² There is no special monograph on John V and the reason is not far to seek. During the early years of his reign he was overshadowed by his powerful rival, John Cantacuzenus, while the later years of his career were dominated by his brilliant son, Manuel, and for the period in between there is hardly any information. For a bibliography of the period of the Palaeologi see my article, P. Charanis, "Internal strife in Byzantium during the fourteenth century," *Byzantion*, XV (Boston, 1940-41), 208, n. 1.

order to get this help that John V visited Rome, where he became converted to Catholicism in 1369, after he had failed in his negotiations with the Serbs to whom he had sent the patriarch Callistus at the head of an embassy in 1364, and with the king of Hungary whom he had visited himself in 1366. It was while John V sojourned in Rome and northern Italy trying to find allies for the empire that the first of a series of quarrels broke out between himself and his eldest son, Andronicus, who had been left in charge of the government in Constantinople. These quarrels were skillfully exploited by the Ottoman Turks to weaken the empire beyond the hope of recovery.

The first conspiracy of Andronicus against his father is shrouded in obscurity. It is mentioned by no contemporary source; and of the later Greek historians only Phrantzes and Chalcocondyles make reference to it.³ According to the account of Phrantzes, Andronicus, who had been left in charge of the government in Constantinople and fervently desired to continue in charge, ignored the pleas of his father, sojourning in Venice, to send him money with which to pay his creditors and to meet the expenses of the voyage home. However, Manuel, the younger son of the emperor, raised the money and went to the assistance of his father in Venice. Chalcocondyles differs from this account only in one respect. He adds that John V was retained by his creditors and was not permitted to leave Venice until he paid his debts. Modern historians, beginning with Gibbon, have repeated this account as the most striking illustration of the abject conditions into which the emperor of the once powerful Byzantine empire had fallen.⁴ Recently, however, a distinguished Polish scholar studied the problem in detail in his brilliant book dealing with the voyage of John V to Rome and came to the conclusion that the statements of Phrantzes and Chalcocondyles are not true.⁵ He makes the following arguments: (1) that Phrantzes and Chalcocondyles are rarely accurate when dealing with the events of the fourteenth century; (2) that, according to the Venetian sources, John V, far

³ Phrantzes, *Chronicon* (Bonn, 1838), 52 f.; L. Chalcocondyles, *Historiarum Libri decem* (Bonn, 1843), 50 f. Darkó's edition of Chalcocondyles and that of Phrantzes by Papadopoulos were not available to me.

⁴ Edward Gibbon, *The history of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, edited by J. B. Bury (London, 1900), VII, 90.

⁵ O. Halecki, *Un empereur de Byzance à Rome* (Warsaw, 1930), p. 334 ff.

from being humiliated, was received by the Venetians with all due honor and that, when he was about to leave Venice, he was given an outright gift of 4000 ducats and provisions for the trip home; and (3) that Andronicus was actually in Italy with his father and not in Constantinople as Phrantzes and Chalcocondyles assert, and as proof of this he offers the treaty concluded between John V and Venice in Rome in 1370, where an Andronicus Palaeologus is mentioned as one of the witnesses.

Now to examine these arguments. It should be conceded at once that Phrantzes and Chalcocondyles are often inaccurate and confused when dealing with the events of the fourteenth century, but it must be also pointed out that their inaccuracies are chiefly in matters of chronology. While they confuse events of different dates they seldom mention anything that did not actually take place, and unless it can be shown by reference to contemporary and trustworthy sources that they are inaccurate, their testimony cannot be rejected. In this case two such sources are offered: (1) the chronicle of the Venetian John Caroldo, written really toward the end of the fifteenth century, but worthy of serious consideration, for it is based on official documents from the archives of Venice;⁶ and (2) the treaty between John V and Venice concluded in 1370.⁷

According to the account of Caroldo, the Venetians received John with courtesy and all honors due to his rank. John informed the authorities that he had important matters to discuss with them and a deputation was designated to confer with him. What John wanted to discuss with them were matters of a financial nature. He had previously borrowed from the Venetians and as security for this loan he had deposited some of the imperial jewels. He now proposed to cede the island of Tenedos to the Venetians if, in turn, they would release the imperial jewels, furnish him with six transports, and, in addition, give him 25,000 ducats, a small portion of which was to be paid in advance in order that he might meet his daily expenses. The Venetians accepted these terms and advanced him 4000 ducats in anticipation of the cession of Tene-

⁶ Caroldo's chronicle is still in manuscript form, but the important passage relating to John's stay in Venice has been reproduced by Halecki who is the first scholar to make use of it. *Ibid.*, p. 385.

⁷ *Diplomaticum Veneto-Levanticum*, ed. G. M. Thomas (Venice, 1899), no. 89.

dos. John now asked for another loan of 30,000 ducats and offered as security other imperial jewels. Finally, when he was about to depart, the Venetians gave him outright the 4000 ducats, which they had advanced to him as partial payment for Tenedos, and considerable provisions for his journey back home. They also gave 300 ducats to Manuel.

What this document proves is precisely the opposite of what it is intended to prove, for the striking thing about it is not that the Venetians advanced or gave outright 4000 ducats to the emperor, but the extreme misery in which the emperor found himself in Venice, misery which is attested also by a letter of Cydones, cited by F. Dölger in his support of the account of the Greek historians.⁸ John was so badly in need of money that he was willing to part with Tenedos in order that, among other things, he might be advanced a few ducats with which to pay his daily expenses. It is indeed difficult to understand the logic of an argument that seeks to show the inaccuracy of one document by citing another that says exactly the same thing, for Caroldo confirms a part while denying nothing of what the Greek historians say. If he does not speak of John's correspondence with Andronicus and the latter's refusal to send him money, that was because he probably knew nothing about it, for he drew his information from official Venetian documents which necessarily dealt only with the negotiations between the emperor and Venice. These negotiations were long and tedious — John stayed ten months in Venice — and there is no reason why John could not have written to Andronicus for money pending the conclusion of his agreement with the Venetians. It would have been unusual indeed if he had not done so.

Then there is Manuel. Admittedly Manuel made the trip to Venice, braving "the violence of the waves and the sea in the winter," as his father puts it, in order to come to him in Venice and help him with his affairs. It is hardly probable that Manuel made the special trip to Venice to help only in his father's negotiations with the Venetians. There must have been a more pressing reason and what else could this reason be than his father's financial embarrassment? Manuel went to Venice in order to bring

⁸ F. Dölger, "Johannes VII, Kaiser der Rhomäer, 1390-1408," *Byz. Zeitschr.*, XXXI (Leipzig, 1931), 22, note 2.

money to his father and once there he doubtless helped him also in his negotiations with the Venetians. But neither the sum brought to him by Manuel nor that of the 4000 ducats advanced by the Venetians was sufficient to enable John to meet his expenses in Venice. This is shown by the fact that when he departed from Venice he left Manuel behind to serve as voucher for the many expenses of his trip, increased, as he says himself, by the meanness of the merchants.⁹

Two of the contentions of the Greek historians, John's want of money and Manuel's voyage to Venice, are confirmed by Caroldo, not to mention the other documents to which reference has been made. Objections may be still raised to the statement of Chalcocondyles that the creditors of John V actually prevented him from sailing from Venice. In denying the truth of this statement, it is contended that Caroldo and other Italian chroniclers not only fail to mention this, but assert on the contrary that John was received by the Venetians with courtesy and all honors due to his rank. But there is nothing either in Caroldo or in Chalcocondyles that makes their statements mutually exclusive. That the Venetians received John with the honors that his rank required can hardly be doubted, for it would have been a flagrant violation of international practice if they had failed to do so, but that afterwards they insisted upon his settling his obligations before they could make him any further financial advances is also possible. The statement of Chalcocondyles is really not hard to understand. Since John was not able to leave Venice on his own resources, any difficulty that he may have had with his Venetian creditors could be interpreted in Constantinople to mean that he had to stay in Venice until he settled his differences with his creditors.

There now remains to examine the objection to the assertion of the Greek historians that Andronicus had remained in Constantinople and refused to send to his father the financial help which he asked.

The treaty of 1370 between John V and Venice, where an An-

⁹ K. E. Zachariae von Lingenthal, "Prooemien zu Chrysobullen von Demetrius Cydones," *Sitzungsberichte der Koeniglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* (Berlin, 1888), 1420; ἐγγυητὴν δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐν μακρῷ χρόνῳ δαπάνης ἐσόμενον, ἣν ἡμῖν ᾗξησεν ἡ τῶν ἐμπόρων μικρολογία. Von Lingenthal (*ibid.*, p. 1415) interprets this as confirming the statements of the Greek historians. Halecki (*op. cit.*, 336) considers this passage "l'origine de toute la légende."

Andronicus Palaeologus is mentioned as one of the witnesses, is offered as proof that there is no truth in this assertion. Obviously if this personage is the son of the emperor, then Andronicus accompanied his father in Italy and there can be no truth in the statement that he stayed in Constantinople and later disobeyed his father. But this Andronicus was not the son of John V, as Dölger has pointed out,¹⁰ for in the treaty he is described as an uncle, *avunculus*, of the emperor. Moreover, of the four witnesses to the treaty only Andronicus is referred to without a title, and yet the son of the emperor had already been invested with the imperial title. That the son of an emperor, himself already emperor, would be relegated to the third position among the witnesses to an official treaty, called a simple relative, and given no official title is extremely improbable.¹¹ Therefore, the treaty of 1370 offers no evidence justifying the rejection of the testimony of the Greek historians according to which Andronicus remained in Constantinople while John V sojourned in Italy. Nor is there any evidence at all disproving their contention that he conspired against his father.

In addition to the testimony of Phrantzes and Chalcocondyles, there is now a short chronicle which suggests that all was not well in Constantinople while John V was in Italy.¹² According to this chronicle John V, upon his return from Italy, caused the arrest of several high personages, namely Glabas, John Asan, Manuel Bryene, Zamplaco, and Agalo. Within a year and a half Andronicus himself was a fugitive before his father, but this was for another reason. It is not stated that there was any relation between the arrest of these high personages and the disobedience of Andronicus, but it is not improbable that they had aided and abetted Andronicus in his defiance of his father. Zamplaco had been an important partisan of Cantacuzenus,¹³ and John Asan had once urged Matthew Cantacuzenus to proclaim himself emperor against the wishes of his father.¹⁴ Nor is it impossible that the Church had a hand in the disobedience of Andronicus. In his

¹⁰ Dölger, *op. cit.*, p. 22, note 2.

¹¹ P. Charanis, "An important short chronicle of the fourteenth century," *Byzantion*, XIII (Brussels, 1938), p. 353, note 1.

¹² Lampros-Amantos, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

¹³ John Cantacuzenus, *Historiae* (Bonn, 1818-32), III, 74, 237.

¹⁴ Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia* (Bonn, 1829-30), 797, 798 f.

reply to his father Andronicus claimed that he was not permitted by the Church to use its treasures and there exists a synodical act, dated c. 1370, prohibiting the alienation of Church property.¹⁵ The Church had no particular enthusiasm for the activities of John V in Italy for it opposed the rapprochement with Rome.

In the meantime, while John V was sojourning in Italy and Andronicus was defying his authority, the Ottoman Turks took another important step in the conquest of the Balkan peninsula. For on September 26, 1371, they inflicted a terrible defeat on the Serbian army under the command of Ugleša and their victory opened the way for the conquest of Macedonia. Scholars have been puzzled why the Greeks, who a few years before had actively sought the help of the Serbs against the Ottomans, had now failed to cooperate with them in this important battle.¹⁶ It has even been asserted that the Greeks, under the leadership of Manuel, actually helped the Ottomans by ceding to them Gallipoli,¹⁷ but this assertion has no foundation as it will be shown below. It is not easy to determine the reason why the Greeks failed to cooperate with the Serbians, but it is not improbable that their failure is related to the internal situation in Constantinople. John V had not returned from Italy yet, while it is quite possible that Andronicus and his faction befriended Murad as one of the means of maintaining themselves in power. In his later revolts against his father Andronicus always relied upon Turkish help. And this may be one of the reasons why John V, upon his return from Italy on October 28, 1371,¹⁸ hastened to come to an agreement with Murad. Despite his conversion to Catholicism, John must have realized that no immediate help could be expected from the west, while the Turks, by their decisive victory over Ugleša, had grown stronger than ever and might endanger his own throne by throwing their

¹⁵ Fr. Miklosich and J. Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca*, I (Vienna, 1859), 513. The possible relation between Andronicus' refusal to send money to his father on the ground that he was not permitted to use the treasures of the Church and this act was noted by Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 1415. But one cannot insist upon this relationship, for the act really bears no date. I have followed von Lingenthal in dating it ca. 1370.

¹⁶ See for instance H. A. Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman empire* (Oxford, 1916), 123. Gibbons' chronology here is wrong.

¹⁷ Halecki, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

¹⁸ Lampros-Amantos, *op. cit.*, p. 81. See also P. Charanis, "An important short chronicle of the fourteenth century," p. 340.

support to his ambitious and disobedient son. The agreement between John V and Murad was reached probably sometime in 1372, for by the spring of 1373 Byzantine troops were fighting with the army of Murad in conformity with the provisions of the agreement.¹⁹

In 1373 Andronicus tried again to seize the throne. According to the traditional view the second revolt of Andronicus was prompted by his fervent desire to overthrow his father because, as punishment for his first conspiracy, he had discarded him from the throne in favor of his younger son Manuel whose loyalty and service he had publicly acknowledged in a chrysobull. All the responsibility, therefore, for the political crisis that this change in the order of succession provoked lay originally with Andronicus. A more recent opinion,²⁰ based on the belief that Andronicus did not conspire against his father in 1370, puts the responsibility on John V who, it is urged, provoked the crisis because of his personal attachment to Manuel. What really happened confirms neither the one nor the other view. It is not known what measures John V took against his disobedient son upon his return from Italy, but it seems improbable that he contemplated an immediate change in the order of succession. This is shown to some extent by the fact that one of his immediate acts upon his arrival to Constantinople was to confirm Manuel as despot of Thessalonica.²¹ Moreover, it seems probable, according to Phrantzes and Chalcocondyles, that once again John V entrusted the government of Constantinople in the hands of Andronicus while he accompanied Murad in an expedition in Asia Minor.²² What really determined John to discard Andronicus from the succession to the throne was the latter's revolt. Andronicus began his open defiance of his father on May 6, 1373²³ and it was not until he was forced to surrender that Manuel was definitely designated the successor of

¹⁹ Phrantzes, *op. cit.*, p. 49 f.; Chalcocondyles, *op. cit.*, p. 40 f. The date results from the fact that it was during this expedition that the revolt of Andronicus and Saudchi took place.

²⁰ Halecki, *op. cit.*, p. 302 ff.

²¹ Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, pp. 1409-1422.

²² Phrantzes, *op. cit.*, p. 50; Chalcocondyles, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

²³ Lampros-Amantos, *op. cit.*, p. 81; R. Loenertz, "La première insurrection d'Andronic IV Paléologue (1373)," *Echos d'Orient*, XXXVIII (Bucharest, 1939), 340.

John V, for Manuel was crowned emperor on September 25, 1373.²⁴

The revolt of Andronicus is associated with that of Saudchi Čelebi, Murad's eldest son, against his own father. The sources that mention this affair, none of which is really contemporary with it, are confusing. According to Ducas²⁵ the two princes, both young and ambitious, agreed to cooperate and overthrow their fathers, seize the power themselves, and then conclude an alliance with each other. But Murad discovered the plot before it could be executed, seized and blinded his son and then demanded that the same punishment be inflicted on Andronicus. Mignanelli of Sienna agrees substantially with this account, but Phrantzes and Chalcocondyles give another version.²⁶ They state that the two princes were left by their fathers in charge of the government, Saudchi in the European possessions of the sultan, Andronicus in Constantinople; that Murad, accompanied by John V, undertook an expedition in Asia Minor against certain rebellious vassals; that the two princes found this the opportune moment to revolt against their fathers; and that Murad crushed the revolt ruthlessly, put his son to death and demanded that Andronicus be blinded. The Turkish historians place the rebellion of Saudchi in Asia Minor and make no mention of Andronicus.²⁷ To these accounts there must now be added that of a short chronicle, included in the Lampros-Amantos collection,²⁸ according to which Andronicus fled from Constantinople, a fugitive before his own father, and joined Saudchi, himself also a fugitive before his own father already for over ten months. Angered by this action of Andronicus, John V aided Murad to transport his forces from Asia Minor to Europe and then helped him to crush the revolt. Among these various accounts that of Phrantzes, Chalcocondyles, and the short chronicle agree on a number of things: (1) that during the revolt Murad and his army were in Asia Minor; (2) that Saudchi was in Thrace where the revolt took place; and (3) that during this time Andronicus was in Constantinople from where doubtless he co-

²⁴ Lampros-Amantos, *op. cit.*, p. 81; Charanis, "An important short chronicle of the fourteenth century," p. 340.

²⁵ Ducas, *Historia Byzantina* (Bonn, 1834), p. 43 ff.

²⁶ Loenertz, *op. cit.*, p. 337; Phrantzes, *op. cit.*, p. 49 ff.; Chalcocondyles, *op. cit.*, p. 40 ff.

²⁷ Loenertz, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

²⁸ Lampros-Amantos, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

operated with Saudchi. What the short chronicle includes which is not found in either Phrantzes and Chalcocondyles, that Andronicus fled from Constantinople and actively joined Saudchi ten months after the latter began his revolt, means simply that instead of submitting to his father after the latter's return from Asia Minor he chose to continue the struggle by actively joining Saudchi. It seems to the writer that the account to follow as most plausible is that of Phrantzes and Chalcocondyles, supplemented by the short chronicle of the Lampros-Amantos collection.²⁹

Murad ruthlessly crushed the revolt and cruelly put to death Saudchi and his companions. Andronicus who had surrendered in the meantime was put in prison by his father, together with his wife and his infant son John, known in Byzantine history as John VII. Murad insisted, however, that he should be blinded and John V gave his consent, although not very willingly, but the operation was not completely successful so that Andronicus retained, at least partially, his eyesight. The same treatment and with the same results was given to his infant son, who according to Ducas was scarcely yet able to talk. Moreover, John V now decided to discard Andronicus from the succession to the throne and on September 25, 1373 he crowned Manuel, who now became his colleague and designated successor.

His failure in the revolt of 1373 and his consequent punishment did not end the ambitions of Andronicus. Partially blinded and in prison he still looked for an opportunity to challenge the power of his father. His opportunity came in 1376. In that year John V ceded to the Venetians the island of Tenedos. Tenedos dominates the Dardanelles and the Genoese, whose commercial interests in the Black Sea would be endangered by the Venetian occupation,

²⁹ R. Loenertz has tried (*op. cit.*, p. 340 ff.) to discredit the Greek historian. His principal argument is based on grounds of topography. He thinks that the Turkish historians who place the struggle in Asia Minor are the more accurate and explains that Phrantzes and Chalcocondyles must have confused the Thracian towns of Didymotichon and Pikridion, where, according to them the struggle took place, with Demetoka and Peges (Spigas) respectively, both of which are located in Phrygia. But the topographical data of the Greek historians are confirmed by the short chronicle of the Lampros-Amantos collection. It is extremely improbable that three persons, or at least two, if it is assumed that Phrantzes and Chalcocondyles used the same source, which is not certain, would make the same mistake. And Hammer, who generally follows the Turkish authorities, has in this case preferred the version of the Greek historians. J. de Hammer, *Histoire de l'empire Ottoman* (Greek Version) (Athens, 1870), I, 366.

were determined to prevent this island from falling into the hands of their commercial rivals.³⁰ Since John V was favorably inclined toward the Venetians and could not be expected to reverse his policy to their advantage their first move was to bring about his overthrow. Accordingly they helped Andronicus to escape from prison, treated his eyes for the improvement of his sight and agreed to help him regain the throne if in return he would cede to them the island of Tenedos. But the success of this attempt depended also upon the attitude of Murad and to gain his help Andronicus made important concessions. He promised him his sister in marriage, an annual tribute, and the surrender of Gallipoli. With the support of such allies, the success of Andronicus was assured. He entered Constantinople on August 12, 1376, seized his father and his two brothers, Manuel and Theodore, and shut them in the tower of Anemas, where he himself had been kept a few years before. He also imprisoned a number of Venetian merchants and seized their property.³¹ Eleven days later he signed an act ceding Tenedos to the Genoese³² and early in the next year he surrendered Gallipoli to the Turks.

Gallipoli had been captured by the Turks in 1354, but it had been restored to the Byzantines in 1367 by Amadeo of Savoy who had recovered it from the Turks in the course of his crusade of the previous year. This was a serious blow to the Turks, for with both Constantinople and Gallipoli in the hands of the Greeks it was difficult for them to move their forces from Asia to Europe or vice versa. Quite naturally they were anxious to recover their loss. It has been asserted that just before the battle of Maritza in 1371 they sought and obtained from John V the cession of this important fortress. It has been urged further that the faction in Constantinople favoring the surrender of Gallipoli was headed by the emperor's son, Manuel, while those in the opposition were led by Demetrius Cydones.³³ The facts of the matter are quite different.

³⁰ Cydones, *Correspondance*, edition Cammelli, p. 59: τοῖς δὲ Γενουβίοις οὐκ ἀνεκτόν, τὴν Τένεδον τῶν ἀντιτέχων ἐχόντων, αὐτοὺς ἡσυχάζειν· οἶονται γὰρ οὕτως τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῶν ποντικῶν κερδῶν ἐλαθῆσθαι, ὃ χεῖρον αὐτοῖς τοῦ καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἐκπεσεῖν βιασθέντας.

³¹ There is ample source material concerning this revolt of Andronicus. See Charanis, "An important chronicle of the fourteenth century," p. 353, n. 3, where the principal authorities are listed.

³² W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant* (Leipzig, 1936), I, 519.

³³ Halecki, *op. cit.*, p. 243 ff.

Gallipoli was not surrendered to the Turks in 1371; Manuel was not in Constantinople to urge its surrender; nor had John V yet returned from Italy.³⁴ Demetrius Cydones indeed made a speech against the surrender of Gallipoli in which he pointed out the strategic importance of this fortress and urged the acceptance of the Serbian offer for an alliance against the Turks, but this speech was made several years later.³⁵ It has been supposed that the Serbian embassy which made the offer of alliance must have been sent to Constantinople by Ugleša in anticipation of his war with the Ottomans and it is for this reason that the speech of Cydones has been dated as of 1371. It is true indeed that Ugleša entered into negotiations with Constantinople, but these negotiations were chiefly ecclesiastical in character, although questions of a political nature may have been also discussed.³⁶ But there is no indication whatsoever that the particular embassy mentioned by Cydones, and by him alone, was sent by Ugleša. Cydones delivered his speech early in 1377, after he had learned of the intentions of Andronicus to surrender Gallipoli to the Turks, for Gallipoli was surrendered early in 1377 and in his speech Cydones implies that he expected it would be surrendered, since, as he says, the majority of the inhabitants and the majority of the council favored giving it up.³⁷ But the initiative in the matter was taken by Andronicus who had already agreed to surrender Gallipoli in return for the help of the Turks to depose his father. This is clearly stated by Cydones in a letter to his friend Calopheros in which he announces the actual surrender of the fortress.³⁸ A part of this letter is so descriptive of the deplorable situation in which the empire was reduced that it is worth quoting in full.

"Know then," Cydones writes to his friend, "that personally I feel well, but I suffer in common with the city about which one reports nothing good. For the old

³⁴ John V returned to Constantinople on October 28, 1371 and for the source of this see note 18. Nor is it probable that Manuel arrived there before his father, for he did not leave Venice till after the departure of his father. See Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 1420.

³⁵ Cydones, *Oratio de non reddenda Callipoli* in Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, CLIV (Paris, 1866), 1009-1036. For an analysis of this speech see Halecki, *op. cit.*, p. 244 f.

³⁶ The question involved was that of reestablishing the jurisdiction of the patriarch in the realm of Ugleša. See Miklosich and Müller, *op. cit.*, I, 553, 560-64.

³⁷ Cydones, *Oratio* . . . , p. 1009: *καὶ τό γε πλείστον τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τῶν συμβουλευέων εἰωθότων, φασὶ δεῖν ἤδη διδόναι.*

³⁸ Cydones, *Correspondance*, pp. 58-60.

scourge, the Turks, pushed to arrogance by the alliance which they concluded with the new emperor against his father, have become more terrible for us. Although they received Gallipoli as compensation and seized many other things belonging to us, and in addition exacted such an amount of money that no one can count easily, they still claim that they are not sufficiently paid for their aid. They command everything and we must obey or else be imprisoned. To such a point they have risen in power, and we reduced to slavery. To this has been added the differences between the Genoese and the Venetians. For the emperor promised Tenedos to the Genoese while he was among them after he escaped from prison. But the Venetians, anticipating this, seized the island, and now, after securing it and its fortress with walls, provisions, men and everything that makes a fortress impregnable, they have gone home, hoping to return in the spring with many triremes. But the Genoese cannot bear to keep the peace while their rivals hold Tenedos, for they believe that they would thus be deprived of access to the sea and the profits of maritime commerce, a thing which is more terrible to them than if they were driven by force from their own country. Therefore they aim to invest the island with triremes, ships, engines of war and everything that those who go to war invent. And they compel the emperor to cooperate with them, for otherwise, they say, he would connive with the Venetians in their steal and prefer them to the Genoese. The emperor, in order to avoid all suspicion, has agreed to ally himself with them and now, in the midst of so much misery, he is preparing arms, munitions, engines of war and ships, and is forced to hire troops, a thing which for him is more difficult than flying. But what makes one consider these evils light, although they are grave indeed, are the ills of within. For the father and the brothers [of Andronicus] still live shut up in places whence there is no escape. . . . For these reasons men expect in the evening to hear of new things with sunrise, whereas the day makes them fear that night will bring some grave misfortune. So that everyone, as in a tempest, runs the risk of sinking. . . . Against these evils we have had one hope, the alliance of the Church and the Christians [of the west], and this we had to renounce because, it seems, of the malevolence of some divinity or our sins. . . ."

The hostilities between Venetians and Genoese of which Cydones speaks in this letter refer to the Chioggia war which broke out in the spring of 1377, and this definitely fixes the date of the surrender of Gallipoli. For as the letter was written before the spring of that year, Gallipoli must have been surrendered either late in 1376 or early in 1377, but probably in 1377. A short chronicle written in the sixteenth century states definitely that Murad took Gallipoli in 1377.³⁹ It is interesting to note also that Cydones had abandoned all hope of any assistance from the west-

³⁹ Lampros-Amantos, *op. cit.*, 77: ἐπήρην ὁ σουλτὰν Μουράτης ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Ὁρχάνη τὴν Καλιόπολιν εἰς τὰ ,ατος' (1377). εἰς ἐκείνον τὸν καιρὸν ἐπήρην τὴν Σερβίαν. Obviously this chronicle is of a later date but there is no reason to doubt its accuracy, for it agrees with the chronological data given by Cydones. Its reference to a Serbian defeat suffered at the hands of the Turks about the same time shows in what dangerous position that nation was and it is not at all improbable that the Serbian embassy referred to in the *Oratio* of Cydones was sent to Constantinople at this time.

ern Christians against the Turks. That the western Christians might help the Greeks against the Turks had always been his hope⁴⁰ and the abandonment of that hope explains why he urged an alliance with the Serbs. It is additional evidence for the view that his speech against the surrender of Gallipoli was composed in 1377 and not in 1371, for in 1371 he must have still believed that western Christendom would come to the relief of Constantinople. Did not John V successfully negotiate with the papacy? It is quite evident too that Cydones was hostile to Andronicus. Andronicus indeed tried to win the support and the services of Cydones, but the latter bluntly replied that under no circumstances would he participate in his administration.⁴¹

The reign of Andronicus was short. He had been placed on the throne with the aid of foreign powers and his position was secure only as long as he kept the support of these powers. He could rely upon the Genoese for their interests were to some extent associated with his, but he could not be sure of the Turks. Meanwhile the Venetians had refused him recognition and were anxious to bring about his downfall. In 1379 they aided John V and his sons to escape from prison, but the old emperor sought the protection of the Turks, for he knew well that without their aid he could not possibly regain his throne. It is said that Murad sent a representative to Constantinople to determine the wishes of the people and on the basis of this investigation decided to support John V. It is not improbable that Murad actually did this in order to justify his defection from the cause of Andronicus, but the wishes of the people of Constantinople were not the decisive factors in his decision. He was influenced by more tangible considerations. For John V offered him a considerable annual tribute and agreed to furnish him a contingent of 12,000 men every spring.⁴² In addition Murad asked and obtained the cession of Philadelphia, the

⁴⁰ Byzantium was divided on foreign policy. There were those who believed that the salvation of the empire could be achieved only by an understanding with the Latins, and those who sought to unite the orthodox peoples of the Balkan peninsula against the Turkish danger. Demetrius Cydones was one of the leaders of the former. See Cydones, *Oratio pro subsidio Latinorum*, Migne, *Patr. Gr.* CLIV, 961-1008.

⁴¹ Cydones, *Correspondance*, p. 56.

⁴² Ducas, *op. cit.*, 45 f.; Phrantzes, *op. cit.*, 55 f.; Chalcocondyles, *op. cit.*, 62 f. For the date, see Charanis, "An important short chronicle of the fourteenth century," 354.

only Greek city in Asia Minor that was still free. Philadelphia, however, was not actually occupied by the Turks till late in the year 1390 when it was taken by Bayazid.⁴³ Aided by Murad and the Venetians, John V and his son Manuel entered Constantinople on July 1, 1379. Andronicus did not offer any resistance, although his Genoese allies fought desperately. But in the final settlement Andronicus was not completely deprived of his powers. On the insistence of the Genoese and probably also on that of Murad, who hoped doubtless to profit further by future dissension among the Palaeologi, Andronicus and his son John, the future John VII, were recognized the legitimate successors of John V. Manuel was thus discarded. In addition Andronicus was invested with the actual administration of the Thracian towns of Selymbria, Heraclaea, Rhaedestus and Panidus. This arrangement was officially sanctioned by the patriarch Nilus in May, 1381,⁴⁴ and was included in the treaty which the Genoese signed with John V on November 2, 1382.⁴⁵ The Genoese still associated their interests with the imperial fortunes of Andronicus and his rights to inherit the throne was one of the points they insisted upon in their negotiations with John V. But they agreed also to refrain from doing anything that might lead to a rupture between John V and Andronicus, and promised, if necessary, to support him against all his enemies, including Andronicus and his son, but not including Murad with whom they wanted to keep in peace. Andronicus did not live to inherit the throne. He died in 1385, shortly after suffering a defeat at the hands of his father.⁴⁶ Meanwhile Manuel returned to Thessalonica to take charge of the administration while Theodore was made despot of the Morea. Theodore took possession of Morea in 1383; but exactly when Manuel arrived in Thessalonica is not known.

The agreement which had settled the quarrel between John V

⁴³ It is quite possible that Philadelphia was not only occupied by, but was also ceded to the Turks in 1390. For Phrantzes and Chalcocondyles who mention the cession of Philadelphia in connection with the overthrow of Andronicus in 1379 confuse this event with the struggle between John V and Manuel on the one hand and John VII on the other which took place in 1390. The date of the capture of Philadelphia by Bayazid will be justified below.

⁴⁴ Miklosich and Müller, *op. cit.*, II, 25; Ducas, *op. cit.*, 46.

⁴⁵ Heyd, *op. cit.*, I, 525; Dölger, *op. cit.*, p. 26. The original document was not accessible to me.

⁴⁶ Charanis, "An important short chronicle of the fourteenth century," p. 355.

and Andronicus was least satisfactory to Manuel, since it deprived him of the imperial title and succession. Manuel left for Thessalonica in secret and against the wishes of his father, which is sufficient proof that he was openly displeased with it.⁴⁷ That father and son had now come to the parting of the ways is also stated by Cydones, whose affection for Manuel never diminished.⁴⁸ Manuel must have felt resentment also against Murad who was probably, at least in part, responsible for the reinstatement of Andronicus. Once established in Thessalonica his hostility against Murad broke out in the open. Manuel's aim, it seems, was to recover Macedonia, and he actually occupied important places, including the city of Serres.⁴⁹ The results of his policy, however, were disastrous, for it not only widened the breach of the already estranged relations with his father, whose one aim was to keep the peace with Murad, but aroused the ire of the Turkish Sultan. Murad commissioned Haireddin Pasha to carry the war to Manuel. Haireddin not only recovered the territory which Manuel had occupied; he attacked also Thessalonica which finally surrendered in 1387 after a siege of four years.⁵⁰

It is often repeated, following Chalcocondyles and Phrantzes, that Manuel, who had fled from Thessalonica, turned to his father, but the latter, fearing a break with Murad, refused to receive him; that Manuel then turned abjectly to the Turkish Sultan and asked his forgiveness; and that the latter received him with honors, forgave his transgressions and recommended him to his father.⁵¹ This story is not strictly accurate as is shown by the letters of Cydones. John V was indeed furious at the insubordination of his son and the consequent loss of Thessalonica. He called a special council, from which, however, all the friends of Manuel, including Cydones, were excluded, to decide the fate of Manuel and, as the latter was subsequently exiled to Lemnos, it may have been here that this decision was reached.⁵² In the meantime Manuel, who had fled to Lesbos, was in a dilemma, not knowing

⁴⁷ R. Loenertz, "Manuel Paléologue et Démétrius Cydonès," *Échos d'Orient*, XXVI (Paris, 1937), 475.

⁴⁸ Cydones, *Correspondance*, pp. 86, 91.

⁴⁹ Phrantzes, *op. cit.*, p. 47 f.; Chalcocondyles, *op. cit.*, p. 46 f.

⁵⁰ Charanis, "An important short chronicle of the fourteenth century," p. 359 f.

⁵¹ Phrantzes, *op. cit.*, p. 48; Chalcocondyles, *op. cit.*, p. 46 f.

⁵² Cydones, *Correspondance*, p. 83 f.

which way to turn. He thought of going to some foreign land; or he might go to the Morea where his younger brother, Theodore, was in charge. He wrote to Cydones for advice. Cydones replied to him in a tender and affectionate letter. He must not quit his country for some strange land. The road there is long and tedious and the people he will meet indifferent to his lot. For, ignoring his rank, they would treat him as a vagabond or as one in need. Nor must he go to the Peloponnesus; its resources are few and insufficient even for those who already dwell there. There will be war between himself and his brother if he and his companions went there. Indeed the Turks will be greatly pleased if they hear that he has gone to Morea; they will even send him help to fight his brother, for in such an event they will profit themselves. He must rather come home to his father, beg his forgiveness and accept whatever punishment he may intend to impose upon him. But he was sure his father would forgive him.⁵³ Manuel, however, did not return to Constantinople immediately. He first visited Murad, however, not abjectly as Phrantzes and Chalcocondyles relate, but after he became convinced by an exchange of embassies that the latter would receive him; then, after affecting a reconciliation with the Sultan, he went to Constantinople.⁵⁴ But his father refused to forgive him; instead he exiled him to the island of Lemnos.⁵⁵ As Thessalonica surrendered to the Turks in April, 1387, Manuel's exile to Lemnos must have begun late in that year or early in 1388.

It is not until the spring of 1390 that Manuel appeared again, actively playing a political role. For the interval between the year of his exile and this year nothing is known about him, but it is not improbable that he remained in Lemnos,⁵⁶ for it was from Lemnos

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 84 ff.

⁵⁴ Loenertz, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 119 ff.

⁵⁶ Loenertz (*ibid.*, p. 122 ff.) says that Manuel was back in Constantinople by the autumn of 1388. His argument is as follows: On August 27, 1388, the Serbs inflicted a defeat upon Murad's forces and in a letter to Manuel, Cydones mentions a defeat suffered by the Turks and regrets that Manuel was not present, for had he been present the Greeks might have played a part in the victory. Thus Manuel was still in Lemnos on August 27, 1388, for the defeat suffered by the Turks at the hands of the Serbs is identified with that referred to by Cydones. But according to another letter written by Cydones to Manuel (*Correspondance*, No. 35) both

that he returned to Constantinople in response to his father's appeal in the spring of 1390.⁵⁷ John V had again lost his throne, this time to his young grandson John,⁵⁸ the son of Andronicus, who entered Constantinople on April 14, 1390. This young man, now about twenty years of age, claimed the throne as belonging to him by right. He had been crowned emperor by his father in 1378 and although, together with his father, he had been deposed in the following year, his claims to the throne had been officially recognized by John V and the Church. But John V does not seem to have accepted this settlement as final. This may be the reason why he continued to have trouble with Andronicus until the latter's death in 1385. His real intention was that the throne should pass to Manuel. Cydones makes this plain. Writing to Manuel in 1387 he declared that despite his present difficulties with his father it would be he who would succeed him.⁵⁹ But there was still John, the son of Andronicus. Chalcocondyles relates that Manuel sent John to Genoa ostensibly in order to solicit the aid of the Genoese against the Turks, but in reality in order to get rid of him, for he had secretly requested the Genoese to put him in

Manuel and Cydones are in Constantinople and the former is about to be reconciled with his father. This letter then must have been written after Manuel's return from Lemnos. Now it is possible to establish the date of this letter by a reference to another letter of Cydones to a friend sojourning in Italy (*Correspondance*, No. 3). According to this letter Cydones had promised his friend the previous winter to join him in Italy and a year has passed without carrying out this promise. He offers two reasons for the delay: the plague that raged in Constantinople and the insistence of the emperor that he should not leave the city. The emperor here is identified with Manuel and as there was a plague in Constantinople in the winter of 1389, it is concluded that Manuel must have returned from Lemnos late in 1388 or early in 1389, at which time Cydones wrote letter No. 35. There are two elements of weakness in this argument: (1) the Turkish defeat alluded to by Cydones is not necessarily that suffered by the Turks on August 27, 1388; and (2) the plague referred to in letter No. 3 is not necessarily the plague of 1389. Indeed it seems more probable that letter No. 3 was written in 1374, for in addition to the plague Cydones refers also to a civil war, perhaps a reference to the revolt of Andronicus in 1373 and the plague that broke out in the winter of 1373/74 (Ducas, p. 515).

⁵⁷ The exact date of Manuel's return from Lemnos is known, Holy Thursday, March 31, 1390, and the reason for his recall was doubtless the revolt of John VII, which began before Easter. See Ignatius of Smolensk, tr. by Mme B. de Khitrowo in *Itinéraires Russes en Orient*, I, 1 (Geneva, 1889), 142 f. See also Charanis, "An important short chronicle of the fourteenth century," p. 356, n. 6.

⁵⁸ On the life and activities of John VII see the important work of F. Dölger, "Johannes VII, Kaiser der Rhomäer 1390-1408," cited above n. 80.

⁵⁹ Cydones, *Correspondance*, p. 86.

prison, and that the Genoese imprisoned him.⁶⁰ The story is plausible. It is indeed probable that Manuel, at the time of the siege of Thessalonica, expecting no help from Constantinople, sent John to Genoa to solicit the aid of the Genoese who themselves had important interests in Thessalonica. Manuel was anxious to find outside help and it is known that he sent an embassy to the pope and another to Venice for that purpose.⁶¹ But after the fall of Thessalonica and his reconciliation with his father he may have contrived to keep John indefinitely in Genoa so that he might inherit the throne without difficulty. That John spent some time in Genoa there is no doubt, for it was from Genoa that he came in the spring of 1390 to overthrow his grandfather.⁶² Like his father in 1376, John turned to the Ottomans for help and Bayazid, who followed his father's policy in creating dissension among the Byzantine princes, furnished him with the necessary forces. Although he was able to enter Constantinople, his victory was not complete. John V managed to keep the fort by the Golden gate long enough to enable his son Manuel, who was now recalled from Lemnos, to gather the forces necessary to recover the city. John, now John VII, was finally driven from the city on September 17, 1390. He fled to Bayazid who invested him with the city of Selymbria which he had occupied in the meantime.

Bayazid apparently did not aid John VII after his initial success for otherwise it would be difficult to understand the final success of John V and Manuel. This was doubtless because he was engaged in Asia Minor throughout the summer of 1390 against the various Turkish emirates. But if he reconciled himself to the failure of John VII that was because he felt sure that John V and Manuel would be as amenable to his wishes as John VII. No sooner were John V and Manuel reestablished in Constantinople that they received word from Bayazid, who probably was now back in Brussa, demanding the tribute which they were accustomed to pay and an expeditionary force headed by Manuel himself to participate in the expedition which he was about to undertake against Pamphylia (the emirate of Tekke). John V, hopelessly powerless to resist, acceded to the demands of Bayazid

⁶⁰ Chalcocondyles, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁶¹ Loenertz, *Échos d'Orient*, XXXVII, 108 f.

⁶² Lampros-Amantos, *op. cit.*, No. 15.

and sent his son Manuel and some troops to do his bidding.⁶³ Doubtless John VII, now in the camp of Bayazid, also participated in the expedition against Tekke. As to the date of this expedition there can be no doubt. It took place between September 17, 1390 and February 16, 1391, the date of the death of John V, when Manuel returned to Constantinople. This is confirmed by Phrantzes who says that Bayazid moved against Tekke in the fall of 1390.⁶⁴

Was it during this expedition that the Byzantine princes helped Bayazid to take Philadelphia? The question is not easy because the chronology of Bayazid's activities in Asia Minor is confused. Both the Turkish and Greek authorities agree that Bayazid, after he had established himself on the throne, undertook to subdue the various Turkish emirates in Asia Minor.⁶⁵ Sa'deddin and Phrantzes say that Bayazid first moved into Asia Minor in the spring after the death of his father, i.e., in 1390. This is probably correct; for Bayazid must have needed some time to settle the affairs in Europe and to gather the necessary forces for his expedition in Asia Minor. But there is no agreement as to the order of his conquests. According to Sa'deddin Bayazid made two expeditions in Asia Minor. In the first one he took Philadelphia, Aydin, Sarukan and Menteşe; in the second, he took Gernian and then Tekke. Other Turkish historians leave some doubt, however, whether Gernian, Tekke and Menteşe fell during the first or second expedition. According to Ducas Bayazid first took Gernian, Menteşe and on the way back, Sarukan and Philadelphia. Then came the expedition to Tekke. Phrantzes makes Bayazid first go along the Pontus, then against Sarukan and Menteşe and finally in the fall against Tekke. In the account of Chalcocondyles Bayazid first takes Philadelphia, then strikes along the Pontus and finally moves against Aydin, Sarukan, Menteşe and Tekke. Of this contradictory mass of material only one thing seems certain: that Bayazid made two campaigns in Asia Minor in 1390, one in the spring and summer, and the other in the fall.

⁶³ Ducas, *op. cit.*, p. 47; Ignatius of Smolensk, p. 142 f.

⁶⁴ Phrantzes, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁶⁵ Their testimony has been analyzed in detail by Paul Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche. Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13-15 Jh.* (Istanbul, 1934), p. 78 ff.

Now, if it is true, as Chalcocondyles asserts, that the Byzantine emperors — Manuel and John VII are meant — helped Bayazid to take Philadelphia,⁶⁶ then that city was taken in the fall of 1390. For in the summer neither Manuel nor John VII was with Bayazid. John VII was in Constantinople while Manuel was trying to gather sufficient forces — he went as far as Rhodes — with which to dislodge him.⁶⁷

It was then during Bayazid's second expedition in Asia Minor in the fall of 1390 that the Byzantine princes, Manuel and John VII, helped the Turks to take Philadelphia. In the meantime John V, in order to protect the capital against any possible assault, began to restore its fortifications. He strengthened the Golden gate by constructing two towers on either side; in addition he fortified the space between the Golden gate and the sea for a possible final refuge. But when the news concerning these fortifications reached Bayazid he immediately demanded that they be torn down and threatened to blind Manuel if John V failed to accede to this demand. The latter, weighed down by age and disease and solicitous for the welfare of his favorite son, yielded and tore down the new fortification. He did not survive this humiliation long, for on February 16, 1391 he breathed his last.⁶⁸ He had reigned, with some interruptions, for fifty years and his was a stormy and tragic career. When he came to the throne in 1341, the empire was still a considerable power; by the time of his death it had lost everything except Constantinople and the despotat of Morea. In 1341 the Ottoman Turks were insignificant; by 1391 it was evident that they would control all the lands once ruled by the empire.

In the meantime Bayazid had returned to Brussa and it was there that Manuel heard the news of the death of his father. He immediately rushed to Constantinople, escaping by night and without the knowledge of Bayazid. He doubtless feared that Bayazid might detain him or even do away with him while he took Constantinople himself or restored it to John VII who must have been in Brussa also. Bayazid, although probably displeased,

⁶⁶ Chalcocondyles, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁶⁷ Lampros-Amantos, *op. cit.*, pp. 32, 33; Ignatius of Smolensk, p. 142 f.

⁶⁸ Ducas, *op. cit.*, p. 47 f.; Ignatius of Smolensk, p. 143. For the date of the death of John V see Charanis, "An important short chronicle of the fourteenth century," p. 357.

acquiesced to the new regime in Constantinople, but doubtless not without the promise of Manuel that he would do nothing to change his father's policy toward the Ottomans. The story that Bayazid laid siege to Constantinople immediately after the accession of Manuel to the throne is without foundation. The siege of Constantinople did not come till several years later.

For three years following his accession to the throne as sole emperor, Manuel's policy toward Bayazid was that of appeasement, not antagonism. During this period Manuel took part in another military campaign conducted by Bayazid in Asia Minor. The exact date of this expedition is not known, but it can be definitely fixed with the help of certain Venetian documents, incidents in the life of Manuel whose chronology is known, and certain references in the letters of the emperor.

According to a Venetian document it was known in Venice on July 14, 1391⁶⁹ that the emperor was about to leave Constantinople in order to participate in an expedition under Bayazid; it was anticipated that this expedition would be long. If Manuel actually left Constantinople, he was back in the city by February 11, 1392, for on that date he and his wife were officially crowned by the patriarch Anthony.⁷⁰ Another Venetian document, dated April 26, 1392, speaks of the preparations of a large fleet by Bayazid, who was about to attack Sinope by sea. It says further that Manuel was to participate in this expedition. But according to still another Venetian document, dated July 20, 1392, Manuel did not leave Constantinople.⁷¹ The expedition of Bayazid in which Manuel participated was directed against the Isfendarides of Qastamuni and Sinope, as Manuel himself says in a letter which he addressed to Cydones during this expedition.⁷² And by the fall of 1392 the Ottomans had become masters of Qastamuni.⁷³ On the basis of this chronological data there can be no other conclusion than that the Ottoman expedition in which Manuel par-

⁶⁹ Max Silberschmidt, *Das orientalische Problem zur Zeit der Entstehung des Türkischen Reiches nach Venezianischen Quellen* (Leipzig, 1923), p. 74.

⁷⁰ Ignatius of Smolensk, 143; Silberschmidt, *op. cit.*, 75; N. Jorga, "La politique vénitienne dans les eaux de la Mer Noire," *Académie Roumaine: Bulletin de la section historique*, 2^e année (Bucharest, 1914), p. 321.

⁷¹ Silberschmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 78, 81; Jorga, *op. cit.*, p. 322 f.

⁷² See below, note 77.

⁷³ E. Zambaur, *Manuel de généalogie et de chronologie pour l'histoire de l'Islam* (Hanover, 1927), p. 149.

ticipated was that mentioned by the Venetian document, dated July 14, 1391. The expedition was long and doubtless extended to the beginning of winter, 1391, for the weather conditions to which Manuel refers in this letter are those of late fall or early winter. This expedition took place, therefore, between the end of summer and the beginning of winter, 1391.

It is doubtless to this expedition that Cydones refers in his letter to Theodore Palaeologus written after his return from Venice in 1391.⁷⁴ Here again Cydones, whose concern for his country had remained undiminished although he had abandoned its religion, gives such a vivid picture of the public demoralization of the Greeks that his letter is worth quoting almost in full.

"The plight in which I found the city upon my return," writes Cydones, "is such that she least needs the science of men; only the aid of God can possibly help her. Everything is upset and it is difficult to find anywhere in the world an example of the chaos that reigns here. The barbarians have seized everything found outside the city and they are responsible for all her misery. The tribute they impose is so large that the entire public revenue will not suffice to pay it. It will be necessary to levy a tax in specie even on the very poor if we are to meet, at least in part, their insatiable demands. But everyone thinks that this is impossible and that their cupidity will never be satisfied. Therefore one looks toward slavery as the only means capable of removing the internal ills. Moreover, the old evil which caused the general ruin still rages. I mean the dissension between the emperors over the shadow of power. For this they are forced to serve the barbarian; it is the only way of being able to breathe. For everybody admits that to whomever of the two the barbarian gives his support that one will prevail in the

⁷⁴ Cydones, *Correspondance*, No. 5. The date of this letter is certain. The allusion to the strife between the emperors refers without a doubt to the struggle between John VII and Manuel in 1390, but with the implication that that episode was over, but that the emperors continued to be competitors, each one trying to win the support of Bayazid. The reference to the arrival of Cydones to the city means his return from Venice. It is known definitely that Cydones was in Venice in January 1391, for there exists a Venetian document of that date granting the privileges of Venetian citizenship to Cydones as long as he would stay in Venice (R. Loenertz, "Démétrius Cydonès, citoyen de Venise," *Échos d'Orient*, XXXVII, 25). The expedition of the barbarian referred to in this letter can be no other than that undertaken by Bayazid late in the summer of 1391. Cydones, therefore, returned to Constantinople while this expedition was under way and it was then that he wrote this letter, i.e., autumn of 1391. G. Cammelli, who edited this letter (Cydones, *Correspondance*, p. 9), thinks that the allusion to the strife between the emperors refers to the outbreak of the second civil war between John Cantacuzenus and John V and dates the letter as of 1353. For this reason he makes Manuel Cantacuzenus and not Theodore Palaeologus the recipient, for the letter is addressed simply to the despot of Morea. This view reveals its author appallingly ignorant of the history of the Byzantine empire in the fourteenth century, a serious matter for an editor of the letters of Cydones.

future. Therefore the emperors by necessity become his slaves before the citizens and live according to his injunctions. And today both emperors, each one with what remains of the troops, receive his orders, follow him and help him to seize the cities in Phrygia and the Pontus. Thus the city, deprived of its garrison, lies exposed, a prize, ready for those who may wish to seize it. And within the city the citizens, not only the ordinary, but indeed also those who pass as the most influential in the imperial palace, revolt, quarrel with each other and strive to occupy the highest offices. Each one is eager to devour all by himself, and, if he does not succeed, threatens to desert to the enemy and with him besiege his country and his friends. This is a tragedy greater than any one related by Homer and all the poets."

It was during the expedition of 1391 that Manuel had the discussions with a Muhammedan theologian over the respective merits of Christianity and Islam which he later committed to writing for the benefit of his younger brother Theodore. As Manuel himself remarks in the introduction these discussions took place in the winter in Ancyra while he was with Bayazid during a military expedition in Asia Minor. The only expedition known in which one can possibly fit these facts is that of 1391. The discussions were later written in the form of dialogues and these dialogues are of considerable importance. They show first of all the theological interests of Manuel; secondly, that educated Moslems and Christians exchanged ideas and were tolerant toward each other; and finally they give a vivid picture of the barbarous luxury of the Sultan's court and the misery of the Byzantine emperor. Unfortunately they cannot yet be fully utilized for they have been only partially published.⁷⁵

During this expedition Manuel also wrote a number of letters of great historical value. These letters reveal the delicate nature of their author and the spiritual agony which he experienced for having to serve the barbarian. Manuel was spiritually never reconciled to the servile policy that he was forced to follow toward the Turkish Sultan. He could stand the fatigue and the privations that this policy imposed upon him, but he could not bear the thought that he was contributing to augment the power of the Turks. The fatigue and the privations he wrote "we suffer in common with the rest of the army; but one thing is unbearable for us: we fight with them [the Turks] and for them, and this

⁷⁵ These dialogues were partially published by C. B. Hase, *Notices et extraits des mss. de la Bibliothèque Royale*, VIII (Paris, 1813); they were reprinted by Migne with Hase's introduction, *Patr. Gr.*, CXVI (Paris, 1866), 111-174.

means that we increase their strength and decrease ours.”⁷⁶ In another letter Manuel describes at length the sufferings and privations that he and his army had to endure and gives a vivid picture of the decadence into which Asia Minor had fallen since the Byzantines were driven out. This letter is one of those documents which should be repeated almost in full.⁷⁷

“Your letter,” he writes to Cydones, “has travelled over many lands; it went past mountains and rivers; and scarcely caught up with us in a certain plain which is surrounded on every side by chains of craggy mountains, as the poet might have said. This plain is very small, hardly sufficient for the army camp; it appears and is very wild. Except for wood and some water not very clear it cannot furnish anything, for it is deserted. The inhabitants have fled into the caverns, forests, and on the high peaks, hoping thus to escape a death from which there is no escape, a death most cruel and inhuman, imposed without recourse to justice. For every mouth that opens to justify itself is at once shut up by the sword. Neither the most tender age nor the weaker sex is spared. Even those who, either because of old age or of disease, cannot use their feet to flee, fall victims to the murderous scimitar. . . .

“The plain we occupy must have had a name in the prosperous times when it was treaded by the Romans and obeyed their rule. But today, when I wished to learn what that name was, it was as if I searched for the wings of a wolf, according to the proverb. There is no person to inform me. Cities there are a lot, but none possesses that which makes the splendor of a city and without which it cannot be a city. I mean men. Most of these cities lie in ruins, a pitiable spectacle for the descendants of those who once possessed them. They have not even names, the destruction being already old. And when I asked what were their names, those around me replied: ‘we have destroyed them and time destroyed their names.’ Immediately I was seized by sadness, but I sorrowed in silence, being still able to control my emotions. But when we reach a city whose ancient name has been changed into some strange and barbarous one, then I lament aloud, for no longer can I restrain myself, however I may desire.

“Since I cannot clearly indicate in what parts of the earth we are (for how can one indicate in writing the location of places that have no names?) I shall try another method: I shall try to the extent that that is possible, to give you an idea of where we are by mentioning those places in the neighborhood which are still known by name.

“You have heard of Pompeiopolis, that great, beautiful and marvelous city; or rather it was such in the days gone by, for today even its ruins are hardly visible. It is located on the bank of a river which is spanned by a bridge of stone, adorned with porticoes, marvelous for their size, beauty and art. Did not this city while it flourished justify the surname of great which the Romans gave to its founder and which was confirmed by numerous trophies? After we left this city and that of Zeno we marched for many days, having Sinope at our left, the river Halys at our right and the sun as our guide. For it is necessary, they say, to look at the sun’s rising and then march straight forward, if one does not wish to lose his way.

“Do now you wish to know the objective of the one who commands the army?

⁷⁶ Émile Legrand (editor), *Lettres de l'empereur Manuel Paléologue* (Paris, 1893), p. 29 (letter 10’).

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 21–25 (letter 15’).

His aim is either to enslave or reduce to vassalage a certain satrap, Peitzas by name, whose domain, some territory, a few small towns and a population not large, borders on Sinope and Amisus. He aims at this in order to surround Sinope from every side and thus subdue Spentare (this is the name of the one who governs Sinope), or force him to accept and respect the oaths that he may impose upon him; and finally in order to strike with all these trophies the ruler of Sebastia and the Scythians. When he will have accomplished these things as he plans he will return home, he says, and, with the aid of God, we can do likewise.

"It is not easy to bear these things: the scarcity of provisions, the excessive cold; the disease which, in striking many of our men, has smitten my soul and many other things which the rules of letter writing forbid to enumerate, not to mention the thought that our affairs at home may have suffered some harm, as is probable, since we have already been gone a long time. And it is unbearable not to see anything, or to hear anything, or to do anything of those things which contribute to the formation or perfection of our souls. This is neither in our education, nor in our customs, nor in our nature. Nothing more pleasant can happen to us than to be delivered from such a situation. . . ."

The letter ends with the following note which shows how thoroughly Manuel disliked the company of Bayazid:

"But I stop, for well nigh do I see those who come to call us to join the chief. Perhaps he wishes again to drink a health and to force us take our fill of wine from his manifold golden bowls and drinking-cups. He thinks thus to assuage our grief brought on by the ills I have described. But, had we been of good cheer, this alone would be enough to sadden us."

The reference to Spentare definitely fixes the date of this letter and that of the expedition during which it was written. The Spentare mentioned here is no other than Sulaiman II of the dynasty of the Isfendiariides, the rulers of Qastamuni and Sinope. Sulaiman was actually killed by Bayazid late in 1392 and his territories came under the domination of the Ottomans who held them until 1402.⁷⁸ But Manuel did not participate in this campaign as is pointed out in the Venetian document which has already been cited. Consequently the campaign during which this letter was written is that of 1391, for the only other campaign in Asia Minor undertaken by Bayazid and in which Manuel participated was not directed against Sinope. This is confirmed by another letter of Manuel, obviously written during the same expedition, in which he expresses concern about the pestilence which raged in Constantinople while he was still there.⁷⁹ It is known from another source that a pestilence raged in Constantinople throughout the winter and summer of 1391;⁸⁰ and, it will be recalled, Manuel

⁷⁸ Zambaur, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

⁷⁹ Legrand, *op. cit.*, p. 31 (letter κ').

⁸⁰ Ducas, *op. cit.*, p. 516.

left Constantinople toward the end of the summer of that year. Evidently Bayazid had found it difficult to take Sinope by land in 1391 and it was doubtless for that reason that, in the following year, he organized the sea expedition, referred to in the Venetian documents, against that city.

In their peregrinations throughout Asia Minor Manuel and his companions doubtless often found it necessary to employ the Turkish language if they wished to communicate with the inhabitants of the country. For the depopulation and the ruined cities, referred to by Manuel in his letter, were not the only evidence of the destructive nature for hellenism of the invasion of Asia Minor by the Turks. The use of Greek, especially in the central regions of Anatolia where its hold was weak, was also disappearing and not only among those who abandoned Christianity for Islam, but also among the Christians. The abandonment of Greek place names for Turkish ones noted by Manuel may be cited as proof of this, but more conclusive is a statement contained in a memorandum which was drawn up in Munich on July 30, 1437 and designed to inform the Council of Basel (1431-1438), which, among other things, took up the question of the union of the churches and of the conditions of the Greek church. "It is to be noted," runs the statement, "that in many parts of Turkey (*in multis partibus Turcie*) one finds priests, bishops and archbishops who wear the garments of the infidels and speak their language. They do not know how to say anything in Greek except to sing Mass, the evangel and the epistles. But in other matters of speech they use the Turkish language."⁸¹ Although it is not specifically stated in the document, the *multae partes Turcie* doubtless refer to Asia Minor for it was too early yet for Christians of European Turkey to have abandoned their own language, something which actually never happened among the Christians of the Balkan peninsula.⁸² But in Asia Minor there were Christians who spoke

⁸¹ S. Lampros, 'Τπόμνημα περὶ τῶν ἐλληνικῶν χωρῶν καὶ ἐκκλησιῶν κατὰ τὸν δέκατον πέμπτον αἰῶνα, in *Néos Ἑλληνομνήμων*, VII (Athens, 1911), p. 366: Notandum est, quod in multis partibus Turcie reperiuntur clerici, episcopi et arciepiscopi, qui portant vestimenta infidelium et locuntur linguam ipsorum et nihil aliud sciunt in greco proferre nisi missam cantare et evangelium et epistolas. Alias autem orationes multi dicunt in lingua Turcorum.

⁸² Some Turkish speaking Christians may be found along the Black Sea coast of Bulgaria but they really came from Asia Minor. See S. A. Hudaverdoglu-

only Turkish until 1922; they were found chiefly in the districts of Konia, Sebastia, Ancyra and Qastamuni and it is doubtless these regions that are meant by the *multae partes Turcie* of the document.⁸³ In 1390 and 1391 Manuel traversed virtually all these regions.

Despite his hardships and humiliation, Manuel maintained his policy of appeasement towards the Ottomans as long as he believed that he could thereby save Constantinople and what other territories were still in the possession of the empire. But by the spring of 1394 he became definitely convinced that Bayazid aimed at nothing less than the complete destruction of the family of the Palaeologi and the occupation of what remained of the Byzantine empire. In May, 1394 Bayazid summoned to Serres⁸⁴ Theodore, the brother of Manuel and despot of Morea; Manuel and the remaining Serbian princes were also there. Theodore was ostensibly summoned in order to answer the charges of Paul Mamonas, a magnate in the Morea and a tool of Bayazid, that he had been illegally deprived of his possessions and the governorship of Monenvasia. But the real purpose of Bayazid was to get the Palaeologi together and then put them to death in order to clear "his fields from the thorns," as Manuel himself puts it. Indeed it was only an accident that saved the Palaeologi, for Bayazid had actually ordered Ali, the son of Haireddin-Pasha, to put them to death, but the latter, for personal reasons, delayed the execution, while in the meantime Bayazid changed his mind and decided to limit himself only to the occupation of the Morea. Manuel was permitted to return to Constantinople while Theodore escaped in time to prevent the surrender of the forts of the Morea to the Turks. The Byzantine princes now decided to break definitely with Bayazid and began to turn their eyes to the West for possible assistance. In his turn Bayazid sent an army under the command of Evrenos-Beg to ravage the Morea, while he himself laid siege to Constantinople. This was in the spring of 1395 and

Theodotos, 'Η τουρκόφωνος ελληνική φιλολογία, 'Επετηρίς 'Εταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν (Athens, 1930), p. 301, n. 1.

⁸³ J. Bogiatzides, 'Εκτουρκισμός καὶ ἐξισλαμισμός τῶν 'Ελλήνων κατὰ τὸν Μεσαιῶνα, in Πανεπιστήμιον Θεσσαλονίκης, 'Επιστημονικὴ 'Επετηρίς (Thessalonica, 1932), p. 98.

⁸⁴ On the date of the conference of Serres see D. A. Zakythinos, *Le despotat Grec de Morée* (Paris, 1932), p. 153 f.

for nearly eight years Constantinople lay under siege.⁸⁵ In the meantime Manuel visited western Europe vainly seeking help from the western powers. Help came from another quarter, from Timur. The battle of Ancyra in 1402 gave Manuel a chance to breathe more freely and to recover some lost territories but this belongs to another chapter of the history of the empire.

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

⁸⁵ Lampros-Amantos, *op. cit.*, p. 32.



PEETERS

ON THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Source: *Byzantion*, Vol. 17 (1944-1945), pp. 39-57

Published by: Peeters Publishers

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44168581>

Accessed: 20-05-2019 00:12 UTC

REFERENCES

Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/44168581?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents

You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Peeters Publishers is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Byzantion*

ON THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE

By PETER CHARANIS

Immobility was the principal feature of the social structure of the later Roman empire as it developed following the crisis of the third century and the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine. Those in the country who actually worked the fields, whether they possessed them or not, became attached to the soil; and those in the cities who were engaged in any trade or profession of public interest became attached to their trade or profession. In neither case was there any freedom of choice; one was legally bound to follow the trade of his father.¹

The three elements that played the predominant role in the establishment of this system were the dangerous external situation of the empire, the decline in the population, and the ever increasing financial needs of the state. The reorganization of the empire by Diocletian and Constantine, designed to establish internal stability, greatly increased the complexity of the government, increasing thereby its financial needs, while the defense of the frontiers against the invasions of the barbarians and the Persians was making greater and greater demands upon the treasury. To meet these demands the empire had limited resources at its disposal: land, a limited supply of agricultural labor,² and certain organized services in the cities, notably those connected with the supply of food. And it was by a systematic exploitation of these resources that the empire could find the necessary funds with which to defend its frontiers and to maintain its governmental establishment. Freedom of choice gave way to strict con-

¹ J. B. Bury, *History of the later Roman empire* (London, 1931), I, 55ff.; Ernst Stein, *Geschichte des Spätromischen Reiches*, I (Vienna, 1928), 22ff.; M. Rostovtzeff, *Economic and social history of the Roman empire* (Oxford, 1926), p. 465ff.; C. E. Stevens, "Agricultural and rural life in the later Roman empire," in *The Cambridge economic history*, I (Cambridge, 1941), p. 106ff. The various theories concerning the origin of the Roman colonate have been reviewed by Roth Clausen, but his book (*The Roman colonate: the theories of its origin*, New York, 1925) is deficient in many respects. See M. Rostovtzeff's very unfavorable review in *The American historical review*, XXXI (New York, 1926), 304-306. See also Ch. Saumagne, "Du rôle de l' "Origo" et du "Census" dans la formation du colonat romain," *Byzantion*, XII (Brussels, 1937), 487-581. On the professional corporations the work of J. P. Waltzing (*Étude historique sur les corporations professionnelles chez les Romains depuis les origines jusqu'à la chute de l'empire d'occident*, 4 vols., Louvain, 1895-1900) is still the fundamental work on this subject. Important also is the more recent work of G. Mickwitz, *Die Kartellfunktionen der Zünfte und ihre Bedeutung bei der Entstehung des Zunftwesens: eine Studie in spätantiker und mittelalterlicher Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Helsingfors, 1936).

² On the depopulation of the empire see M. Rostovtzeff, *Social and economic history of the Roman empire*. pp. 465f.; 620, n. 18.

trol and supervision. Land and its cultivation were bound together; one could not leave the land, nor could the land be taken away from him, for the empire obtained its revenues mainly from the land, and it was imperative that the land be cultivated. But these revenues were chiefly in kind; they had to be transported, transformed and distributed; and to achieve these things the state turned to certain existing organizations of transport and industry, imposed its control upon them, held their members responsible with their property for the performance of the services required of them, and rendered their trade hereditary. The ship owners (*navicularii*), the bakers (*pistores*) and the pork dealers (*suarii*) were those chiefly affected. Those working in the state factories, where arms and certain garments, destined for the use of the imperial court, were manufactured, or the state mints, were also attached to their work and their trade was made hereditary. Attached to their social position which was also hereditary were the urban aristocracy, the *curiales*, who performed certain public services, notably the collection of the taxes. The evolution of this social structure was complete by the end of the fourth century.

This was a hard system but the times were hard also. The empire was faced everywhere by formidable enemies; it was fighting for its very existence and it had no other recourse than to exploit fully the only resources at its disposal. The fact is that it survived. Besides, the social immobility never became complete. There were free peasants who were at liberty to move provided they did not stay on the same land for thirty years or more.³ And in the towns the majority of the artisans, particularly those whose trades were not connected with any public service, though organized into guilds and their activities regulated, enjoyed considerable freedom of action and their trades were not forcibly hereditary, although in actual fact the son usually followed the trade of his father, which was what the government wanted and encouraged.⁴ They were even free to strike for higher wages as is shown by the well known inscription of Sardis of 459 A.D.,⁵ and their intervention in politics often had important results. The fact also that members of guilds engaged in public services could find substitutes for themselves proves further that there were people for whom the security afforded by membership in such guilds outweighed the curtailment of freedom and the heavy obligation that such membership carried with it.

But there were abuses and weaknesses and these had serious consequences. The burden of taxation was heavy, and to this was added the maladministration of the lower officials who usually exploited the poor beyond the requirement of the law, while they were much more lenient with

³ *Codex Justinianus*, XI, 48, 19.

⁴ Waltzing, *op. cit.*, II, 310 f.

⁵ W. H. Buckler, "Labour disputes in the province of Asia," *Anatolian studies presented to Sir William Mitchell Ramsay* (London, 1923), pp. 36 ff.

the wealthy.⁶ Many peasants ran away, or sought the protection of the large land-owners, who were also great civil or military functionaries, turning over to them their land and becoming simple *coloni*. The *patrocinium*⁷ was perhaps the greatest evil, for it not only deprived the state of some of its revenue, but lessened the number of the small peasant proprietors, while increasing the power of the wealthy who, with their private armies, often defied the central government, thus adding to the maladministration of the empire.⁸ Nor did it help to ameliorate the condition of those peasants who resorted to it, for in place of the state they were now exploited by their private masters, and much more ruthlessly.⁹ The condition of most of the *coloni* was indeed miserable. There were some who even chose to live among the barbarians rather than in the Graeco-Roman world.¹⁰ And as the small free peasants continued to disappear, while the great magnates were permitted to substitute money payments for the recruits,¹¹ chosen among their *coloni*, which they were required to furnish to the state, the army of the empire became an army of mercenaries. The state required of its citizens to work and pay the taxes while it entrusted to barbarians and other foreigners the defense of its frontiers.

The emperors of the fifth and sixth centuries, especially Justinian,¹² sought to eliminate some of these abuses, but the measures which they adopted were palliatives, designed to work within the cadre of the existing organization. They did not succeed. At the close of the sixth century there were but large magnates and *coloni* in the empire, although the small free peasant proprietor did not completely disappear.

The two centuries that followed form one of the darkest and most critical periods in the history of the empire. The empire was almost ripped to pieces by the Persians and then by the Arabs in the east, by the Avars and the Slavs in the Balkan peninsula. In the face of these external

⁶ That the taxes were high and that there were irregularities in their collection there can be no doubt. According to a writer of the sixth century "a foreign invasion seemed less formidable to the taxpayers than the arrival of the officials of the fisc": John Lydus, *De Magistratibus* (Bonn, 1837), p. 264. The edition by R. Wuensch was not available to me.

⁷ On the *patrocinium* see F. Zulueta, "De patronis vicorum," *Oxford studies in social and legal history*, I (Oxford, 1909).

⁸ G. Rouillard, *L'administration civile de l'Égypte byzantine* (Paris, 1928), p. 182; Justinian, Nov. 30, c. 5, editor R. Schoell, vol. III of the *Corpus Juris Civilis* (Berlin, 1895).

⁹ See, for example, John Chrysostom, "Homelia in Matth.," *P. G.*, LVIII (Paris, 1860), 591.

¹⁰ Priscus, "Fragmenta," in *Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum*, edited by C. Muller (Paris, 1851), IV, 86. This passage has been translated by J. B. Bury, *History of the later Roman empire*, I, 284.

¹¹ *Codex Theodosianus*, VII, 13, 13.

¹² A. A. Vasiliev, *Histoire de l'empire byzantin* (Paris, 1932), II, 203 ff.

dangers important measures were taken which actually transformed the social structure of the empire, gave new life to its society and enabled it not only to stop the Saracens, but to regain eventually the dominant position in the orient. The paucity of the sources makes it impossible to determine definitely what was the exact nature of these measures, when and by whom were they adopted, but what information there is indicates clearly that a transformation of the social structure of the empire took place during this period.

The most important document attesting to such a transformation, at least in the rural districts of the empire is the well known little code, "The Farmer's Law."¹³ But when and by whom was it issued? No convincing answer has been given to this question, although the attempts have been many, for there is no external evidence concerning the origin of the code and the internal evidence is too indefinite to yield a final answer. Most scholars agree in placing it in the seventh or eighth century, some attributing it to Leo III (717-741),¹⁴ others to Justinian II (685-95, 705-11).¹⁵ On the basis of the manuscript tradition (the code is found along with the *Ecloga* of Leo III), it is quite possible that the "Farmer's Law" may have been issued by Leo III, but the point is not of capital importance, for the code, while attesting to the transformation of the rural society, it offers no evidence that it affected this transformation. And if it be granted that this code was the work of Leo III, it does not follow that this emperor was responsible for the reforms which changed the structure of the rural society of the empire. Besides the code is fundamentally a compilation of police regulations affecting the free village communities, and when it was issued these communities already existed.

¹³ The best edition of the "Farmer's Law" is that by W. Ashburner, "The Farmer's Law," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XXX (London, 1910), 85-108, commentary and translation by the same author in the same journal, XXXII (London, 1912), 68-95.

¹⁴ Zachariä von Lingenthal, *Geschichte des Griechisch-Römischen Rechts*, 3rd edition (Berlin, 1892), p. 250, K. Paparregopoulos, *History of the Greek Nation* (in Greek), edited by P. Karolides, (Athens, 1932), vol. III, pt. 2, p. 57; K. Amantos, *History of the Byzantine empire* (in Greek) (Athens, 1939), pp. 357, 360.

¹⁵ G. Vernadsky, "Sur l'origine de la loi agraire," *Byzantion*, IV (Brussels, 1925), 169-80; G. Ostrogorsky, "Agrarian conditions in the byzantine empire in the middle ages," in *The Cambridge economic history*, I, 198, n. 1. Other scholars are less definite: Ashburner simply says (*Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XXXII, 83) that "the vocabulary and phraseology of the Farmer's Law point to its being the work of the seventh or eighth century" and that "it is not by a private hand but a work of legislative authority"; R. H. Panchenko, as quoted by Vasiliev (*Histoire de l'empire byzantin*, I, 325) considers it a product of the seventh century; Vasiliev (*loc. cit.*) thinks that it belongs to an earlier period than the eighth century; H. Grégoire (*Byzantion*, XII, 642) associates it with the reforms of Heraclius and his successors; F. Dölger (*Historische Zeitschrift*, CLXI, Munich, 1929-30, pp. 112-113) suggests that it is the work of Justinian I.

The "Farmer's Law," therefore, as Ostrogorsky and others before him have pointed out, cannot be taken as proof of an extensive reforming activity of the Isaurian dynasty,¹⁶ but it is important evidence of the introduction of reform which affected the structure of the rural society of the empire. It is concerned exclusively with the free peasant communities where the majority of the peasants owned the land and cultivated it with their own hands. It says nothing about the large estates and their tenants, and this has been interpreted to mean that they had disappeared.¹⁷ The large estate, serfdom and, of course, slavery, continued to exist,¹⁸ but the free village community became more and more an important element of the rural society of the empire. This is attested to not only by the "Farmer's Law," but also by numerous references in the hagiographical literature of the ninth century¹⁹ as well as by official or semi-official documents, such as the "Byzantine treatise of taxation"²⁰ and of course, the novels of the

¹⁶ Ostrogorsky, "Über die vermeintliche Reformtätigkeit der Isaurier, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XXX (Leipzig, 1929-30), 394-400. For a review of the various theories concerning the agrarian question in Byzantium see N. A. Constantinescu, "Question agraire dans l'empire byzantin," *Revue historique du sud-est européen*, I (Bucharest, 1924), 233-250.

¹⁷ Zachariä von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 251; Paparregopoulo, *op. cit.*, 57.

¹⁸ A. Constantinescu has tried to show on grounds other than the Farmer's Law that serfdom disappeared in the course of the seventh or eighth century, but his arguments are not convincing: "Réforme sociale ou réforme fiscale? Une hypothèse pour expliquer la disparition du servage de la glèbe dans l'empire byzantin," *Bulletin de la section historique de l'acad. Roumaine*, XI (Bucharest, 1924), 94-109. It is interesting to note that K. Amantos, who follows Paparregopoulo in attributing to Leo III many social reforms, does not accept the view that serfdom disappeared in Byzantium: K. Amantos, *op. cit.*, p. 358 f.

¹⁹ L. Bréhier, "Les populations rurales au IX^e siècle d'après l'Hagiographie byzantine," *Byzantion*, I (Brussels, 1924), 175-190.

²⁰ This document was first published without any commentary by W. Ashburner: "A byzantine treatise of taxation," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XXXV (London, 1915), 78-86. It was reedited with an exhaustive commentary in 1927 by F. Dölger: *Beiträge zur Geschichte der byzantinischen Finanzverwaltung besonders des 10 und 11. Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig, 1927). In the same year Ostrogorsky published a study on Byzantine taxation largely based on the treatise, together with a German translation of it: "Die ländliche Steuergemeinde des byzantinischen Reiches im X. Jahrhundert," *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, XX (Stuttgart, 1927), 1-108. Still in the same year Constantinescu published an article on the Byzantine village community which was based on this treatise: "La communauté de village byzantin et ses rapports avec le petit traité fiscal byzantin," *Bulletin de la section historique de l'acad. Roumaine*, XIII (Bucharest, 1927), 160-74. In a long and laudatory review of the works of Dölger and Ostrogorsky A. Andreades made some contributions of his own: "Deux livres récents sur les finances byzantines," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XXVIII (Leipzig, 1928), 287 ff., republished in his *Oeuvres*, I (Athens, 1938), 563 ff. Andreades agrees with Ostrogorsky (*Oeuvres*, p. 568) that the treatise was composed in the tenth century and not in the eleventh as Dölger would have it.

emperors of the tenth century. And while the Theodosian code and the legislative works of Justinian, when dealing with rural problems speak repeatedly of the *coloni*, seldom mentioning the free peasants, the literature of the period after the sixth century, both official and unofficial, puts the emphasis upon the free village communities, and this can only mean that these communities were numerous, doubtless the dominant element of the rural society of the empire.

The characteristic feature then of the rural society of the later Roman empire after the sixth century is the free village community, inhabited by peasants who owned individually the land²¹ and cultivated it themselves, but if for some reason, they were not able to do so, they could let it to another member of the community either on a share basis or for a money payment. Each such community formed a fiscal unit for purposes of taxation, and if one farmer failed to meet his obligations to the treasury, his neighbors were held responsible for them unless other measures were taken to relieve them of this responsibility. These villages, at least in the eighth and ninth centuries, were on the whole prosperous: many of their members were poor, of course; but a considerable number were well to do peasants, while a few had grown to be extremely wealthy. Such one was Philaretos of the town of Amnia in Paphlagonia. He is described as noble, but his nobility was doubtless of very recent origin, for when he lost his property as a result of an incursion by the Saracens, he found it not unbearable to cultivate himself with his two remaining oxen what was left of his fields. At the height of his prosperity his estates were many, and his flocks numerous. He possessed forty-eight large estates through every one of which ran a spring; six hundred heads of cattle; one hundred teams of oxen; eight hundred mares in pasture; eighty saddle horses and mules, and twelve thousand sheep. Philaretos had become, indeed, a great magnate.²² The majority, however, were less fortunate: few strips of land, a pair of oxen, a horse or perhaps a donkey, may have been all they possessed. They worked their own fields, paid their taxes, and, if necessary, served in the army.

Freedom of movement among the non-servile elements of the population was another feature of the rural society of the empire during this period. This is well attested to by the sources, both official and unofficial. Doubts may be raised, however, as to whether this freedom of movement was *de*

²¹ The old view that the members of these village communities held the land in common is without any foundation. Cf. Ostrogorsky, "Die ländliche Steuergemeinde . . .," 40.

²² M. H. Fourmy and M. Leroy, "La vie de S. Philarète," *Byzantion*, IX (Brussels, 1934), 113. Vasiliev's edition of this interesting "Life" was not available to me. A more striking example of a poor peasant risen to become extremely wealthy was Philocales, mentioned by Basil II in one of his novels issued for the protection of the poor: *Jus Graeco-Romanum*, edited by Zachariae von Lingenthal, III (Leipzig, 1857), 310.

facto only, or whether it was also *de jure*.²³ That people moved from one place to another is absolutely certain, but it is certain also that the government sought to discourage such movement. The "Byzantine treatise of taxation" is very clear on this point, for, in explaining the various tax exemptions on abandoned land, it states that they were granted in order to prevent others, who, according to the principles of the *epibole*, were required to pay the taxes on these lands, from leaving their villages.²⁴ And the persistence of the *epibole*²⁵ is really proof that the peasants were expected to stay in their villages, for if they could legally leave their lands, there could be no justification why their neighbors should be required to pay the taxes on these lands. There are no indications anywhere that the old laws against mobility were ever repealed, but as people moved anyway even in the earlier period despite the repeated prohibitions not to do so, the practice came to be accepted and was tolerated by the government. But this mobility was not very extensive. The vast majority of the people

²³ Ashburner already raised doubts about this: *Journal of hellenic studies*, XXXII, 77 ff.

²⁴ Dölger, *Beiträge* . . . , p. 116.

²⁵ The fundamental work on the *epibole* is that by H. Monnier, "Études de droit byzantin. L' ἐπιβολή" *Nouvelle revue historique de droit français et étranger*, XVI, XVIII, XIX (Paris, 1892, 1894, 1895). According to Monnier the *epibole* was abolished by Tiberius (578-582), but he has been shown to be mistaken. Stein was the first to raise doubts about the abolition of the *epibole* by Tiberius: "Des Tribes Constantinus Novelle περί ἐπιβολῆς und der Edictus domni Chilperici regis," in *Klio*, XV (Leipzig, 1920), 74. The continuation of the *epibole* is now definitely proven: Ostrogorsky, "Die ländliche Steuergemeinde . . .," p. 26 ff; Dölger, *Beiträge* . . . , 128 ff. It is well known that in the time of Justinian the *epibole* was applied to two kinds of property: the (1) *ἀμόδιον*, properties which originally belonged to one great domain, and as this domain formed one fiscal unit, they continued to be considered, for purpose of taxation, as one unit, and if one of them was abandoned, the other property of the owner, if he had any, was burdened with the tax of the abandoned property; if he had not other property then whoever owned the property to which the abandoned property originally belonged was held responsible for the tax. The (2) *ἀμόκνησα*, properties belonging to different people and, without ever having belonged to one domain, together form one fiscal unit and when one was abandoned the owners of the others were jointly responsible for its taxes. However, what principle governed the *epibole* in the case of *ἀμόκνησα* is not definitely known, but as Bury remarks (*History of the later Roman empire*, I, 445, n. 2) it was that of proximity, i. e., the neighbors of the abandoned property were held responsible for the taxes on that property and in return had the right of usufruct on it. Proximity is definitely the principle that governs the application of the *epibole*, now known as *allelengyon*, in the period after the sixth century. The term *epibole* is used in this period in a more general sense; it means simply tax imposition. Whether the *epibole*, in its narrow and technical sense, continued after the reign of Romanus III Argyrus (1028-1034) is a question still under discussion. There are some indications that it continued to exist, but the evidence is too scanty to warrant a definite conclusion. See, G. Rouillard, "L'*epibolē* au temps d'Alexis I Comnène," *Byzantion*, x (Brussels, 1935), 81-89; F. Dölger, "Das Fortbestehen der *Epibole* in mittel- und spätbyzantinischer Zeit," *Studi in memoria di Aldo Albertoni*, II (Padova, 1934), 3 ff.

unless moved by the government itself or driven away from their homes by some foreign incursion, grew and died in the community where they were born.

The process whereby the transformation of the rural society of the empire was brought about during the period after the sixth century has been variously explained by scholars. On the assumption that the "Farmer's Law" was the work of Leo III, certain scholars have attributed the creation of the new system to that emperor and his immediate successors.²⁶ This is a contention which has been shown to be without foundation, as has been pointed out above. The explanation offered by Constantinescu and accepted with some important reservations by Ostrogorsky appears much more seductive and at first sight convincing.²⁷ In the opinion of this scholar the separation of the head tax from the land tax, a reform supposedly introduced toward the end of the seventh century, was what brought about the greater mobility in the rural society in the period after the sixth century just as the inseparable relationship of these two taxes in the period before had brought about the immobility which characterized the society of that period. For as each peasant now had to pay a head tax independently of the land with which he was associated, the state had no particular interest in keeping him attached to the land.

The system of taxation established by Diocletian has been one of the knottiest problems of the history of the later Roman empire. In 1916 Piganiol published a booklet²⁸ in which he attempted to prove that the *capitatio-jugatio* were not two different taxes, one on the peasants and the other on the land, but two different aspects of a single tax. Looked at it from the point of view of the land it may be considered as a land tax, but looked at from the point of view of the peasants it may be considered as a head tax, for the computation of the tax was based not only on the quality of the land but also on the number of persons that worked on that land so that there could be no *juga*, the fiscal units of taxation, without *capita*, or *capita* without *juga*. An intimate relationship between land and labor was thus established, but the system could not work unless a definite stability were established between land and labor, hence the interest of the government in attaching the peasants to the land. This explains Constantine's edict of 332 providing for penalties for those peasants who would leave the land and the lords who would accept the services of the fugitives. Piganiol's theory has been accepted by many byzantinists.

²⁶ Zachariä von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 251; Paparregoppoulo, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

²⁷ Constantinescu, "Réforme sociale ou réforme fiscale . . .," p. 102 ff.; Ostrogorsky, "Agrarian conditions in the Byzantine empire," p. 197; "Das Steuersystem im byzantinischen Altertum und Mittelalter," *Byzantion*, VI (Brussels, 1931), 230 ff.

²⁸ A. Piganiol, *L'impôt de capitation sous le Bas Empire Romain* (Chambéry, 1916).

In 1933 Boak published a number of papyri, included among which is the edict of the Prefect of Egypt, putting into effect the new taxation system of Diocletian. After pointing out some irregularities in the collection of taxes the Prefect declares: "Therefore I have publicly set forth the quota of each aroura with respect to the quality of the soil, and the quota of each head of the agrarian population and the minimum and maximum ages of liability in accordance with the published divine edict and the breviary included in it, and issued the copies of this my edict."²⁹ Reviewing his own theory on the basis of this text, Piganiol came to this conclusion:³⁰ "To each proprietor there corresponds a part. The tax of the small proprietor is the *capitatio plebeia*: one must understand under this term both his land and personal charges. The tax of the large proprietor was divided more distinctly in *jugatio*, corresponding to the land tax, and in *capitatio humana* and *animalium*, corresponding to the equipment of the estate, but the whole of these taxes was comprehended, as in the case of the *plebeius*, under the more general term of *capitatio*." All this means that there were two taxes, the head tax and the land tax and the head tax was paid by all the peasants whether they cultivated their own land or not, whether free or serfs. The peasants who owned the land themselves paid also, of course, the land tax.

There is nothing in the taxation system of the period after the sixth century that differs radically from this. There is a head tax, *kapnikon*, and a land tax, and all the peasants whether they owned the land or not were required to pay the head tax.³¹ To be sure the *kapnikon* of the later period is really a hearth and not a head tax, but already in the fourth century the old *capitatio* was on the way of becoming a family tax. For according to a law of 386 the *caput*, as a fiscal unit, was to consist of two and a half men, or four women, and on this basis a family of three, husband, wife and a son, would be counted, for purposes of taxation, as one *caput*.³² It is easy to see how the head tax of the earlier period was gradually transformed into the hearth tax of the later period. If then the taxation system

²⁹ A. E. R. Boak, "Early Byzantine papyri from the Cairo Museum," *Société royale égyptienne de papyrologie: études de papyrologie*, II (Cairo, 1933), 4. I have used Boak's translation.

³⁰ Piganiol, "La capitation de Dioclétien," in *Revue historique*, LXXVI (Paris, 1935), 10.

³¹ There is no agreement whether both peasant proprietors and those who did not possess any property paid the *kapnikon*. Constantinescu ("Réforme social ou réforme fiscale," p. 103) says that only the propertyless peasants paid this tax and Dölger (*Beiträge . . .*, p. 53) agrees with him, but Ostrogorsky maintains that all peasants, proprietors or not, paid this tax ("Das Steuersystem im byzantinischen Altertum," p. 234 f.) I think Ostrogorsky is right.

³² *Cod. Just.*, XI. 48, 10. Cf. O. Seeck, *Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt* (Stuttgart, 1921), 2: 272.

of the later period did not differ fundamentally from that of the earlier period it is hard to imagine how in the first case it could lead to social mobility while in that of the second to social immobility.

The reasons for the changes in the rural society of the later period must be sought elsewhere. They are connected with the dangerous external situation of the empire during the seventh century and the administrative and military reforms of Heraclius and his immediate successors. It is now generally conceded that the system of themes, designed to check the advance of the Saracens and the incursions of the barbarians, was the work of the dynasty of Heraclius.³³ But with the establishment of the themes there is connected the establishment of another institution, the military estates. Many who had fled from the conquered provinces and, what was more important, many barbarians who were settled in the empire were granted land in return for military service. And while the eldest son of each grantee inherited his father's plot together with the obligation for military service, the rest of the family were free to reclaim and cultivate the land that was vacant, thus adding to the number of the free peasant proprietors.³⁴ In this there was no break with the past, for the free peasant proprietor and the free peasant community had been a feature of the rural society of the empire before Heraclius, although by the end of the sixth century both were on the verge of disappearing.^{34a} The wisdom of Heraclius and his successors lay in this that, instead of settling these people on state or private land as *coloni*, they settled them as free men in free village communities, and thus the free village community was given new life. The increased number of free peasants, cultivating their own land, paying the taxes, and, if necessary, serving in the army, in turn lent

³³ Ostrogorsky, "Über die vermeintliche Reformtätigkeit der Isaurier," p. 396; Grégoire, *Byzantion*, XII, 642 f.

³⁴ Ostrogorsky, "Die Wirtschaftsgeschichte und die sozialen Entwicklungsgrundlagen des byzantinischen Reiches," *Vierteljahrschr. für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, XXII (Stuttgart, 1929), 133. On the militarization of the empire see further, E. Darko, "La militarizzazione dell'impero Bizantino," *Studi Byzantini e Neoellenici*, V (Rome, 1939), 90ff.

^{34a} There is no longer any doubt about the existence of free peasant proprietors and free peasant communities in the empire before Heraclius. Their existence is well attested to by the Theodosian Code (XI. 7, 12; XI. 24, 6); by papyri (H. I. Bell, "An epoch in the agrarian history of Egypt," *Recueil d'études égyptologiques dédiées à la mémoire de Jean F. Champollion*, Paris, 1922); by Libanius (*Oratio de patrociniis*, ed. R. Foerster in *Libanii opera*, 3: 450 f.); and by the novels of Justinian (*Nov. XXXII*; *XXXIV*). But by the end of the sixth century the free peasant was on the verge of disappearing: *Jus Graeco-Romanum*, III, 21 f. The theory that the free peasant communities were communistically organized and that they had been created in the course of the seventh and eighth century under Slavonic influence, a theory first developed by certain Russian scholars, has now been generally abandoned: Vasiliev, *Histoire de l'empire byzantin*, I, 331; Ostrogorsky, "Die ländliche Steuergemeinde . . .," p. 40 ff.

new vigor to the empire and enabled it eventually to recover its position in the Orient. Heraclius and his successors did what Arcadius, despite the pleas of Synesius,³⁵ had failed to do, create an army of citizens and a body of citizens whose interest would be bound up with the maintenance and the defense of the empire.

Urban society, too, went through some important changes during this period. The loss of Egypt and Syria and the consequent abolition by Heraclius³⁶ of the gratuitous distribution of bread doubtless affected the corporation or guild of the shipowners, the *navicularii* of the earlier period. Already under Justinian they had won some important concessions,³⁷ and during the reign of Maurice a decree was issued, "enacting that the captain of a vessel should not be subjected to punishment and made to render compensation when his ship was wrecked, but that the loss should be put down to the imperial revenue."³⁸ During the reign of Heraclius and after, the impression given by the sources is that the shipowners were comparatively free agents, plying the seas for their own personal gain.³⁹ Were they still attached to their trade, and was that trade hereditary? No definite answer can be given; the *Book of the Prefect* says nothing about the *navicularii*; but it would seem, on the basis of the general economic organization characteristic of this period, that one was free to enter or abandon this trade. There can be no doubt, however, that the activities of the *navicularii*, whether they were still organized into a corporation or not, were regulated, for the provisioning of Constantinople was one of the deepest concerns of the central government.⁴⁰ The abolition of the gratuitous distribution of bread probably also affected the organization of the guild of the bakers. The *Book of the Prefect* has now been definitely shown to have been the work of Leo VI (886-912),⁴¹ but the various trade or-

³⁵ Synesius, *De regno*, p. 134 of A. Fitzgerald's translation, *The essays and hymns of Synesius of Cyrene*, I (London, 1930).

³⁶ *Chronicon Paschale*, ed. L. Dindorf (Bonn, 1832), I; 711; Dölger, *Beiträge . . .*, p. 58.

³⁷ Their compensation for the transportation of grain for the state was increased ten-fold: Stöckle, "Navicularii" in *Pauly-Wissowa*, XVI (Stuttgart, 1935), 1931; Rouillard, *op. cit.*, 142 f.

³⁸ John of Nikiu, *Chronicle*, tr. by R. H. Charles (London, 1916), 165.

³⁹ H. Gelzer (editor), *Leontios von Neapolis Leben des Heiligen Johannes des Barmherzigen . . .* (Freiburg, 1893), pp. 18, 54; B. N. Nelson and J. Starr, "The legend of the divine surety and the Jewish money-lender," *Université libre de Bruxelles: Annuaire de l'institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves*, VII (New York, 1944), 298 ff.; A. Ashburner, *The Rhodian sea-law* (Oxford, 1909). The date of the composition of this code cannot be definitely fixed. It is placed in the period between 600 and 800 A.D.: *Ibid.*, lxxv.

⁴⁰ G. I. Bratianu, "La question de l'approvisionnement de Constantinople," *Byzantion*, V (Brussels, 1930), 91.

⁴¹ A. Christophilopoulos, *Τὸ ἐπαρχικὸν βιβλίον Λέοντος τοῦ Σοφοῦ καὶ αἱ συντεχνίαι ἐν Βυζαντίῳ* (Athens, 1935), p. 24.

ganizations which it regulated were not the creations of that emperor; they were the continuations of the trade guilds of the early centuries of the later Roman empire.⁴² The impression given by this document is that the bakers were neither attached to their trade nor was that trade hereditary.⁴³ The same thing is true of the dealers in pork.⁴⁴

When these changes took place is, of course, impossible to determine, but that they may be associated with the abolition of the gratuitous distribution of bread is not at all improbable. Indeed, the principles of attachment to one's trade and the hereditary transmission of it which characterized the public corporations of the early centuries were already being abandoned by the end of the sixth century. The complaint of the *saponarii* of Naples addressed to pope Gregory I at the end of the sixth century to the effect that the *palatinus* of Naples permitted anyone to enter their corporation is well known.⁴⁵ During the reign of Heraclius, however, an attempt seems to have been made to check the tendency to ignore the regulations requiring the hereditary transmission of one's trade at least in those corporations that directly affected the interests of the state. There is a law, preserved in the *Basilics* and probably issued by Heraclius, which restricted admission to the public corporations, those corporations that were directly managed by and served the state, to the descendants and relatives of the corporation members. This law, however, did not apply to the private corporations. These enrolled their members without reference to any hereditary rights.^{45a} By the end of the ninth century, therefore, attachment to one's profession and the hereditary transmission of it no longer seems to have been a feature, at least, of the private corporations, and this development must have taken place during the seventh or eighth century, the result of the force of circumstances rather than of the conscious efforts of the government. All corporations, however, whether public or private, were strictly regulated, but these regulations had in view not only the interests of the State, but also those of the public at large as well as those of the trades themselves.⁴⁶ The organization of

⁴² A. Stöckle, *Spättrömische und byzantinische Zünfte* (Klio, Beiheft IX, Leipzig, 1911), p. 140 f.

⁴³ *Le Livre du préfet ou l'édit de l'empereur Léon le Sage sur les corporations de Constantinople*, ed. T. Nicole (Geneva, 1893), C. 18. The *Book* has been reprinted by T. and P. Zepos, *Jus Graeco-romanum*, 2 (Athens, 1931), 371-392. There is also an English translation: A. E. R. Boak, "The Book of the Prefect," *Journal of economic and business history*, I (Cambridge, 1929), 600 ff.

⁴⁴ *The Book of the Prefect*, C. XIV.

⁴⁵ Stöckle, *Spättrömische und byzantinische Zünfte*, p. 40, where the reference to the letter of Gregory I is given.

^{45a} See the brilliant study of R. S. Lopez, "Silk industry in the Byzantine empire," *Speculum*, XX (Cambridge, 1945), 5.

⁴⁶ Besides Stöckle (*op. cit.*), Christophilopoulos, (*op. cit.*), Mickwitz (*op. cit.*), the urban economy of Byzantium in the tenth century has been studied by C. M. Macri, *L'organisation de l'économie urbaine dans Byzance sous la dynastie de Macé-*

the trades in Byzantium during this period was indeed more balanced and freer than was the case during the early centuries of the empire.⁴⁷

This society of small farmers, and of artisans organized and regulated for the interest of all was undermined by the social struggle of the tenth century and the political and military disasters of the eleventh. Indeed this social struggle was one of the principal reasons for the fall of the empire from its pre-ëminent position.

Everything being equal, the small farmer, with his strips of land, a pair of oxen, and a mule or a donkey, managed to provide for his family, but it was difficult, if indeed not impossible, to accumulate a reserve with which to meet an emergency. Any misfortune, as for instance, the loss of one of his animals, might endanger his entire social and economic position. For the loss would lessen his productivity and he might not be able to pay his taxes or meet the demands of his creditors, if he had been unfortunate enough to have resorted to borrowing. In either case he might abandon his land and run away.⁴⁸ Protracted service in the army might have the same results. Then again his whole existence might be endangered by the incursions of the enemy, an earthquake or a famine. Wars and famines were quite frequent during the tenth century. Under these circumstances the small farmer evinced a desire to sell his land, and to try and eke a living by working for some large landed magnate. And there was no lack of purchasers. The landed aristocracy had never ceased to occupy a very important position in the society of the empire. It was a powerful and wealthy group, controlling the high military functions of the empire and enjoying many economic privileges. This aristocracy had grown still more powerful in the course of the ninth century; many of them had found their way into the free village communities;⁴⁹ they began now the systematic

doine (Paris, 1925), and G. Zoras, *Le corporazioni bizantine; studio sull' ἐπαρχικὸν βιβλίον dell' imperatore Leone VI* (Rome, 1931). Zoras' book was not available to me.

⁴⁷ A. Andreades, "Byzance: Paradis du monopole et du privilège," in *Byzantion*, IX (Brussels, 1934), 171 ff. See also S. Runciman, *Byzantine civilization* (London, 1933), 174 ff.

⁴⁸ Fourmy and Leroy, "La vie de S. Philarète," *Byzantion* IX (1934), 117-119, where a peasant complains that, having lost one of his oxen, there is nothing left for him but to run away for he will no longer be able to pay his tax and his creditors.

⁴⁹ Some of the peasants themselves became great magnates as, for instance, Philaretos and Philocales (note 22). The aristocracy could find their way into the free village community easily through the system of *klasmata*. According to the principles of the *allelengyon* the neighbors of abandoned land were responsible for the taxes to that land, but in order to lessen the tax burdens of these people and prevent them from running away too, the government often relieved them from this responsibility by freeing the abandoned land from all taxes. If at the end of thirty years the original owners did not return, the land was taken over by the fisc. It was usually sold or granted to the aristocracy, for the aristocracy were the only ones able to buy it. Cf. Ostrogorsky, "Agrarian conditions in the Byzantine empire . . .," p. 203.

absorption by various means, but principally by purchase, of the land holding of the small farmers, for land offered the most promising outlet for economic expansion, as the economy of the empire was basically agricultural. Thus the small independent farmer tended more and more to disappear.

The great emperors of the tenth century realized the dangerous social and political implications of this tendency and they tried to put a stop to it. As Romanus Lecapenus put it in one of his novels designed to protect the holdings of the peasants: "It is not through hatred and envy of the rich that we take these measures, but for the protection of the small and the safety of the empire as a whole. . . . The extension of the power of the strong . . . will bring about the irreparable loss of the public good, if the present law does not bring a check to it. For it is the many, settled on the land, who provide for the general needs, who pay the taxes and furnish the army with its recruits. Everything falls when the many are wanting."⁵⁰ And by a series of measures Lecapenus and his successors fought valiantly against the absorption of the small holdings by the powerful.⁵¹

But the aristocracy resisted and a social struggle ensued which underlies the entire development of the internal politics of the empire in the tenth century and determined its fate. The aristocracy, led by certain powerful families, of which the most important were the Doukases and the Phocas, challenged the imperial authority. One of the Phocas ascended the throne, and a reaction in favor of the landed aristocracy took place during his reign.⁵² His relatives tried to emulate his example, and it was only

⁵⁰ Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Jus Graeco-Romanum*, III, 246-47.

⁵¹ G. Testaud, *Des rapports des puissants et des petits propriétaires ruraux dans l'empire byzantin au x^e siècle* (Bordeaux, 1898). V. Vasilievsky, "Materials for the history of the Byzantine state," *Journal of the Ministry of Public Instruction*, CCII (St. Petersburg, 1879) (in Russian), 160-230. My knowledge of Russian is very elementary, but I consulted the works of Vasilievsky as well as other Russian works with the aid of Mrs. Nathalie Scheffer. Dölger, "Die Frage des Grundeigentums in Byzanz," *Bulletin of international committee of historical sciences*, V (1933), 5 ff. Andreades, "Floraison et décadence de la petite propriété dans l'empire byzantin," *Mélanges offerts à Ernest Mahaim*, I (Paris, 1935), 261-266; A. M. Diomedes, "Ἡ πολιτικὴ τῆς μακεδονικῆς δυναστείας κατὰ τῆς μεγάλης ἰδιοκτησίας. Τὰ αἷτια," *Ἑλληνικά*, XI (Athens, 1939), 246-262; Ostrogorsky, "Agrarian conditions in the Byzantine empire . . .," 204-210.

⁵² Nicephorus II Phocas (963-969). In his novel of 967 Nicephorus deprived the peasants of the right of pre-emption in the sale of property belonging to the aristocracy. That right had been given to them by Constantine Porphyrogenitus (*Jus Graeco-Romanum*, III; 296 f.). In another novel he increased the value of the inalienable minimum of a military holding from four to twelve pounds of gold. This had the effect of making of the soldiery a lesser nobility. (*Ibid.*, p. 299 f.). On the progressive side was his measure prohibiting new monastic foundations and all transfers of land to churches and monasteries (*ibid.*, p. 292 ff.). This was repealed by Basil II (*ibid.*, p. 303).

with the aid of six thousand Russians that Basil II finally crushed them in 987. This struggle between the landed aristocracy and the central government is echoed in the popular songs that were composed during this period and were incorporated in the Byzantine epic, *Digenis Akritas*. Grégoire has shown that the great heroes of the poem are the Doukases and the Phocases and that the whole work, at least the original version, is permeated by an anti-imperial tradition.⁵³

The principal provision of the various novels issued by the emperors in the tenth century was the prohibition of the purchase by the aristocracy of the holdings of the small farmers. The sale of these holdings was not prohibited, but the right of purchase was reserved for certain persons who stood in a definite relationship to the property offered for sale.⁵⁴ In the first category in the order of preference came those persons whose own property was mixed up with that offered for sale and together with which it formed an economic unit (*ἀναμειγμένοι*) and among these those were preferred who were joint owners, if such persons existed, and of the latter relatives came first. In the second category came those who had property adjoining that offered for sale (*συμπαράκειμένοι*) and of these the preference was given to those who were jointly responsible with the seller for the taxes. If all these persons declined to make the purchase then the property might be sold to any other member of the community in which the property was located.⁵⁵ The aristocracy was further prohibited from accepting the property of the poor by legacy or gift or to extend to them their protection.

The repeated issuance of these prohibitions is the clearest evidence that the acquisition of the property of the small peasants by the aristocracy was not checked. The reason is not far to seek. The aristocracy was powerful and was in a position to circumvent the measures taken by the central government, while these measures did not strike at the roots of the problem. The persons given the right of purchase belonged in general to the same social and economic status as the sellers, and if the latter were not able to keep their property, it was not very likely that the former would be in such a better position as to be able not only to keep their own property but also to buy that of their neighbor. Accordingly, as the aristocracy was the only element that could invest in new land, the peasant who wanted to sell his land had no other recourse than to turn to the aristocracy, and as long as the conditions which made the peasant sell his land continued to exist the prohibition against the purchase of that land by the aristocracy

⁵³ H. Grégoire, *Digenis Akritas* (New York, 1942, in Greek), p. 72 f.

⁵⁴ This preferential treatment given to certain persons is known in Byzantine law as *protimesis*: G. Platon, "Observations sur le droit de *πορτῶνους* en droit byzantin, in *Revue générale du droit, de la législation et de la jurisprudence en France et à l'étranger*, XXVII-XXIX (Paris, 1903, 1904, 1905).

⁵⁵ Ostrogorsky, "Die ländliche Steuergemeinde . . .," p. 32 ff.

could not be very effective. But the problem could be solved by the amelioration of the conditions of the poor peasants which would lessen the necessity for them to sell their land. The measure taken by Basil II in 1002 attacked the problem from this point of view. He decreed that henceforth the aristocracy were to pay the *allelengyon* for the poor, i.e., they were to pay the tax arrears of those peasants who were too poor to meet their own obligations, but while paying the tax the aristocracy were not to enjoy the usufruct of the property involved. The right of usufruct was to be enjoyed by the peasant who still remained the owner of the land.⁵⁶ This measure was designed not only to help the poor peasants, but also to crush the aristocracy. When, after 987, Basil was reconciled with Bardas Sclerus, one of his most formidable opponents, the latter advised him that, if he were to preserve the imperial authority, he should permit no one of the aristocracy to prosper and should exhaust their means by heavy taxes.⁵⁷ By the measure of 1002 Basil tried to put this advice into effect.

But the aristocracy was too strong and not long after the death of Basil, during the reign of Romanus III Argyrus (1028–1034), Basil's law concerning the *allelengyon* was repealed,⁵⁸ while the laws prohibiting the purchase of the peasants' land by the aristocracy were not enforced. On the land question the aristocracy triumphed, but the struggle of the central government against its widespread influence continued under another form.

One of the important reasons for the triumph of the aristocracy was the very strong hold that it had upon the military positions of the empire. If it could be shaken from this hold, it would lose in power and influence and would become more amenable to the wishes of the imperial government. And this is precisely what certain emperors of the eleventh century, notably Constantine IX Monomachus (1042–1055), tried to do.⁵⁹ The means of attack which they employed was to weaken the military organization by reducing the size of the army, thus depriving the aristocracy of its military commands.⁶⁰ The great military triumphs of the tenth century, the crushing of the Saracens and the Bulgarians and the pushing of the frontiers to the Euphrates and the Tigris in the east, to the Danube in the

⁵⁶ Cedrenus, *Historiarum Compendium* (Bonn, 1839), II, 456.

⁵⁷ M. Psellos, *Chronographie*, ed. and tr. into French by É. Renaud (Paris, 1926), I, 17.

⁵⁸ Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, 486.

⁵⁹ For the position of the empire in the eleventh century the two fundamental books are: C. Neumann, *Die Weltstellung des byzantinischen Reiches vor den Kreuzzügen* (Leipzig, 1894). French translation (Paris, 1905). N. Skabalanovich, *Byzantine state and church in the eleventh century* (St. Petersburg, 1884, in Russian).

⁶⁰ Zonaras, *Epitomae Historiarum*, ed. T. Büttner-Wobst (Bonn, 1897), III, 627, 653.

Balkans, created a sense of security and the feeling that the maintenance of a powerful army was no longer necessary. With Constantine IX Monomachus, peace became the keynote of the imperial foreign policy,⁶¹ and there began a systematic elimination of the aristocracy from the army while at the same time the development of a civil bureaucracy was promoted. The wars of the seventh century had led to the militarization of the administration; now, under the impression that the enemies of the empire had been crushed forever, the imperial government sought to demilitarize the administration. But the aristocracy fought back, and a new struggle ensued, this time between the aristocracy as a military class, and a new party of civil officials.

The struggle plunged the empire into a series of civil wars that squandered its resources and man power at a time when new and formidable enemies were making their appearance, both in the east and in the west. But the most serious result of the imperial policy was the deterioration of the army. While heaping honor after honor upon his civil advisors Constantine IX Monomachus neglected the army and retired its generals. His measure depriving the soldiers of the frontier regions of the payment which they had been accustomed to receive further added to the deterioration of the army⁶² and left the frontiers wide open to the barbarians. The profession of the soldier which in the great days of Byzantium carried with it prestige, honor and position had no longer any value, and so, as Skylitzes puts it, "the soldiers put aside their arms and became lawyers or jurists."⁶³ The same author, writing of the army that took the field against the Seljuks in 1071 says: "The army was composed of Macedonians and Bulgarians and Cappadocians, Uzi, Franks and Varangians and other barbarians who happened to be about. [One should add: Patzinaks.] There were gathered also those who were in Phrygia (*θέμα ἀνατολικῶν*). And what one saw in them was something incredible. The renowned champions of the Romans who had reduced into subjection all of the east and the west now numbered only a few and these were bowed down by poverty and ill-treatment. They lacked in weapons, swords and other arms, such as

⁶¹ Psellos, *op. cit.*, I, 151 f.

⁶² Zonaras, *op. cit.*, III, 647. According to Zonaras what Constantine IX did was to relieve the frontier regions of their military obligations, transforming them into money payments. Michael Attaliotes (p. 44) gives a different version. According to him the soldiers of the frontier region of Iberia received payments from the nearby public lands (*χώρας*). This means, as Skabalanovich (*op. cit.*, 311) long ago pointed out, that the taxes raised in Iberia and the surrounding regions, instead of going to the imperial treasury, were used to meet the payments allowed to the frontier soldiers. Monomachus stopped these payments and turned over to the treasury the returns from these taxes.

⁶³ Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, 652.

javelins and scythes. . . . They lacked also in cavalry and other equipment, for the emperor had not taken the field for a long time. For this reason they were regarded as useless and unnecessary and their wages and maintenance were reduced."⁶⁴ The result was Mantzikert.

Mantzikert was only a battle and what was lost there might have been retrieved had the society of the empire been healthier and more vigorous or new measures had been taken to make it so. The neglect of the army meant also the neglect of that class of soldiers that had been created in the seventh century along with the establishment of the system of themes. The protection of the interests of these soldiers had been one of the deepest concerns of the emperors of the tenth century,⁶⁵ but by the end of the eleventh century these soldiers were reduced into poverty and henceforth ceased to be an important element in the society of the empire.⁶⁶ Their disappearance further depressed what remained of the free village community just as their creation had helped to invigorate that community. Henceforth the rural economy of the empire was to consist of the large estates, owned by the lay nobility or the church and worked by servile labor.⁶⁷ The free independent peasant virtually ceased to exist. In the meantime the commercial privileges granted to Venice and to other Italian cities in return for assistance against the many enemies of the empire under-

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 668.

⁶⁵ Wrote Constantine Porphyrogenitus in the novel designed to protect the interests of the soldiers: "The army is to the state what the head is to the body. . . . He who neglects it neglects the safety of the state. . . . Therefore in promulgating our constitution (on the military estates), we feel we are working for the welfare of all." (*Jus Graecoromanum*, III, 262 f.). On the various measures taken by the emperors of the tenth century to protect the military estates see in general R. Gaignerot, *Des Bénéfices militaires dans l'empire romain et spécialement en Orient et au X^e siècle* (Bordeaux, 1889), p. 60 ff.

⁶⁶ Already at Mantzikert the mercenary occupies a very important position in the Byzantine army: C. Cahen, "La campagne de Mantzikert d'après les sources musulmanes," *Byzantion* IX (Brussels, 1934), 629. After Mantzikert the mercenaries dominate almost completely. The armies of Alexius Comnenus, for instance, were composed of Russians, Turks, Alans, English, Franks, Germans, Bulgarians and others (*Jus Graeco-romanum*, 3: 373). Cf. *Byzantion*, XIV (1939), p. 280 sgg. The military fiefs were revived in the later part of the eleventh century and continued to the end of the empire, but the holders of them were usually officers and, therefore, belonged to the aristocracy. Some common soldiers were included among them, however. These military grants were known as *pronoiae*. The two fundamental works on the Byzantine *pronoia* are: (1) P. Mutačiev, "Vojniski zemi i vojnici v Vizantija prez xiii/xiv v.", *Spisanie na Bŭlgarskata Akademija*, xxvii (Sofia, 1923), 37 ff; (2) Th. Uspensky, "Značenie vizantijskoj južnoslavjanskoj pronii," *Sbornik V. J. Lamanskomu*, (St. Petersburg, 1885), 1-32.

⁶⁷ On the tendency toward feudalism in the Byzantine empire during the twelfth century and after see A. Vasiliev, "On the question of Byzantine feudalism," *Byzantion*, VIII (Brussels, 1933).

mined the economy of the cities.⁶⁸ Complete recovery under these circumstances was impossible.

In the history of the later Roman empire war and religion were the two principal factors that moulded the society of the empire and determined its external position.

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY.

⁶⁸ The granting of commercial privileges to the Italian republics, says Andreades, "became the gnawing worm of the Byzantine public economy." A. Andreades, *Ιστορία τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Δημοσίας Οἰκονομίας*, I (Athens, 1918), 514.



THE GREEK HISTORICAL SOURCES OF THE SECOND HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Source: *Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January, 1944), pp. 406-412

Published by: Polish Institute of Arts & Sciences of America

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24725044>

Accessed: 20-05-2019 00:14 UTC

REFERENCES

Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/24725044?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents

You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Polish Institute of Arts & Sciences of America is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America*

Let us not permit the illustrious names of our great men and our past to be sullied.

And we who are here in this great country of the future, of which we expect so much, let us show our own country in the light in which it deserves to be shown. Let us not judge before investigating all circumstances, before learning the whole truth.

This is our greatest cultural problem today.

THE GREEK HISTORICAL SOURCES OF THE SECOND HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

By PROFESSOR PETER CHARANIS

Rutgers University

In the history of the Balkan peoples the events of the second half of the fourteenth century are of the utmost importance. They laid the foundation of the political and social structure of the Balkan peninsula which lasted for several centuries. That structure was not seriously shaken until the latter part of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth centuries.

The rise of the Ottoman Turks to the position of dominance was, of course, the most significant phenomenon of the second half of the fourteenth century. This was a capital event in the history of Europe and its repercussions were world-wide. It created that Eastern Question which has caused directly or indirectly most of our modern wars and may yet cause the break-up of the grand alliance which has been formed under the pressure of the Nazis.

Yet, despite its world-wide importance, the history of this period is not well known, for many problems connected with the collapse of the Christians in the Balkan peninsula and the rise of the Ottoman Turks to a position of world significance remain still to be solved. This is, of course, due to the fragmentary nature of the sources and it is with the problem of the sources, more specifically, the Greek sources, that this paper is concerned. By its very nature it cannot, of course, be an exhaustive study; it will be restricted to some general remarks and suggestions.

The second half of the fourteenth century bequeathed to posterity no great historical work in Greek. Such a work may have existed;

there are some evidences that it did exist,¹ but what matters is that it has not been preserved and for the story of what happened during this period one had to rely chiefly upon the works of the Greek historians of the fifteenth century, Dukas, Phrantzes and Chalkokondyles.² Now, these are important names in the history of Byzantine historiography. They were the last in a series of Greek historians, who, beginning with Herodotus, have left an almost continuous record of the history of the Near East without which that history would be very inadequately known. Like most Byzantine historians, they were men of affairs as well as historians. They were eye witnesses of many of the events which they describe and knew well the important personalities of their times and for this reason their works are invaluable for the history of the fifteenth century. But for that of the fourteenth century they offer very little; their accounts are brief, fragmentary, confusing, often inaccurate. Still, their testimony is of some importance. Their inaccuracies are chiefly in matters of chronology. They confuse events of different dates, but they seldom mention anything that did not actually take place, and unless it can be shown by reference to contemporary and more trustworthy sources that they are inaccurate, their testimony cannot be rejected. But, as their accounts are brief, they are wholly inadequate for the reconstruction of the history of the second half of the fourteenth century. There is need of a fuller account, both of events and personalities, and, a more accurate chronology.

Despite the lack of a detailed contemporary historical work it is not impossible to reconstruct this account. The fourteenth century was a period of political and economic decline for the Greeks, but it was also a period of intellectual and artistic development. Learning flourished in the great Greek centers, in Constantinople, in Thessalonica, in Mistra. Men studied and wrote profusely. They wrote discourses, treatises of all sorts, letters. Much of this literature still lay unpublished in the various libraries of Europe and this is one of the reasons why this period is so inadequately known. And that which has been published has not yet been sufficiently studied. Not all of this literature is valuable as source material; much of it is almost

¹ See my article, "An important short chronicle of the fourteenth century," *Byzantion*, XIII (Brussels, 1938), 339.

² On these historians see W. Miller, "The last Athenian historian: Laonikos Chalkokondyles," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XLII (London, 1922), 36-49; "The historians Doukas and Phrantzes," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XLV (London, 1926), 63-71.

completely devoid of historical interest, except in so far as it reveals a certain mentality, but there is much which is of great historical value. This is particularly true of the works of Demetrius Cydones and Manuel Palaeologus, outstanding personalities of the second half of the fourteenth century, men of affairs as well as scholars. This paper is in reality a plea for the publication of the complete works of Demetrius Cydones.

Demetrius Cydones was one of the most famous men of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.³ He lived for almost a century and throughout this period he was continuously active both in politics and in the realm of letters. He knew the important personalities and understood the issues of his times. For many years he was one of the principal advisors of John V and of his son and successor, Manuel II. But his knowledge and acquaintances extended beyond the confines of the Greek world. Cydones knew the West also. He had visited Italy several times, learned Latin and made numerous friends, particularly in Venice and Rome. Venice made him an honorary citizen and the papacy looked upon him as one of its staunchest supporters in the East. Cydones abandoned Greek Christianity in favor of that of Rome; translated into Greek the *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas and the works of other Latin theologians; and worked hard to bring about the union of the churches, or at least, a rapprochement between Greeks and Latins. His aim in politics was two-fold: to stop the internal strife among the Greeks and to check the ever-growing power of the Ottoman Turks, for he saw clearly that they would destroy the empire. His conversion to Catholicism, however, lessened his influence among the people and the clergy of Constantinople and he was not very effective among them. But his influence in the imperial council and among the ruling elements of the empire was great. If not always an active participant of the important events of the fourteenth century, nevertheless he was always in a position to know. It is this that makes his works extremely important as historical sources.

Cydones wrote voluminously. His political writings and his letters

³ There is yet no adequate study on Demetrius Cydones. Such a work will not be possible until the complete publication of his works. The article of G. Cammelli, "Demetrio Cidonio: Brevi notizie della vita e delle opere," *Studi Italiani di filologia classica*, N.S. I (1920) is mediocre. G. Mercati's work on Cydones, as far as I know, is not available in this country. On Cydones' efforts to bring about a rapprochement between Greeks and Latins see O. Halecki's brilliant work, *Un Empereur de Byzance à Rome* (Warsaw, 1930).

are the most important as historical sources. He has left three political discourses, besides several orations addressed to John Cantacuzenus and John V Palaeologus. Two of these discourses, the one advising an alliance with the Latins in order to check the expansion of the Ottomans, and the other, counseling against the surrender of Gallipoli to the Ottomans, were written during the second half of the fourteenth century and throw considerable light upon the political position of the empire. The discourse for the Latin alliance, pronounced about 1366, reveals a division among the Greeks as to foreign policy. The continuous expansion of the Ottomans was, of course, the great problem, on that every one agreed; but how to check this expansion, on that there was no agreement. Some believed that the salvation of the empire lay in an alliance with the Latins; others sought to unite the orthodox peoples of the Balkan peninsula against the Turkish danger. Demetrius Cydones was one of the outspoken leaders of the former and he made his discourse in order to win the people of Constantinople to his point of view. The discourse against the surrender of Gallipoli, delivered in 1377, reveals the empire still more divided and impotent. It appears resigned to the triumph of the Turks and ready to do their bidding. This discourse must be interpreted in the light of the letter of Cydones to his friend Calopheros, written in 1377, which explains the cession of Gallipoli to the Turks. Gallipoli was surrendered to the Turks by Andronicus IV, who had obtained their help in his successful revolt against his father in 1376. Both these discourses of Cydones appear in Migne, but they need to be reedited and translated. They are important documents for the history of the Balkan peninsula in the second half of the fourteenth century.

The letters of Cydones are still more valuable as source material. Cydones had many important acquaintances among his contemporaries and he corresponded with them frequently. His letters do not consist of obscure or meaningless phrases; they deal rather with the happenings and interests of his times. For this reason they are important sources of information. Of the 447 letters that Cydones left, only about 100 have been published and yet they have yielded sufficient information to solve a number of problems connected with the history of the empire during the second half of the fourteenth century.⁴ One may expect much more when all the letters are

⁴ See my forthcoming article, "The strife among the Palaeologi and the Ottoman Turks," *Byzantion*, XVI.

published. Giuseppe Cammelli has promised a complete edition; it is to be hoped that it will be much better than that of the fifty letters which he published in 1930.⁵ The history of the fourteenth century will not be adequately known until the publication of all the letters of Cydones. They will doubtless also throw considerable light on the problem of the relation of Byzantium to the Renaissance in Italy.

Next to the works of Cydones those of the emperor Manuel Palaeologus are the most important. With the possible exception of Michael VIII, Manuel was the ablest among the Palaeologi to occupy the throne.⁶ Under different circumstances he might have gone down in history as a great emperor. The empire which he inherited, however, was already a third rate power, and despite his valiant efforts he was not able to check definitely its decline. He tried hard to preserve what was left of it, now by cooperating with the Ottomans, now by sowing dissension among them, now through alliances with the West, and he succeeded to a certain extent, but he was never able to lend to it new strength. It was already too late for that; the empire had neither the manpower nor the financial resources for a comeback. Its economic life had been sapped by the commercial domination of the Venetians and the Genoese, and by the occupation of its wealthiest provinces by the Turks. Manuel was a Greek, Greek in nationality, Greek in education, Greek in sentiment. Consideration of policy often led him to serve the Ottomans, but he was never reconciled spiritually to their domination. The company of Bayazid was particularly detestable to him. In a letter to Cydones written while he was accompanying Bayazid in an expedition into Asia Minor and describing at length the sufferings and privations that he and his army had to endure and giving a vivid picture of the decadence into which Asia Minor had fallen since the Byzantines were driven out, he writes: "But I stop, for well nigh do I see those who come to call us to join the chief. Perhaps he wishes again to drink a health and to force us to take our fill of wine from his manifold golden bowls and drinking-cups. He thinks thus to assuage our grief brought on by the ills I have described. But, had we been of good cheer, this alone would have been enough to sadden us."

⁵ Giuseppe Cammelli (ed.), *Démétrius Cydonès: Correspondance* (Paris, 1930).

⁶ The work of Berger de Xivrey ("Mémoire sur la vie et les ouvrages de l'empereur Manuel Paléologue," *Mémoires de l'Institut de France. Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres*, XIX, part 2, Paris, 1853) is still fundamental but it needs revision.

Manuel wrote considerably, for he was not only a diplomat and soldier, but also a scholar. Altogether something like 109 discourses and letters from the pen of Manuel have been preserved. The discourses deal with a variety of subjects; two of them are particularly important as sources: The funeral oration, composed in memory of his brother, Theodore, a document which throws considerable light upon conditions in the Morea and the struggle with the Ottomans, and the dialogues over the respective merits of Christianity and Islam. Berger de Xivrey considers the funeral oration as the only one of Manuel's works of a historical character, but the dialogues are also important, for, although they deal primarily with theological questions, they give a vivid picture of the barbarous luxury of the Sultan's court and the misery of the Byzantine emperor. Unfortunately, they cannot yet be fully utilized, for they have been only partially published. Then there are the letters of the emperor; not all of them have any historical significance, but those that do are extremely valuable. Besides the information which they contain, they reveal the spiritual agony of Manuel in having to serve the Ottomans, as the passage quoted above clearly indicates. Cydones and Manuel offer to the historian important sources of information, and unless these are fully utilized the history of the second half of the fourteenth century will not be adequately known.

One of the most difficult problems connected with the history of the second half of the fourteenth century is the problem of chronology. The chronological data given by the historians of the fifteenth century are wholly inaccurate. Cydones and Manuel make no contributions. Indeed, as their works are not dated, they add to the difficulty of this problem. For years, the late Greek scholar, Spyridon Lampros, kept collecting numerous chronological notices which he found in various manuscripts. Lampros, whose works are fundamental for the study of the period of the Palaeologi, died before he was able to publish all these notices. These notices were published a few years ago under the direction of C. Amantos.⁷ This edition suffers from serious deficiencies, but at least it makes available a number of short chronicles. These chronicles contain important chronological data and additional information, particularly concerning the civil strife among the Palaeologi. With their aid, it has been possible also to establish the chronology of some of the

⁷ S. Lampros and C. I. Amantos, *Brachea Chronika* (Athens, 1932-33).

works of Cydones and Manuel which has made these works much more valuable. They need to be studied still further.

These are the principal Greek sources for the history of the second half of the fourteenth century. They have not yet been fully utilized, but by their very nature they cannot be adequate by themselves. They must, of course, be supplemented by the non-Greek sources, particularly by the Venetian, Genoese and papal documents.

The Phonikon and other Byzantine Taxes

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Source: *Speculum*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Jul., 1945), pp. 331-333

Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Medieval Academy of America

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2854615>

Accessed: 20-05-2019 00:07 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Medieval Academy of America, The University of Chicago Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Speculum*

THE PHONIKON AND OTHER BYZANTINE TAXES

By PETER CHARANIS

ANDRÉ MIRAMBEL has just published an interesting study on the vendetta in southern Greece, notably Maina.¹ Of the general thesis of his article we are not competent to judge, but we wish to make some observations on his interpretation of the data which he drew from official Byzantine documents of the fourteenth century, and in particular on his understanding of the term *φόνος* or *φονικόν*.

Mirambel writes (p. 389): 'The tradition of the vendetta existed among the Slavs. . . . The character of the institution must have struck the Greeks since, first, it is mentioned as a specific feature of alien tribes, second it is described rather clumsily and, finally, it is generally referred to under the name *φόνος* "murder." ' He cites among others a passage from the chrysobull of Andronicus II which was issued to George Trulenos in 1299 confirming his possession of some property which he owned near Serras.² Here is the passage: *ἀνευ μέντοι τοῦ κεφαλαίου τῆς σιταρκίας, τῆς καστροκτισίας, τῆς ὀρικῆς, τοῦ φόνου*. Mirambel translated: "with the exception of provisioning of corn, construction of castles, mountain life, vendetta" (p. 389).

In general a translation is the best commentary, but in this case it will not do. The terms employed in this passage are technical and belong to the official tax terminology of the Byzantines. They are untranslatable. The passage in question deals with a matter of taxes. The estates of Trulenos were exempted from certain taxes, but these exemptions did not include the taxes called *sitarkia*, *kastroktisia*, *orike*, and that of *phonos*. There is still some discussion as to the exact nature of these taxes, but there is some reason in believing that *sitarkia*³ was the general land tax payable in money, *kastroktisia* was the corvée for the construction and maintenance of fortifications, but it could be fulfilled by a money payment,⁴ and *orike*⁵ was a tax on mountain pastures.

The payment of *phonos*, called more often *phonikon*, has been studied by G. Rouillard and A. Soloviev in a joint work based on the chrysobull which Andronicus II issued to the monastery of Laura in 1298.⁶ This chrysobull has not

¹ André Mirambel, 'Blood Vengeance (Maina) in southern Greece and among the Slavs,' *Byzantion*, xvi (Boston, 1944), 381-392.

² F. Miklosich et J. Müller, *Acta et Diplomata*, (Vienna, 1887), 5: 89-90.

³ Vasilievsky followed by Ostrogorsky thinks that this is the general land tax: George Ostrogorsky, 'Die ländliche Steuergemeinde des byzantinischen Reiches im X. Jahrh.,' *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, xx (Stuttgart, 1927), 50 f. Dölger on the other hand takes it to stand for the old Roman *annona*: F. Dölger, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der byzantinischen Finanzverwaltung* (Leipzig, 1927), p. 57 ff. I think Vasilievsky and Ostrogorsky are right. I shall discuss the problem of taxation in Byzantium in my book on Michael VIII that I am now preparing.

⁴ T. Florinsky, *Athonian Acts* (St Petersburg, 1880), p. 79: *εἰς δόσον τῶν πεντήκοντα ὑπερπύρων ἅπερ ἐδίδουν κατ' ἔτος χάριν τοῦ κεφαλαίου τῆς σιταρκίας τῆς ὀρικῆς καὶ τῆς καστροκτησίας*.

⁵ This is generally taken to be a tax on mountain pastures: Ostrogorsky, *op. cit.*, p. 57; Henri Grégoire has suggested to me that this term may be connected with *ὄρεῖς* (mule) and derived from *ὀρικός* (of or for a mule). If the suggestion is correct then this tax would be a tax on mules.

⁶ G. Rouillard and A. Soloviev, 'Τὸ φονικόν: Une influence slave sur le droit pénal byzantin,' in *Μνημόσυνα Παππούλια* (Athens, 1934), 221-232.

yet been published, but the clause which deals with the *phonikon* has been printed in the study of Rouillard and Solov'yev.¹ Here is the text:

Ναὶ μὴν διατηρηθήσεται τὰ τοιαῦτα κτήματα ἀνενόχλητα πάντα καὶ ἀδιάσειστα, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ φονικοῦ μὲν ὀνομαζόμενον, κακῶς δ' ἐπινενοημένον, ἅτε δὴ τοῦ φόνου οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἄλλης τινος τοιαύτης ἐπιχειρήσεως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τρόπον ἕτερον καὶ τυχηρὰν αἰτίαν συμβαίνοντος. Εἰ δὲ γε φανερώς καὶ ὁμολογουμένως εὐρεθείη ἄνθρωπος, ἄνθρωπον ἀπεκτονῶς, τότε δὴ καὶ μόνον ὀφείλει ἀπαιτεῖν ὁ δημόσιος ἐξ αὐτοῦ μόνου τοῦ φονεύσαντος ἢ καὶ ἐτέρων εἰς τοῦτο συνεργησάντων αὐτῷ τὸ ἀνήκον ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου φόνου. Ἐτέρῳ δὲ τινι τῶν μὴ συμπραξάντων μὴ ἐνοχλεῖν ὅλως ὑπὲρ τούτου.

I translate: 'That these properties may remain undisturbed and unmolested also in the matter of the *phonikon*, i.e., the *phonikon* badly understood and applied when the murder is committed not by the premeditation of men or some other attempt of this kind, but happens in some other way or results from some fortuitous cause. But if a man is found to have clearly and confessedly killed another, it is then only that the treasury must demand from the murderer alone and his accomplices what belongs to it as a result of the crime. But whoever was not an accomplice is not to be disturbed in this matter.'

The *phonikon* here appears clearly as a fine imposed by the treasury on the culprit in a case of premeditated murder. Still more precise and definite on this question is another chrysobull of Andronicus II, issued in favor of the bishopric of Kanina in Albania in 1307 and published recently by Paul J. Alexander.² Here is the text:³

Ὅποτεν συμβῇ ἐνεργηθῆναι φόνον παρὰ τινος τῶν παροίκων τῆς αὐτῆς ἀγιοτάτης ἐπισκοπῆς ἢ ἐτέρου τινὸς προσγενοῦς τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ κληρικῶν, εἰ μὲν εὐρίσκεται οὗτος ἔχων γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας, ἀπαιτῇ τὸ μέρος τοῦ δημοσίου καὶ ἀναλαμβάνη τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ κινητοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῦ χάριν φονικοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἐπίλοιπον ἥμισυ κατέχωσιν ἡ γυνὴ καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ ὡς ἂν μὴ τελείως ἐξαπορήσωσιν οὗτοι καὶ ἐκτριβῶσιν· εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν εὐρίσκεται ἔχων γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας αὐτὸς ὁ ἐνεργήσας τὸν φόνον, ὀφείλει τὸ μέρος τοῦ δημοσίου ἀναλαμβάνειν χάριν φονικοῦ τὸ ὅλον κινητὸν πρᾶγμα αὐτοῦ, τὴν δὲ ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ καταλιμπάνειν ἀνενόχλητον κατέχεσθαι ἀδιασείστως παρὰ τοῦ μέρους τῆς δηλωθείσης ἀγιοτάτης ἐπισκοπῆς· καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην μὲν διὰ ζημίας παίδευσιν διορίζεται ἡ βασιλεία μου ἐνεργεῖσθαι εἰς αὐτοὺς μόνους οἵτινες ἂν εὐρεθῶσιν ἐργασάμενοι καὶ ἐνεργήσαντες φόνον, εἰς δὲ τοὺς λοιποὺς συνεπόικους αὐτῶν τοὺς μηδὲλως συνδραμόντας ἢ συνεργήσαντας εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην πράξιν τοῦ φόνου οὐδὲ ὅλως διακρίνει δίκαιον οὐδὲ εὐλογον ἡ βασιλεία μου καθυπάγεσθαι εἰς ζημίαν ἐπεὶ καὶ παντελῶς ἄδικον καὶ παράλογον λογίζεται ἐτέρων κακουργησάντων ἐτέρους εὐθύνεσθαι μὴ κοινωνήσαντας μὴ δὲ συμμετασχόντας αὐτοῖς τῆς τοιαύτης κακουργίας.

I translate: 'When it happens that a murder is committed by one of the tenant

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

² Paul J. Alexander, 'A chrysobull of the emperor Andronicus II Palaeologus in favor of the see of Kanina in Albania,' *Byzantion*, xv (1941), 167-207. Alexander's publication is cited in the article of Mirambel, but I understand the citation was inserted by the editor of *Byzantion*. He had received the article of Mirambel before the appearance of Alexander's work.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182.

peasants (*paroikos*) of the same most holy see or by a relative of the clerics that belong to it, and if the culprit is found to have a wife and children, the treasury demands and obtains half of his movable property, on account of the *phonikon*, and the remainder is left to his wife and children to the end that they may not become entirely destitute and be destroyed. But if the man who committed the murder has not a wife and children then the treasury must receive all his movable property on account of the *phonikon*. However, his immovable holdings are to be left to the most holy see which is to hold it without any disturbance and molestation. And our majesty orders this penalty to be applied to those only who may be found to have committed murder, but it considers it neither just nor reasonable to impose it on their fellow villagers who in no way participated in or acted with them in the murder, for it is entirely wrong and contrary to reason to hold responsible for the crimes committed by others people who took no part in these crimes.'

The Kanina document thus not only defines the *phonikon* as a fine for murder, but gives valuable particulars concerning the precise character of this fine, and in this it is much more interesting than the chrysobull of Laura which formed the basis of the work of Rouillard and Soloviev. It also yields further evidence that the agents of the treasury often held the entire community responsible for the murder committed by one of its members. Indeed it is expressly stated in this chrysobull that the clause on the *phonikon* was included as a result of the complaints of the bishop of Kanina that the agents of the treasury in case of murder confiscated all the property of the culprit and imposed fines on his fellow villagers.¹ The collective responsibility of the community for the crime committed by one of its members was something alien to Roman law, perhaps Slavonic in origin, and the imperial authority sought to suppress it.

I have thought it necessary to reproduce the two most definite passages known concerning the *phonikon* because I wish to remove the wrong impression created by the article of Mirambel. The *κεφαλαιον φόνου* called more often *φονικόν* sometimes *δόσις φόνου* was a fine for murder and consisted in the confiscation of part or all of the movable property of the culprit. The vendetta was widely prevalent, especially in the Albanian regions of the empire, and the *phonikon* was doubtless applied to the murders resulting from it, but to think of it as vendetta or applicable only to the murders resulting from the vendetta — and this is the impression given by the article of Mirambel — is absolutely unjustifiable. Whatever the origin and history of the vendetta may have been in mediaeval Greece, all that can be gained about it from the official pronouncements concerning the *phonikon* is that the punishment for the murders resulting from it involved also confiscation of all or some of the property of the culprit. Mirambel, who does not seem to be acquainted with the technical terminology of the Byzantine chrysobulls of the period of the Palaeologoi, has completely misunderstood these documents.²

DUMBARTON OAKS

RESEARCH LIBRARY AND COLLECTIONS.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

² A brief summary of this note will appear in *Byzantion*, vol. xvii (1945).



PEETERS

THE SLAVIC ELEMENT IN BYZANTINE ASIA MINOR IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Source: *Byzantion*, Vol. 18 (1946-1948), pp. 69-83

Published by: Peeters Publishers

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44168622>

Accessed: 20-05-2019 00:17 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Peeters Publishers is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Byzantion*

THE SLAVIC ELEMENT IN BYZANTINE ASIA MINOR IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

The Byzantine empire was never in its long history a true national state with an ethnically homogeneous population. The conquests of the Arabs in the seventh century deprived the empire of huge blocks of non Greek-speaking elements and gave to it an aspect which was more Greek than ever before. But the incursions of the Slavs in the European possessions of the empire in the same century introduced new racial elements and lessened what homogeneity may have existed there. In Asia Minor also there were important ethnic groups which were hardly touched by Hellenism. The situation was further complicated by the settlement through the action of the government of foreign elements in different parts of the empire and the transfer of the inhabitants from one part to another. Indeed, only during the last years of the empire when it was restricted to Constantinople, Thessalonica, Mistra and a few islands of the Aegean was the empire ethnically completely Greek ⁽¹⁾.

To the Byzantine empire of the thirteenth century belonged that part of Asia Minor which had been occupied in ancient times by the Greeks on the coast and by Thracians, Mysians, Bithynians, Lydians, Phrygians in the interior. But already by the time of Strabo it was difficult to identify these peoples, for the process of hellenization had gone very far ⁽²⁾. Yet in the rural communities of the interior there remained many elements which were only superficially touched by Hellenism

(1) On the ethnic composition of the empire during the tenth century, see A. RAMBAUD, *L'empire grec au dixième siècle* (Paris, 1870), 209-253.

(2) STRABO, XIV, 5, 23.

as the various heresies during the early centuries of Christianity indicate ⁽¹⁾. The triumph of Orthodoxy doubtless aided the hellenizing process, but the ethnic situation was again complicated by the settlement of new peoples during the early Middle Ages.

The most important of these settlements were those of the Slavs. The first Slavs were settled in Bithynia sometime during the first half of the seventh century, during or before the reign of Constans II (642-668). This is known from a lead seal ⁽²⁾ which has been dated as of 650 and the statement of Theophanes that five thousand Slavs deserted to the Saracens in 665, when the latter made an incursion in Asia Minor, and were settled by them in Syria ⁽³⁾. More important were the Slavonic settlements in Bithynia which were established by Justinian II following his successful expedition against the Slavs in Macedonia in 688 ⁽⁴⁾. The Slavs involved were numerous, « multitudes », says Theophanes, and a modern

(1) W. M. CALDER, « The epigraphy of the Anatolian heresies », *Anatolian Studies Presented to Sir William Mitchell Ramsay* (Manchester, 1923), 64.

(2) B. A. PANCHENKO, « Pamiatnik Slavian v Vifinii VII. v. », *Bulletin de l'Institut Archéologique à Constantinople*, 8 (Sofia, 1903), 1ff; the legend reads (*Ibid.*, 25) τῶν ἀνδρας δόντων σκλαβῶν τῆς Βιθυνῶν ἐπαρχίας.. Schlumberger reads the legend as follows: τῶν ἀνδραπόδων τῶν σκλαβῶν τῆς Βιθυνῶν ἐπαρχίας, and translates: (sceau) des esclaves (mercenaires) slaves de l'éparchie de Bithynie. *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 12 (1903), 277. Panchenko with good reasons dates the seal as of 650, p. 27. G. OSTROGORSKY (*Ceschichte des byzantinischen Staates*, p. 85, n. 3) dates the seal as of 694/95 and H. Grégoire follows him: Grégoire, « Un edit de l'empereur Justinien II », *Byzantion*, 17 (1944-45), 123. But as 20,000 of the Slavs settled in Bithynia in 688 or shortly after deserted to the Arabs in 692 and the bulk of the remaining were slaughtered by Justinian II the date given by Ostrogorsky for the seal may be questioned.

(3) THEOPHANES, *Chronographia*, edited by C. de Boor., 1: 348. From this reference in Theophanes it cannot be known whether the Slavs in question had been settled in Bithynia. All that Theophanes says is that the Sarcens made an expedition in Ῥωμανία and the Slavs deserted to them. But as the expedition was obviously by land, by Ῥωμανία Theophanes obviously means Asia Minor.

(4) *Ibid.*, 364; Nicephorus, *Opuscula Historica*, edited by C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1880), 36.

Russian scholar has estimated them at no less than 80,000 men ⁽¹⁾, and another at 250,000, including men, women and children ⁽²⁾. All that can be said, however, is that these Slavs were sufficiently numerous to enable Justinian II, shortly after he had settled them in Bithynia, to raise an army of 30,000 among them. At least that is what Theophanes says ⁽³⁾. About seventy years later, during the reign of Constantin V (741-775), another mass of Slavs, 208,000 according to one chronicler ⁽⁴⁾, were settled in Asia Minor about the Artanas river, a little stream which flows into the Black sea west of the Sangarius and not far from the Bosphorus. In 1129 or 1130 additional Slavs were transplanted to Asia Minor. They were Serbian prisoners whom John II settled in the neighbourhood of Nicomedia, assigned them land, enrolled those who could bear arms in the army, and subjected the others to taxation ⁽⁵⁾. These Serbes were doubtless the inhabitants of the *servochoria* which are mentioned in the *Partitio regni graeci* at the beginning of the thirteenth century ⁽⁶⁾.

Russian scholars have attributed to the Slavs a role of major importance in the history and development of the institutions of the Byzantine empire. A theory particularly developed by them is that the free village community which was the characteristic feature of the rural structure of the Byzantine empire from the seventh century onward was a Slavic institution adopted by the Byzantines at the time of the establishment of the Slavic settlements in the empire ⁽⁷⁾.

(1) V. J. LAMANSKY, *O Slavianakh v Maloi Azii v Afrikie i v Ispanii in Uchenyia Zapiski II otd. Imp. Akademii Nauk*, 5 (St. Petersbourg, 1859), 3.

(2) Th. N. USPENSKY, « K istorii krest'ianskago zemlevladieniia v. Vizantii », in *Zhurnal Ministerstva Prosvieshcheniia*, 225 (St. Petersbourg, 1883), 319.

(3) THEOPHANES, *op. cit.*, I: 366.

(4) NICEPHORUS, *op. cit.* 68 f.

(5) Nicetas CHONIATES, *Historia* (Bonn, 1835), 23.

(6) G. L. Fra. TAFEL and G. M. THOMAS, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig*, 1 (Vienna, 1856), 475.

(7) V. G. VASILIEVSKIJ, « Materialy k vnutrennej istorii vizantijs-

The important element of this theory is that the composition of each community was predominately Slavic with communal rather than private ownership of property. This theory is no longer accepted, for it is now known that the village community was a territorial circumscription designed to facilitate the imposition and collection of taxes, that the property in it was private and not communal, that in its origins it is much older than the appearance of the Slavs, and consequently the establishment of it had nothing to do with them ⁽¹⁾. Nevertheless some of the Russian scholars who developed this theory accepted it as a fact and offered it as proof that the Slavs in Asia Minor maintained their national entity throughout the history of the empire, were still there as a racial unit in the thirteenth century and constituted the core of the *akritai*, the frontier soldiers, under the Lascarids and Michael Paleologus ⁽²⁾. Lamansky even went further. He believed that there was still in the population of Bithynia in the nineteenth century many concrete traces, indicating the survival of the Slavs long after the fall of the empire. « It has to be supposed, he wrote, that there are at present in Asia Minor, though the Slavic element has not been preserved in its purity, many Slavic traces in the customs, language, songs, melodies, finally even in the physical peculiarities of the inhabitants of some parts of Asia Minor » ⁽³⁾. That by « some parts of Asia Minor » Lamansky had in mind Bithynia follows from the discussions in his work which precedes this statement.

The opinion of Lamansky and the other Russian scholars who shared his views was conditioned no doubt by a pro-Slav

kago gosudarstva », in *Zhurnal Ministerstva Prosvieshcheniia*, 202 (1879), 160, 161. ; USPENSKY, *op. cit.*, 307, 309, 310.

(1) The credit for exploding the theory of the Slavic origin of the village community in the Byzantine empire belongs to Panchenko. See his fundamental work, « Krestjanskaja sobstvennost v Vizantii » in *Izvestiya Russkago Arkheologicheskago Instituta v Konstantinopole*, 9 (Sofia, 1904), 1-234. See also Charanis, « On the social structure of the later Roman empire, » *Byzantion*, 17 (Boston, 1946), note 34 a.

(2) USPENSKY, *op. cit.*, 322-326, 340-341.

(3) LAMANSKY, *op. cit.*, 18,

approach to the history of the Slavs. But the question of the survival of the Slavic element in Bithynia down to the thirteenth century and beyond is one that should be decided solely by the data found in the sources.

The question of the survival of the Slavs in Bithynia depends to a considerable extent upon the magnitude and fate of the Slavic settlements established there during the seventh and eighth centuries. There is some evidence, indeed, that additional Slavs settled or were settled in Asia Minor after the eighth century, but this evidence is general and contains no indication that these Slavs were very numerous. In his account of the revolt of Thomas the Slavonian in the reign of Michael II, Theophanes Continuatus says of the Slavs that they « often took root in Asia Minor » ⁽¹⁾. Uspensky seized upon this statement and inferred from it that there was an almost continuous stream of Slavs settling in Asia Minor ⁽²⁾. What led Uspensky to draw this inference was doubtless the use of the term « often », but it is by no means certain that by the use of this term the Continuatus had in mind anything more than the settlements of the seventh and eighth centuries. Three transfers of Slavs to Asia Minor carried out at different times by three different emperors certainly justified the use of the term « often. » There is only one more reference, besides the one already noted, that concerning the settlement of Serbs in Asia Minor during the reign of John II, which may indicate that Slavs were settled in Asia Minor after the eighth century. This concerns the Bulgarians who fled to Michael I (811-813) and were settled by him in different parts of the empire ⁽³⁾. Some of these Bulgarians may have been settled in Asia Minor, but this can only be a conjecture, for the source says nothing about it. Besides, they do not appear to have been very numerous.

(1) Theophanes CONTINUATUS, *Chronographia* (Bonn, 1838), 50, τῶν Σκλαβογενῶν, τῶν πολλάκις ἐγκισσευθέντων κατὰ τὴν Ἀνατολήν.

(2) USPENSKY, *op.cit.*, 315, where Uspensky quotes from Lamansky with approval.

(3) Georgius CEDRENIUS, *Historiarum Compendium*, 2 (Bonn, 1839), 52. Βούλγαροί τινες ἐξ ἡθῶν ἀναστάντες τῶν πατρῶων τὴν Ῥωμαίων καταλαμβάνουσι παγγενεῖ, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως προσδεχθέντες Μιχαὴλ ἐν διαφόροις ἐγκατοικίζονται χώραις.

Now to analyze the data given by the sources concerning the settlement of the Slavs in Asia Minor during the seventh and eighth centuries. Of the Slavs settled during or before the reign of Constans II, not much can be said. It must be noted, however, that, unless the settlement was very large, the desertion of 5,000 of its members to the Saracens in 665 must have crippled it very seriously. More is known concerning the Slavs settled by Justinian II. Following is the account of Theophanes ⁽¹⁾: « In this year (6180 - 688 A.D.), Justinian made an expedition against Sclavinia and Bulgaria... and, sallying as far as Thessalonica, seized many multitudes of Slavs, some by war, others by consent... and settled them in the region of the Opsikion theme. » But by 692 all these Slavs had disappeared from the Opsikion theme. To give again the account of Theophanes. In the year (6184 - 692 A.D.) Justinian selected 30,000 from the Slavs whom he had transplanted, armed them, and named a certain Neboulus as their leader. He then led them against the Arabs. Neboulus, however, was bribed by the Arabs and deserted over to them with 20,000 of his followers. This desertion, which was responsible for the rout of the Roman army, angered Justinian who « then destroyed what remained of the [Slavs] with the women and children at a place called Leucate, a place which was precipitous and close to the sea in the gulf of Nicomedia » ⁽²⁾.

Justinian's horrible deed against the Slavs is recorded only by Theophanes. The patriarch Nicephorus says nothing about it, but his account implies that all the Slavs whom Justinian had conscripted deserted to the enemy ⁽³⁾. That Justinian

(1) THEOPHANES, *op. cit.*, 364. Τούτῳ τῷ ἔτει (6180) ἐπεστράτευσεν Ἰουστινιανὸς κατὰ Σκλαυινίας καὶ Βουλγαρίας ... μέχρι δὲ Θεσσαλονίκης ἐκδραμών, πολλὰ πλήθη τῶν Σκλάβων τὰ μὲν πολέμῳ, τὰ δὲ προσρύνετα παραλαβὼν εἰς τὰ τοῦ Ὀψικίου διὰ τῆς Ἀβύδου περάσας κατέστησε μέρος.

(2) *Ibid.* 366 : ὑποβαλὼν δὲ Μονάμεδ τῷ συμμαχοῦντι Ῥωμαίοις στρατηγῷ τῶν Σκλάβων, πέμπει αὐτῷ κούκουρον γέμον νομισμάτων ... πείθει προσφυγεῖν πρὸς αὐτοὺς μετὰ ᾗ χιλιάδων Σκλάβων ... τότε Ἰουστινιανὸς ἀνείλε τὸ τούτων ἐγκατάλειμμα σὺν γυναιξὶ καὶ τέκνοις παρὰ τῷ λεγομένῳ Λευκάτῃ τόπῳ κρημνῶδει καὶ παραθαλασσίῳ κατὰ τὸν Νικομηδείαςιον κόλπον κειμένῳ.

(3) NICEPHORUS, *op. cit.*, 37, καὶ ὁ κληθεὶς περιόσιος τῶν Σκλάβων.

actually committed the horrible deed attributed to him by Theophanes has been denied by Lamansky and others ⁽¹⁾. The deed was too cruel, it is not mentioned by the patriarch Nicephorus, and Justinian's relations with the Slavs were on the whole friendly. None of these arguments, however, justify the rejection of Theophanes' testimony. The deed was cruel indeed, but Justinian II, when angered, was capable of the greatest cruelty. Was it not he who ordered and dispatched a fleet to destroy the well to do inhabitants of Cherson? The Chronicle of the patriarch Nicephorus is brief and does not contain everything that Theophanes relates, and, while Justinian was friendly with the Bulgarian king Terbel, he had previously taken arms against both the Bulgarians, and the Slavs of Macedonia. In the edict, issued in 688, by which he granted to the church of St. Demetrius of Thessalonica a *salina*, Justinian calls the enemies, i.e. the Slavs, of St. Demetrius, his own ⁽²⁾.

It is not improbable also that the number of Slavs settled in Opsikion by Justinian II was largely exaggerated by Theophanes. This is indicated by a reference in an Armenian historian which says that the Slavs who deserted to the Arabs numbered 7000 horse ⁽³⁾, almost two-thirds less than the number given by Theophanes. The number given by the Armenian historian, if correct, would indicate that the entire Slav army which Justinian led against the Arabs numbered considerably less than 30,000. But, whatever the size of the original settlement may have been, that settlement was virtually liquidated by the desertion to the Arabs and the subsequent cruel deed of Justinian. If some Slavs succeeded in surviving they were doubtless not many.

βων λαὸς τοῖς Σαρακηνοῖς προστίθεται, καὶ σὺν αὐτοῖς Ῥωμαίους ἀνῆρουν.

(1) LAMANSKY, *op. cit.*, 3; USPENSKY, *op. cit.*, 319; PANCHENKO, « Pamiatnik Slavian v Vifinii, » 33.

(2) A. VASILIEV, « An edict of the emperor Justinian II, September, 688 », *Speculum*, 18 (Cambridge, 1934), 5. πείραν σύμμαχον εἰληφόντων ἡμῶν τοῦ ἀγίου μεγαλομάρτυρος Δημητρίου ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῶν πραχθεῖσιν παρὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ ἡμῶν πολεμίων διαφόροις πολέμοις.

(3) J. B. BURY, *A History of the Later Roman Empire* (London, 1889), p. 322, note 3.

The Slavic settlement established by Constantine V about the river Artanas ⁽¹⁾ proved more durable. At least there are no indications anywhere that it was ever destroyed. It is doubtful, however, if it were as large as it has been supposed by certain scholars. Here again it is important to reproduce the sources. In the year 6254 (762 A.D.), says Theophanes, the Bulgarians revolted and raised to the throne Teletz. « And many Slavs, having fled, went over to the emperor, who settled them about the Artanas » ⁽²⁾. More explicit is the statement of the patriarch Nicephorus. « Tribes of Slavs », he writes, « abandoned their land as fugitives and crossed the Euxine. Their multitude reached the number of 208,000. They were settled about the river which is called Artanas » ⁽³⁾.

The two important elements of information given by Nicephorus are that the Slavs in question reached the Artanas by sea, and that they numbered 208,000. Panchenko, the most judicious among the Russian scholars who have dealt with the question of the Slavic settlement in Asia Minor, interprets the figure given by Nicephorus to refer to the number of men capable of bearing arms, and, accordingly, fixes the total number of Slavs involved in the settlement at about 750,000 ⁽⁴⁾. It is doubtful, however, if the passage of Nicephorus lends itself to such an interpretation. Nicephorus speaks of tribes of Slavs (*γένη Σκλαβηγῶν*) and the multitude (*πλήθος*) of these Slavs. Multitude here means mass, total number, and the figure that Nicephorus gives must refer not to the men alone, but to the total number of the Slavs involved, men, women and children.

(1) The Artanas is a little stream flowing in the Black sea, not far from the Bosphorus. W. Tomaschek, « Zur historischen Topographie von Kleinasien im Mittelalter » *Sitzungsberichte der kais. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien: Philosophisch-historische Classe*, 124 (Vienna, 1891), 74.

(2) THEOPHANES, *op. cit.*, 1, 432: *Σκλάβων δὲ πολλῶν ἐκφυγόντων προσεργύσαν τῷ βασιλεῖ, οὗς κατέστησεν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀρτάναν.*

(3) NICEPHORUS, *op. cit.*, 68 f. *Σκλαβηγῶν γένη τῆς ἐαυτῶν μεταναστάντα γῆς φνγάδες διαπερῶσι τὸν Εὐξείνιον. συνετέλει δὲ αὐτῶν τὸ πλήθος ἄχρι καὶ εἰς ἀριθμὸν ὀκτῶ καὶ διακοσίας χιλιάδας· καὶ πρὸς τὸν ποταμὸν δὲ Ἀρτάνας καλεῖται αὐτοὶ κατοικίζονται.*

(4) PANCHENKO « *Pamiatnik Slavian v Vifinii* » 35.

But even the figure of Nicephorus, as interpreted here, cannot be accepted without some reservations. Figures given by medieval chroniclers are generally of doubtful accuracy, and in this case the doubt is increased by the fact that the Slavs in question reached the Artanas by sea. To have transported by sea a crowd of 208,000 with at least some of their personal and household effects was a tremendous undertaking, requiring a tremendous amount of shipping, and it is questionable if this shipping was available or at the disposal of the Slavs. It is known, indeed, that Constantine V, in order to fight the Bulgars, built a fleet of 800 vessels, each vessel capable of carrying twelve horses, but this fleet was constructed after the settlement of the Slavs in the region of the Artanas (1). Besides, there is nothing in the sources which indicates that the Slavs were transported to Bithynia under the supervision of the imperial government. They came by themselves, with their own means, in such ships as they could find. They must have been considerably less than 208,000 if they all found shipping and succeeded in reaching Bithynia. What it meant to transport a large number of men in the eighth century is shown by the expedition which Justinian II sent against Cherson in the Crimea in 710. The men involved in this expedition are said to have numbered 100,000 and to have them transported Justinian imposed a special charge on the people of Constantinople and utilized every ship available, including fishing smacks and very small boats (2). An effort considerably greater than this would have been required to transport a multitude 208,000 from Bulgaria to Bithynia, but there is no indication anywhere that any special effort was made in connection with the settlement of the Slavs about the Artanas region.

But, while rejecting the figure of Nicephorus, one cannot

(1) NICEPHORUS, *op. cit.*, 69; THEOPHANES, *op. cit.*, I: 432 f. On the chronology see S. RUNCIMAN, *A History of the First Bulgarian Empire* (London, 1930), p. 38, note 1.

(2) THEOPHANES, *op. cit.*, I. 377. *πάσαν ναὺν δρομώνων τε καὶ τριηρῶν καὶ σκαφῶν μυριαγωγῶν καὶ ἀλιάδων καὶ ἕως χελανδίων, ἀπὸ διανομῆς τῶν οἰκούντων τὴν πόλιν συγκλητικῶν τε καὶ ἐργαστηριακῶν καὶ δημωτῶν καὶ παντὸς ὄφικλου.* NICEPHORUS, *op. cit.*, 44.

deny that the number of Slavs involved in the settlement about the Artanas was considerable, perhaps several tens of thousands. The question now is to determine to what extent these Slavs were conscious of their national origin and tried to keep their racial unity. The question cannot be answered definitely, but there are a number of observations that can be made. When these Slavs came to Asia Minor they were still to some extent barbarians and, of course, pagans. But not long after their arrival they must have been converted to Christianity and put under the jurisdiction of Greek bishoprics ⁽¹⁾. There is no reason to assume that the services in their churches were conducted in any other language than Greek. Greeks were doubtless the first priests appointed over them, and the Slavs who subsequently took holy orders must have learned at least how to read the scriptures in Greek. Whatever instruction there may have been among them, it must have been in Greek, for there was no Slavonic alphabet as yet. Christianization was thus a powerful force making for the absorption of these Slavs ⁽²⁾. But there were other forces. These Slavs were settled in a region that had long felt the impact of hellenism and over which the imperial government kept a strong hold. They were isolated from the vast body of Slavs in Europe. The official business with the government involved Greek, and Greek was essential for a career in the army and the administration. It is difficult

(1) No bishoprics in Bithynia with Slavonic names are known for certain, for the Slavic origins of Gordoserva and Modrina are doubtful. The etymology of Modrina is considered by M. Niederle as non Slavic (as cited by F. DVORNIK, *Les Slaves, Byzance et Rome au IX^e siècle*, Paris, 1926, p. 103) and Gordoserba which is first mentioned for certain in 692 (MANSI, XI, col. 996 E) and perhaps as early as the reign of Heraclius (*Notitia Epiphaniae*, edited by H. GELZER, *Abh. der I Kl. der k. Ad. der Wiss. München*, vol. 21, Munich, 1901, p. 538, n° 187) contrary to what is thought (DVORNIK, *op. cit.*, 103), may have nothing to do with the Serbs. It has been recently questioned whether there was such a Slavic tribe as the Serbs, and it is suggested that the name may derive from *Servus*. See H. GRÉGOIRE, « L'origine et le nom des Croates et des Serbes », *Byzantion*, 17 (Boston, 1946), 117.

(2) In discussing the conversion of the Slavs of Asia Minor Dvornik (*op. cit.*, 103) remarks : « la conversion ne fut ici que la première étape de l'hellénisation. »

to see, in view of these observations, how the Slavs who came to Asia Minor in a state of comparative barbarism could have remained for centuries impervious to the powerful hellenizing forces all round them and kept their racial identity. In the Byzantine empire there was no racial distinction ; differences in religion was what marked certain elements of the population from another, but there is no evidence that the Slavs of Asia Minor developed heretical views ; they were doubtless attached to the official church, a fact which made their absorption much easier. There is some evidence, however, which shows that the process of Byzantination was slow and that for many years the Slavs of Asia Minor kept, at least in part, their Slavonic character.

A part of this evidence concerns the revolt of Thomas, known as Thomas the Slavonian ⁽¹⁾. The revolt of Thomas, in which many ethnic elements of Asia Minor participated, broke out in 821, about sixty years later than the settlement of the Slavs in the Artanas region. In 821 many Slavs among the original settlers no doubt were still alive, and it is probable that the hellenizing process had not yet touched deeply even those who were born and raised in Bithynia. But is it true, as it is contended, that they were conscious of their nationality, and for that reason rushed to the standards of Thomas in whom they saw a leader who might lead them to independence ⁽²⁾? Thomas, although the evidence is not without contradictions, seems to have been of Slavic origins ⁽³⁾,

(1) The fullest account of the revolt of Thomas is that given by A. VASILIEV, *Byzance et les Arabes*, translated from the Russian and revised by H. Grégoire et al., 1 (Brussels, 1935), 22-49.

(2) Uspensky as cited by VASILIEV, *Byzance et les Arabes*, p. 24, note 4.

(3) J. B. BURY, « The identity of Thomas the Slavonian, » *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 1 (Leipzig, 1892), 55-60 ; *A History of the Eastern Roman Empire* (London, 1912), 11. In the French version of Vasiliev's *Byzance et les Arabes*, p.24, Thomas is said to have been an Armenian, whereas in the Russian version he was said to be a Slav. [Génésius, p. 8, dit très précisément que Thomas né à Gazioura dans le Pont, était de souche arménienne. Ce témoignage doit être préféré à celui, plus vague, de la page 32, où Thomas est dit Σκνθίζων (cf. Continuateur de Théophane, p. 50, c. 10 qui l'appelle Σκλαβογενής). H.G.]

but he had occupied important posts in Byzantium, and had become, or, at least sought to have himself pass as, a Byzantine, as is shown by the fact that he posed as Constantine VI. In his attempt to seize the throne he was backed by many elements which were discontented with the administration of Michael II. The revolution headed by Thomas, as the ever judicious Panchenko remarks, was a social movement, complicated by religious and political factors ⁽¹⁾. Among the followers of Thomas there were some Slavs, ⁽²⁾ but to assume that this fact gave to his revolt the character of a Slavic national movement is pure nonsense. No better proof for this can be offered than the fact that the Opsikion theme, the theme where most of the Slavic settlements were located, was one of the two themes in Asia Minor which failed to support Thomas ⁽³⁾. The references to the revolt of Thomas, however, do show that during the first quarter of the ninth century there were Slavs in Asia Minor who had not yet lost their identity as Slavs.

Not until the tenth century are there any more references to the Slavs of Opsikion, but these are no longer known as Slavs but as Slavasinians (*Σκλαβησιάνοι*). These Slavasinians were enrolled soldiers and appear in the sources in connection with military expeditions. The new name seemingly was used in order to distinguish these Slavs from the rest of the Slavs, but on what ground was this distinction made? Doubtless because they lived in a region known as Sclavisia, a region which must have been located in the Opsikion

(1) PANCHENKO, « Pamiatnik Slavian v Vifinii, » 37.

(2) But besides Slavs there were numerous other peoples who supported Thomas. Here is the list as given by Genesius, *Historiae*, (Bonn, 1834), 33. *εἶτα μετ' Ἀγαρηνῶν Ἰνδῶν Αἰγυπτίων Ἀσσυρίων, Μήδων Ἀβασίων Ζηχῶν Ἰβήρων Σαβείρων Σκλάβων Οὔρων Βανδύλων Γετῶν καὶ ὅσοι τῆς Μάνεντος βδελυρίας μετείχον, Λαζῶν τε καὶ Ἀλανῶν Χάλδων τε καὶ Ἀρμενίων καὶ ἑτέρων παντοίων ἐθνῶν*. On the identity of these peoples see VASILIEV, *Byzance et les Arabes*, p. 31, note 2.

(3) *Ibid.*, 32-33. *Ὀλβιανοῦ μόνον, τοῦ τῶν Ἀρμενιακῶν στρατηγοῦντος, τοῦτον περινολεῖς ἐπιπειθεῖς ἄγοντος καὶ Κατάκλυα τοῦ Ὀψικίου τῷ βασιλεῖ Μιχαήλ γε προσκειμένων*. THEOPHANES CONTINUATUS, *op. cit.*, 53.

theme ⁽¹⁾, since the Slavesinians were enrolled in the army of the Opsikion theme ⁽²⁾. The name, therefore, throws no light upon the degree of hellenization of these Slavs, probably descendants of the Slavs who were settled in Bithynia in the eighth century, but there are other indications that some of them had become highly hellenized, while others had remained essentially Slavic. Basilitzes whom at one time the emperor Alexander had thought of raising to the throne was doubtless a highly hellenized Slav ⁽³⁾, but the Slavesinians who, during the reign of Romanus Lacapenus, had landed in the Peloponnesus must have been essentially Slavic. For the statement of Constantine Porphyrogennitus ⁽⁴⁾ that Romanus Lacapenus was disturbed lest these Slavesinians join the Ezeritae and Milengi, Slavic tribes of the Taygetus chain, and consequently granted to the latter better terms of submission to the imperial authority than they enjoyed before, can mean only one thing; that these Slavesinians spoke Slavic and could recognize the Ezeritae and the Milengi as people of the same stock as themselves.

By the middle of the tenth century, therefore, there were still Slavs in the Opsikion theme, who doubtless had adjusted themselves to Byzantine civilization, but who still retained, at least to some extent, their Slavic character. In the next three hundred years their number must have been reduced by the inroads of the process of hellenization, just as the same process had led to the absorption of many of them in the previous three centuries. In any event Slavs in Opsikion are not mentioned by the sources after the tenth century, a silence which may mean two things: either that

(1) Theophanes CONTINUATUS, *op. cit.*, 379: *Βασιλιτζην τὸν ἀπὸ Σκλαβισίαν.*

(2) Constantine PORPHYROGENNITUS, *De Cerimoniis*, 1 (Bonn, 1829), 662: *οἱ Σθλαβησιάνοι οἱ καθισθέντες εἰς τὸ ὄψικιον*; 666: *ἀπὸ τῶν Σθλαβησιάνων τῶν καθημένων εἰς τὸ ὄψικιον.*

(3) Theophanes CONTINUATUS, *op. cit.*, 379 f.

(4) Constantine PORPHYROGENNITUS, *De Administrando Imperio* (Bonn, 1840), 223. *ἐπεὶ δὲ ... εἰσῆλθον οἱ Σκλαβησιανοὶ ἐν τῷ θέματι Πελοποννήσον, δεδιὼς ὁ βασιλεὺς ἵνα μὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ προστεθέντες τοῖς Σκλάβοις παντελῆ ἐξολόθρευσιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέματος ἐργάσωνται, ἐποίησεν αὐτοῖς χρυσοβούλλιον ...*

the Slavs of Opsikion completely disappeared, or that there was no occasion for the sources to take account of them. Of these two alternatives the latter seems the more plausible. The Slavosinians of the tenth century were enrolled soldiers and it is as enrolled soldiers that they are mentioned by the sources of the century. But the institution of the enrolled soldiers as it was known in the tenth century virtually ceased to exist after the eleventh century. It is more than likely therefore, that the descendants of the Slavosinians of the tenth century had lost their status as soldiers and were reduced to the status of tenant peasants. As poor peasants there was no reason why they should have been particularly noted by the sources ⁽¹⁾.

It is quite possible, therefore, that in the thirteenth century there were still some remnants of the descendants of the Slavs who had been settled in Bithynia in the eighth century. To these should be added the descendants of the Serbs whom John II settled near Nicomedia. It is doubtful, however, if these remnants were very numerous. That the *Akritai* of the thirteenth century were Slavs is an opinion by no means well founded ⁽²⁾. It is expressly stated by Pachymeres that in reconstituting the *Akritai*, the Lascarids drew from every part of the empire (*πανταχόθεν*) ⁽³⁾. The same writer refers to the *Akritai* as mountaineers⁽⁴⁾, doubtless because they were stationed along the mountains, and when he uses ethnic terms in connection with the army of Asia Minor, they are terms of classical Asia Minor or of the early Byzantine period — Boucellarii, Maryandeni, Paphlagonians ⁽⁵⁾. Nowhere

(1) Panchenko remarks that the Slavs other than the soldiers disappeared and left no traces. « Pamiatnik Slavian v Vifinii » 51.

(2) PANCHENKO (*Ibid.*, 57) already remarked that there is nothing in the information given by the sources concerning the *Akritai* which indicates that they were Slavs.

(3) PACHYMERES, *op. cit.* 1, 16. *εἰτα νῶτα στρέψαντες ἐκόντων ἀκόντων Περσῶν τοῖς ὄρεσιν ἐπεβάλοντο, συγχοῖς δὲ τοῖς πανταχόθεν ἐποῖκοις καὶ ἰσχυροῖς κατασφαλισάμενοι ἔρμυνα τείχει καὶ οἶον δυσεπιχειρήτους θορυγκοὺς τῇ Ῥωμαῖδι ταῦτα κατέστησαν.*

(4) *Ibid.*, 1, 193. *οἱ κατὰ τῆς Νικαίας τὰκτρα χωρεῖται ἀγρόται μὲν ὄντες καὶ γεωργίᾳ προσέχοντες.*

(5) *Ibid.*, 1, 221.

does he refer to the *Akritai* or other soldiers of Asia Minor as *Τριβαλλοί* or *Μυσοί*, terms which he applied to the Serbs and Bulgarians respectively when he used classical terminology. The *Akritai* were doubtless composed of different ethnic groups, with a culture typical of the frontier ⁽¹⁾. Slavs may have been included among them, but to see in them only Slavs is to ignore the sources with contempt.

Rutgers University.

Peter CHARANIS.

(1) The *Akritai* apparently did not feel themselves very different in culture from those on the opposite side of the frontier, to whom they deserted frequently if for any reason they were displeased with the Byzantine administration. *Ibid.*, 1, 222. οἱ ταῖς ἀκραῖς προσκαθήμενοι, τῷ τε πάσχειν ἐνθένδε καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζειν ἐκεῖθεν τὰ λώονα, εἰ μόνον προσχωροῖεν ἐκόντες, προσχωρεῖν ἔγνωσαν καὶ ὁσημέραι προσετίθεντο Πέρσαις.

The Jews in the Byzantine Empire under the First Palaeologi

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Source: *Speculum*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan., 1947), pp. 75-77

Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Medieval Academy of America

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2856204>

Accessed: 20-05-2019 00:28 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Medieval Academy of America, The University of Chicago Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Speculum*

THE JEWS IN THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE UNDER THE FIRST PALAEOLOGI

By PETER CHARANIS

IN matters of worship the Jews who dwelled in the Byzantine empire, except for an occasional outburst of persecution, were left unmolested by the Byzantine government. Starr has pointed out that between the death of Heraclius (641) and 1204, a period of more than five and a half centuries, the Jews suffered only three general persecutions which together covered about fifty years.¹ As the last of these persecutions took place during the reign of John Tzimiskes (969–976), there was a period of almost two and a half centuries during which the Jews were left unmolested to worship as they pleased. If Starr's conclusion errs in any way, it errs most probably in the inclusion as anti-Jewish of certain measures, especially those taken during the reign of Leo III (717–741), whose anti-Jewish character is by no means certain. No less an authority than Henri Grégoire has stated that if Starr's conclusion 'is ever revised, it will be in favor of the thesis of absolute toleration.'² The problem needs to be further examined. In the meantime we make some observations concerning the status of the Jews during the period of the first Palaeologi, a period which is not covered by Starr's book.

What characterized the position of the Jews during the reigns of Michael Palaeologus and his son, Andronicus II, was the remarkable degree of toleration which they enjoyed. The long period during which the Jews had been left unmolested by the Byzantine government had come to an end following the dissolution of the Byzantine empire as a result of the Fourth Crusade. Persecutions against the Jews broke out in two of the Greek states which rose out of the ruins of the former empire. A Jewish document, a letter of Jacob de Latte to his cousin Pablo Christiani, is the source of this information.³ According to this letter the Jews suffered a persecution under Theodore Ducas Angelus, the despot of Epirus, after he had occupied Thessalonica and had himself crowned emperor (1222–1230), and again under John Vatatzes, the emperor of Nicaea, who wanted the Jews to 'follow his cult and adhere to his faith.' John Vatatzes issued his anti-Jewish measure in 1253, a year before his death, but it seems to have been continued by his son and successor, Theodore II Lascaris. Thus when Michael Palaeologus came to the throne, the Jews were being persecuted.

Michael Palaeologus put an end to this persecution. De Latte's letter is again the source of this information. De Latte gives no particulars; he states simply

¹ J. Starr, *The Jews in the Byzantine empire* (Athens, 1939), 1–10.

² In his review of Starr's book in *Renaissance, Revue trimestrielle publiée par l'école libre des hautes études de New York*, II–III (New York, 1945), 481.

³ Jacob Mann, 'Une source de l'histoire juive au XIII^e siècle: La lettre polémique de Jacob b. Elie à Pablo Christiani,' *Revue des Etudes Juives*, LXXXII (Paris, 1926), 372–373. Mann's work was called to my attention by Joshua Starr. But see also L. Lewin, 'Eine Notiz zur Geschichte der Juden im byzantinischen Reiche,' *Mónatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*, XIX (Breslau, 1870), 117–122. Also N. Bees, 'Übersicht über die Geschichte des Judentum von Janina (Epirus),' *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher*, II (Berlin, 1921), 159–177.

that Michael called together the leaders of the Jews and promised them religious toleration. That he actually carried out his promise may be inferred from the Jewish policy of his son and successor, Andronicus II, which doubtless indicates that the latter had grown up in an atmosphere more or less friendly to the Jews.

The tolerance which Andronicus showed toward the Jews was indeed remarkable. The information about Andronicus' Jewish policy is derived from two unimpeachable Greek sources, an imperial chrysobull which Andronicus himself issued and a letter of the patriarch Athanasius addressed to Andronicus himself. Andronicus' chrysobull has been known for a long time and has served as the basis of a learned monograph on the Jews of Janina in Epirus by the Greek, N. Bees.⁴ The letter of the patriarch Athanasius has not yet been published, but its contents have become recently known through the analysis of Athanasius' correspondence issued by the Rumanian, N. Bănescu.⁵

Andronicus' chrysobull is not a document specifically dealing with the Jews. It was issued in favor of the city of Janina, and its principal aim was to define the status and privileges of that important fortress. Included in the document, however, there is a clause which covered the Jews of the town. They were to be free and unmolested like the rest of the inhabitants.⁶ The letter of the patriarch Athanasius was drawn in protest of the emperor's tolerance toward the Jews and other non-Christian or heretical elements which dwelled in Constantinople. Besides the Jews, the patriarch singled out the Armenians and the Turks and charged the emperor with letting them set up their houses of prayer among the Orthodox Christians. In addition, he accused a certain Kokalas who, allowing himself to be bought by presents, gave to the Jews 'great power.' It follows from both the chrysobull and the patriarch's letter that the attitude of Andronicus II toward the Jews was that of absolute toleration.

What apparently had shocked the patriarch and led him to protest to the emperor was the freedom granted to the Jews, Armenians and Turks to circulate in Constantinople and to erect their houses of prayer wherever they pleased. His protest indicates that this freedom was unusual and raises the question whether Jews and heretics were not usually required to live in special quarters apart from the Orthodox Christians. That special Jewish communities existed in Constantinople, Thessalonica and elsewhere there is no doubt, but the question is whether this segregation was obligatory or voluntary. Starr raised this question, but offered no satisfactory answer.⁷ Starr seems to have overlooked an important document, which actually gives the answer. This is the reply given by John, bishop of Citrus, toward the end of the twelfth century to Constantine

⁴ Bees, *op. cit.*

⁵ N. Bănescu, 'Le patriarche Athanase I^{er} et Andronic II Paléologue. -Etat religieux, politique et social de l'empire,' *Académie Roumaine. Bulletin de la section historique*, xxiii, I. (Bucharest, 1942), 35-36. The letters of the patriarch Athanasius were also studied on the basis of different manuscripts from the one used by Bănescu by R. Guiland, but the letter concerning the Jews was not included. A. Guiland, 'La correspondance inédite d'Athanase, patriarche de Constantinople (1289-1293; 1304-1310),' *Mélanges Ch. Diehl*, I (Paris, 1930), 121-140.

⁶ F. Mikosich and J. Müller, *Acta et Diplomata*, v (Vienna, 1887), 83.

⁷ Starr, *op. cit.*, 43.

Cabasilas, archbishop of Durazzo, who asked whether it was permissible for the Armenians to build churches of their own in the cities where they resided. 'People of alien tongues and alien beliefs,' wrote John, 'such as Jews, Armenians, Ismaelites, Hagarites, and others such as these were permitted from of old to dwell in Christian countries and cities, except that they had to live separately and not together with the Christians. For this reason quarters located either within or without the cities are set apart for each one of these groups that they may be restricted to these quarters and may not extend their residence beyond them.'⁸ It must be noted, however, that obligatory confinement to a special quarter was not a restriction imposed only upon the Jews. It was applied to all foreigners, especially to those of alien or heretical beliefs.

Whether the Jews in Byzantium were as Jews subject to a special tax is a question on which there has been no general agreement. The references are very few and by no means entirely clear and their interpretation depends to a considerable extent upon what is specifically known, and this is not much, about Byzantine taxation. The problem of a special Jewish tax has been thoroughly discussed by Andreades, Dölger and Starr.⁹ Andreades and Dölger, after an initial disagreement, ended by agreeing in favor of a tax, while Starr, referring essentially to the same texts, expressed a contrary view. Notwithstanding this disagreement it seems probable, at least for the period of the early Palaeologi, that the Jews of the empire were, as Jews, subject to a special tax. The source for this opinion is a chrysobull, dated 1333, according to which the sum of twenty *hyperpera* was collected annually from the Jews of the town of Zihna, located not far from Serres, as a tax.¹⁰ There is, indeed, nothing in this text which proves that this tax was paid by the Jews as Jews, but the document does show that an account of the tax paid by the Jews of Zihna was kept by the treasury, a fact which indicates that this tax was perhaps different from the taxes paid by the Christians.

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY.

⁸ G. A. Ralle and M. Potle, *Syntagma tōn theiōn kai heirōn kanonōn*, v (Athens, 1855), 415.

⁹ A. Andreades, 'Les Juifs et le fisc dans l'empire byzantin.' This article was first published in *Mélanges Diehl* (Paris, 1930), I: 7-29. It was reprinted in *Oeuvres*, I (Athens, 1938) 629-659; 'The Jews in the Byzantine empire,' *Economic History*, III (1934), 1-23. F. Dölger, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Byzantinischen Finanzverwaltung besonders des 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig, 1927), 501; 'Die Frage der Judensteuer in Byzanz,' *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, XXVI (1933), 1-24. Starr, *op. cit.*, 11-17. See also the review of Starr's book by Dölger, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XL (1940), 291 f., and Grégoire's review of the same book in *Renaissance, op. cit.*, III-IV (New York, 1945), 481. Grégoire accepts Starr's conclusion on the question of a special Jewish tax.

¹⁰ Miklosich and Müller, *op. cit.*, v, 106.



PEETERS

BYZANTIUM, THE WEST AND THE ORIGIN OF THE FIRST CRUSADE

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Source: *Byzantion*, Vol. 19, ACTES DU VII^e CONGRÈS DES ÉTUDES BYZANTINES BRUXELLES 1948. — I (1949), pp. 17-36

Published by: Peeters Publishers

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44168643>

Accessed: 20-05-2019 00:06 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Peeters Publishers is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Byzantion*

BYZANTIUM, THE WEST AND THE ORIGIN OF THE FIRST CRUSADE

The battle of Manzikert decided the fate of Asia Minor and conditioned the subsequent history of the Byzantine Empire. But while this is obvious to the modern historians of Byzantium, to those who were in charge of the empire at the time, the debacle of 1071 and the Turkish occupation of Asia Minor which followed appeared by no means decisive. The Byzantine armies had been beaten before; Persians and Arabs had advanced as far as the Aegean and the Propontis; both were driven back, however, and Byzantine power was re-established in Asia Minor. What was done twice might be done again. The Turks could be checked and Asia Minor recovered once more.

That Michael VII and his advisors hoped to turn back the Turks and re-establish the Byzantine position in Asia Minor is clearly stated by Cedrenus ⁽¹⁾. They were aware, indeed, that the task would be difficult, but they believed it could be done with the aid of allies. And to find this aid they applied to the West.

They first turned to Robert Guiscard. In the same year that the Byzantine armies suffered the disaster at Manzikert, Guiscard completed the conquest of the Byzantine possessions in southern Italy by the capture of Bari. The capture of Bari made Guiscard the unquestioned master of southern Italy, but perhaps already before this event the Byzantines had reconciled themselves to the loss of their Italian possessions. It is not known exactly when Romanus Diogenes proposed the marriage of one of his

(1) CEDRENUS, *Historiarum Compendium*, II (Bonn, 1839), 724.

sons to one of Guiscard's daughters, but the proposal was made, no doubt, in view of the danger which threatened the empire in Asia Minor; in any case, the fact that it was made indicates that the Byzantine emperor was ready to extend to Guiscard some kind of recognition ⁽¹⁾. The proposal was rejected by the Norman leader.

Diogenes' policy was revived by his successor, Michael VII. It is known that Michael definitely abandoned his claims to the former possessions of the empire in southern Italy. He was in no position to reconquer these territories, but this was not the only reason why he abandoned his claims to them; what he wanted was the friendship of the Norman leader, and this for two reasons: To safeguard his empire from any further attacks from Guiscard, and to enlist the Normans in an effort to drive the Seljuks out of Asia Minor. It was for these two reasons that Michael VII revived his predecessor's proposal for a marital alliance with Guiscard. This we are told by Cedrenus ⁽²⁾ but the two letters by which Michael VII asked the alliance of Guiscard and the chrysobull to Guiscard by which he confirmed the conditions of the alliance which he succeeded in concluding with him have survived. The first letter was most probably written late in 1071 or early in 1072; the second letter was written either in 1072 or 1073; and the chrysobull bears the date, August, 1074 ⁽³⁾.

(1) C. SATHAS, *Bibliotheca Graeca Medii Aevi*, V (Paris, 1876), 387.

(2) CEDRENUS, *op. cit.*, II, 724. 'Ο δὲ Μιχαὴλ οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀντεποιήσατο τῆς διαφερούσης ἐαυτῷ χώρας, ὡς εἰρηται, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν τοὺς Τούρκους τῆς ἀνατολῆς ἐξελάσειε δέον ἐνόμισε σπείσασθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ δι' αὐτῶν καὶ σὺν αὐτοῖς ἀποσοβῆσαι αὐτῶν τὴν ἄλογον κατὰ τῆς Ῥωμαίας ἐπέλευσιν. ὅθεν καὶ κῆδος πρὸς τὸν Ῥομπέρτον ποιεῖται, καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ θυγατέρα Ἑλένην κατεγγυᾶται τῷ ἑαυτοῦ νιῷ Κωνσταντίνῳ.

(3) C. SATHAS, *Deux lettres inédites de l'empereur Michel Ducas Parapinace à Robert Guiscard*, in *Annuaire de l'association pour l'encouragement des études grecques* (1874), 207. The two letters were republished by Sathas in his *Bibliotheca Graeca Medii Aevi*, V (Paris, 1876), 385-392. Cf. F. CHALANDON, *Histoire de la domination normande en Italie et en Sicile* (Paris, 1907), 1, 260 ff. For date of letters see F. DÖLGER, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches von 565-1453*, II (Munich, 1925), 18, N° 989.

The subject of the two letters is a proposal for the marriage of the emperor's brother, Constantine, to one of Guiscard's daughters in return for Guiscard's friendship and alliance. Of the two letters, the first is rather general. It puts the emphasis on the common religion of the two rulers; praises the greatness and intelligence of Guiscard, recognizes by implication Guiscard's conquest of southern Italy, and declares that the two rulers should in the future identify their interests. The second letter is more specific. In return for the marriage of one of his daughters to the emperor's brother, Guiscard was to become the rampart of the Byzantine frontiers, spare the princes who were vassals of the empire, furnish aid to Byzantium in all things and fight with the Byzantines against all the enemies of the empire ⁽¹⁾. Guiscard rejected both proposals ⁽²⁾.

In 1074 the Byzantine court tried again. This time the emperor proposed, as the basis of the alliance which he sought, the marriage of his own son with one of Guiscard's daughters. Guiscard accepted this proposal and in August, 1074, Michael VII issued a chrysobull which he addressed to the Norman leader and by which he confirmed the conditions of the alliance the two leaders had reached. The agreement provided for the marriage of the emperor's son, Constantine, to Guiscard's daughter who subsequently took the name of Helen; it gave to the young couple the imperial titles; granted to Guiscard the title of *nobilisimos*; allowed him to name one of his sons *curopalates*; and put at his disposal eight other titles of varying rank which he was free to grant to anyone among

(1) SATHAS, *Annuaire...*, 211. Δεί οὖν σε τὸ ἐντεῦθεν, οἷα δὴ τῆς συγγενείας τοῦ ἐμοῦ κράτους ἡξιωμένον, τὰ μὲν πρῶτα χαίρειν καὶ ἀγαλλιάσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ πράγματι, καὶ τὴν ὁμολογίαν συντετελεσμένην ἔχειν ἀληθεῖα, καὶ φροῦρον εἶναι σε τῶν ἡμετέρων ὀρίων, φείδεσθαι τε τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς ὑπηκόου ἀρχῆς, συμμαχεῖν τε καὶ ἀντιμαχεῖν ἐν ᾗπα ι καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας, καὶ τοῖς μὲν εὐνοοῦσιν ἡμῖν προσφέρεισθαι εὐνοϊκῶς, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίως ἔχουσιν ἀπεχθάνεσθαι καὶ μισεῖν.

(2) AIMÉ, *Ystoire de li Normant*, edited by O. DELARC (Rouen, 1892), 297 f. Lo impereor, par lo conseil de ceaux de sa cité, a ce qu'il non fust chacié de l'onor del empire, requist la fille del duc pour moillier a son fillz; et dui foiz lo duc lo contredist. Cf. Chalandon, *op. cit.* I, 260.

his followers. Some of these titles carried with them an annual payment. Guiscard, in return, agreed not to violate the territories of the empire, but to defend them against its enemies. The agreement was, as far as the Byzantine empire was concerned, a defensive and offensive alliance ⁽¹⁾. The Turks are nowhere mentioned, but we are told by Cedrenus in the passage already cited, that Michael's motive was the hope that with the help of the Normans he might be able to drive the Turks out of Asia Minor ⁽²⁾.

In their search for aid against the Seljuks, the Byzantine authorities did not restrict themselves to the negotiations with Guiscard. They also tried to win the papacy. But in view of the bad relations which then existed between Guiscard and the papacy, the Byzantines could hardly have hoped to win the friendship of both at the same time. What seems to have happened was that having been rebuffed at first by Guiscard, they turned to the papacy, and when they finally reached an agreement with the Norman leader, they abandoned their negotiations with the pope. The chronology of the negotiations is, in this connexion, of some significance. The Byzantines made their first proposal to Guiscard late in 1071 or early in 1072, and following its rejection they tried again, late in 1072 or early in 1073. It was only after they had been rejected for the second time that they turned to the papacy, for Michael VII must have made his appeal to the pope, Gregory

(1) P. BEZOBRAZOV, *Chrisovul imperatora Michaila VII Duki*, in *Viz. Vremmenik*, VI (1899), 141. *Καὶ σὺ μὲν συμφωνεῖς ἔμοι συν-εισεργεῖν τὴν πρόπευσαν ὑποταγὴν τε καὶ εὐνοίαν τὸ μὴ μόνον τῶν ἡμετέρων μὴ κατατρέχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν κατατρεχόντων ταῦτα κατατρέχειν καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἐπικρατείας ἡμῶν ἀποκρούεσθαι καὶ συμμαχεῖν ἡμῖν, τὰ μὲν προσκαλούμενος παρ' ἡμῶν, τὰ δὲ οἰκοθεν ἐξορμῶν τῆς δὲ συγγενείας ἔνεκα καὶ τῆς εὐγενοῦς προαιρέσεως καὶ τῆς θαυμασίας ταύτης καὶ βασιλικῆς ἀγκιστείας, τοῦτοις προστιθεῖς τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἀπεχθανομένους ἡμῖν ἐχθροὺς ἀντικρὺς ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς σῆς ἀπωθεῖσθαι φιλίας καὶ ἀντιλήψεως, τοὺς δὲ οἰκείως καὶ εὐμενῶς ἔχοντας οἰκειοῦν σεαυτῷ καὶ πάσης ἀξιοῦν εὐμενείας καὶ συγκροτήσεως, καὶ ἵνα τὸ σύμπαν δηλώσω συνεκτικῷ καὶ περιεκτικῷ λόγῳ, τοιοῦτον σεαυτὸν ἐπαγγέλλη ἡμῖν γενήσεσθαι εὐνοούστατόν τε καὶ θερμότατον σύμμαχον, ὁποῖος αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις πράγμασι γίνοιο. Cf. DÖLGER, *Regesten*, II, 19, N° 1003.*

(2) See note 3.

VII, in the spring of 1073, since the reply which he received is dated July 9, 1073⁽¹⁾. The Byzantine authorities were doubtless made uneasy by Guiscard's rejection of their second offer, and turned to the pope, who was then at odds with the Norman leader, in the hope that with his aid they might immobilize the Normans and at the same time get the assistance which they needed against the Turks. This point of view is supported to some extent by the letters which Gregory VII addressed to various rulers of Europe in the course of 1074⁽²⁾.

The original letters by which Michael VII opened negotiations with the papacy have not survived. What is known about them is derived wholly from the papal reply in which the pope makes the following references : Two monks, Thomas and Nicholas, delivered to the pope letters from the emperor in which he expressed sentiments of warm-hearted benevolence and profound devotion for the Roman Church. To these letters the imperial envoys added an oral message which, they said, came from the emperor and urged the pope to have the greatest confidence in them. The contents of the message dealt with matters of the utmost importance, but no details about them are given by the pope.

The contents of these messages, however, can be determined, at least in general terms, by a careful examination of Gregory's reply and a number of statements which he made elsewhere. In his reply to the emperor Gregory declared that he had at heart the re-establishment of the ancient concord which had previously existed between the Roman Church and its daughter, the Church of Constantinople. This statement points to the problem of the union of the churches as the important matter with which the imperial messages dealt. This inference is confirmed beyond doubt by the letters which Gregory VII addressed to Henry IV on December 7, 1074, for Gregory here states that the Greeks desired the union of the churches. The letter to Henry IV is important for another reason, for we are here told that Gregory was trying to orga-

(1) *Registrum*, Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, CXLVIII, 300-301.

(2) See p. 22, note 2.

nize a military expedition in response to the appeals of the Greeks ⁽¹⁾. This statement, taken together with a number of others which Gregory issued in the course of 1074, calling upon the faithful to come to the aid of the Greek empire, menaced by the Turks, throws further light upon the nature of the imperial messages ⁽²⁾. They must have contained, besides a proposal for the union of the churches, an appeal to the pope for military aid for an offensive against the Turks. The military aid requested for this offensive was no doubt made a prerequisite for the union of the churches.

The union of the churches and papal aid for an offensive against the Turks — these were matters of great importance and Gregory grasped their significance. For this reason Gregory did not content himself with the words of the imperial envoys, He wanted to have them confirmed. He decided, therefore, despite the protest of the imperial envoys that he should have full confidence in them, to send his own representative to Constantinople in order that through him he might learn if the emperor still held to the views which his envoys had expressed and if he were ready to put them into practice. He chose for this purpose the patriarch Dominic of Grado ⁽³⁾.

Of the course of the negotiations between the papal envoy and the Byzantine court hardly anything is known. It is known only that the papal envoy was back in Venice by September, 1074 ⁽⁴⁾.

(1) *Ibid.*, 385-387: Illud etiam me ad hoc opus permaxime instigat, quod Constantinopolitana Ecclesia de sancto Spiritu a nobis dissidens, concordiam apostolicae sedis expetat.

(2) On February 2, 1074, the pope wrote to William of Burgundy to organize an expedition which, having first subdued Guiscard, would then go to the help of the Greeks against the Turks. *Ibid.*, 325-326. On March 1, 1074 Gregory issued a call to all the faithful urging them to come to the aid of the empire of Constantinople. *Ibid.*, 329-330. On December 7, 1074 he wrote to the Emperor Henry IV that he was organizing an expedition of fifty thousand men in response to the appeals of the Greeks. If possible he would command it himself and would go as far as Jerusalem. *Ibid.*, 385-387. On December 16, 1074, Gregory again issued a general call to the faithful to go to the assistance of the Greeks. *Ibid.*, 390.

(3) *Ibid.*, 300-301.

(4) W. HOLTZMANN, *Studien zur Orientpolitik des Reformpapsttums*

He either delayed his report to the pope, or else he brought him some hope, for in December, 1074, Gregory VII again urged the faithful to come to the assistance of the Byzantines ⁽¹⁾. Shortly afterwards, however, he must have learned that the Greeks were no longer anxious to bring about the unity of the churches. In a letter to Hugh, Abbot of Cluny, Gregory VII wrote: « Great pain and universal sorrow obsess me. The church of the Orient is moving farther from the Catholic faith, and the devil, having killed it spiritually, causes its members to perish in the flesh by the sword of his henchmen lest at any time divine grace bring them to a better mind » ⁽²⁾. Thus the negotiations begun in 1073 between Byzantium and the papacy ended in failure. The reason for this failure cannot be determined; but it is quite possible that the final success of the negotiations between the Byzantines and Guiscard may have been, at least in part, responsible for it. Here again the chronology is of some importance. The chrysobull to Robert Guiscard by which the emperor confirmed the conditions of the alliance which he had concluded with him bears the date, August 1074. The letter in which Gregory VII expresses his despair concerning the reconciliation of the Greek and Roman Churches is dated January 22, 1075. There is evidently some connexion between these two events. Having successfully concluded the treaty of alliance with Guiscard, the Byzantines must have become reluctant to accept the conditions of the papacy for the union of the churches, and, as a consequence, the negotiations with the papacy were allowed to lie.

Byzantium derived no benefit from its treaty of alliance with Guiscard. Indeed, following the overthrow of Michael VII, this treaty furnished to Guiscard the excuse which he needed

und zur Entstehung des ersten Kreuzzuges, in Historische Vierteljahrsschrift, XXII (1924-1925), 172.

(1) See note 2, p. 22.

(2) *Registrum, MPL, CXLVIII: 400.* Circumvallat enim me dolo immanis, et tristitia universalis, quia orientalis Ecclesia instinctu diaboli catholica fide deficit, et per sua membra ipse antiquus hostis Christianos passim occidit, ut quos caput spiritualiter interficit, ejus membra carnaliter puniant, ne quando divina gratia resipiscant.

in order to invade the Balkan possessions of the Byzantine empire. The failure of the negotiations between pope and emperor also proved detrimental to Byzantium. Gregory had been badly disappointed by this failure; he must have also been convinced that the Greeks would not accept the union of the churches under conditions favorable to the papacy. That no doubt was the real reason why he sanctioned the invasion of the Byzantine empire by Guiscard, although he justified his action by his desire to help Michael VII recover his throne. On July 25, 1080, he wrote to the bishops of Apulia and Calabria asking them to lend all possible help to the expedition which Guiscard was about to undertake against Byzantium ⁽¹⁾. These negotiations, however, are very important, for in them we see the formulation of a Byzantine policy which was designed to enlist the help of the papacy and western rulers for the purpose of turning back the Turks. This policy was shortly to have world-wide significance.

It was generally admitted, even before the publication by Holtzmann of a series of documents which show that the Byzantine emperor, Alexius I, and the pope, Urban II, virtually reached a temporary agreement concerning the union of the churches ⁽²⁾, that the relations between the two men were cordial ⁽³⁾. It is generally admitted also that Alexius appealed to the pope for help in order to face the Patzinak danger during the terrible winter of 1090-91 ⁽⁴⁾. But the view, at one time also generally accepted, that the appeals for help which came from the Byzantine emperor, particularly that made at Piacenza, moved Urban II to call the First Crusade, has been contested, first by Riant and then by Chalandon.

(1) *Ibid.*, 580.

(2) W. HOLTZMANN, *Die Unionsverhandlungen zwischen Kaiser Alexios I. und Papst Urban II. im Jahre 1089*, in *Byz. Zeitschrift*, XXVIII (1928), 38-67; P. CHARANIS, *The American Historical Review*, LIII (1948), 941-944.

(3) See for instance B. LEIB, *Rome, Kiev et Byzance à la fin du XI^e siècle* (Paris, 1924), 25 f.

(4) F. CHALANDOZ, *Essai sur le règne d'Alexis I^{er} Comnène, 1081-1118* (Paris, 1900), 129 ff.

Riant took the position that the imperial embassy at Piacenza as well as the correspondence between Urban II and Alexius I had as their aim the union of the churches. He denied that there was an appeal on the part of the emperor for help and as best proof for this he pointed out that the First Crusade was preached and organized not in favor of Byzantium, but for the liberation of the Holy Land. Riant also urged that by 1095, the year of the council of Piacenza, the situation of the Greek empire had so improved that Alexius had no need to make desperate and humble appeals to the West for help ⁽¹⁾. Riant thus rejects the statement of a Latin chronicler that at the council of Piacenza, following the appeals made by the ambassadors of Alexius, Urban actually urged those present to come to the defense of the Greek empire. Chalandon, on the basis of Riant's opinion, expressed essentially the same view. If Alexius appealed to the West for help he made his appeal in connexion with the crisis of 1090-91. There was no reason for him to make any appeal in 1095. Alexius, therefore, had nothing to do with the calling of the First Crusade. Chalandon expressed his views in the study which he devoted to the reign of Alexius I and repeated them in his history of the First Crusade which was published after his death ⁽²⁾. His views have been accepted by outstanding students of the history of the Byzantine empire ⁽³⁾, although historians of the First Crusade such as

(1) Comte Riant, *Inventaire critique des lettres historiques de croisades: I^e partie*, in *Archives de l'Orient latin*, I (Paris, 1881), No XXXV, 101-105.

(2) Chalandon, *Essai sur le règne d'Alexis I^{er} Comnène...*, 155 ff.; also, *Histoire de la première croisade jusqu'à l'élection de Godefroi de Bouillon* (Paris, 1925), 17-18.

(3) Only recently Ostrogorsky has written: « Es ist das grosse Verdienst von Chalandon, Alexis I. gezeigt zu haben, dass, entgegen den älteren Anschauungen, der byzantinische Kaiser das Abendland nicht nur zu einem Kreuzzug nie aufgefordert hat, sondern dass der Kreuzzug für ihn völlig unerwartet und auch höchst ungelegen kam ». Georg Ostrogorsky, *Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates* (Munich, 1940), p. 225, n. 2.

Hagenmeyer ⁽¹⁾, Röhricht ⁽²⁾, Bréhier ⁽³⁾ and others ⁽⁴⁾ have rejected them either in whole or in part. But neither those who have accepted these views nor those who have rejected them have produced any new evidence.

The three texts round which the whole discussion has turned are those of Ekkehard of Aura, Bernold of St. Blaise, and the letter to Robert, Count of Flanders, presumably written by Alexius.

The letter to the Count of Flanders, in its present state, is of course, a forgery ⁽⁵⁾. This is the opinion of almost everyone — Vasilievsky is a notable exception — who has studied this curious document. But it is also the opinion of these scholars that the author of this forgery drew his inspiration from a genuine original now lost, which Alexius had addressed to the Count of Flanders. This opinion is based principally on certain passages in the *Alexiad* of Anna Comnena ⁽⁶⁾.

(1) Heinrich HAGENMEYER, *Der Brief des Kaiser Alexios I. Komnenos an den Grafen Robert I. von Flandern*, in *Byz. Zeitschrift*, VI (1897), 32; also *Étude sur la chronique de Zimmern*, in *Archives de l'Orient latin*, II (1884), 66-67.

(2) R. RÖHRICHT, *Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzuges* (Innsbruck, 1901), 16, 18.

(3) L. BRÉHIER, *Vie et mort de Byzance* (Paris, 1947), 309; also *L'Église et l'Orient au moyen âge : Les croisades* (Paris, 1928), 51, 53, 61 f.

(4) D. C. MUNRO, *Did the Emperor Alexius I ask for aid at the Council of Piacenza, 1095?*, in *The American Historical Review*, XXVII (1922), 731-733; HOLTZMANN, *Studien zur Orientpolitik des Reformpapsttums...*, 190 ff; A. FLICHE, *Urbain II et la Croisade*, in *Revue d'histoire de l'Église de France*, XIV (1927), 289-306; Carl ERDMANN, *Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens* (Stuttgart, 1935), 301; F. DOELGER, *Regesten*, II, p. 43, n° 1176.

(5) For the text of the letter see Riant, *Alexii I Comneni Romanorum imperatoris ad Robertum I Flandriae comitem epistola spuria* (Geneva, 1879), 9-24; HAGENMEYER, *Die Kreuzzugsbriefe aus den Jahren 1088-1100* (Innsbruck, 1901), 129-136. Concerning this letter there has been considerable discussion. See for instance, HAGENMEYER, *ibid.*, 10-44; Riant, *Epistola spuria*, VII-LXXIX; CHALANDON, *Essai sur le règne d'Alexis...*, 325-336; H. PIRENNE, *A propos de la lettre d'Alexis Comnène à Robert le Frison, comte de Flandre*, in *Revue de l'instruction publique en Belgique*, L (1907), 217-227; C. VERLINDEN, *Robert I^{er} le Frison, comte de Flandre* (Paris, 1935), 160 ff.

(6) A. A. VASILIEV, *Histoire de l'empire byzantin*, II (Paris, 1932), 17-18.

There exists, however, additional information, included in a Greek source which we shall discuss presently. But by way of anticipation we may state here that, according to this source, Alexius, in order to obtain the aid which he desired, addressed himself not only to the papacy, but to lay rulers of western Europe. We may safely assume that among these lay rulers the Count of Flanders was also included, for Alexius knew him personally. It is more than probable, therefore, that the forgery had its inspiration in a letter that Alexius actually wrote to Robert. That letter must have been written in 1090, for, if we can judge from the forgery, it was the Patzinak danger which prompted Alexius to write to the Count of Flanders. This was five years before the calling of the First Crusade, and it may be objected that the request for help made by Alexius on this occasion could not have had any influence in the calling of the First Crusade. This objection would be valid if this were the only request for help that Alexius had made to the west. That quite the opposite is true is shown not only by other Latin references, but by the Greek source which we are the first to present. It may be said, therefore, that Alexius' letter to the Count of Flanders could not by itself, especially since it was an appeal for help against the Patzinaks, give rise to the idea of a general offensive against the Turks. But it is proof that Alexius sought help in the West, a policy which he continued to pursue and which contributed not a little to bringing about the First Crusade.

The view that Alexius repeatedly requested the help of the West has been based until now on the other two Latin texts, those of Ekkehard and Bernold. These texts are, of course, well known, but we submit them once more because they confirm, and are confirmed by, the Greek source to which we have already alluded.

« The Emperor of Constantinople Alexius », writes Ekkehard, « also sent to pope Urban in connexion with these same barbarian brigands, who had now spread over the greater part of his kingdom, not a few letters in which he deplored his inability to defend the churches of the East. He beseeched the [pope] to call to his aid, if that were possible, the entire West... He promised to provide for those who should go to fight

all that they might need on land and sea ⁽¹⁾ ». Ekkehard's text has no chronological reference and, consequently, we cannot tell when precisely Alexius addressed his numerous letters to Urban. For this reason the accuracy of Ekkehard's statement has not been seriously contested. Those who deny that the appeals of the Greek emperor had anything to do with inspiring the First Crusade interpret Ekkehard's text as referring to the requests for help which he made in 1090 in connexion with the Patzinak danger, requests which are confirmed by certain passages in the *Alexiad* of Anna Comnena. There are two points in Ekkehard's text, however, which are significant : First, Alexius made his appeals for the defense of the churches of the orient ; and second, he urged the pope to call to his aid the entire occident. These two points, I think, require that a different interpretation be given to Ekkehard's text. The appeals by the Greek emperor of which it speaks must be taken to refer not to the appeals which he made in connexion with the Patzinak danger, but to others made subsequently and designed to get him the help which he needed in his struggle with the Seljuk Turks in Asia Minor. Ekkehard's text, thus interpreted, constitutes proof, therefore, that the appeals of the Greek emperor helped to inspire the calling of the First Crusade.

The interpretation which we have given to Ekkehard's text is substantiated by our last Latin text, that of Bernold. Bernold's text is very precise in its chronology. It refers to the council of Piacenza, hence to the year 1095, more exactly, March 17, 1095. Bernold states : « There arrived at this council an embassy from the emperor of Constantinople which humbly beseeched Our Lord the Pope, and all the faithful

(1) H. HAGENMEYER, *Ekkehardi Uraugiensis Abbatis Hierosolymita* (Tübingen, 1877), 81-83. Predictus etiam Alexius imperator Constantinopolitanus super eisdem barbaris predonibus, per maiorem iam regni sui partem diffusis, non paucas epistolas Urbano papae direxit, quibus in defensionem orientalium aecclesiarum se non sufficere deploravit, obtestans, totum, si fieri posset, occidentem, qui iam ex integro christiana professione censeretur, sibi in adiutorium advocari, promittens per se cuncta necessaria praeliaturis terra marique ministrari.

of Christ to procure for him some help against the pagans for the defense of our holy church which the pagans had already almost destroyed in his territories. The pagans had rendered themselves masters of his territories as far as the walls of the city of Constantinople. Our Lord the Pope, therefore, urged many to furnish this aid, even engaging them to promise under oath to go there, with the consent of God, and bring to this same emperor, to the best of their power, their most faithful aid against the pagans ⁽¹⁾. We may summarize the significant points of this text as follows: First, at Piacenza Alexius solicited the help of the West; second, the reason he offered for his request was the necessity of defending the church; and third, the pope not only reacted favorably, but actually engaged some of those present to go to the assistance of the Greek emperor. These three points, if accurately reported, make it possible for us to state that at Piacenza we have the preliminary calling of the First Crusade, a calling which was made in response to the appeal of the Greek emperor.

Bernold's account is the only source which definitely states that at Piacenza ambassadors of the Greek emperor solicited the aid of the west. For this reason its credibility has been questioned⁽²⁾. But it has already been observed that this reason does not offer sufficient justification for doubting Bernold's statement. Bernold was a contemporary; there is some evidence that he was a participant in the council of Piacenza but even if he were not there, we know definitely that his bishop, Gebhard of Constance, was. We may safely assume, therefore, that Bernold obtained his information either directly or from Gebhard; in either case his source must be almost

(1) Bernold, *Chronicon*, *MGH*, SS, V, p. 462. Item legatio Constantinopolitani imperatoris ad hanc sinodum pervenit, qui domnum papam omnesque Christi fideles suppliciter imploravit, ut aliquod auxilium sibi contra paganos pro defensione sanctae ecclesiae conferrent, quam pagani iam pene in illis partibus deleverant, qui partes illas usque ad muros Constantinopolitanae civitatis obtinuerant. Ad hoc ergo auxilium domnus papa multos incitavit, ut etiam iureiurando promitterent, se illuc Deo annuente ituros, et eidem imperatori contra paganos pro posse suo fidelissimum adiutorium collaturos.

(2) Riant, *Inventaire...*, pp. 101-105, N° XXXV; Chalandon, *Essai sur le règne d'Alexis...*, 156.

contemporary as he died in 1100. A comparison of his description of the council of Piacenza with the text of the canons which has been preserved in another way shows that he was well informed ⁽¹⁾. These are important elements in favor of the accuracy of his account. As to the other argument used to discredit it, namely, that by 1095 the situation of the Greek empire had so improved that Alexius had no need to solicit humbly the help of the West ⁽²⁾, we cite a statement by Fliche which constitutes an effective answer ⁽³⁾. « Without a doubt, as Chalandon observes », Fliche writes, « the situation of the Greek empire in 1095 was not alarming, but could not Alexius I nourish at this date the project of restoring the Byzantine power in Asia by recovering the regions occupied by the Turks?... For the realization of such a dream foreign aid could be, if not indispensable, at least very useful. Was not, as the text of Bernold precisely indicates, the putting forth of the urgent necessity for defending the church, persecuted by the infidels, the surest way of obtaining aid? Nothing then can be opposed to the view that Alexius' legates, in order to succeed in their objectives, may have drawn a dark picture of the suffering endured by the oriental churches ».

Fliche is an authority and what he says is very significant, but what makes his statement more important is the fact that it finds confirmation in the sources. For we now learn from a Greek text which neither he nor any other scholar seems to have known, exactly what he says, and indeed something more. We have found this text in the thirteenth century chronicle which Sathas had published anonymously under the title of *Synopsis Chronike* ⁽⁴⁾, but which is now attributed to Theodore Skutariotes.

(1) On the credibility of Bernold see HAGENMEYER, *Étude sur la chronique de Zimmern*, 66-67; ERDMANN, *op. cit.*, 301; HOLTZMANN, *Studien zur Orientpolitik des Reformpapsttums...*, 190 ff; FLICHE, *op. cit.*, 290-93.

(2) Riant, *Inventaire...*, pp. 101-105, n° XXXV; CHALANDON, *Essai sur le règne d'Alexis...*, 156.

(3) FLICHE, *op. cit.*, 291-93.

(4) Published in *Bibliotheca Graeca Medii Aevi*, VII (Paris, 1894).

The existence of this chronicle was, of course, well known, but apart from certain passages published by Heisenberg in his edition of Acropolites because they refer to events of the thirteenth century with which the author was contemporary, it has not been generally used. The reason for this is that the sources on which it is based, Malalas, Theophanes, Georgius Continuatus, Constantine Manasses, Scylitzes, Nice-tas Choniates, George Acropolites, are still extant and scholars have naturally preferred to use these rather than the summaries of them which Skutariotes gives. But the summaries are accurate and this fact speaks well for the accuracy of the chronicle as a whole. The point is important because besides these summaries there are in this chronicle scraps of information which we can find in no other source. These scraps of information were doubtless drawn from sources now lost ; it is, therefore, impossible to check them, but in view of the accuracy of the chronicle as a whole there is no valid reason why their credibility should be questioned⁽¹⁾. One of these scraps is the text with which we are concerned.

The information given by this text is so important for the problem of the origin of the First Crusade that the fact that no Greek source contemporary with the event makes any mention of it may be cited as an objection to its credibility. This would be an argument from silence, but besides the fact that *argumenta a silentio* are notoriously fallacious, the silence of the contemporary Greek sources can, we think, be explained.

The two almost contemporary Greek sources for the First Crusade are the chronicle of Zonaras and the *Alexiad* of Anna Comnena. Neither alludes even in passing to Alexius as having played any rôle in bringing about this great expedition. The silence of Zonaras is not surprising ; generally brief, he devotes only a few lines to the First Crusade⁽²⁾. His chronicle, as a source for the origin of the First Crusa-

(1) On Skutariotes and the credibility of his chronicle, especially for the period of the early Comneni, see G. MORAVCSIK, *Byzantino-turcica I. Die Byzantinischen Quellen der Geschichte der Türkevölker* (Budapest, 1942), 329 f.

(2) ZONARAS, *Epitomae historiarum*, III (Bonn, 1897), 742-743.

de, is of no significance. The *Alexiad* of Anna Comnena is, of course, more important, but neither what it says nor fails to say constitutes an infallible argument. There are serious inaccuracies and omissions in Anna's account of the origin of the First Crusade ⁽¹⁾. She attributes the whole movement to the preaching of Peter the Hermit and ignores completely the role of Urban II. She is animated by profound hostility towards the papacy ⁽²⁾ and knows nothing of the cordial relations which existed between her father and pope Urban. Nor is it possible to believe her statement that Alexius first heard of the Crusade when the disorganized masses approached his territories. It suffices to cast a glance at the chronology of the events to expose the incredibility of this statement. Urban II preached the Crusade in November, 1095; at the end of December, 1095, he addressed a bull to the princes and people of Flanders in which he fixed August 15 as the date of the departure of the Crusaders and designated Adhemar of Puy as his representative. Peter the Hermit left for the Orient on March 8, 1096, and it was not until the end of June that he reached Hungary where he stayed until July 2 ⁽³⁾. Now it is difficult, if not impossible, to believe that between December, 1095 and July, 1096, especially since Constantinople was fixed as the meeting place of the Crusading armies, Alexius received no official notice from the pope concerning the coming expedition. There is, indeed, evidence to the effect that Alexius was officially informed by Urban as early as January, 1096, of the imminent departure of the Crusaders ⁽⁴⁾. Alexius

(1) ANNA COMNENA, *Alexiad*, II (Bonn, 1878), 26 ff.

(2) To Anna Comnena pope Gregory VII was an execrable barbarian. *Alexiad*, I, 63 ff.

(3) On the chronology of these events see HAGENMEYER, *Chronologie de la première croisade* (1094-1100). (Paris, 1902), p. 9, n° 9; p. 11, n° 13; p. 12, n° 15; p. 15, n° 22; p. 28, n° 47.

(4) Riant, *Inventaire...*, p. 112, n° 48. The document which gives this information is not absolutely dated, and for this reason Riant included it in his *Inventaire* with reservations, but he adds: « Je dois dire cependant qu'il est peu probable que les croisés n'aient pas eu la précaution de prévenir de leurs desseins Alexis, dont ils allaient traverser les états, et qu'en lui-même l'envoi par eux d'une missive destinée à avertir l'empereur, n'a rien que de très naturel ». He adds

may have been surprised and alarmed when he heard of the arrival of the masses under Peter the Hermit, but that must have been not because he had no previous knowledge of the coming expedition, but because he saw coming to his assistance, instead of experienced soldiers, undisciplined masses whose depredations were causing considerable damage, while their effectiveness against the Turks was highly questionable. And if, when the regular armies began to arrive, he showed some concern and took every precaution in his dealings with them, that was only natural. For he was anxious to avoid any disorder, which would be bound to prove harmful, and at the same time to channel the energies of his new allies in the interest of his empire. Thus in her account of the beginning of the First Crusade, Anna Comnena was either badly informed or else she consciously suppressed essential information. The *Alexiad* is essentially a panegyric of the first Comnenus and in the light of the troubles which had arisen between the Normans of Antioch and the empire, it is quite possible that Anna suppressed information which showed that her father was responsible for bringing the Latins to the Orient.

The silence of Zonaras and Anna Comnena, therefore, constitutes no argument against the credibility of Skutariotes. Skutariotes must have had before him sources of information which were either unknown to, or ignored by, Anna Comnena and Zonaras. His credibility, when considered in the light of what is already known concerning the relations between Alexius I and Urban II and the information transmitted by Ekkehard and Bernold, becomes evident.

Now here is what Skutariotes says about Alexius I : « Having considered, therefore, that it was impossible for him alone to undertake the battle on which everything depended, he recognized that he would have to call in the Italians as allies, and effect this with considerable cunning, adroitness

further that at the beginning of the sixteenth century Benedetto degli Accolti and Guillaume Aubert of Potiers, seigneur of Massoigne, published each a history of the first crusade in which they speak of an embassy sent by Urban II to Alexius I in order to inform the latter of the deliberation of the Council of Clermont.

and deeply laid planning. For finding a pretext in the fact that this nation considered unbearable the domination of Jerusalem and the life-giving Sepulchre of Our Saviour Jesus Christ by the Persians and seeing therein a heaven-sent opportunity, he managed, by dispatching ambassadors to the bishop of Old Rome and to those whom they would call kings and rulers of those parts, and by the use of appropriate arguments, to prevail over not a few of them to leave their country and succeeded in directing them in every way to the task. That is the reason why many of them, numbering thousands and tens of thousands, having crossed the Ionian sea, reached Constantinople with all speed. And, having exchanged assurances and oaths with them he advanced towards the East. With the aid of God and their alliance and by his own efforts he speedily expelled the Persians from Roman territories, liberated the cities and restored his sway in the East to its former glory. Such was this emperor; great in the conception of plans and the doing of deeds » (1).

Thus the reports of the Latin Chronicles, that Alexius repeatedly asked the West for help, are now confirmed from a Greek source. Its credibility, in view of what we are told by

(1) SATHAS, *Bibliotheca Graeca Medii Aevi*, VII (Paris, 1894), p. 184-185. Σκεψάμενος οὖν ὡς οὐχ οἷός τε ἔστι μόνος τὴν ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀναδέεσθαι μάχην, συμμάχους καὶ τοὺς Ἱταλοὺς δεῖν ἔργῳ κε προσλαβεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τινος κρυψινόας καὶ βαθυγνώμενος οἰκονομίας καὶ ἐπιτηδειότητος. Εὐρὼν γὰρ πρόφασιν ὡς τοῦτο τὸ ἔθνος οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν ἡγῆται τὴν ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις τῶν Περσῶν ἐπικράτησιν, καὶ τοῦ ζωοποιοῦ τάφου τοῦ σωτήρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, τοῦτο ὡς ἐρμαιον εὐρηκῶς, καὶ ἀποστολαῖς πρέσβων πρὸς τε τὸν τῆς πρεσβυτέρας Ῥώμης ὡς ἀρχιερέα προϋστάμενον, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τόπους ὡς ἂν οὗτοι φαῖεν ἐγγάδας καὶ ἄρχοντας, ἀξίοις λόγοις χρησάμενος, οὐκ ὀλίγους ἰσχυσε τούτων τῆς πατρίδος ἀνασπῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ὀλοτρόπως ὑπαγαγεῖν. Ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ πολλοὶ τούτων ἐς χιλιοστάς καὶ μυριάδας κατ' ἀριθμὸν κορυφούμενοι, τῇ Κωνσταντινουπόλει, οὐ διὰ χρόνον πεζεύοντες, ἐπιδεδημήκασιν τὸν Ἰόνιον διαπεραιωθέντες· μεθ' ὧν καὶ πίστει ἐνόρκους ἐκθέμενος, καὶ συμβάσεις συντεθεικῶς, πρὸς ἕω χωρεῖ, καὶ δι' ὀλίγον συνάρσει θεία καὶ συμμαχία τούτων, καὶ οἰκείαις σπουδαῖς ἰσχυσε τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν χωρῶν ἐξωθῆσαι τοὺς Πέρσας, καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐλευθερῶσαι, καὶ τὴν τῆς ἕω διακράτησιν πάλιν εἰς τὴν πρὶν εὐκλειαν ἐπαγαγεῖν.

Τοιοῦτος ἦν ὁ βασιλεὺς οὗτος· μεγαλόβουλος καὶ μεγαλουργός.

Latin chroniclers and the fact that at Clermont Urban II devoted a part of his speech to the appeals made to him by the Greek emperor ⁽¹⁾, cannot be questioned. But the Greek chronicler is more precise than the Latin sources. Ekkehard and Bernold speak only generally concerning the reason which Alexius offered for his request for help. Ekkehard simply says that the request was made for the defense of the oriental churches; Bernold for the church of the empire. The Greek chronicler is more specific. He distinguishes between the real and the pretended motives of Alexius. His real motive was to drive the Turks out of Asia Minor; his pretended motive was to liberate Jerusalem from the domination of the infidels. Thus, in order to achieve his real purpose, Alexius exploited the feeling which was widely prevalent in the West that the domination of the Holy Land by the Turks was intolerable. He no doubt knew of the feeling from the various pilgrims who passed through Constantinople ⁽²⁾; he may also have learned about it from the patriarch of Jerusalem, Euphemius, who was in Constantinople in 1083 ⁽³⁾. It was certainly widely known in Constantinople, as we learn from Anna Comnena, who says that the rank and file among the Crusaders were really impelled by the desire to venerate the Sepulchre of the Lord and to visit the Holy Land ⁽⁴⁾. Alexius thus employed

(1) D. C. MUNRO, *The Speech of Pope Urban II at Clermont*, 1095, in *The American Historical Review*, XI (1906), 231-242.

(2) We know, for instance, that Alexius had an interview with Robert I of Flanders when the latter passed through Constantinople on his way to the West from Jerusalem where he had gone as a pilgrim. See VERLINDEN, *op. cit.*, 158.

(3) We know this from a document which Bezobrazov published in the *Journal of the Ministry of Public Instruction* (Russian) CCLIV (1887), 77. It is there stated that the patriarch Euphemius was sent by Alexius to negotiate with Bohemond who was then invading the empire. Brehier remarks concerning this event: « En 1083 Euthymius, patriarche de Jérusalem, qui se trouvait alors dans l'empire byzantin fut chargé par Alexis Comnène d'aller négocier la paix à Thessalonique avec Bohemond. Le choix de ce messenger est significatif, et l'on peut penser que parmi les arguments destinés à entraîner le consentement des Normands, celui de la situation de Jérusalem et de la défense commune de la chrétienté devait peser d'un certain poids ». *L'Eglise et l'Orient au moyen âge : Les Croisades*, 53.

(4) *The Alexiad*, II, 32.

the most powerful argument — the need of liberating the Holy Land — in order to gain the support which he needed to carry out his offensive against the Turks. He must be regarded, therefore, along with Urban II, as the instigator of the First Crusade. The two men had different motives. Alexius' motive is known ; that of Urban II is more difficult to determine. But the union of the churches, no doubt, figured among his objectives ⁽¹⁾. This would have greatly increased his prestige at a time when the investiture struggle had by no means been decided. If the two men fell short of fully realizing their objectives, that was because, as in all political movements, great and small, it was difficult to predict or guide the development of events ⁽²⁾.

Rutgers University.

Peter CHARANIS.

(1) On this point see the interesting article by A. C. KREY, *Urban's Crusade, Success or Failure*, in *American Historical Review*, LIII (1948), 235-50 ; Cf. CHARANIS, in *American Historical Review*, LIII, 941-944.

(2) My presence in Europe and, as a consequence, my participation in the Seventh International Congress of Byzantine Studies, where this paper was read, was made possible by the financial assistance granted me by the American Philosophical Society, the American Council of Learned Societies and by the Rutgers University Research Fund to enable me to continue there my researches in the history of the Byzantine empire.

DUMBARTON OAKS

The Monastic Properties and the State in the Byzantine Empire

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Reviewed work(s):

Source: *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, Vol. 4 (1948), pp. 51+53-118

Published by: [Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1291049>

Accessed: 26/01/2013 22:54

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

THE MONASTIC PROPERTIES
AND THE STATE IN THE
BYZANTINE EMPIRE

PETER CHARANIS

FROM the little that is known about the social structure of the Byzantine empire in the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries it has been possible to conclude that the characteristic feature of the rural society of the empire was the free village community, inhabited by peasants who owned their own land and in the most part cultivated it themselves.¹ Large estates continued to exist, however, and their owners constituted the aristocracy whose members occupied the important court and military positions of the empire. But besides this court and military aristocracy there was also a provincial aristocracy. Its existence is well attested by a number of references in the sources. When the city of Patras was besieged by Slavs and Saracens at the beginning of the ninth century those who undertook its defence were the *ἄρχοντες* and the *οἰκότρες*, i.e., the rich and most prominent members among its citizens,² who doubtless constituted the aristocracy of the region. To this aristocracy belonged the wealthy widow, Danelis, called by the chronicles "noble and most wealthy woman," who showered Basil the Macedonian with valuable gifts at the time of his visit to Patras because she had foreseen his future grandeur. Among the gifts which she gave to him there were thirty slaves (*ἀνδράποδα*), and this alone gives a good indication of her vast richness.³ To the provincial nobility, to which the hagiographical literature of the ninth century frequently refers,⁴ belonged also Philaretos of the town of Amnia in Paphlagonia, although his nobility

¹ Peter Charanis, "On the social structure of the later Roman empire," *Byzantion*, 17 (Boston, 1945), 39-57.

² Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De administrando imperio* (Bonn, 1840), 217. A French scholar has remarked in this connection: "Comment croire en effet, que le sort de la ville la plus riche et la plus importante de la péninsule hellénique au moyen-âge, fût, en de si graves circonstances, abandonné à la décision d'insignifiants personnages? C'est cependant ce qu'il faut dire, si on refuse en bloc à tous les archontes municipaux une place parmi les *δυνατοί*." G. Testaud, *Des rapports des puissants et des petits propriétaires ruraux dans l'empire byzantin au x^e siècle* (Bordeaux, 1898), p. 18, n. 4. More authoritative is the view of the Russian scholar, V. G. Vasilievsky, who points out not only the existence but also the importance of the provincial aristocracy. V. G. Vasilievsky, "Materials for the study of the Byzantine state," *Journal of the Ministry of Public Instructions*, 202 (St. Petersburg, 1879), 163 (in Russian). My knowledge of Russian is very elementary, but I have been able to consult the work of Vasilievsky and those of other Russian scholars with the aid of Mrs. Nathalie Scheffer who very generously read them with me.

³ Theophanes Continuatus, *Chronographia* (Bonn, 1838), 227-8. In most secondary accounts the name of this wealthy widow is spelled Danielis. See, for instance, Charles Diehl, *Figures byzantines*, 1 (Paris, 1930), 160.

⁴ Louis Bréhier, "Les populations rurales au ix^e siècle." *Byzantion*, 1 (Brussels, 1924), 175-190.

must have been of recent origin.⁵ This provincial aristocracy sought to blend itself with that of the court either by buying the necessary titles or by entering the bureaucracy. Some of its members were of peasant origin; they obtained their titles after they had become extremely wealthy. The best known among these are Philocales⁶ and Symeon Ampelas,⁷ both of the second half of the tenth century.

The provincial aristocracy which blended itself with that of the court and the military organization constituted the class known in the legislative monuments of the tenth century as the powerful or *δυνατοί*. To the same class also belonged the high ecclesiastical and monastic officers. In the social and economic structure of the Byzantine empire the monastic and church properties and those who administered them were of the utmost importance. It has been estimated by a competent authority on the internal history of Byzantium that at the end of the seventh century about one third of the usable land of the empire was in the possession of the church and the monasteries.⁸ The iconoclastic movement had checked the expansion of monasticism and confiscated much of the property of the monasteries, but this was only temporary. Monasticism was deeply rooted in Byzantine society and the members of the various monastic houses exerted considerable influence in the society of Byzantium, a fact which contributed greatly in the final defeat of iconoclasm. With the defeat of iconoclasm the monastic establishments began to multiply and their property, acquired through gifts and purchases, to increase so that by the tenth century their landed possessions were perhaps no less than they had been in the seventh century.

It is well known how the emperors of the tenth century tried to check the growth of the large estates, the properties of the powerful, and thereby protect the free peasant holdings and those of the soldiers. Every major emperor from Romanus Lecapenus to and including Basil II, with the exception of John Tzimeskes, issued more than one novel for this purpose. Most of these novels have been preserved and constitute the principal sources for

⁵ M. H. Fourmy and M. Leroy, "La vie de S. Philarète," *Byzantion*, 9 (Brussels, 1934), 113. Ἦν τις ἄνθρωπος ἐν χώρᾳ τῶν Παφλαγόνων τοῦνομα Φιλάρετος καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦν εὐγενὴς τῶν ἀπὸ πόντου καὶ Γαλατικῆς χώρας, υἱὸς ὑπάρχων Γεωργίου τοῦ Φερωνύμου.

⁶ Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Jus Graeco-Romanum*, 3 (Leipzig, 1857), 310: καὶ γὰρ εὗρομεν τὸν φιλοκάλην γενόμενον μὲν καταρχὰς τῶν εὐτελῶν καὶ χωριτῶν ἕνα, ὕστερον δὲ τῶν περιδόξων καὶ πλουσιῶν ὃς ἕως μὲν ὑπῆρχε τῶν κάτω, συνετέλει, τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συγχωρίταις καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐκαينوτόμει· ἀφ' οὗ δὲ τοῦτον εἰς τιμὴν ὁ Θεὸς ἀνήγεν ἐβδομαδαρίου, εἴτα κοιτωνίτου, καὶ μετέπειτα πρωταβεσταρίου, καὶ τὸ ὅλον κατέσχε χωρίον καὶ προάστειον ἴδιον ἐποίησεν.

⁷ Leo Diaconos, *Historiae* (Bonn, 1828), 113. Ampelas had the title of patrician. Cedrenus, *Historiarum Compendium*, 2 (Bonn, 1839), 388: πατρικίος . . . Συμεὼν ὁ Ἀμπελάς. The more prosperous peasants often took advantage of the distress of their fellow villagers to absorb their property. Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 3:248.

⁸ Vasilievsky, *op. cit.*, 222.

the study of the "social struggle" in the Byzantine empire in the tenth century.⁹ This struggle was really one between the imperial authority and the powerful aristocracy, between the central government, which tried hard to preserve the small holdings of the free peasants and soldiers because it considered them an essential element in the health of the state, and the aristocracy which tried to absorb these holdings by any means, fair or foul. Included in this aristocracy were ecclesiastic and monastic dignitaries who administered church and monastic properties.

Already in the powerful novel of Romanus Lecapenus, issued in 935, there is a provision which restricted somewhat the power of the monasteries to expand their landed property. Besides classifying ecclesiastic and monastic dignitaries, such as metropolitans, archbishops, bishops and hegumens, among the powerful (*δυνατοί*) and therefore prohibiting them from acquiring the property of the small peasants,¹⁰ it provided also that if a peasant became a monk and donated his land to a monastery, the monastery could not accept it. The land had to go to the fellow villagers of the tondured peasant but they were required to pay to the monastery its value in cash.¹¹ This provision, as Vasilievsky rightly observes,¹² doubtless remained ineffective, for the peasants, whose devotion to the church and everything it stood for was proverbial, seldom took advantage of it. Besides, the tendency in the tenth century was for the peasants to sell what holdings they themselves possessed rather than to acquire more. In any case, the provision was not intended to stop the monasteries from extending their landed property. They could still accept gifts from the wealthy or buy land from them. The prohibition to acquire the land holdings of the small peasants imposed upon the ecclesiastical and monastic dignitaries by Romanus Lecapenus was repeated in the novel of Constantine Porphyrogenitus¹³ of 947 but no further disabilities were imposed upon them.

A measure of greater severity, one designed expressly to check the extension of the landed property of the monasteries and to prohibit the establishment of new monastic houses was the novel issued by Nicephorus Phocas

⁹ They are published by Zachariae in the third volume of his *Jus Graeco-Romanum*.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 3:246. μηδείς οὖν μηκέτι μήτε τῶν περιφανῶν μαγίστρων ἢ πατρικίων, μήτε τῶν ἀρχαῖς ἢ στρατηγίαις ἢ πολιτικοῖς ἢ στρατιωτικοῖς ἀξιώμασι τετιμημένων, μήτε μὴν ὅλως τῶν εἰς συγκλήτου βουλὴν ἀπηριθμημένων, μήτε τῶν θεματικῶν ἀρχόντων ἢ ἀπαρχόντων, μήτε τῶν θεοφιλεστάτων μητροπολιτῶν ἢ ἀρχιεπισκόπων ἢ ἐπισκόπων ἢ ἡγουμένων ἢ ἐκκλησιαστικῶν ἀρχόντων ἢ τῶν τὴν προστασίαν καὶ ἐπικράτειαν τῶν εὐαγῶν ἢ βασιλικῶν οἰκῶν ἐχόντων . . .

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 251. We have given the interpretation of Michael Attaliates. *Ibid.*, p. 242, n. 1: εἰ δὲ προφάσει μονάσαντος ἢ μονάσας βουλομένου χωρίτου προσκυρωθῇ τι χωρικὸν εἰς μοναστήριον, ἢ δικαία τιμὴ τοῦ κτήματος παρέχεται εἰς τὸ μοναστήριον παρὰ τῶν συγχωρικῶν, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα μένει παρ' αὐτοῖς.

¹² Vasilievsky, *op. cit.*, 224.

¹³ Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 3:252 ff.

in 964, during the first year of his reign. Following is a translation of this remarkable novel.¹⁴

The word of God, the Father, wishing our salvation indicates the way to it and directly teaches us that wealth and our desire for many possessions constitute the greatest obstacles to it. Wishing us to live simply he prohibits us to think not only of the staff and the wallet and another garment,¹⁵ but even of the food of to-morrow. And now, observing what is happening in the monasteries and other holy houses, I note an obvious disease, for it is only by disease that I can describe this greediness. I do not know what treatment for the evil to contrive, nor how to check the avarice. Whom of the Holy Fathers are they following and whose suggestions are they taking that they have come to such an excess and such a folly. They have turned all the attention of their souls to the care of acquiring daily thousands of measures of land, superb buildings, innumerable horses, oxen, camels, and other cattle, making the life of the monk no different from that of the layman with all its vain preoccupations. Does not the word of God say something quite different, and does it not command for us freedom from such preoccupations? Don't care, it says, what you eat or what you drink. Does it not give us as an example the freedom from care of the birds, to our disgrace? Does not the holy Apostle say: "These my hands served for me and for mine";¹⁶ and in another place: "Having food and shelter let us be contented with these."¹⁷ Look with me into the life of the Holy Fathers who once thrived in Egypt, Palestine, Alexandria and in many other places of the world, and you will find that it was simple, so simple indeed that they appear to have been living only with their souls and to have reached the bodily form of angels.

Christ said that the kingdom of God can be reached only with great effort and through many sorrows. But when I see how those who take the vows of monastic life and put on the attire which marks this life turn into lie their vows and by their conduct contradict their aspect, I do not know why I should not call all this an empty theatrical show invented for the derision of the name of Christ. It is not the commandment of the Apostle nor the tradition of the fathers to acquire enormous property and to worry greatly about its produce. This is not in harmony with the virtuous life; it is more of a case of the needs of the body, when the more spiritual yields before the more worldly. Necessity in the course of time becomes intemperance (*ἀμετρία*), just as evil is wont to grow beyond measure from small beginnings. What is then the matter with the people who, moved by the wish to do something to please the Lord and to have their sins pardoned, neglect thus the easy commandment of Christ which enjoins them to be free of cares and, selling their property, to distribute its proceeds among the poor? But instead of following this commandment they make it intentionally more difficult and troublesome and subject themselves to more worries by seeking to establish monasteries, hostels (*ξεῖμα*) and houses for the old. In times gone by when such institutions were not sufficient, the establishment of them was praiseworthy and very useful; surely the good done by those who established them was more abiding, for they wished to provide food and care for the bodies of men in the one case, and in the other, to pay attention to the conduct of the soul and the higher life. But when their number has increased greatly and has become disproportionate to the need and people still turn to the founding of monasteries, how is it impossible not to think that this good is not mixed

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 292–296.

¹⁵ cf. Matthew, 10, 10.

¹⁶ *Acts of the Apostles*, 20, 34.

¹⁷ I Timothy, 6,8.

with evil and not to say that to the wheat has also been added darnel (ζιζάνια)? And moreover, who will not say that piety has become a screen for vanity when those who do good, do so in order that they may be seen by all the others? They are not satisfied that their virtuous deeds be witnessed by their contemporaries only, but wish also that future generations be not ignorant of them. And who are the people who do these things? Alas! Christians, who, called to good deeds, seek in every way to escape. This is indeed obvious to any one, for at a time when there are thousands of other monasteries which have suffered by the lapse of time and need much help we show no zeal in spending money for their rehabilitation, but turn our attention instead to the creation of new monasteries of our own. And this in order that we may not only enjoy the name of having founded something new, but also because we desire that our foundation should be clearly in evidence and be apart by itself to the end that our name may appear throughout the world and be celebrated in accordance with the divine prophecy.

Accordingly, wishing to arouse you to follow the commandments of Christ, and to tear by the roots this vanity which is hated by God, and thinking that, if we do good, we do it for God and not to please mankind . . . we order those who wish to be pious and perform good deeds in the interest of mankind to follow the command of Christ and, selling their goods, distribute the proceeds thereof to the poor. For He wishes us to be extravagant and beyond measure in what concerns mercy, not only distributing to the needy the money that we have, but having spent it, to turn readily to the sale of our property. But if there are some who love the beautiful and the magnificent (we call this their love of honor (φιλότιμον) and wish to set up monasteries, hostels and houses for the old, they will be prevented from doing so by no one. But, since, as we have said, there are among the existing monasteries many in decay with hardly any part of them standing, let them take care of these monasteries, let them stretch out their hands to them, and let them show their love of God through them. But as long as they disregard these monasteries and, closing their eyes on them and turning to the side against them, to use the words of the Evangile, strive to build others and new ones — that we will neither praise nor allow, for we see in it nothing else than the love of vainglory and evident folly. We command, therefore, care for the established monasteries which are now in ruins and need help, but by this we do not mean that fields, estates and buildings should be given to them. From what has been given to them they have enough of these, but they are not cared for and lie uncultivated because money is lacking. Let those who deem it worthy to take care of these monasteries sell their own estates to whomever among the laymen they may desire and with the money provide for them slaves (οἰκέτας), oxen, sheep and other animals. But if we gave to the monasteries which have suffered and are in bad condition our fields and estates themselves, we shall be exactly where we were before, i.e., we shall have left these monasteries uncared for, since they will have neither the money nor the necessary hands to do anything with their land. They cannot obtain money by selling land, for the law forbids both the monasteries and the churches to sell their property.

Therefore from this moment on it will not be permitted to anyone to grant fields and estates of any kind to monasteries, houses for the poor and hostels, and to metropolitans and bishops, for such grants bring no benefit to them. However, if there are among the existing pious institutions and monasteries some which have no land left because they have been poorly managed — these will not be prevented from acquiring the land which is necessary for them, but they must acquire this land (by gift is meant) after an investigation by and approval of the emperor. The foundation of cells and so called laurae we do not forbid. Indeed, we find it praiseworthy, provided these cells and laurae do not strive to obtain fields and estates beyond their enclosures.

Recommending and legislating these things I know that I shall appear to many to be uttering hard words, words not in harmony with their own thoughts. But I do not care, for in accordance with apostle Paul, I want to please the Lord, not man. However, to those who have sense and understanding and are used to looking not at the surface, but are able to go further and penetrate into the heart of things, we shall appear to be expressing what is useful both to the people who live according to God and to the community as a whole (τῷ κοινῷ πάντι).

It was not out of disrespect for the monastic life or the absence of piety that Nicephorus issued this remarkable novel. Nicephorus was profoundly religious, pious, austere, ascetic and seems to have had, throughout his life, a nostalgia for the cloistre and actually thought of becoming a monk. He venerated his maternal uncle, the monk Michael Maleinos, whose piety had made him famous and who was later canonized by the Greek church. He was the friend and spiritual son of Athanasius, the founder of the monastery of Laura on Mount Athos, and helped him to found his famous monastery. Nicephorus was a sincere admirer of the monastic life.¹⁸

The stern measure which he took against the monasteries was not directed against the monastic life itself. People might still retire from this world and devote themselves to God. Indeed Nicephorus was particularly fond of the hermits. That is the reason why his novel did not prohibit the foundation of single monastic cells or laurae provided they did not seek to acquire property beyond their own particular enclosures. In the Byzantine empire of the tenth century it was not unusual, as it will be presently seen, to find peasants who built small churches for themselves on their own property, embraced the monastic life and devoted the rest of their lives to God. They could still do so under the provisions of the novel of Nicephorus. Nor was it made impossible for them to enter a larger monastery and these were numerous, according to the novel itself.

The novel was primarily directed against the foundation of new large monastic establishments, hostels, and houses for the poor (in those days houses for the poor and hostels were attached to monasteries) and the further acquisition by gifts of landed property by the church and the monasteries. Gifts to monasteries as such were not prohibited; only the giving of land was prohibited. But even this prohibition was not absolute. If it was found that a monastery did not have enough land for its requirements, gifts in land, if previously approved by the emperor, could be given to it.

In issuing this novel the aim of Nicephorus was not primarily to reform or impede the monastic life. That he would have been pleased if the effect of his novel upon the monastic life was salutary there can be little doubt,

¹⁸ Cf. Gustave Schlumberger, *Un empereur byzantin au dixième siècle: Nicéphore Phocas* (Paris, 1923), 252 ff.

as the entire introduction of the novel amply shows, but that was not his principal objective. His aim was primarily economic and political. There were too many monasteries and these already possessed too much land. Much of this land lay fallow because the monasteries did not have the means to cultivate it, and Nicephorus was interested in having the land produce, a condition which was indispensable for the prosperity of the empire as a whole and the payment of the taxes to the treasury. And as the monasteries could not take care of the land which they already possessed to give them more meant to increase the land that lay uncultivated thereby lessening the prosperity of the state and reducing the ability of the treasury to collect the taxes. Nicephorus was a soldier and knew well the importance of the army in the Byzantine setup. But the army required money, and this money came chiefly from taxation. Consequently Nicephorus sought to increase the land under cultivation. That is the reason why he did not prohibit but urged the pious to give their gifts to monasteries in money. With money the monasteries could buy the necessary implements and livestock and hire the labor required for the cultivation of their land. Giving them land meant, under the then existing conditions of most of the monasteries, taking that land out of cultivation. Giving them money meant putting the land which they already possessed under cultivation. The net result would be an increase in the amount of cultivated land and this was doubtless the primary aim of the novel.

The protection of the soldiers against the encroachments of monasteries doubtless also entered into the considerations of Nicephorus. This is shown clearly by another of his novels, that concerning the military holdings of the Armenians. These Armenians were one of the most unstable and roving element among the Byzantine frontier soldiers, the *akritoi*. They often left their holdings and wandered far and wide. Sometimes they came back and laid claims to their former military holdings. In the meantime these holdings were usually given to others and the return of the Armenians created difficulties which threatened to destroy the discipline of the frontier soldiers. In the novel concerning the military holdings of the Armenians, Nicephorus gave instructions on how the Armenians who returned after they had abandoned their holdings should be treated. If they had been away for three or more years and if in the meantime their holdings had been given to other soldiers of merit, they lost every right to them. But if their holdings had been given to some powerful person or to a monastery — in this case the imperial monastery of Lacape^{18a} was involved — as a favor and not because

^{18a} Doubtless a monastery put under imperial protection by Romanus Lecapenus. Lacape, Laqubin, Lakotena, in the theme of Lycandos, halfway between Melitene and Samosata, was

of some public service, they were to be restored to them or to their heirs, notwithstanding any chrysobulls that the new possessors might have in support of their claims. And the period within which the Armenians could claim their holdings was fixed in this case not at three but at thirty years from the time they had gone away.¹⁹ Nicephorus was so much taken up with the army that even in the case of the Armenians whom he thoroughly distrusted he showed no hesitation in supporting them as against other elements, including monasteries, which performed no public services.^{19a}

In the "social struggle" of the tenth century the legislative measures of Nicephorus are usually considered reactionary.²⁰ This opinion is based chiefly upon two other novels which were issued by Nicephorus. The Novel of 967 by which Nicephorus deprived the peasants of the right of preëmption in the sale of property belonging to the aristocracy, a right which had been given to them by Constantine Porphyrogenitus.^{20a} The exact date of the other novel is not known, but by this novel Nicephorus increased the value of the inalienable minimum of a military holding from four to twelve pounds of gold. The reason for this was the introduction of new weapons which made the equipment of a soldier much more expensive than before, but the social effect was to make of the soldiery a lesser nobility.²¹ On the other hand, the measure prohibiting new monastic foundations and all gifts of land to churches and monasteries is thought to have been progressive.²² Progressive indeed it was in so far as it attempted to check the deterioration of the existing monasteries and to improve the economic conditions of the empire by increasing the amount of land under cultivation. But on the major social problem of the tenth century, the problem of protecting the small peasant against the encroachments of the powerful, the measure of Nicephorus made no important contribution. Doubtless, if enforced strictly,

the native town of Romanus Lecapenus. See Henri Grégoire, "Le lieu de naissance de Romain Lécapène et de Digénis Acritas," *Byzantion*, 8 (Brussels, 1933), 572-573.

¹⁹ Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 3:290. Εἰ δὲ τινα τῶν τοιούτων ἀρμενικῶν τοπίων εἴτε τῇ βασιλικῇ τῆς Λακάπης μονῇ ὡς ἔγραψας ἐπεδόθησαν, εἴτε ἀφωρίσθησαν οἰαισδήποτε κουρατωρείαις, ἢ καὶ τινι τῶν δυνατῶν οὐ διὰ τινος κοινοφελείας δουλείας, ἀλλὰ διὰ μόνην προσπάθειαν ἐδωρήθησαν, τῶν τοιούτων οἱ κληρονόμοι, μὴ μόνον εἰ τριετία διήλθεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ τῆς παρελεύσεως τῶν τριάκοντα χρόνων ὑποστρέφοντες, ἐχέτωσαν ἐπ' ἀδείας ἀναλαμβάνειν τὰ ἴδια. κἂν γὰρ λιβέλλους ἐποπτῶν καὶ χρυσοβούλλια ἐπιφέρονται οἱ ταῦτα εἰληφότες διὰ προσπάθειαν, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ μὴδὲν κελεύομεν λογιζεσθαι πάντα καὶ τοὺς τῶν στρατιωτῶν κληρονόμους, τοὺς ἰδίους ἀπολαμβάνειν βουλόμεθα τόπους.

^{19a} See further, O. Tafrali, "Nicephore II Phocas," *Hommes d'Etat*, ed. by A. B. Duff and F. Galy (Paris, 1936), 1:564.

²⁰ Georg Ostrogorsky, "Agrarian conditions in the Byzantine empire in the Middle Ages," *The Cambridge economic history of Europe*, 1 (Cambridge, 1941), 208.

^{20a} Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 3:296 ff.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 300. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ νῦν, ἐπεὶ τὰ τῶν κλιβανοφόρων καὶ ἐπιλωρικοφόρων κίνισιν ἔλαβε, διακελεύομεθα, μὴ ἔχειν ἐπ' ἀδείας μηδένα ἀπλῶς στρατιώτην ἀλλαχοῦ διαπιπράσκειν ἀπὸ τούτου ἀκίνητον ὑπαρξέν, εἰ μὴ ἐπέκεινα ἔχει ἢ λιτρῶν ἀκίνητον εὐπρόσσοδον περιουσίαν.

²² Ostrogorsky, *op. cit.*, 208 f.

it could prevent the establishment or growth of large monasteries in free peasant communities. This was important, for such monasteries, as Basil II observed some years later, almost always absorbed the free peasant holdings, contributing thus to the disappearance of the free peasantry. But all this had already been provided for in the famous novel of Romanus I of 935. None of the powerful, and these included the high monastic and ecclesiastical officers, hegumens, bishops, archbishops and metropolitans, could legally acquire any of the property of the small peasants, whether by purchase or gift. Moreover, a peasant who decided to become a monk could not grant his land to his monastery; the land remained with his fellow villagers, although the latter were required to give to the monastery a sum equivalent to the value of the land. To all this the Novel of Nicephorus made no radical innovations. Indeed, it seems quite plausible that in issuing this novel, Nicephorus had in mind large and important donations, donations that could be made only by the wealthy. At least that is the impression which is created by that part of the novel where Nicephorus charges that those who sought to found new monasteries or grant lands to old ones did so in order to acquire fame. The modest cells that the peasants might found could hardly be considered to bring fame to their founders. Nicephorus' novel was an important economic and social measure, but its objective was not primarily to protect the small peasant proprietors. What Nicephorus had chiefly in mind were the interest of the state and the army.

The novel of Nicephorus remained in force until 988 but it is questionable if it was enforced by the immediate successors of Nicephorus.²³ Basil II finally repealed it.²⁴

²³ In Cod. Vindob. suppl. 47 and 48 of this novel, at the end, there is this note: ὅρα αὐτῇ ἡ νεὰ κατηργήθη παρὰ τοῦ τζυμισχῆ κακῶς δέ. (Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 292, note 1.) This note is doubtless the reason why Schlumberger [*L'épopée byzantine à la fin du dixième siècle*, 1 (Paris, 1896), 728] and Ostrogorsky (*op. cit.*, 209) hold that the bold novel of Nicephorus Phocas had been repealed by John Tzimiskes. If Tzimiskes actually repealed the novel of Nicephorus then it must be supposed that it was reissued after his death, a supposition for which there is no evidence. Nor is there any additional evidence, besides this note, that Tzimiskes formally repealed this novel. It is known indeed that at the time of his coronation Tzimiskes made some ecclesiastical concessions to the patriarch Polyeuct, but these consisted in the repeal of the laws of Nicephorus Phocas which forbade the church officials to make any decisions and to name or promote anyone to an ecclesiastical office without the consent of the emperor. P. Charanis, "Coronation and its constitutional significance in the later Roman empire," *Byzantion*, 15 (Boston, 1941) 60. It is more than likely that Tzimiskes did not enforce this law, and this, plus the concessions which he made to the patriarch, could easily lead to the belief that this law of Nicephorus was formally repealed by him. Vasilievsky (*op. cit.*, 228) says that the law of Nicephorus was formally repealed in 988 and expresses the view that it was probably not enforced by Tzimiskes. A. Vasiliev [*Histoire de l'empire byzantin* (Paris, 1932), 1:444] also attributes the repeal of this law to Basil II. Besides, the author of the Vindob. note may have confused Tzimiskes with Basil II.

²⁴ Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 3:303-304.

Our majesty [writes Basil in his novel of repeal issued in 988] having learned . . . that the law of Nicephorus concerning the churches of God and the pious institutions, a law whose issuance was unjust and insolent not only to the churches and the pious institutions but to God Himself, has been the cause and source of the present evils and of the general upheaval and disturbance (since its enactment to the present day no good whatsoever has happened among us, but to the contrary there has been no lack of every kind of misfortune), decrees by the present pious, (imperial) chrysobull signed by our hands, that the above mentioned law is henceforth to be null and void. There are to come into operation again the laws concerning churches and pious foundations which were in effect before the issuance of this law, i.e., the laws which the grandfather of our majesty, his father and grandfather most excellently and piously enacted.

The evils, the upheavals, and the disturbances of which Basil speaks in this chrysobull doubtless refer to the awful devastations which the empire suffered during the early years of the reign of Basil. From 976 to 980 all of Asia Minor was ravaged by the terrible revolt of Bardas Skleros which brought in its wake destruction, ruin, and famine. In the European provinces of the empire the Bulgarians were spreading ruin and terror everywhere and the first attempt of Basil to check them resulted in disaster. Then in late summer of 987 came the revolt of Bardas Phocas. Meanwhile Bardas Skleros had escaped from Bagdad and once again raised the standard of revolt. The two rebels joined hands, but their coöperation did not last long, for Skleros fell victim to the treachery of Phocas who imprisoned him while he carried on the war against Basil for almost two years, ravaging Asia Minor and threatening Constantinople itself. It was only with the aid of six thousand Russian warriors which Basil obtained from Vladimir after negotiations whose consequences were of world significance that Basil was finally able to put down his indomitable foe. But when he issued his measure repealing the novel of Nicephorus, Phocas was still undefeated and threatened to take the capital.²⁵ In those days when piety and superstition were indistinguishable Basil may have well believed that all the evils that had befallen his empire were due to the impious novel of Nicephorus which he had failed to repeal. But it is not improbable also that by his measure of repeal Basil sought to win the support of the clergy and the monks against Bardas Phocas who represented the tradition of Nicephorus and whose nephew he was. Other measures of Basil taken after his formidable opponents had been crushed show that he was not afraid to risk the wrath of God in serving the interests of the State.

In less than ten years after the issuance of his measure repealing the novel of Nicephorus Basil issued another measure which revived to some extent the monastic policy of Nicephorus.²⁶ Basil had found that the founda-

²⁵ Schlumberger, *L'épopée byzantine*, 1:354 ff; 726 ff.

²⁶ Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 3:313-315.

tion of new monasteries was one of the forces which threatened the extinction of the free peasant class. Accordingly, in the novel which he issued in 996, a novel designed to protect the free peasant class against the encroachments of the powerful, he devoted a paragraph of considerable length to the question of monastic foundations in the free peasant communities and in effect restricted the acquisition of new landed property by the monasteries. Following is a translation of the paragraph in question.

It has been called to the attention of our majesty by reports from almost every theme that many of the villages find themselves injured and wronged: that some of them are on the point of extinction; and that the cause of this is to be found in the monasteries. For, as they say, it happens in many of the villages that a peasant builds a church on his land and with the permission of his fellow villagers grants to it all his property, then becomes a monk and spends the rest of his life there. This is done by another villager and still by another and so gather there two or three monks. When these monks die the local metropolitan and bishop take over the church and call it a monastery. The metropolitans or bishops by holding such monasteries or by granting them to the powerful as gifts injure and wrong and destroy the villages. Therefore we order that all the houses of prayer (we refuse to call them monasteries), built in this way should be returned to the peasants (*πένησιν*) and that the claims of the metropolitans or bishops be set aside. And if the metropolitans or bishops have granted them as gifts to some personages (*προσώποις τισίν*), the latter should be driven out, even if they have held them for a long time, for in this we order that the law of prescription should not be applied. The houses of prayer, as we have said, must be returned to the villagers; they will remain houses of prayer but under the jurisdiction of the village communities, and they must house no more monks than they housed before. The only rights that the metropolitans and bishops can enjoy in these houses of prayer are these: the right of having their names mentioned during the liturgy; the right of performing ordinations; and the right of correcting the transgressions of the monks if there should be any transgression. However, they cannot receive the customary contributions (*τὴν συνήθειαν*) or any other contributions which they receive from monasteries. On the other hand the villages must have no more monks in these houses of prayer than there had been before. However, if to some of these houses of prayer have been added cells and they have, besides, received donations from the emperor, these may remain under the metropolitans or bishops under whom they are now on condition that they are not transferred to another person. This is not strictly in conformity with the law, but it is allowed because of the imperial solicitude with which these houses of prayer have been honored. The metropolitans and bishops, although this too is not in strict conformity with the law, may also keep the monasteries which, having been built in this way, became subsequently large with eight or ten monks because many of the neighbors took the monastic vows and came to live there, granting to them their property. In addition, the metropolitans and bishops may grant or transfer these monasteries to whomever they may wish. We allow this provided that such monasteries had and now have more than eight or ten monks and the actual means for their support, for they cannot make new acquisitions since they have been prohibited from doing so by our great grandfather, the emperor Romanus the Elder and now by our own majesty. We shall not permit it, if, following the publication of our present order and because we have defined as monasteries those houses that have more than eight or ten monks, the metropolitans and bishops assigned more monks to the houses of prayer. We shall not

allow this even if these houses of prayer have enough land to take care of all the monks assigned to them, but we shall still consider them houses of prayer and under the jurisdiction of the villages. Concerning the independent and great ancient monasteries we order that they remain, as in the past, under the authority of the metropolitans or bishops who may present or transfer them to whomever they may wish, although they may not have a sufficient number of monks, or, because of the neglect of this or that metropolitan or bishop, no monk at all.

The novel of Basil II is less drastic and less general in its provisions concerning the monasteries than that of Nicephorus. While Nicephorus prohibited the foundation of all new monastic houses and forbade the old ones to acquire new landed properties, Basil was less ambitious and more restricted in his aims. He was primarily concerned with the monastic foundation in the free peasant communities, which he tried to prevent from growing into larger units, absorbing thereby the land holdings of the peasants. By his novel Basil struck against one of the most effective indirect methods employed by the powerful to take possession of the property of the free peasants. The simple houses of prayer which many a peasant founded on his property were claimed by the ecclesiastical hierarchy on the ground that they were monasteries and then granted them to powerful laymen as *kharistikia* and the latter doubtless used them to exploit the piety of other peasants and thereby absorb their property. It was this evil that Basil tried to extirpate. Of all the emperors of the tenth century Basil II was the sternest in his fight against the aristocracy.²⁷ The various measures which he took were designed not only to protect the poor peasants, but also to crush the aristocracy. When, after 987, Basil was reconciled with Bardas Skleros the latter advised him that, if he wished to preserve the imperial authority, he should permit no one of the aristocracy to prosper and should exhaust their means by heavy taxes.²⁸ By his various measures Basil tried to put this advice into effect.

II

Basil II died in 1025 and with his death came the end of the most glorious period in the history of the Byzantine empire. His death was also followed by a reaction in favor of the aristocracy, a reaction which saw the formal repeal of Basil's strongest law against the aristocracy,²⁹ that concerning the *allelengyon*, i.e., the obligation of the powerful to pay the tax arrears of those peasants who were too poor to meet their own taxes, and the failure to enforce the other social legislations issued in the tenth century, although

²⁷ Ostrogorsky, *op. cit.*, 209.

²⁸ M. Psellos, *Chronographie*, ed. and tr. into French by E. Renauld (Paris, 1926), 1:17.

²⁹ Cedrenus, *Historiarum Compendium* (Bonn, 1839), 2:486.

the latter were not formally repealed. At the same time the sense of security and the feeling that the maintenance of a powerful army was no longer necessary,³⁰ created by the great military triumphs of the tenth century, the crushing of the Saracens and the Bulgarians and the pushing of the frontiers to the Euphrates and the Tigris in the east, to the Danube in the Balkans, led to the neglect of the army. The conflicts between the military and the civil parties which ensued over the issue of the army weakened the central government both in the capital and in the provinces and contributed not a little in bringing about the great disaster at Mantzikert. During this period of false security and consequent political instability and foreign invasions there began also to appear the first of many chrysobulls which were issued to the monasteries by the various emperors. These chrysobulls, which may be defined as charters, usually defined and confirmed the properties in possession of this or that monastery, sometimes added to them, and often granted to the monasteries to which they were issued exemptions from the various obligations, taxes, and *corvées*, which these monasteries owed to the government for their property, and independence from the judicial administration. A great many of these chrysobulls have been preserved, most of them belonging to the period from the second half of the eleventh century to the end of the fourteenth century. They constitute one of the most priceless sources for the study of the agrarian conditions, the taxation system, the ethnic composition, and society in general of the Byzantine empire during this period.

The tax and judicial immunities granted to the monasteries are known in the Byzantine documents by the technical term of *exkuseia* (ἐξκουσσεία), doubtless the hellenized form of the Latin *excusatio* (*excusare*).³¹ Of the documents published by Miklosich and Müller the earliest that refers to this institution, although the term itself is not used, is the chrysobull of Constantine IX Monomachos which was issued in June, 1045, to the monastery of the Mother of God, *Nea Moné*, in the island of Chios.³² By this chrysobull the monastery was granted immunity from the judicial jurisdiction of the officials of the government who were thenceforth not to molest, or enter the property of, the monastery. However, it was not until the second half of the eleventh century that the form of *exkuseia* became crystallized,

³⁰ With Constantine IX Monomachos peace became the keynote of the imperial foreign policy. Psellos, *op. cit.*, 1:151 f.

³¹ C. Uspensky, "Ekskussiia-immunitet v Bizantiiskoj imperii," *Vizantiiskij Vremennik*, 23 (Petrograd, 1923), 76. A. Vasiliev, "On the question of Byzantine feudalism," *Byzantion*, 8 (Brussels, 1933), 593.

³² F. Miklosich et J. Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi*, 5 (Vindobonae, 1887), 2 ff.

and the term itself used in the documents which henceforth become more and more numerous. This documentary material has formed the basis for the belief that the Byzantine immunity made its appearance and assumed its definite form in the second half of the eleventh century, having arisen, as some think independently in Byzantium, out of the disturbed conditions of the eleventh century³³ or, in the opinion of others, borrowed from the west.³⁴ But C. Uspensky found documentary traces of the existence of the *exkuseia*, although the name itself was not used, belonging to the ninth and early tenth century, at the time when the monastic establishments in the empire, according to the same author, reached the apogee of their power. In his opinion, supported also by A. Vasiliev, the *exkuseia* may have developed out of the various privileges granted to the Christian clergy in the fourth century.³⁵ For the absence of ample documentary evidence for this period Uspensky offers two explanations: (1) that the documents once existed but have since disappeared, for in general the documentary material of the empire before the eleventh century has not been preserved; or (2) such documents were never issued because the monasteries were so secure in their position that they were not needed. In either case their absence does not mean that the *exkuseia* did not exist before the eleventh century. Nor does their existence for the eleventh century mean that the institution of *exkuseia* appeared for the first time in that century.

The increase in the documentary material concerning the *exkuseia* in the second half of the eleventh century may indicate, again according to Uspensky, that the position of the monasteries in that period changed for the worse.³⁶ The disturbed political conditions of the period doubtless lessened the security of the monasteries and it was in order to protect themselves against any encroachments on their properties or any infringement against their privileges that they sought and obtained special chrysobulls which defined their properties and confirmed the privileges, including the immunities, which they enjoyed. The privileges granted to monasteries were not always respected by the local functionaries and that is the reason

³³ P. A. Yakovenko, *K istorii immuniteta v Vizantii* (Yuryev, 1908) 31–71, as summarized by C. Uspensky (*op. cit.*, 100) and Vasiliev ("On the question of Byzantine feudalism," 593).

³⁴ N. S. Suvorov in his long review of Pierre Grenier, *L'empire byzantin, son evolution social et politique in Vizantiiskij Vremmenik*, 12 (St. Petersburg, 1906), 227–228 (in Russian).

³⁵ C. Uspensky, *op. cit.*, 95 ff; Vasiliev, "On the question of Byzantine feudalism," 594 f. The theory of Uspensky is confirmed by the edict issued by Justinian II in 688 in favor of the Church of St. Demetrius of Thessalonica by which a *salina* (ἀλική) was granted to that church. The *salina* was to be *παντελευθέρα*, i.e., free from any charges. A. Vasiliev, "An edict of the emperor Justinian II," September, 688, *Speculum*, 18 (Cambridge, Mass., 1943), 6.

³⁶ C. Uspensky, *op. cit.*, 95.

why the monasteries repeatedly asked and obtained confirmation of their privileges. The complaints of Theophylact of Bulgaria against the violence of the officials and his appeals to important personages for relief are well known, and there are documents which show that the imperial orders were not always observed and consequently were repeated.³⁷ This is true not only of the eleventh and twelfth centuries; but of the later period also, as is shown by the imperial order, issued in 1233 to the Duke of the Thrakesion theme, ordering him not to molest the *paroikoi*, i.e., dependent peasants, and the monks of the monastery of Lemvo near Smyrna, and to cease imposing on them various obligations, obligations from which they had been specifically exempted.³⁸

But it was not only from the local officials and other persons that the monasteries had to fear. The emperors themselves did not always respect the chrysobulls held by the monasteries, as is shown by the novel of Nicephorus, already cited, concerning the military holdings of the Armenians. During the second half of the eleventh century when the imperial government was in a bad financial condition, while the demands on the treasury were increasing daily, the fact that monasteries possessed chrysobulls which defined and confirmed their privileges and properties was no guarantee that their property rights would not be violated. For money was needed with which to reorganize the army in order to meet the ever-growing external danger,³⁹ and one of the ways by which this money could be raised was by the confiscation of the monastic properties.

This step was taken by Isaac I Comnenus (1057–1059) who was raised on the throne by the military party. Isaac realized that what the empire needed most was an army. The once-powerful Byzantine army had been dealt a body blow during the reign of Constantine IX Monomachus (1042–1055). The profession of the soldier which in the great days of Byzantium carried with it prestige, honor and position had by this time no value, and so, as Skylitzes puts it, “the soldiers put aside their arms and became lawyers or jurists.”⁴⁰ But to reorganize the army funds were needed, and to obtain

³⁷ M. Goudes, “Βυζαντιακὰ ἔγγραφα τῆς ἱερᾶς Μονῆς Βατοπεδίου,” Ἑπετηρὶς Ἑταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν, 3 (Athens, 1926), 131 f.; L. Petit, “Le monastere de Notre Dame de Pitie,” *Izvestiya Ruskigo Arkheologicheskago Institute v Konstantinopole*, 6 (Sofia, 1900), 34 ff.

³⁸ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 4:214. For the date see F. Dölger, “Chronologische und Prosopographisches zur byzantinischen Geschichte des 13. Jahrhunderts,” *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 27 (Leipzig, 1927), p. 314, n. 127.

³⁹ The two fundamental books on the position of the empire in the eleventh century are: C. Neumann, *Die Weltstellung des byzantinischen Reiches vor den Kreuzzügen* (Leipzig, 1894). French translation (Paris, 1905). N. Skabalanovich, *Byzantine state and church in the eleventh century* (St. Petersburg, 1884) (in Russian).

⁴⁰ Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, 2:652.

these funds, Isaac seized the properties of the monasteries. Following is a translation of the passage of Michael Attaliates where he describes, not without approval, the measures taken by Isaac Comnenus to ameliorate the conditions of the treasury.⁴¹

When Isaac succeeded to the throne he turned his attention to the expenditures of the empire and the magnitude of the requirements for the maintenance of the army. He was faced by wars which entailed large expenses, for the enemies were on every side excited against the Romans and were prevailing over them. He saw that he would be in need of money and considered that its acquisition in the largest sums was indispensable and for this reason he came to be deemed by those who owed to the treasury a severe levier of taxes. He was also the first to restrict the distribution of titles, and, like an insatiable hunter, he searched for money everywhere. He took care also to be economical and to provide the crown with additional lands. For this reason he confiscated the property of many private persons, disregarding the chrysobulls which confirmed them in their possession of it. He put his hands also on some of the monasteries whose large and rich properties were in no way inferior to those of the crown. He took away much of their property, justifying himself by saying that he left enough for the monks and the monasteries, and thus added to the imperial belongings. This act, which seemed to be unlawful and dishonest and to the pious directly equivalent to sacrilege, had no bad results in the eyes of the people who looked at things with seriousness. It appeared to be profitable in two ways: (1) By freeing the monks from the worries which did not correspond to their way of life, it turned away from gain those who have been trained to live in poverty without depriving them of the indispensables for life. At the same time it freed the neighboring peasants from a heavy burden, for the monks, relying upon their extensive and wealthy estates, were wont to force them to abandon their lots. The monks were sick with insatiety which reached the point of passion. If ever they were brought to court they prevailed over their opponents and won praise because of their vast estates and the influx of money, money which they could use without giving any account. And (2) by this measure the public treasury which was forced in divert ways to spend its own with open hands obtained an addition and relief which was not inconsiderable without doing any harm at all to others.

The primary purpose of the measure taken by Isaac was, of course, to find revenues for the treasury, but it is interesting to note that the protection of the peasants entered also into consideration. Indeed, the measure was not taken for the protection of the peasants, but the confiscation of monastic properties removed the influence of the monasteries on the neighboring peasants and produced that effect. On the basis of this passage from Attaliates and the novel of Basil II of 996 it appears that the monasteries were among the worst offenders in the virtual elimination of the free peasantry in Byzantium. Their influence in this connection was to grow still stronger in the centuries that followed.

Isaac gave up his throne in 1059, and his immediate successors seem to

⁴¹ Michael Attaliates, *Historia* (Bonn, 1853), 60-62.

have abandoned his bold policy concerning the properties of the monasteries. It was said of Constantine X Ducas (1059–1067) that he was a friend of the monks beyond measure.⁴² However, if monastic properties were not confiscated outright, whole monasteries were granted as gifts to important personages by the emperor. For instance, the Logothetes Nicephorus, the favorite of the emperor Michael VII Ducas (1071–1078), distributed honors and *pronoëae*, i.e., revenue producing grants given to persons, usually, but not always military, for services rendered or to be rendered, freely, and had himself granted the monastery of Hebdomen which he made the center of his vast possessions.⁴³

The bold financial policy of Isaac was revived by his more famous nephew, the emperor Alexius I Comnenius (1081–1118). When Alexius ascended the throne the finances of the empire were in a state of bankruptcy while formidable enemies surrounded the empire from every side.⁴⁴ Alexius had sought relief at first by confiscating some of the sacred vessels of the church and converting them into money. But no sooner had he done this than he repented, doubtless under the pressure of the discontent that his measure must have aroused, returned an amount equal to the value of the confiscated vessels to the church, and issued a novel condemning his own action and making it unlawful in the future to touch the sacred vessels of the church.⁴⁵ Evidently Alexius did not think that this novel applied to him, for, after the capture of Durazzo by Robert Guiscard in 1083, he again seized some of the sacred vessels of the church. He justified his action on the ground that "it was lawful to sell the sacred properties of the churches for the ransoming of prisoners of war." Leo of Chalcedon who violently opposed this action was eventually removed from his see.⁴⁶

The seizure of sacred vessels was only one method employed by Alexius to replenish his treasury. Other measures included the debasement of the coinage, the vigorous collection of the taxes and a general survey of landed property aimed at a better precision of the taxes and the recovery of public property illegally seized by private individuals. But more important perhaps was the seizure of some of the landed property of the church, monasteries and certain laymen. This is well known not only from the general

⁴² *Ibid.*, 76.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 201: ἦν γὰρ . . . καὶ κτήσεων ἀκινήτων χανδὸν ποιούμενος τὴν ἐπὶ κτήσιν. ὧν ἀκορέστως ἐχόμενος κέντρον καὶ ταμείον τῆς τῶν λοιπῶν αὐτοῦ κτήσεων ἐπισυναθροίσεως τὴν τοῦ Ἐβδόμου μονῆς. ταύτην γὰρ λαβὼν κατὰ δωρεάν . . .

⁴⁴ Anna Comnena; *Alexiad* (Bonn, 1839), 1:164.

⁴⁵ Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 3:355–358.

⁴⁶ Anna Comnena, *op. cit.*, 1:226 ff. Cf. V. Grumel, "L'affaire de Léon de Chalcédoine: le chrysobulle d'Alexis 1^{er} Comnène sur les bien sacrés," *Études Byzantines*, 2 (Paris, 1944), 126–133.

literature of the period but also from monastic and other documents. In one of his letters Theophylact of Bulgaria writes: "I have found the village, which from ancient times belonged to the church and was not inscribed in the census, taken away from the church by the emperor, as he has taken away the property of the nobility."⁴⁷ The general import of this statement has been recently questioned by a very competent authority, who urges that the seizure of the village spoken of by Theophylact was perhaps the result of the new survey of landed property which showed that the village did not legally belong to the church of Ochrida.^{47a} Still there is little doubt that Alexius resorted to confiscations in order to meet the needs of the treasury. This is clearly indicated by a document of Vatopedi. The document bears no date, and does not mention the name of the emperor who issued it, but it seems very probable, as the editor thinks, that it was issued by Alexius. Now it is clearly stated in this document that land belonging to Vatopedi was confiscated because the treasury was empty and means were needed in order to fight the many enemies who threatened the empire.⁴⁸ There can be no doubt that Alexius was anxious to create a coterie of friends, with the members of his family as the nucleus, upon whom he could rely and to whom he could entrust the administration and defense of the empire. The lands which he confiscated he distributed to these friends and relatives. "To his relatives and favorites," writes Zonaras, "Alexius distributed the public goods by wagon full; he granted to them sumptuous annual revenues. The great wealth with which they were surrounded and the retinue which was assigned to them were more becoming of kings than of private individuals. The houses which they acquired appeared like cities in size and were no less magnificent than the imperial palace itself. But to the rest of the nobility he did not show the same beneficence."⁴⁹ Indeed, as is known from the chrysobulls issued by Alexius himself, whole territories

⁴⁷ Theophylact of Bulgaria, *Epistolae*, in Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, 126:533, letter 20: Ἐγὼ γὰρ, αὐθέντη μου, τὸ χωρίον ὃ ἐξ ἀρχαίων τῶν χρόνων κατείχεν ἡ ἐκκλησία, μηδὲ πρακτικῶ ὑποκείμενον, ἀφαιρέθην παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως εὐρον καὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἀποσπαθέν· ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων πάντων. Migne's *Patrologia Graeca* is cited hereafter as MPG.

^{47a} G. Rouillard, "Notes et discussions à propos d'un ouvrage récent sur l'histoire de l'État byzantin," *Revue de Philologie de Littérature et d'Histoire Anciennes*, 16 (Paris, 1942), 177 ff.

⁴⁸ Goudes, *op. cit.*, p. 128, n. 4. Cf. F. Dölger, "Chronologisches und Diplomatisches zu den Urkunden des Athosklosters Vatopedi," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 39 (1939), 328 f.

⁴⁹ Zonaras, *Epitomae Historiarum*, 3 (Bonn, 1897), 767. ὁ δὲ τοῖς μὲν συγγένεσι καὶ τῶν θεραπόντων τισὶν ἀμάξαις ὅλαις παρέιχε τὰ δημόσια χρήματα καὶ χρησίας ἐκείνοις ἀδρὰς ἐτησίους ἀπένειμεν, ὥς καὶ πλοῦτον περιβαλέσθαι βαθύν καὶ ὑπηρεσίαν ἑαυτοῖς ἀποτάξαι οὐκ ἰδιώταις, ἀλλὰ βασιλεῦσι κατάλληλον, καὶ οἴκους προσκτήσασθαι, μεγέθει μὲν πόλεσιν ἐοικότας, πολυτελείᾳ δὲ προσκτήσασθαι βασιλείων ἀπεικότας οὐδέν· τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς τῶν εὐ γεγονότων οὐχ ὅμοιαν ἀνεδείκνυτο τὴν προαίρεσιν.

were sometimes included in these grants. It is known, for instance, that the entire peninsula of Cassandra was granted by Alexius to his brother Adrian. Included in this grant were all the public lands located in the peninsula and all the public revenues derived from the land privately owned. The status of the private land did not change, but the taxes on it were no longer payable to the imperial treasury but to Adrian. Indeed, the chrysobull from which this information is obtained was issued in 1084 to the monks of Laura, whose landed possessions in the peninsula of Cassandra were considerable, in order to assure them that the grant of Cassandra to Adrian did not mean that they became his dependents (*paroikoi*).⁵⁰ The grant of Cassandra is one of the earliest examples of the appendage system in Byzantium.

The gifts of land to Leo Kephalas is another illustration of the policy of Alexius to win friends and supporters by liberal grants. Leo Kephalas was a high functionary and during the reign of Nicephorus Botaneiates (1078–1081) he obtained from the emperor some public land (*κλασματικὸν τόπον*),^{50a} but before he took possession of it Nicephorus was overthrown. Kephalas now appealed to Alexius and by a chrysobull issued in 1081, the latter confirmed the grant made to Kephalas by Botaneiates. Kephalas was designated the absolute owner of this land for which he was to pay a tax of four and one half nomismata, but was to be free from all other charges and obligations.⁵¹ Three years later Kephalas obtained from Alexius another piece of land, an estate located at Mesolimna near Thessalonica. This estate had originally belonged to the Frank Othon and Leo Baasprakanites but it had been taken from them on the ground that they were traitors.⁵² This is a striking illustration of the policy of Alexius of confiscating the land of the nobles whom he could not trust and rewarding those in whom he had confidence and who rendered him valuable service. In 1086 still another estate, the village of Chospiane, with complete and perpetual exemption of all

⁵⁰ This document was first edited by Vasilievsky in *Vizantiiskij Vremennik*, 3 (St. Petersburg, 1896), 121. τὰ ταύτης ἐντὸς τῷ δημοσίῳ ἀνήκοντα σύμπαντα τῷ πανσεβάστῳ προτοσεβαστῷ κυρίῳ Ἀδριανῷ, τῷ περιποθήτῳ αὐτῆς αὐταδέλφῳ, ἡ βασιλεία μου ἔδωρήσατο, καὶ τὸν παρὰ τῶν οἰκητόρων τῆς τοιαύτης νήσου ἐτησίως τελούμενον τοῦ δημοσίου κανόνα τῷ προσώπῳ τε καὶ τῷ μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐλογίσατο, ὥστε πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτὰ τελεῖσθαι καὶ καταβάλλεσθαι. The document has been reedited by G. Rouillard and Paul Collomp, *Actes de Laura* (Paris, 1937), 104 ff.

^{50a} *κλασματικὸς τόπος* or *κλάσμα* were technical terms in the financial administration of the empire. According to the principle of the *epibole* the neighbors of an abandoned piece of land were required to pay the land tax on that land. But it was found by experience that the carrying out of this principle led to the withdrawal of more taxpayers, and to prevent this the government, in many instances, gave up taxing abandoned property. If a piece of abandoned property did not pay taxes for thirty years, it was considered to belong to the state and was known as *κλασματικὸς τόπος* or *κλάσμα*. Ostrogorsky, *op. cit.*, 203.

⁵¹ Rouillard and Collomp, *op. cit.*, 99.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 104.

charges, prestations, and *corvées*, was given to Kephalas. This was his reward for his defense of Larissa against Bohemond.⁵³ Grants such as those awarded to Kephalas may have been rare, but the example of Kephalas shows definitely that Alexius resorted to them in order to win supporters.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that some of the land granted by Alexius to his followers was obtained by the outright confiscation of lands belonging to the church, the monasteries, and members of the lay nobility. But besides outright confiscation Alexius resorted to another method of obtaining the means with which to reward his partisans. This was an old Byzantine institution and consisted in the grant of whole monasteries together with all their properties to an outside individual, either lay or ecclesiastic, doubtless the former in the case of Alexius. This was not a confiscation, for the monasteries remained monasteries and did not lose title to their properties, but their management was put under the direction of the individuals to whom they were granted, who, while undertaking to support the monks and maintain the buildings, appropriated for themselves what remained of the revenues. This kind of grant was designated in Byzantium by the technical term of *kharistikion* and the holder of it was known as *karistikarios*. It was not unlike the western *beneficium*.⁵⁴ It was granted for a specific period, usually the lifetime of the holder.

In the novel of Basil II of 996 this kind of grant is mentioned several times, although the technical name for it is omitted. Basil, it will be recalled, forbade the ecclesiastical hierarchy to take possession of the houses of prayer built on peasant property and to grant them to the powerful. This prohibition, however, did not extend to such houses of prayer that assumed the true character of monasteries by having eight or ten monks. Nor did it include the more ancient and larger monasteries.⁵⁵ Mention has also been made of the grant by the emperor Michael Dukas of the monastery *Hebdomon* to the *Logothetes* Nicephorus who made it the center of his vast possessions.⁵⁶ Alexius seems to have exploited this institution to the fullest

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 110 ff. Concerning these grants to Kephalas see also, Rouillard, "Un grand bénéficiaire sous Alexis Comnène: Léon Képhalas," in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 30 (Leipzig, 1930), 444 ff.

⁵⁴ Vasilev, "On the question of Byzantine Feudalism," 587.

⁵⁵ Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 3:314–315. ὅσα δὲ πάλιν ἀπὸ χωρίων . . . συνέστησαν μοναστήρια . . . καὶ εἰσὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνὰ ἡ' ἢ ι' ἢ καὶ ἐπέκεινα μοναχῶν, εἰ καὶ τάχα καὶ δίκαιον οὐκ ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' οὖν εὐδοκοῦμεν εἶναι ταῦτα ὑπὸ τοὺς μητροπολίτας καὶ τοὺς ἐπισκόπους, καὶ μὴ διακωλύεσθαι τούτους τοῦ δωρεῖσθαι ἢ παραπέμπειν αὐτὰ ὅπου βούλονται . . . τὰ δὲ ιδιώστατα καὶ ὅσα μεγάλα μοναστήρια ἐκ παλαιοῦ ἦσαν, εἰ τάχα καὶ μοναχοὺς ἄρτι πολλοὺς οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀμελείᾳ τυχὸν τοῦ μητροπολίτου ἢ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου χωρὶς μοναχῶν εἰσι, διοριζόμεθα ταῦτα καὶ πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν μητροπόλεως καὶ τῶν ἐπισκοπῶν εἶναι καὶ δωρεῖσθαι καὶ παραπέμπειν αὐτὰ τοὺς τὴν μητροπολίτας καὶ τοὺς ἐπισκόπους ὅπου καὶ ὅτε θελοῦσιν.

⁵⁶ See note 43.

extent. At least this is the conclusion that one draws by reading the pamphlet of John of Antioch, written in order to denounce the practice of granting monasteries as *kharistikia*.

John was patriarch of Antioch (John IV) at the time of the First Crusade and he must have written his pamphlet toward the end of the eleventh century.⁵⁷ It covers therefore the first half of the reign of Alexius, the time during which he was in the greatest need of money, and doubtless describes the prevailing conditions of this time.⁵⁸ After saying that the *kharistikia* first originated and were widely distributed during the iconoclastic period, especially in the reign of Constantine Copronymus,⁵⁹ John adds:⁶⁰

But he [Copronymus] was overthrown together with his iconoclastic machinations with the aid of the invincible might of Christ by the monks, whom he persecuted, and fell, a corpse of portentous significance. From that day until now, a period of four hundred years, the monastic order has been so worshipped and honored by the faithful that they have come over to the monks to make the confession of their sins and receive from them deliverance by expiation or absolution.

However the enemy [of the monks] could not endure seeing these things and be-thought himself of the ancient cunning. And he knew that he must not attack openly either the faith or the monks or the laymen but with craft and secrecy to overthrow and destroy both by a single artifice. [This artifice consisted of the suggestion that] the donations made to God by pious emperors, prelates, *archontes*, monks and laymen should be given as gifts by men to men. By donations to God I mean monasteries, houses for the old, hostels, and the properties belonging to all these . . . This violence, this injustice to God, this evil which I cannot describe because of its excessiveness began, as every one knows, at the time of the iconoclastic heresy and its fiery protector, as has been said, Copronymus, whose hatred of the monks was implacable. But it came to an end through the triumph of orthodoxy.

Then it began again through the mischief of the evil devising enemy who always flatters the good, but ends in evil. Emperors and patriarchs granted to the *archontes* (τοῖς ἀρχοῦσι) [i.e. to members of the aristocracy] monasteries and houses for the poor that lay in or were on the point of decay on the pretext of caring for them. These monasteries were not given as gifts and for the private profit of those who received them, but in order that they may be restored and ornamented, and for the benefit of the souls of those who received them. But as time went on the enemy introduced in this practice his own poison. I mean the sordid love of gain and greediness. Thinking that it was fair, subsequent emperors and patriarchs took hold of this practice of grants which their predecessors had used, ostensibly for the management of the monasteries and the house for the poor, and began to give these institutions as absolute gifts, including among them not only those that had decayed or were decaying, but also those that still stood, and, with the passing of time, the greater and more prosperous. However, the holy Sisinnius, having become patriarch of Constantinople not long

⁵⁷ On John of Antioch see K. Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur* (Munich, 1897), 156; Vasilievsky, *op. cit.*, 202:400 ff.; F. Chalandon, *Essai sur le règne d'Alexis 1^{er} Comnène, 1081–1118* (Paris, 1900), xxviii f.

⁵⁸ John of Antioch, *De monasteris laicis non tradendis* in MPG, 132:1117–1154.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 1120.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 1128–32.

before this time [Doubtless Sisinnius II, 995–998?], did not endure to see this violence, stood up, as some say, and denounced it, although it had not come to such an extreme of evil. But those who came after him took little account of his stand and renewed the evil (*πονηρὸν*), which, growing gradually, has ended in the present calamity. For it is no longer this or that monastery which is granted, but all to-gether, small and big, poor and rich, those for men and those for women. A few have still escaped, those recently constructed and the wealthier, but those too will suffer the same fate if the evil practice continues. The monasteries are granted to laymen, both men and women, sometimes even to foreigners, even to two persons.

John of Antioch had evidently seen some of the documents by which these grants were made, for he continues:

Here is the soul-destroying, full of blasphemy preamble of the grant: “My Majesty, our Mediocrity grants to you — such a monastery — with all its rights and privileges together with all its possessions both movable and immovable to hold for life.”

Concerning the fate of the monasteries granted as *kharistikia*, John says:⁶¹

If one were to say that the monasteries are granted for their restoration and permanence, those of them that have been destroyed by the *kharistikarii* would give a brilliant answer. And of these not a few have been turned into private estates. I do not know if there exists a monastery which has been restored and renewed by a *kharistikarios*.

The protest of John of Antioch and doubtless of others may have been one of the reasons for the issuance of a novel by Alexius designed to correct some of the evils pointed out by John. By this novel Alexius authorized the patriarch to investigate and correct the moral transgressions of the monks of all the monasteries, whether these monasteries were free, granted to others for their management and supervision, patriarchal, public, imperial or autonomous. The patriarch was further authorized to see that the monasteries granted to others were not damaged by them, and if damaged, to require those who held them to make the necessary repairs. The exact date of the issuance of this novel is not known, but, according to the indiction it must have been issued in 1082 or 1097 or 1112.⁶²

According to John of Antioch the *kharistikion* as an institution was established during the iconoclastic period and was widely used, especially during the reign of Constantine Copronymus. There is some evidence, however, which seems to indicate that the *kharistikion* was known for some time before the iconoclastic period. For instance, the forty-ninth canon of the

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 1136–37.

⁶² Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 3:408. Ἐπὶ δέ γε τοῖς κατ’ ἐπίδοσιν δοθείσι μοναστηρίοις καὶ κατ’ ἐφορείαν ἢ οἰκονομίαν ἢ παντελῇ ἐλευθερίαν οὐ μόνον τὰ ἄλλα ψυχικὰ σφάλματα ἐπιζητήσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ κατελύθησαν ἢ καταλύονται μερικῶς ἢ καθόλου παρὰ τῶν λαβόντων ταῦτα. καὶ εἰ εὕρησει τινὰς μειώσεις ἐν αὐτοῖς γινομένας, καταναγκάσει τοὺς ταῦτα κατέχοντας ἀποκαθιστᾶν ταῦτα . . .

Trullan council, held in 691 during the reign of Justinian II, repeated the twenty-fourth canon of the council of Chalcedon that monasteries once established were to remain monasteries for all times and were never to be turned into lay establishments and added that they were not to be granted to laymen even though this may have been a practice until then.⁶³ It follows from this canon that at the time of the Trullan council the *kharistikion*, at least in substance if not in name, was already well known and, therefore, its origin antedated by far the iconoclastic movement. If this is so, then the opinion of Vasiliev that "possibly this peculiarity of Byzantine *beneficium* (*kharistikion*) should be connected with the iconoclastic epoch, when the government in its struggle against the monks resorted to the secularization of monastic lands"⁶⁴ will have to be given up. Strictly speaking the *kharistikion* did not involve the secularization of monastery lands. What was involved in the grant was the management of the monastery and its properties. It is well known that the canons of the church did not permit the alienation of monastic properties. The *kharistikion*, therefore, may have been invented by the hierarchy itself, metropolitans, bishops and archbishops who controlled monastic properties, in order to get around this prohibition. If this conjecture is correct, then the opinion of Th. Uspensky,⁶⁵ rejected by Vasiliev,⁶⁶ that "the system of *kharistikion* as a custom of granting monasteries and church lands was an institution which developed within the church itself and was in complete harmony with the customs and opinions existing among the laity as to the right of disposal of land property" may not be unsound after all.

The ill effects of the institution of the *kharistikion* upon the monasteries and their properties, denounced by John of Antioch, are confirmed by documentary evidence. One of the most famous and wealthiest monasteries in Constantinople was that of St. Mamas. But, according to the charter (*τυπικόν*) which was granted to it in 1159 following its restoration, its possessions had been dissipated and lost "through the insatiety and shamelessness of the *kharistikarii* who had held it from time to time and who, like

⁶³ G. A. Ralle and M. Potli, *Σύνταγμα τῶν Θείων καὶ Ἱερῶν Κανόνων* (Athens, 1852), 2:423. *Ανανεούμενοι καὶ τοῦτον τὸν ἱερὸν κανόνα, ὀρίζομεν, ὥστε τὰ ἅπαξ καθιερωθέντα μοναστήρια κατὰ γνώμην ἐπισκόπου, μένειν εἰς τὸ διηνεκὲς μοναστήρια, καὶ τὰ ἀνήκοντα αὐτοῖς πράγματα φυλάττεσθαι τῷ μοναστηρίῳ, καὶ μηκέτι δύνασθαι γίνεσθαι αὐτὰ κοσμικὰ καταγώγια, μήτε δὲ ὑπὸ τινος τῶν ἀπάντων κοσμικοῖς ἀνδράσι ταῦτα ἐκδίδουσαι, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ μέχρι νῦν γέγονε τοῦτο, μηδαμῶς κρατεῖσθαι ὀρίζομεν.*

⁶⁴ Vasiliev, "On the question of Byzantine feudalism," 587.

⁶⁵ Th. Uspensky, "Mniēniā i postanovleniā konstantinopoliskikh pomiēstnykh Soborov XI i XII vv. o razdachiē tserkovnykh imushchestu (*kharistikarii*)" in *Izvestiya Russkago Arkheologicheskago Instituta v Konstantinopole*, 5 (Sofia, 1900), 5.

⁶⁶ Vasiliev, "On the question of Byzantine feudalism," 587.

wolves, gaped ravenously at it.”⁶⁷ This is confirmed by another document, dated 1169. The monastery of St. Mamas, according to this document, had been built during the reign of Justinian and was under the jurisdiction of the patriarchate. It had been from time to time granted as a *kharistikion* by the various patriarchs, and the *kharistikarii* dissipated its property and ruined it completely. Finally the patriarch Cosmas (1146–1147) granted it to George Cappadokes the Mystic. George restored it and prevailed upon the patriarch, Nicholas Mouzalon (1147–1151), to free it from the jurisdiction of the patriarchate and declare it independent because he feared that, after his death, it would again fall into the hands of unscrupulous *kharistikarii*.⁶⁸ In the charter which he issued to the restored monastery it was specifically prohibited to grant the monastery to any person or institution.⁶⁹

George Cappadokes is not the only example of a founder of a monastery including a provision in the foundation charter which prohibited the granting of his foundation as a *kharistikion*. Founders of monasteries in the eleventh and twelfth centuries generally included a similar provision in their foundation charters. In 1077 Michael Attaliates founded a monastery and a house for the poor and in the foundation charter which he granted to it he calls the wrath of God upon any person, whether priest or layman, emperor or patriarch, who would dispose of his institutions in a way contrary to the provisions of the foundation charter.⁷⁰ The charter which the empress Irene, the wife of Alexius I, granted to the monastery which she founded in 1118, specifically prohibits the granting of the monastery to any person or institution under any circumstances.⁷¹ A similar provision was included in the foundation charter of the monastery which Leo, the bishop of Nauplia

⁶⁷ S. Eustratiades, “Τυπικὸν τῆς Μονῆς τοῦ ἁγίου μεγαλομάρτυρος Μάμαντος,” in ‘Ελληνικά, 1 (Athens, 1928), 257. παντάπασιν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπολελοιπότην αὐτὴν διὰ τὴν τῶν κατὰ καιροὺς χαριστικαρίων ἀπληστίαν τε καὶ ἀναίδειαν, ὡς λύκων ἐπιχαιρόντων αὐτῇ.

⁶⁸ P. Bezobrazov, “Materials for the history of the Byzantine empire” (in Russian with Greek texts), in *The Journal of the Ministry of Public Instructions*, 254 (St. Petersburg, 1887), 74 f. Παραλαβὼν οὖν τὰ τῆς μονῆς ὁ μυστικὸς καὶ ἰδὼν αὐτὴν εἰς παντελῇ ἐρήμῳσιν καταντήσασαν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι μονὴν σχεδὸν ἀπολέσασαν, ζήλω θεῷ παρακινήθεις ἠθέλησεν ἐπανορθῶσαι τὰ τῆς μονῆς καὶ εἰς τὴν προτέραν αὐτὴν ἐπαγαγῆν κατάστασιν ἣ καὶ κρείττονα. ὑποπτεύσας δὲ φόβον οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ ποτε πάλιν μετὰ τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἢ καὶ τοῦ μετ’ αὐτὸν τὴν τοιαύτην μονὴν ἀναδεχομένου εἰς χεῖρας ἐμπέσῃ χαριστικαρίου κατὰ τοὺς πρότερον καὶ χρήσῃται τῷ μοναστηρίῳ ὡς ἐκεῖνοι, τὰς μὲν τούτου προσόδους ἀναζητῶν, ἐπιμέλειαν δὲ τῆς μονῆς οὐδεμίαν ποιούμενος καὶ ἀπολέσῃ τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῦ γενησόμενα δαπανήματα, προσήλθε τῷ γεγονότι πατριάρχῃ κυρῷ Νικολάῳ τῷ Μουζάλλωνι καὶ ἐζήτησεν ἐλευθερωθῆναι τὴν μονὴν καὶ τῶν πατριαρχικῶν ἀπολυθῆναι δικαίων, ὃ καὶ γέγονε τῇ τοῦ μεγαλεπιφανεστάτου μυστικοῦ αἰτήσει τοῦ πατριάρχου ἐκείνου πειθαρχήσαντος καὶ γέγονεν ὑπόμνημα ἐπὶ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ τῆς τοιαύτης μονῆς.

⁶⁹ Eustratiades, *op. cit.*, 258.

⁷⁰ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 5:299 f.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 332. μήτε κατὰ δωρεάν ἢ ἐπίδοσιν ἢ ἐφορείαν ἢ οἰκονομίαν ἢ ἐπιτήρησιν ἢ ἑτέραν τινὰ πρόφασιν προσώπῳ οἰωδῆτινι ἢ μονῇ ἢ εὐαγεί οἴκῳ ἢ τῷ ὀρφανοτροφείῳ ἢ ἑτέρῳ σεκρέτῳ ἢ ξενῶνι τινι ἀνατιθεμένην.

and Argos, founded in 1143.⁷² In his testament of 1093 the monk Christodoulos, who had founded the monastery of St. John the Theologian in the island of Patmos but who was later forced to flee by the incursion of the Turks, designated as one of his successors as head of the monastery a certain Theodosius. Theodosius is called *kharistikarios* but is specifically prohibited from introducing any of his relatives in the monastery. Besides, he was required to become a monk and was enjoined to keep the monastery free and independent (*αὐτοδέσποτον καὶ αὐτεξούσιον*).⁷³ Another founder who prohibited the granting of his monastery as a *kharistikion* was the monk Manuel who in 1080 established the monastery of Our Lady the Merciful near Stroumitsa in Macedonia.⁷⁴

The church itself took note of the ruthless exploitation of the monasteries by the *kharistikarii*, but it made no general and serious attempt to end the system of the *kharistikia*. The patriarch Sisinnius II (995–998) seems to have prohibited the practice, as is known not only from John of Antioch, but also from Balsamon, but his order had neither the support of the church nor that of the emperor.⁷⁵ Sergius II issued an official pronouncement (*τόμος*) in 1016, signed also by the emperor (Basil II) in which he offered his interpretation of the forty-ninth canon of the Trullan council, an interpretation according to which that canon was understood to prohibit the reduction of monasteries to lay establishments, but not their being granted to the laity for their improvement and amelioration. Sergius not only failed to prohibit the system of *kharistikia*, but, on the contrary, he commended it as useful, provided, of course, that the monasteries granted retained their character of monastic establishments and the *kharistikarii* took care of them, seeking their general improvement and doing nothing that would harm them. Sergius ordered that the system of *kharistikia* itself should not be attacked.⁷⁶

The question came up again in 1027, during the patriarchate of Alexius

⁷² *Ibid.*, 181. καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ ἀδώρητον τῇ μονῇ χαριζόμεθα διὰ τοῦ παρόντος ἡμῶν ὑπομνήματος καὶ μηδὲ ὑπὸ ἔφορον ἢ χαριστηκάριον ἢ ἕτερον τινα γενέσθαι ταύτην ποτὲ ἐντελλόμεθα.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 6:82, 84.

⁷⁴ Petit, *op. cit.*, 92.

⁷⁵ Ralle and Potli, *op. cit.*, 2:613–614.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 614. προεκομίσθη ἕτερος τόμος τοῦ πατριάρχου ἐκείνου κυροῦ Σεργίου . . . ὑπογραφῇ βασιλικῇ κατησφαλισμένος, ἐρμηνεύων τε τὸν μὲν κανόνα τῆς ἐν τῷ Τρούλλῳ συνόδου, καὶ γνωματεύων, τὴν ἔκδοσιν μὴ ἐκλαμβάνεσθαι εἰς τὰς δωρεὰς τὰς συντηρούσας τὴν τῶν μομαστηρίων κατάστασιν· ἀλλ' εἰς τοὺς λαμβάνοντας μοναστήρια, ἐφ' ᾧ ἔχειν αὐτὰ κοσμικὰ καταγώγια . . . Ἐπιβεβαιούντες δὲ καὶ ἐπικυροῦντες τὸ παλαιὸν καὶ καινὸν λυσιτελὲς ἔθος τῶν μακαρίων καὶ θεοφόρων Πατέρων ἡμῶν, ὀρίζομεν γίνεσθαι δωρεὰς καὶ ἐπιδόσεις ἀκωλύτως, ἐπὶ συστάσει καὶ βελτιώσει τῶν ἐπιδιδόμενων καὶ δωρουμένων φροντιστηρίων. ἔδοξε δὴ τὰ τῶν ῥηθέντων κανόνων ὀφείλειν ἐρμηνεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸν παρόντα τόμον, καὶ τὰς πρὸς κοσμικοὺς γινομένας δωρεὰς τῶν μοναστηρίων, πολλῶ δὲ πλέον τὰς ἐπιδόσεις, ἔχειν τὸ ἀπαρεγχείρητον.

Studites. A local council, presided over by the patriarch, was held in Constantinople in November of that year, and a general review of the abuses of the system of the *kharistikia* was made, a review which confirms the criticisms of the system made by John of Antioch. The measures taken were not radical. It was decided that thenceforth (1) a monastery held through a grant by one person could not be transferred to another; (2) that monasteries for men should not be granted to women or vice versa; (3) that no grant should be made without the approval of the patriarch, metropolitan, or archbishop; and (4) that monasteries which originally belonged to a metropolis but had been granted by the metropolitan to a bishopric had to be returned to the metropolis if the latter found itself in financial distress while at the same time the bishopric was prosperous.⁷⁷ A few months later, in January 1028, another local synod, presided over by the patriarch, was held in Constantinople, and the question of the *kharistikia* was again raised. Here again no radical measures were taken. It was decided to (1) hold the *kharistikarii* responsible for the damages done to the monasteries which they held; (2) to deprive the evil doers among them of their grants; (3) to require them to make the contributions which the monasteries held by them owed to the metropolises; and (4) to prohibit the granting of any monastery located in the immediate neighborhood of the seat of a metropolitan. The granting of monasteries located elsewhere was not only permitted but considered a good thing.⁷⁸

Neither the council of 1027 nor that of 1028 took any measures against the principle of the *kharistikia* itself. This is equally true of a third council held in 1071 during the patriarchate of John VIII Xiphilinos. This synod took up the question of the *kharistikia* at the request of Constantine, the metropolitan of Cyzicus. Constantine said that the monasteries belonging to his metropolis were in the hands of *kharistikarii*, granted to them by his predecessors. These grants, while enriching the holders of them, had deprived his see of its principal sources of revenue and had reduced it to such

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 5:23. καὶ μήτε δωρεὰ μοναστηρίον εἰς πρόσωπον ἀμωσγέπως μεταβαίνειτω τὸ μὴ ἀναταττόμενον ἐν αὐτῇ, μήτε ἄνδρες γυναικείων, ἢ γυναῖκες ἀνδρῶν μοναστηρίων φροντιζέτωσαν· μήτε μὴν ἔκδοσις παραλαυρίων, ἢ τινος ἀκινήτου ἐτέρους, χωρὶς εὐδοκήσεως τοῦ ἀγιοτάτου πατριάρχου, ἢ μητροπολίτου, καὶ ἀρχιεπισκόπου γινέσθω· γεγονυῖα δὲ, ἐν γράμμασι κείσεται μόνον· ἐν πράγμασι δὲ, οὐδ' ὅσα ὄνειροι ἐνεργήσει, ἢ ὀνήσει τοὺς ἐκλαμβάνοντας. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπίσκοποι, ὅσοι δωρεαῖς μητροπολιτῶν κατέχουσι μοναστήρια, καὶ ἔτυχε τὰς μὲν μητροπόλεις στενοῦσθαι καὶ ἀπορεῖν, εὐθηνέσθαι δὲ καὶ εὐπορεῖν τὰς ἐπισκοπὰς, δικαίως τὰς δωρεὰς, ἀντιστρέψωσι, καὶ τῶν φροντιστηρίων ὑπεκστῶσι ταῖς μητροπόλεσιν, ὡς ἂν μικρόν τι ἐντεῦθεν ἢ σύγκληρος αὐτῶν παραμυθῆται στενοχωρία.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 30-31. Ὅσα δὲ κοινῶν κατὰ τι ταῖς μητροπόλεσιν, ἢ πλησιασμόν ἐν ταύταις ἔχει, καὶ ἀνακοίνωσιν, καὶ οὐκ ἀπεχαρίσθη πρὸ τούτου τισίν, εἰς δωρεὰς δίδοσθαι προσώποις οὐκ εὐδοκοῦμεν· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἐδόθη, ἀκύρους εἶναι καὶ ἀνισχύρους τὰς δωρεὰς βουλόμεθα, καὶ τὰ φροντιστήρια αὐτόθεν ἀντιστρέφειν πρὸς τὰς μητροπόλεις, ἢ ἐπισκοπὰς. τὰ γὰρ μήκοθεν καὶ ἰδιοπεριόριστα δωρεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν ἁγίοις Πατράσι καλῶς ἔδοξε, καὶ ἡμῖν.

a poverty that it was not even able to provide the candles and the oil necessary for the religious services. He asked for a written opinion by the synod which he wanted to present to the secular authorities who might help him to regain control of these monasteries. The synod delved into the archives of the patriarchate and discovered the acts of the councils of 1027 and 1028, and, with these acts serving as basis, rendered an opinion favorable to Constantine. The synod decided that Constantine had a right to recover the monasteries of his see because, according to the acts of the councils of 1027 and 1028 it was (1) uncanonical to reduce monasteries into pure lay establishments; (2) to grant the monasteries located in the immediate neighborhood of the seat of the metropolitan; and (3) to keep monasteries in the hands of *kharistikarii* while the metropolis to which they legally belonged was in a state of poverty.⁷⁹ The decision thus covered every monastery that might have belonged to the see of Cyzicus, but whether Constantine actually recovered control of them or not is not known. The point to emphasize, however, is this that while its decision in this particular case was unfavorable to the *kharistikarii*, the synod made no general pronouncement against the principle of the *kharistikia* itself, although it seems to have prohibited the granting of property that was in an actual state of production.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Th. Uspensky, *op. cit.*, 23. Καὶ ὅσα τῶν μοναστηρίων μοναχοὺς οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἀλλὰ κοσμικὰ γεγόνασι καταγῶγια τῶν χαριστικαρίων τὰς προσόδους σφετεριζομένων ἀνακαλέσεται πάντως ὁ μητροπολίτης κατὰ τὸ εὐλογον· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅποσα ταῖς μητροπόλεσιν ἐγγίζονται ὡς ὑπερέσματα καὶ ἐνδιατήματα τούτων ἀρχήθεν ἐτύγχανον καὶ ταῦτα εἰκότως πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἀναδοθήσεται διὰ τὸ κεκωλυμένας εἶναι τὰς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς δωρεάς, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάλιν ἀναλήψεται ὁ μητροπολίτης διὰ τὸ τῆς κατ' αὐτὸν ἐκκλησίας ἄπορον καὶ ἀπρόσοδον κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς προαναπεφωνημένης συνοδικῆς δοκιμασίας ἥτις βοηθεῖ ταῖς ἀπόροις μητροπόλεσι, τὰ δὲ δεδωρημένα ἐπισκοπαῖς ἢ καὶ προσώποις μοναστήρια ἐπασαλαμβάνειν διὰ εἰς ὕστερον ἐπισυνμβάσαν ἀπορίαν.

⁸⁰ This synod prohibited the granting of one type of property, known by the technical name of *autourgion* (αὐτούργιον), but just exactly what the αὐτούργια were is not quite clear. Th. Uspensky (*op. cit.*, 42-45) has gathered together all the passages known which refer to the αὐτούργια and has come to the conclusion that the definition given by Du Gange in his dictionary of medieval Greek, viz., *praedium rusticum qui colitur ab agricolis*, is both insufficient and inaccurate, but he himself offers no definition other than to say that the term sometimes is applied to describe a certain property, sometimes the income from certain properties, and not always land. Balsamon (Ralle and Potli, *op. cit.*, 2:595) defines the αὐτούργιον as follows: Ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτούργιά εἰσι τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ ὡς οἶον οἴκοθεν διδόντα τοὺς καρποὺς, ὡς αἱ ἀλικαὶ, οἱ ἐλαιῶνες, οἱ ἀμπελῶνες, οἱ λιβαδιαῖοι τόποι, οἱ ἰδρόμυλοι, τὰ κεραμαρεῖα, ὡς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τοιαῦτα. On the basis of this definition all properties would be considered as αὐτούργια, but Balsamon clarifies his definition by saying that αὐτούργια are those properties that are actually and not potentially productive: Τὸν δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, καὶ μὴ κατὰ σκῆψιν, ὄντα ἀπρόσοδον ἀγρὸν, ἐκδίδοσθαι ὥστε, ἐὰν μὲν τὸ αὐτούργιον γένηται πάντῃ ἀπρόσοδον, (τυχὸν γὰρ λιβαδιαῖος τόπος κατεκλύσθῃ ὑπὸ ποταμίου ῥεύματος), ἢ καὶ τὸ ἐξώχρον προστείον, ἐὰν εὐπρόσοδον καταστῇ, ὡς διὰ παροίκων οἰκισθὲν ἐκ νέου, τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐξώχρον, διὰ τὸ εὐπρόσοδον, οὐκ ἐκποιήσεται· ἐκεῖνο δὲ, κ' ἂν αὐτούργιον ἐλέγετο, διὰ τὸ ἀπρόσοδον, καὶ τὸ ἀνωφελές, ἐκδοθήσεται. Αὐτούργια then, according to Balsamon, are properties that actually produced income, and the prohibition of granting αὐτούργια passed by the synod of 1071 would mean that lands in actual cultivation and therefore productive could not be given as *kharistikia*, but lands that lay unculti-

Another particular case came up for review in 1107, during the patriarchate of Nicholas III, and the decision reached was unfavorable to the *kharistikarii*, but again no general pronouncement against the principle of the *kharistikia* itself was made. The case was brought to the attention of the patriarch by the metropolitan of Athens Nicetas who complained that his predecessor, described as simple and old, had granted properties and monasteries belonging to his metropolis to *kharistikarii* who had reduced them to a state of ruin, and asked that these properties and monasteries be returned to the direct control of his church. The decision which the patriarch and his synod rendered called for the expulsion of the *kharistikarii* who had reduced the monasteries to such a ruin that they no longer had any monks, unless the metropolitan agreed to let them stay for one or two years more on condition that within that period they would restore the monasteries and thenceforth take care of them if they wanted to keep them longer. The decision also provided for the expulsion of those who held by grant other properties belonging to the metropolis.⁸¹ The synod did not go beyond the immediate aspects of the case to make a general pronouncement on the question of the *kharistikia*.

There seems to be little doubt that the *kharistikion*, whatever its origins may have been, had become by the end of the tenth century and perhaps earlier an institution deeply rooted in the society of Byzantium, accepted not only by the laity, as Th. Uspensky seems to think,⁸² but also by the clergy. The ruthless exploitation of the granted monasteries by the *kharistikarii* aroused protests from many people, but these protests were limited in their scope. The church attempted from time to time, especially in the eleventh century, to remedy the evils connected with this institution and some of those who founded new monasteries sought to safeguard their foundations against these evils by including a clause in the foundation charters prohibiting their grant as *kharistikia*. But no serious effort was ever made to eliminate the institution completely and those who raised their voices against its principle must have been very few. John of Antioch was

vated and in ruin could be given out. In other words the synod of 1071 tried to revive the original meaning of the *kharistikion*, i.e. a grant of a ruined property for the purpose of its reclamation.

⁸¹ Th. Uspensky, *op. cit.*, 33–34. Τοὺς τὰ μοναστήρια καὶ εὐκτήρια κατέχοντας καὶ ἐπὶ λύμην τούτων οὐκ ὀλίγην γεγονότας καὶ μήτε μοναχοὺς ἔχοντας τοὺς τὸ θεῖον δοξολογεῖν ὀφείλοντας καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς κτημάτων ἐπιμελομένων ἀπεντεύθεν ἤδη τούτων ἐξωθεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ γε βούλοιτο ὁ θεοφιλέστατος μητροπολίτης ἀσφαλῶς τούτους ἀπαιτῆσαι ὥστε καὶ μοναχοὺς ἔχειν καὶ τούτων πρόνοιαν ἐνδεχομένην ποιεῖν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀκινήτων μείωσιν ἐπανασώσασθαι ἄχρι τινὸς ρητῆς προθεσμίας ἢ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἢ διετίας. ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς κατέχοντας κτήματα τῆς μητροπόλεως κατὰ δωρεὰν ἀπελαθῆναι.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 5.

one of these, but his vigorous pamphlet denouncing the system apparently had no permanent effect. Balsamon, writing toward the end of the twelfth century remarks, in summing up his discussion of the meaning of the forty-ninth canon of the Trullan council, that what he has written will suffice for the one who desires to know not to pay attention to the writings of John of Antioch, written against the granting of monasteries to individuals and branding these grants as impious. According to Balsamon the interpretation of the forty-ninth canon of the Trullan council given by the patriarch Sergius II was the correct one.⁸³

The *kharistikia* were usually granted by the ecclesiastical hierarchy, as is amply shown by the documents that have been studied. But grants of this kind made by the emperors themselves were not uncommon even before the eleventh century. That the iconoclastic emperors used the *kharistikion* as a weapon against the monks there can be little doubt,⁸⁴ but this institution was also used by the emperors of the Macedonian dynasty. For instance, the emperor Basil II made grants of *kharistikia*, despite the order of the patriarch Sisinnius II, prohibiting such grants, and this was offered as proof by the patriarch Sergius II that Basil never approved the order of Sisinnius.⁸⁵ In granting monasteries to laymen, therefore, Alexius Comnenus made no innovations in the practices of his period concerning the disposal of monastic properties by the state. The most that can be said about him in this connection is that he distributed *kharistikia* more extensively than any one of his predecessors, with the exception, of course, of the iconoclastic emperors. But then the situation which he faced was extremely critical.

III

The anti-monastic measures issued in the tenth century were designed primarily to check the growth of the monastic properties and to protect the small holdings of the free peasants, although the latter seems not to have

⁸³ Ralle and Potli, *op. cit.*, 2:614. Τὰ ἐν τῇ ἐξηγήσει τοῦ παρόντος κανόνος γεγραμμένα παρ' ἡμῶν ἀρκέσουσι τῷ βουλομένῳ, εἰς τὸ μὴ προσέχειν τοῖς παρὰ τοῦ πατριάρχου ἐκείνου Ἀντιοχείας Ἰωάννου γραφεῖσι, χάριν τοῦ μὴ δίδοσθαι προσώποις μοναστήρια, καὶ ὀνομάζουσι τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο ἀσέβειαν. Πάντως γὰρ κατακρατῆσει τούτων ὁ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγνωτάτου οἰκουμενικοῦ πατριάρχου κυροῦ Σεργίου γεγονὼς τόμος μετὰ συνοδικῆς συμπράξεως, ἐρμηνεύων πῶς ὀφείλουσι νοιεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν κανόνων.

⁸⁴ Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire*, 2:148.

⁸⁵ Ralle and Potli, 2:614. Ἀνατρέπομεν οὖν συνοδικῶς, διὰ τῆς δοθείσης ἡμῖν παρὰ τοῦ ἀγίου Πνεύματος ἐξουσίας, τὴν τὰς δωρεὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιδόσεις ἀναιροῦσαν ἐκείνην πράξιν, ὡς ἐξ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπισκοπικῆς συναίνεσεως, ἐξ αὐτονόμου δὲ γνώμης γεγενημένην, καὶ μηδὲ βασιλεῖ τῷ φιλοχρίστῳ δεχθεῖσαν, καθὼ φαίνεται καὶ αὐτὸς δωρούμενος μοναστήρια παρὰ τὴν ταύτης ἰσχύιν. The act prohibiting gifts and grants of monasteries which Sergius repealed is doubtless the one which had been issued by Sisinnius II. Therefore, the emperor referred to here as making grants of monasteries could be no other than Basil II.

entered into consideration in the promulgation of the novel of Nicephorus Phocas. In the eleventh century it was no longer a question of restricting the growth of these properties, but of using them in the interest of the state. As the political situation of the empire had worsened and its finances reduced to a state of bankruptcy, the imperial government did not hesitate to confiscate outright monastic and church properties or to use them in a way that would serve the interests of the state. This was done by the emperors Isaac and Alexius, both of the family of the Comneni. In the twelfth century, during the reign of Manuel Comnenus, there was a limited revival of the monastic policy of Nicephorus Phocas.

It is Nicetas Choniates who makes the statement that Manuel Comnenus revived the monastic policy of Nicephorus Phocas. He says this in explaining the reasons for the unusual monastery which Manuel had founded. Following is a translation of this interesting passage from Choniates:⁸⁶

[Manuel] built a monastery near the entrance of the Bosphorus from the Black sea in a place called Kataskepe and dedicated it to the archangel Michael. Here he invited the most celebrated and famous monks and made provision for them in order that they might lead a life of solitude and free from cares. Because he saw that the possession of property and the troubles of the world take away the tranquility of those who chose the life of solitude and lead them away from the life according to God, the life in which consists their particular calling, he did not grant to the monastery any property such as fields or vineyards, but allowed for it a money payment from the imperial treasury for the maintenance of the monks. By this, I think, he wished to check the great desire shared by many people to establish monasteries, and to give an example to the next generation of how they should set up a church and what sort of table they should prepare for the hermits who are without possessions and who have renounced the world. He was so far from praising the present state of affairs, i.e., the existence of people who call themselves monks, but who delight in the things of the world, possessing great properties and having many cares, that he revived the law which the most virtuous emperor, Nicephorus Phocas, a man of heroic stature and great mind, had decreed. This law, issued in order to stop the extension of the properties of the monasteries had no longer any effect, having died long ago by the lapse of time. Manuel now gave to it new life, having warmed it with the redness of the imperial ink, which acted as if it were blood. And this was not all. He never ceased reproaching his father and grandfather and others among his relatives, who, after they had founded monasteries, assigned to them vast stretches of fertile land and green pastures. He did not blame, or sneer at, them because they gave part of their property to God, but because they did good in a bad way. For the monks, according to him, should set up their shelters in secluded places and deserted lands, in the deepness of caves and on the tops of mountains, and should turn their eyes away from the beautiful city on the Hellespont just as Odysseus avoided the temptation of the lotus and that of the Sirens.

The measure by which Manuel revived the monastic policy of Nicephorus Phocas referred to by Choniates is doubtless the chrysobull which

⁸⁶ Nicetas Choniates, *Historia* (Bonn, 1835), 270-271.

Manuel issued in 1158. This chrysobull, preserved to the present day,⁸⁷ was also summarized by a historian of the twelfth century, who was not only a contemporary of Manuel but one of his advisers. Cinnamus writes about this chrysobull: "In the fifteenth year of his reign the same emperor [Manuel] decreed that there should be no interference with the monasteries located in the neighborhood of Byzantium and with their properties whatever or wherever they may be. He confirmed this by a document which is called chrysobull by custom because it is stamped with a golden seal."⁸⁸ The statement of Choniates and that of Cinnamus seem to contradict each other, and if Cinnamus is right then Choniates must be wrong. Indeed, the chrysobull of 1158 is concerned with the monasteries located in the neighborhood of Constantinople, on both sides of the Bosphorus and on the islands of the Propontis. It provides for the enumeration of all the properties actually in the possession of these monasteries at the time of the issuance of the chrysobull, no matter how they may have been obtained, whether by purchase or by grant, legally or illegally. It confirms the possession of these properties by the monasteries and grants to them important tax exemptions. Moreover, it enjoins the fiscal agents of the state to keep away from these monasteries and their properties. There is nothing in this summary of the chrysobull of 1158 that contradicts in any way the statement of Cinnamus and it may be said, therefore, that the description of this chrysobull by Cinnamus is accurate. Because Cinnamus' statement is favorable to the monasteries and because there are no other extant measures of Manuel that can be possibly interpreted as anti-monastic and in view of the statement of Balsamon⁸⁹ that there was nothing in the legislations of Manuel contrary to the canons and the general good disposition of Manuel toward the monasteries, it has been held by some that Manuel never issued any measure restricting the extension of monastic properties and, therefore, the testimony of Nicetas Choniates must be rejected.⁹⁰ This view fails to take into account an important passage of the chrysobull of 1158 whose clarity is so striking that it is astonishing to find that one who devoted an entire monograph to

⁸⁷ Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 3:450-455.

⁸⁸ Cinnamus, *Historia* (Bonn, 1836), 276. ὁ αὐτὸς ἔτει τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ ιε' ἐψήφιστο τοῖς ἀνὰ τὸ Βυζάντιον ἱεροῖς σεμνείοις πολυπραγμοσύνην ἐπάγεσθαι οὐδ' ἡντιναοῦν ἐφ' αἷς ὅπου δῆποτε κτήσεσιν ἔσχον. τὴν μέντοι δωρεὰν καὶ τόμῳ ἐστήριξεν, ὃν ἅτε χρυσῷ ἐνσεσημασμένον χρυσόβολλον ἔθος καλεῖν ἔστιν. As Manuel came to the throne in 1143, the fifteenth year of his reign fell in 1158. Therefore, the chrysobull to which Cinnamus refers is that of 1158.

⁸⁹ Th. Balsamon, *Canones*. in MPG, 137:896 f, 933 ff; Ralle and Potli, *op. cit.*, 2:603.

⁹⁰ André Ferradou writes: "La chose est tellement extraordinaire, qu'il est difficile d'accepter comme vraie une allégation isolée, qui est en contradiction formelle avec tout ce que nous savons de l'attitude de Manuel Comnène vis-à-vis des monastères." *Des biens des monastères à Byzance* (Bordeaux, 1896), 47.

the monastic properties in Byzantium ignored it.⁹¹ "For the monasteries," runs this passage of the chrysobull, "will not have the right to increase what properties they hold today, be they landed estates or tenant-peasants (*paroikos*)."⁹² It states further that after the registration of the monastic properties, in accordance with the other provisions of the chrysobull, the fiscal agents will not have the right to disturb the monasteries unless they can show that the monasteries possess properties in excess of what they actually held in 1158, the year of the issuance of the chrysobull. If they should be found to have such property, it will have to be confiscated.

It is quite obvious that in speaking of the revival of the anti-monastic law of Nicephorus Phocas by Manuel, Nicetas Choniates had in mind the chrysobull of 1158.⁹³ But his statement is much more sweeping than is warranted by the chrysobull itself. In the first place the novel of Nicephorus was general in its application, i.e., it applied to all the monasteries in the empire; that of Manuel was restricted to the monasteries in the neighborhood of the capital, excluding, therefore, some among the larger monasteries, as, for instance, those on Mount Athos. The Athonian monastery of Laura possessed toward the beginning of the twelfth century more than 50000 *modii* of land of which only about 12000 were subject to the land tax;⁹⁴ and this monastery was not covered by the chrysobull of Manuel. In the second place, the law of Nicephorus prohibited all new foundations; that of Manuel is silent on this point. Nor is Choniates right when he says that Manuel revived the law of Nicephorus which "had no longer any effect, having died long ago by the lapse of time." The law of Nicephorus, of course, did not die "by the lapse of time"; it was repealed by Basil II.⁹⁵ Choniates also failed to mention the positive provisions of the chrysobull

⁹¹ *Idem*.

⁹² Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 3:435. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπ' ἀδείαν ἔξουσιν αἱ μοναὶ τὰ σήμερον παρ' αὐτῶν κατεχόμενα, εἴτε πάροιχοι εἴεν εἴτε τόποι εἴτε αὐτούργια, ἐπαύξειν καὶ εἰς πληθυσμὸν ἄγειν πλείονα.

⁹³ Cf. C. Uspensky, *op. cit.*, 91-94; E. Lavissee and A. Rambaud, *Histoire Générale*, 2 (Paris, 1893), 809; L. Oeconomos, *La vie religieuse dans l'empire byzantin au temps des Comnènes et des Anges* (Paris, 1918), 135. Oeconomos accepts without any question or discussion the testimony of Nicetas Choniates.

⁹⁴ Rouillard and Collomp, *op. cit.*, 146 ff. See also F. Dölger, "Zur Textgestaltung der Lavra-Urkunden," *Byz. Zeitschrift*, 39 (Leipzig, 1939), 58 f. The *modios* was the Byzantine land measure equal to a little less than one-fifth of an acre. Th. Uspensky and V. Benechevitch, *Actes de Vazelon* (Greek texts with a commentary in Russian) (Leningrad, 1927), LXXVIII; F. Dölger, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der byzantinischen Finanzverwaltung* (Leipzig, 1927), 87. In terms of acres, therefore, Laura possessed something like ten thousand acres of land, an estate of no mean proportion.

⁹⁵ Oeconomos apparently does not know that the novel of Phocas had been repealed by Basil II, for he writes, *op. cit.*, 135: "Or pour que Manuel ait eu à exprimer les mêmes plaintes que Nicephore, il faut bien croire que l'édit de ce dernier n'avait pas eu la vie longue."

of 1158, i.e., the confirmation of the properties in the actual possession of the monasteries at the time of the issuance of the chrysobull, the exemptions from taxation, and the freedom from the interference of the imperial agents. But neither did Cinnamus summarize the chrysobull fully, for he left out the provision prohibiting the further extension of the properties of the monasteries concerned. If the chrysobull of 1158 had not been preserved, the closest that one could have come in determining its contents would have been by a combination of the statement of Choniates with that of Cinnamus, a procedure that would not have found much favor among scholars as the two statements seem, at least in spirit, contradictory. It would have been more natural to believe either that one of the statements is false, or that they refer to two different measures. But even if the two statements were combined, the result would still not be an accurate reconstruction of the contents of the chrysobull of 1158, for, on the basis of the novel of Nicephorus, one would have to conclude that it included also a provision, prohibiting the establishment of new monasteries. No such provision, of course, was included in the actual chrysobull of 1158.

Was it because Manuel sincerely believed that the possession of property was a source of corruption for the monks, that they "should set up their shelters in secluded places and deserted lands, in the deepness of caves and on the tops of mountains" that he tried to restrict the extension of the properties of certain monasteries? Possibly, for Manuel, like most of the Byzantines, had the greatest respect for the monastic life and may have entertained the hope, like Nicephorus Phocas, like his grandfather Alexius, of reviving its ancient purity. But property, the desire to possess more and more of it, was a serious obstacle to any reform. Indeed, this desire for more and more property was one of the most important sources of corruption of the monastic life in the twelfth century. This was felt not only by members of the laity, such as Manuel, but also by important ecclesiastics, such as Eustathius, bishop of Thessalonica, who wrote one of the most outspoken indictments against the licentiousness and greediness of the monks ever written in the long history of the Byzantine empire. Following is a translation of one of the most stinging passages of Eustathius' work:⁹⁶

[The monks hear that] there is a rich man nearby; that he is distinguished by his fields, buildings, livestock and all the other goods in which the laity seems to find happiness. Immediately they seek to manipulate and win him over by the favors in which the men of the world find pleasure. The sly monks thus entice the more simple and attract them to themselves. They invite them and when they come they provide them with a hot bath . . . and then put before them things that delight the body, both

⁹⁶ Eustathius of Thessalonica, *De emendanda vita monachica*, MPG, 136 (Paris), 825 f.

meats and drinks . . . After the entertainment they turn their attention to matters of the spirit which they offer as bait. They speak of abstinence, they who are indifferent to it; they say that hunger and thirst are good for the health, they who are insatiable . . . They philosophize saintly, saying that a heavy stomach is as detrimental to sleep as it is for running. They boast of their visions and miracles and other such matters by which the more pious soul is elevated and, with love for God, turns its attention to the things above. But all these miracles and visions are fabrications of sleep, just simple dreams.

When they have charmed their hearer and by the persuasiveness of their spiritual spells tempt him to tonsure himself but he still hesitates, putting forth as his reason the austerity of the life of a monk, they then turn to other enchantments and through these they finally convince him. They promise him that he will become a saint and will save his soul without any pain for himself; that he will gain nearness to God without an intercessor; that he will win entrance to paradise without fear of the sword of fire; that he will become virtuous without having to bathe himself in a river of sweat. They promise him further a harvest unsown and uncultivated; a vintage self-grown; a profitable sailing toward what is without danger; and other things of a tempting nature. When they have led on this man, having taught and persuaded him that he will achieve excellence, and caught him in their nets together with his property, both land and cash, then they show to what profession they belong and what sophisms they have invented about it. For, having emptied the purse of the neophyte and obtained what they desired, they let him shift for himself, saying that he does not have the slightest virtue. The man is good, but in order not to criticize their bad behavior, he mingles with them and becomes like them. But if he should happen to mutter a little privately they turn against him and ask: "Who are you, man; what is your power, and what is the profit derived from you?" And they threaten to deprive him of the little property which they had left him by common consent.

The poor fellow soon finds himself forced to work in the fields, to do precisely what he had been doing before, except that now he works for the monastery and not for himself.

The charms and favors used by the monks to get more land were reserved for the rich. For the poor they had other and more direct means: threats and violence. They were especially anxious to absorb the lands which were continuous to those of the monastery and the poor peasants who happened to own these lands were never let alone until they gave up their property to, and became dependents of, the monastery.⁹⁷ In the twelfth century, as in the tenth and eleventh, the monasteries were among the principal offenders in the decline of the free peasant holdings in the empire. By the end of the fourteenth century the free peasant holdings virtually, if not completely, disappeared.

In drawing this gloomy picture of the monks of this period Eustathius doubtless exaggerated. Not all the monks of the twelfth century were gluttons and thieves, bent upon only one thing, how to increase the property of their monastery. Many among them were sincerely pious and ascetic. For

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 829.

instance, the monastery which Manuel founded at Kataskepe was built for the pious and the ascetic, and these were easily found. And Eustathius himself says about the monks of Constantinople: "The capital is inhabited by virtuous monks. . . . On the shores and the islands of the Propontis there are many folds filled with holy flocks. Among the sheep of these folds there are no goats that will have to put themselves at the left of the Lord; every one of them will take its place at the right of God."⁹⁸ But the picture drawn by Eustathius is, on the whole, not inaccurate. It conforms to what is known from other sources, the novel of Nicephorus Phocas, Attaliates, and documents belonging to the reign of Alexius Comnenus.⁹⁹ It is quite possible, therefore, that in restricting the further acquisition of immovable property by the monasteries located in and around Constantinople, Manuel sincerely sought to check the evils described by Eustathius. But there may have been other reasons for the restrictions imposed by Manuel on these monasteries. If reform of the monastic life was the only objective, why is it that Manuel restricted his measure to the monasteries located in and about Constantinople, the monasteries precisely which, according to Eustathius, were inhabited by virtuous monks?

A Byzantine institution which made its appearance in the eleventh century, but became fully developed in the second half of the twelfth century was the assignment by the government of a revenue-yielding property to individuals in return for certain services, usually but not always military, rendered or to be rendered. The grant consisted usually of land, but it could be a river or a fishery and was known in Byzantium by the technical term of *pronoia* (πρόνοια) and its holder by that of *pronoetes* (προνοητής).¹⁰⁰ The size of the grant varied from a territory of considerable extent to a single village, or estate sufficient to take care of one family. It was granted for a specific period, usually but not always for the life time of the holder. It could be neither alienated nor transmitted to one's heirs and it was always subject to recall by the imperial treasury.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 797–800: Καὶ τοιοῦδε μὲν οἱ τὴν θεῖαν κουρὰν τιμώντες, καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῆς τιμώμενοι, καὶ εἰς τοιοῦτοι οἱ ἐν ὄρεσι, καὶ σπηλαίοις, καὶ ῥωχμαῖς γῆς, καὶ στύλοις, καὶ ἐκκληισμοῖς . . . Γέμει δὲ πολιτείας τοιαύτης καὶ ἡ τῷ ὄντι Μεγαλόπολις . . . Προβέβληται δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ ὁ τῆς Προποντίδος αὐλῶν, πρὸς βουρὰν μέχρι καὶ εἰς τὰς Εὐξείνου προβολὰς, καὶ πον καὶ ἐφεξῆς. Πλουτοῦσι δὲ καλοῖς τοιοῦτοι καὶ νῆσοι, ὅσας ἡ Προποντὶς αὕτη κλύζει. Καὶ γέμονσιν αἱ τοιαῦται μάνδραι ποιμνίων ἱερῶν γραφικῆς ἀγέλης μυρίας, κεκαρμένης ἄλλης ἀλλαχοῦ. Τῆς δεξιᾶς πάντες οὗτοι μερίδος τοῦ ἀρχιποίμενος Θεοῦ. Ἐρίφια γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς, τῇ ἀριστερᾷ πρεποντα, οὐκ ἔχουσι κατασκιρτᾶν.

⁹⁹ See for instance Oeconomus, *op. cit.*, 142 ff.

¹⁰⁰ The two fundamental works on the Byzantine *pronoia* are: (1) P. Mutafčiev, "Vojniski zemi i vojnici v Vizantija prez xiii/xiv v." in *Spisanije na Bulgarskata Akademija*, 27 (Sofia, 1923) (in Bulgarian), 37 ff; (2) Th. Uspensky, "Značenie vizantijskoj juznoslavjanskoj pronii," *Sbornik V. J. Lamanskomu* (St. Petersburg, 1883), 1–32. But see also Vasiliev, "On the question of Byzantine feudalism," 590–591.

Making a temporary grant of a revenue-yielding property in return for certain services was an idea well known in Byzantium, as is shown by the development of the institution of the *kharistikia*. But the *kharistikia* were grants of monasteries and their properties and were designed, in principle at least, for the rehabilitation and improvement of the monasteries granted and not for the profit of the holder of the grant. The monasteries were exploited, of course, and some of them were reduced into utter destruction, but this fact did not alter the principle involved. A grant designed in principle as well as in fact for the profit of the holder who in return was expected to render certain services could not properly be a *kharistikion*. Such a grant could consist only of property from which the treasury derived revenue; it could include, of course, revenues derived from monastic properties.

The *pronoia* was precisely such a grant. The grant consisted not of the actual land involved, but of the revenues derived by the treasury from that land. The grant of a certain land did not alter the private relationships over the various properties located on that land. The younger brother of Alexius I Comnenus, Adrian, was granted the peninsula of Cassandra, but the ownership of the various properties located in that peninsula was not disturbed. The grant simply meant that the taxes and other obligations paid to the treasury by the owners of these properties were thenceforth to be paid to Adrian.¹⁰¹ Documents belonging to the thirteenth century further illustrate this point. In 1231 Xenos Legas, a tenant-peasant (*paroikos*) of the monastery of Lemvo, located near Smyrna, sold to that monastery the olive trees which he possessed in the village of Panaretos, a village which was included in the *pronoia* held by Syrgares. Among the stipulations in the act of sale there was one providing for the payment of the taxes for these trees to Syrgares by the monastery.¹⁰² In other words the grant of Panaretos to Syrgares had not affected the ownership of the olive trees of Legas. He simply paid his taxes to Syrgares, instead of to the imperial agents; the monastery that bought his property was to do likewise. In 1234 the river Hermon, near Smyrna, was the *pronoia* of a certain Kalegopoulos; the revenues which he obtained from this grant consisted of the dues paid by the inhabitants of the neighborhood for the right to fish.¹⁰³ These were the dues which they for-

¹⁰¹ See note 50.

¹⁰² Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 4:61: ὁφείλει δὲ ἐπιτελεῖν ἡ μονὴ ἐκάστῳ καιρῷ ὑπὲρ ἐπιτελείας νόμισμα πραττόμενον ἐν πρὸς τὸν πανευγενέστατον λίζιον καβαλλάριον τὸν Σουργαρήν.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 4:239. Τὰ ἐκεῖσε πάντα βιβάρια ἐτέλουν τῷ Καληγοπούλῳ ὡς ἔχοντι εἰς πρόνοιαν τὰ δίκαια τοῦ ποταμοῦ. The revenues derived from fisheries were considerable. Here is what Sanudo says about the fisheries of the river Meander in Asia Minor: "Provincia detta lo Menadro, che è molto Grande, buona e Fertile d'ogni bene, per la qual passa un Fiume Grande, che fa un Gran Lago in Morea, ed evvi qualche isola piccola che guarda verso Ponente, in la qual vi stava gran moltitudine di Piscadori, che percavano in quel Lago, e

merly paid to the government. Michael Palaeologus granted the island of Euboea (Negropont) to Licario, the Italian adventurer who had helped him recover the islands of the Aegean and whom he later designated as his admiral.¹⁰⁴ This did not mean that Licario became the owner of the properties located in Euboea: he simply received the revenues which were formerly paid to the imperial treasury. The same emperor granted to his brother John the islands of Rhodes and Mitylene as well as important lands in the mainland.¹⁰⁵ Again this only meant that John enjoyed the public revenues obtained from these lands. Similarly in the fifteenth century George Gemistos Plethon was granted the fortress of Phanarion, including the surrounding country, with the right of receiving the public revenues from this territory.¹⁰⁶ Less extensive territories, single estates, were also granted, usually to soldiers of a lesser grade, but these were drawn from the public lands. The term *oekonomia* was generally applied to this kind of grant because it was designed to provide for the maintenance of a soldier and his family, besides enabling him to obtain the necessary equipment for war.¹⁰⁷

The imperial government was careful to prevent the holders of a *pronoia* from acquiring permanent possession of the properties located in their *pronoiae*. In 1233 a decision was rendered, which was confirmed by the emperor, declaring that the taxpayers for properties located in a *pronoia* could not sell these properties to the holder of the *pronoia*.¹⁰⁸ In the docu-

della gran quantita del Pesce, che pigliavano, pagavano all' Imperatore un gran Denaro," Marino Torsello Sanudo, *Istoria del Regno di Romania*, ed. C. Hopf, *Chroniques greco-romanes* (Berlin, 1873), 145.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 123: "ed allora l'Imperator, acciò il detto Mega Duca li fusse più leal e lo servisse più fedelmente, li fece dono di tutta l'isola di Negroponte pigliandosi, e li fece il Privilegio di questo amplissimo, con obbligazion di servirlo con 200 Cavallieri."

¹⁰⁵ Pachymeres, *Historia* (Bonn, 1835), 1:321. νῆσοι γὰρ πάσαι . . . Μιτυλήνη λέγω καὶ Ῥόδος, καὶ κατὰ γῆν πλείστα τε καὶ μέγιστα οἱ εἰς αὐτάρκη πρόνοιαν ἦσαν.

¹⁰⁶ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 3:173. Τὸ κάστρον καὶ χώραν τοῦ Φαναρίου μετὰ πάσης τῆς αὐτοῦ νομῆς καὶ συνηθείας καὶ περιοχῆς, λαμβάνων κατ' ἔτος ἐντὸς τοῦ προσοδίου αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ δίκαια τοῦ κεφαλατικίου τῆς αὐτῆς χώρας, τὰς μύζας καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ὀφείλουσιν οἱ ἔποικοι τῆς αὐτῆς χώρας αὐθεντικὸν δίκαιον χωρὶς μόνης τῆς τοῦ φλωριατικοῦ δόσεως, ἥτις ὀφείλει εἶναι τοῦ δημοσίου. A year later (1428) the fortress of Brysis was also granted to Gemistos Plethon and in 1450 the δόσις φλωριατικοῦ which was not included in the original grant was granted to the heirs of Gemisthos Plethon. *Ibid.*, 174, 225.

¹⁰⁷ Such were the *pronoiae* referred to in the prostagma of Michael VIII Palaeologos, naming his son Andronicus co-emperor. A. Heisenberg, "Aus der Geschichte und Literatur der Palaiologenzeit," in *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften: Philosophisch — philologische und historische klasse*, 10 Abhandlung (Munich, 1920), 40–41.

¹⁰⁸ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 4:199. οὐκ ὄφειλον οἱ Γουνάρουποιοι διαπωλῆσαι πρὸς τὸν βλαττερὸν τὴν τοιαύτην γῆν διὰ τὸ ὑπὸ παροικίαν τελεῖν ταύτην, καὶ μὴ ὀφείλειν τοὺς ὑποτελεῖς πιπράσκειν τὰ παρ' αὐτῶν κατεχόμενα πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ λόγον προνοίας ἔχοντας αὐτὰ ὡς ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ δημοσίου χεῖρα ἀείποτα τελοῦντα. A. Vishniakova misinterprets the text when she says that the

ments of the thirteenth century the inhabitants of a *pronoia* are called *paroikoi*, i.e., dependents of the holder of the *pronoia*. The term *paroikos* is generally rendered by tenant-peasant, usually but not always attached to the soil, but when used to describe the relationship of an inhabitant of a *pronoia* with the holder of that *pronoia* it should be given a wider meaning.¹⁰⁹ The *paroikoi* of a *pronoia* were the dependents of the holder of the *pronoia* in the sense that they paid their taxes to him, were judged by him in cases of dispute among them, and protected them against the encroachments of an outsider.¹¹⁰ Doubtless there were many tenant-peasants among them, but they were not all tenant-peasants. Among the people living in the *pronoia* of Syrgares there were *οικοδόσποτες, κρείττονες, γωνικάριος*, i.e., property owners.¹¹¹ The ownership of their land and their social position was legally not affected by the fact that their village was included in the *pronoia* of Syrgares. What was changed was their relationship to the government. In matters of taxation and justice they became subject to Syrgares instead of to the imperial agents. Any taxable property, therefore, no matter by whom it was owned, could be included in a *pronoia*, for, unless it belonged to the public domain, it was not the property itself but the public revenues obtained from the property that were affected by the grant.

land located in a *pronoia* could not be sold without the permission of the *pronoetes*: "Khozjaistvennaja organizatcija monastyrya Lemveotisse" in *Vizantijskij Vremennik*, 25 (Leningrad, 1927), 40. The interpretation given above agrees with that of Th. Uspensky, *Sbornik V. J. Lamanskomu.*, 28 f. and B. A. Pancenko, "Krestjanskaja sobstvennost v Vizantii. Zemledelceskii zakon i monasterskie dokumenty" in *Izv. Russk. Archaeol. Inst. v. K/le* 9 (Sofia, 1904), 96. For the date of this Document see F. Dölger, "Chronologischen und Prosopographisches . . ." p. 314, no. 115.

¹⁰⁹ Scholars generally do not distinguish between the *paroikoi* of a *pronoia* and *paroikoi* as tenant-peasants. For instance F. Dölger wrote in his review of Mutaččiev's work (*Byz. Zeitschrift*, 26:109): "What we hardly dare believe, but what is undeniable on the basis of the sources, namely, that by the introduction of *pronoia* the tax payers concerned were reduced simply to the status of *paroikoi*, and, therefore, became unfree, was in Byzantium hardly worthy of discussion . . . The peasants of the villages, whose income was granted to a *pronoetes*, were simply designated as *paroikoi*." Dölger again expressed this view a few years later, "Zur Textgestaltung der Lavra-Urkunden," 59. The distinguished German scholar was, of course, well acquainted with the Chrysobull that Alexius I granted to the monks of Laura (see note 50) in 1084 by which he assured them that the grant of Cassandra to his brother Adrian did not make them the *paroikoi* of the latter. They remained as free as before except that now they paid their taxes to Adrian instead of to the imperial treasury. However, Dölger dismissed this document as an isolated example.

¹¹⁰ Lawsuits involving property disputes among the inhabitants of a *pronoia* were judged by the *pronoetes* with the help of the *κρείττονες*, i.e., the more distinguished element, of the *pronoia*. Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 4:81. 'Ο Συργαρής επέπεμψε τὴν τοιαύτην κρίσιν πρὸς τοὺς οἰκοδόσπους τῆς προνοίας αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τηρηθῆναι ἀκριβῶς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ ἐξισεῦσαι αὐτούς. συναχθέντες γοῦν ἅπαντες οἱ κρείττονες τῆς προνοίας αὐτοῦ . . . ἔκριναν ἀδίκως λέγειν τὸν Πολέαν. Lawsuits involving a *pronoetes* or the *paroikoi* of a *pronoetes* with another party not included in the *pronoia* were judged by the military governor of the region. *Ibid.*, 4:239-40, 36 ff; 419.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 4:81. For text see preceding note.

The *pronoia* as a grant for soldiers was already used by Alexius Comnenus,¹¹² but it was Manuel who seems to have generalized it.¹¹³ Manuel introduced into the army organization many westerners, especially Italians, and to many of them he made grants of *pronoiae*.¹¹⁴ As considerable amount of land must have been needed for these grants it is not impossible that Manuel issued the chrysobull of 1158 as one means of making this land available. Granting monastic lands to foreigners might have involved him into difficulties with the church and that may have been the reason why Manuel tried to determine what lands exactly belonged to the monasteries. On the other hand, allowing the monasteries to extend their possessions indefinitely would reduce the land available for grants of *pronoiae*, hence the prohibition to acquire new lands. But as this prohibition could also arouse the opposition of the monks, he tried to soften it by a wide grant of exemptions on the property which they already possessed. The less land the monasteries possessed the more should be available for grants of *pronoiae*, for the granting of land belonging to the laity was politically less dangerous. Besides, the change involved in such a grant was not radical; it involved simply the change of one master for another, the fiscal agent of the government for the *pronoetes*. It is quite possible that most of the Italians introduced into the army organization of the empire were granted *pronoiae* not far from Constantinople, for it was necessary to keep an eye on them. This would explain the reason why the chrysobull of 1158 applied only to the monasteries located in, or in the neighborhood of, Constantinople.

The monastic policy of Manuel was subtle and fine, designed to check the growth of monastic properties by combining the granting of privileges with the impositions of restrictions. But the monks were too powerful. Manuel was finally compelled to remove the restrictions, but along with the restrictions he removed also some of the privileges. The brief summary of the Novel of 1176, the text of which has not been preserved, is the proof for this.¹¹⁵ In the measure of 1158 and in that of 1176 restrictions and privileges

¹¹² In a document of 1167, deciding a dispute between the monastery of Laura and certain soldiers over a certain estate, it is stated that the land in question had been previously granted as *pronoia* to certain soldiers by Alexius Comnenus. Rouillard and Collomp, *op. cit.*, 158 ff. See also Dölger, "Zur Textgestaltung der Laura-Urkunden," 59.

¹¹³ Nicetas Choniates, *op. cit.*, 272. ἱάτο τὸ δίψος τῶν στρατευμάτων ταῖς λεγομένοις τῶν παροίκων δωρεαῖς.

¹¹⁴ A grant of *pronoia* to Italians is referred to in western document as *feudum*. G. L. Fr. Tafel and G. M. Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republic Venedig*, 1 (Vienna, 1856), 513, "et de toto feudo quod et Manuel quondam defunctus Imperator dedit patri meo." Concerning the grants of *pronoiae* to Italians see also, Th. Uspensky, *Sbornik V. J. Lamanskomu*, 6.

¹¹⁵ Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 3:502. 'Απελύθη κατὰ τὸν ἰούνιον μῆνα τῆς θ' ἰνδ. τοῦ στχπδ' ἔτους πρόσταγμα βασιλικόν, ἀνατρέπον σχεδὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον εὐσεβέστατον καὶ

went together; the measure of 1158 imposed the restrictions and granted the privileges; that of 1176 removed the restrictions and also some of the privileges. Manuel apparently was anxious to check the growth of monastic properties, and his reason for this must have been particularly important.

The monastic policy pursued by the Comneni was not always friendly toward the monasteries. But this was rather for reasons of state than out of disrespect for, or hostility toward, the monastic life. The Comneni were able and clever men and above all good soldiers, but in matters of faith and in their sentiments toward the monastic life they did not differ much from the vast majority of their contemporaries. They believed in the monastic life as they believed in Orthodoxy. Isaac Comnenus died a monk and Alexius Comnenus, besides granting important privileges and exemptions to monasteries, tried hard, as is shown by his support of Christodoulus, the founder of the monastery of St. John the Theologian in the island of Patmos, to revive the ancient purity of monasticism.¹¹⁶ Manuel too, although criticizing his father and grandfather for the various grants which they made to monasteries, was an admirer of, and believer in, the monastic life. This is shown by his foundation of the monastery of Kataskepe where he hoped to revive the ancient ideals of the monastic life. Besides, the privileges which he granted to monasteries outweighed by far the restrictions which he imposed. Manuel came to be known as the friend of the monks. His benevolence to them is recalled with emphasis in the measure which the regency issued in 1181 in the name of his son, Alexius II, granting numerous privileges to the monasteries in an effort to win the support of the monks against the growing strength of Andronicus.¹¹⁷ Manuel himself gave his wish to have the support of the monks as one of his principal reasons for his decision to issue the chrysobull of 1158.¹¹⁸

εὐεργετικώτατον χρυσόβουλον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντα τὰ μοναστηριακὰ ἀκίνητα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγραφέων ἡρπάζοντο. See also C. Uspensky, *op. cit.*, 94; Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine empire*, 2:137.

¹¹⁶ Oeconomus, *op. cit.*, 142 ff.

¹¹⁷ Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 3:505–506. Ἡ βασιλεία μου, τῆς ἐκ τῶν ὑμετέρων εὐχῶν συνάρσεως χρήζουσα καὶ ἐν πᾶσι κατ' ἔχρος βαίνειν τοῦ ἐν μακαρίᾳ τῇ λήξει βασιλέως αὐθέντου καὶ πατρὸς αὐτῆς θέλουσα, καὶ τὸ περὶ τούτων ἀνατεθειμένους ὑμᾶς τῷ Θεῷ εὐεργετικὸν ἐκείνου μμεῖσθαι προήρηται. Cognasso writes about the issuance of this measure: "Assai probabilmente, appunto durante questi contrasti, il Reggente pubblicava in nome di Alessio II una novella nella quale questi dichiarava di voler imitare il padre anche nella protezione dei monaci — avendo grande bisogno delle loro preghiere —, e confermava ai monasteri i privilegi concessi loro dagli imperatori precedenti, in ispecie da Manuele, ordinando agli esattori di cancellare senz'altro dai loro registri dei contribuenti le proprietà monastiche. Il governo cercava di riacquistare partigiani." F. Cognasso, *Partiti politici e lotte dinastiche in Bisanzio alla morte di Manuele Comneno*, in *Memorie della Reale Accademia delle Scienze di Torino: Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche*, 2nd series, 62 (Torino, 1912), 246.

¹¹⁸ Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 3:450–51. ἅμα δὲ βουλομένη (ἡ βασιλεία μου) καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως χριστοῦ δηλονότι, τοὺς δι' αὐτὸν τὸν μονήρη βίον προελο-

IV

The events of 1204, the capture of Constantinople by the Latins and the dissolution of the Byzantine empire, were of capital importance not only for the history of the Balkan peninsula and the Near East in general, but for the history of Europe as a whole. They sharpened the religious antagonism between the Greeks and the Latins and set in motion the process of the political and internal disintegration of the Christians of the Balkan peninsula, a process which made possible the great victories of the Ottoman Turks in the fourteenth century and their capture of Constantinople in 1453. But the political revolution which the Fourth Crusade brought about did not affect radically the social structure of the lands which had formerly belonged to the Byzantine empire. When the Latins took over the empire they found its social structure substantially not very different from their society in the west, and they were contented to let it stay as it was, satisfied with the taxes and *corvées* exacted from the peasants. The imperial property was confiscated and many of the Greek magnates were dispossessed, but many also were not disturbed. This was particularly true of the lands that came under the domination of the Venetians, and of the Morea. In 1207 the island of Corfu was granted by Venice to Angelo Acotanto and Petro Michaeli, and in the agreement it was stipulated that the status of everyone in the island should remain the same and that no one should be required to pay more than he used to pay at the time of the Greek emperors.¹¹⁹ A similar stipulation was included in the treaties that Venice concluded with Ravano dalle Carceri and his successors in 1211 and 1216 respectively concerning the island of Negropont (Euboea).¹²⁰ In the Morea also a general understanding was reached between the French and the Greek magnates, providing for the retention by the latter of most of their possessions.¹²¹ Thus many of the Greek magnates were left untouched, provided they swore allegiance to

μένους καὶ τὴν πανοπλίαν ἐνδυσσάμενους τοῦ πνεύματος, συμμάχους ἔχειν καὶ συνασπιστὰς ἰσχυροὺς κατὰ τῶν ὀρωμένων καὶ ἀοράτων ἐχθρῶν.

¹¹⁹ Tafel and Thomas, *op. cit.*, 2:57. "Quos omnes et alios in ipsis insulis consistentes debemus in suo statu tenere, nichil ab aliquo amplius exigentes, quam quod facere consueuerant temporibus Gregorum Imperatorum."

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 2:95, 183. "Grecos autem tenebo in eo statu, quo domini Emanuelis Imperatoris tempore tenebantur. Faciam etiam, quod omnes, qui per me sunt in insula et erunt in antea et Latini et omnes magnates Greci, uobis iurent fidelitatem."

¹²¹ *The Chronicle of Morea*, ed. by John Schmitt (London, 1904), 112.

Κι ἀφότου ἐσωρεύτησαν ἐκεῖ εἰς τὴν Ἀνδραβίδα,
τὸ ἀρχοντολόγι τοῦ Μορέως, ὅλης τῆς Μεσαρῆας,
ἐποίκασιν συμβίβασιν μετὰ τὸν Καμπανέσην,
ὅτι ὅλα τὰ ἀρχοντόπουλα, ὅπου εἶχασιν προνοίης,
νὰ ἔχουσιν ὁ κατὰ εἰς, πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν ὅπου εἶχεν,

the new masters. Nor were the peasants radically affected by the political changes. They remained subject to the same charges as before.¹²²

Like the Greek empire, the Greek church, as an autonomous and independent body, came to an end in the lands occupied by the Latins, following the capture of Constantinople. Many of the churches of the capital had been destroyed; others were despoiled. The patriarchate and most of the episcopal sees were vacated by the Greeks and occupied by the Latins. The rule set down by Innocent III in this matter was this: where the population was entirely Greek, Greek ecclesiastics were to be appointed; where there were also Latins, Latin ecclesiastics were to be preferred, but whether Greek or Latin they were to recognize the authority of Rome.¹²³ What happened to the churches also happened to the monasteries. Many were destroyed; others were deserted by the Greeks; some were taken over by the Latins.¹²⁴ Those that still remained in the possession of the Greeks lost most of their property. Of these the least to suffer were the monasteries of Mount Athos which were early taken under the protection of the emperor Henry. Preserved still in the monastery of Laura is a picture depicting Henry as the restorer of the monastery.¹²⁵

The question of the disposal of church and monastic property came early under the consideration of the Latin leaders. In March, 1204 an agreement was reached between the Venetians and the French, providing for the division of the church and monastic properties, and allowing the clergy a share sufficiently large to maintain itself honorably.¹²⁶ But Innocent III

τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν καὶ τὴν στρατείαν, τόσον νὰ τοῦ ἐνεμείνῃ,
καὶ τ' ἄλλο τὸ περισσότερον νὰ μερίζουν οἱ Φράγκοι
καὶ οἱ χωριάτες τῶν χωριῶν νὰ στέκουν ὡσὰν τοὺς ἡῆραν.
Ἄρχοντας ἔξι ἐβάλασιν καὶ ἄλλους ἔξι Φράγκους,
ὅπερ ἐμοιράσασιν τοὺς τόπους καὶ προνοίης.

¹²² *Idem.*; The French version of the *Chronicle of Morea* says about the agreement reached between the Greeks and the French: "se acorderent avec le Champenois en tel maniere que li gentil homme grec qui tenoient fiez et terres et les casaux dou pays eust cescun et tenist selonc sa qualite; et le surplus fust departi a nostre gent; et que le peuple payassent et servissent ainxi comme il estoient use a la seignorie de l'empereor de Constantinople." *Chronique de Morée*, ed. Jean Longnon (Paris, 1911), 34.

¹²³ Innocent III wrote to Morosini on August 2, 1206: "Ad quod fraternitati tuae breuiter respondemus, quod in illis Ecclesiis, in quibus sunt solummodo Graeci, Graecos debes episcopos ordinare, si tales ualeas reperire, qui nobis et tibi devoti et fideles existant, et a te consecrationem velint accipere humiliter et deuote. In illis vero, in quibus cum Latinis Graeci sunt mixti, Latinos praeficias, et praeferas ipsos Graecis." Tafel and Thomas, *op. cit.*, 2:24.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 2:25.

¹²⁵ C. Paparegogoulos, *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἐθνους* edited by P. Karolidis (Athens, 1925), 5:31.

¹²⁶ Tafel and Thomas, *op. cit.*, 1:451. "de possessionibus vero ecclesiarum tot et tantum clericis et ecclesiis debent provideri, quo honorifice possint vivere et sustentari. Relique vero possessiones ecclesiarum dividi et partiri debent secundum ordinem presignatum."

vigorously opposed the execution of this agreement. Writing to Baldwin, the newly elected emperor of the Latin empire, in November, 1204, Innocent admonished him to guard faithfully and carefully the property of the church, both movable and immovable, until he could safely and without any confusion dispose of it, rendering unto Caesar what was Caesar's and unto God what was God's.¹²⁷ Innocent was especially firm in his correspondence with the Duke of Venice,¹²⁸ but despite his vigorous protests considerable church property was seized by the secular rulers, for in the agreement reached between the patriarch of Constantinople, Thomas Morosini, and the emperor Henry, on March 17, 1206, the question was of recompensating the church for the property that had been taken away from it.¹²⁹ According to this agreement the church was to be allowed one fifteenth of the property outside of Constantinople conquered or to be conquered. Of the property seized in Constantinople the church was to receive, payable by Henry, one fifteenth of the value of this property. But this share of the church did not include monastic properties. All monasteries and monastic properties whether located in the city or not were to remain in the possession of the church.¹³⁰

The agreement of 1206 did not settle definitely the relations between the new states and the church over the question of church and monastic properties. The rulers of the new states, as, for example, Geoffrey Villehardouin of Achaea and Otho de la Roche of the Duchy of Athens, not only confiscated church and monastic properties but sought also to restrict the growth of these properties by prohibiting their subjects to make any grants to the church.¹³¹ The question was taken up again at the council held at Ravennike, a valley located in the neighborhood of Thermopylae. The council, called together by emperor Henry, met on May 2, 1210, and was attended by the important ecclesiastics and feudal barons of the new states, including the emperor Henry and the patriarch Morosini. The agreement reached provided that the churches and monasteries, located in the regions between Thessalonica and Corinth, were to have their properties restored; that they

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1:517, "attentius provisorus, ut ecclesiastica bona, tam immobilia, quam mobilia, diligenter facias et fideliter custodiri, donec per nostrae dispositionis arbitrium salubriter ordinentur, ut, quae sunt Caesaris, Caesari, et quae sunt Dei, Deo sine confusione reddantur."

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1:534.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 2:32. "Dominus Henricus de consilio et assensu omnium Principum, Baronum, Militum et populi dat Ecclesiis et promittit se daturum in earundem recompensationem possessionum . . ."

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 2:31-34.

¹³¹ Innocentii III PP. *Regestorum lib. XIII*, Migne *Patrologia Latina*, 216 (Paris, 1891), p. 302, let., 110. See also Gregorovius-Lambros, *Ἱστορία τῆς Πόλεως Ἀθηνῶν* (Athens, 1904), 1:433.

were not to be disturbed in the possession of these or any others that they might acquire; that these properties were to be free of all charges save the land tax (*acrostichon*), such as was paid at the time of the capture of Constantinople; and that only if the churches failed to pay this tax would the lay rulers have any right to confiscate any of their property, and then only as much as was necessary to meet the unpaid tax.¹³²

The Ravennike agreement like that of 1206 did not end the confiscations of church and monastic properties, especially by Geoffrey Villehardouin and Othon de la Roche. Geoffrey had participated in the council of Ravennike, but the agreement, as it was finally drawn, did not apply to his realm. In the Morea one third of the property seized by the French had been allotted to the church.¹³³ But when money was needed for the defense of the country or for the extension of the conquest the secular authorities showed no hesitation in seizing the property of the church. Thus in 1219 Geoffrey II, now prince of Achaea, seeking the conquest of Monemvasia, a stronghold which was still in the hands of the Greeks, requested from the ecclesiastical authorities the military aid owed them by reason of the lands which they had received. They replied that, as their prince, they owed him honor and respect, nothing more. Their lands, they said, they held not from him, but from the pope. Geoffrey's reaction was quick. He seized all the property of the church and with the revenue derived thereof he built the fortress of Glarentza, known then as Clermont (Χλουμουτζι). Immediately after the seizure the local prelates excommunicated him, but Geoffrey continued to hold the property until the fortress was built, and then appealed to the pope

¹³² *Ibid.*, 968–972. “Renuntiaverunt quidem domini Nameus Roffredus comestabulus regni Thessalonici, Otto de Roccha dominus Athenarum, Guido marchio, Ravinus dominus insulae Nigripontis, Raynerius de Tracort, comes Bertulduus, Nicolaus de Sacto Omer, Guillelmus de Banel, Guillelmus de Arsa pro se et hominibus suis et fidelibus et vassalis, in manibus supradicti domini patriarchae recipientis pro Ecclesia nomine domini papae et suo et archiepiscoporum et episcoporum infra dictos terminos positorum et ecclesiarum cunctarum, omnes ecclesias et monasteria, possessiones redditus, mobilia et immobilia bona, et universa jura Ecclesiae Dei, volentes et firmissime promittentes dictas ecclesias et monasteria cum omnibus rebus suis habitis et habendis, et personas in eis positas et ponendas, et claustra ecclesiarum, et servientes et servos et ancillas et homines, et universa suppellectilia et bona libera et absoluta per se successoresque suos, homines, milites, vassallos, fideles, servientes et servos in perpetuum permanere ab omnibus angariis et parangariis, taliis, servitiis et servitutibus universis, et excepto acrostico tantum, quod eis debent cuncti sive Latin sive Graeci tam in dignitatibus quam in minoribus officiis et ordinibus constituti propter terras quas tenent ab ipsis, si quas tenent vel tenuerunt, quod tempore captionis civitatis regiae Constantinopolitanae solvebatur a Graecis.” I do not know why Rambaud (Lavissee and Rambaud, *op. cit.*, 2:859) writes: “a l’assemblée du Val de Ravenika, ils s’étaient occupés de restreindre les empiétement des églises: a l’avenir elles ne pourraient acquérir que des biens meubles.” Ferradou (*op. cit.*, 58) makes the same statement but his reference is to Rambaud.

¹³³ *The Chronicle of Morea*, 175: αἱ ἐκκλησίαι κρατοῦσιν σὺν τὸ τρίτον τοῦ Μορέως, ὅλου τοῦ πριγκιπάτου.

with whom he finally reached an understanding (1222) on the basis of the Ravennike agreement.¹³⁴

The Fourth Crusade, whatever its original character may have been, became, following the departure of the crusaders from Venice, a secular affair. In the division of the spoils, following the capture of Constantinople, the leaders tried at first to treat with the property of the church in the same way as they treated with the property of the laity. The vigorous intervention of Innocent III prevented this, and despite the numerous confiscations of church property by the rulers of the new states, the church managed on the whole to retain much of its property and many of its privileges. This was important for the later history of Byzantium, for with the recovery of most of the territories lost to the Latins, the Greeks again took possession of their churches and monasteries and applied once more, as a matter of course, the practices and institutions which concerned their properties before 1204. Indeed these practices and institutions had been hardly altered by the political changes of 1204. In the Ravennike agreement the immunities and privileges of church and monastic properties were fully recognized, and the land tax which they were required to pay was to be no different from that which they paid at the time of the Greek emperors. And it is a sound inference from this that this tax too was not required from those properties which at the time of the Greek emperors were not subject to it. Nor was the practice of confiscating church property in time of need or restricting the further extension of it alien to the Byzantines. Many of the Greek ecclesiastics and monks, of course, had fled before the Latins, but as the latter were driven out most of them came back or were replaced by others and resumed their ancient ways — the exaction of additional privileges from the government and the acquisition of more and more property — as though nothing had happened. And as far as the pro-monastic sentiment in Byzantium, and the relations between the state on the one hand and the church and monasteries on the other with respect to the properties of the latter were concerned, nothing happened.

V

Following the capture of Constantinople the objectives of the Fourth Crusade were only partially realized. Important territories of the former Byzantine empire, Epirus, the regions around Nicaea in Asia Minor, and the territory along the coast of the Black Sea with Trebizond as the center, remained definitely beyond their control. There Greek rulers set themselves

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 178–182; Longnon, *Chronique de Moree*, p. 66, note 1. See also Gregorvius-Lambros, *op. cit.*, 1:435–39.

up and carried on the Byzantine traditions, among which monasticism occupied first rank. In every one of these Greek states the monastic life was nurtured and promoted, old monasteries were revived, new ones were founded, and numerous grants of land and privileges were made to them. Of the many monastic documents that have been preserved,¹³⁵ those belonging to the thirteenth century form one of the richest collections and this in itself is sufficient testimony of the importance of the monastery in the life of the Greek states in the thirteenth century. These documents show, among other things, that the traditions, practices and the structure of the monastic life among the Greeks was not affected fundamentally by the tremendous political events of 1204. What these documents show most clearly, however, is the enormous concentration of property in the hands of the monasteries.

The methods employed by the monasteries in the acquisition of property differed in no way from those employed in the century before as they are known from documents belonging to that century and the vivid description of Eustathius of Thessalonica. Grants by the emperors, purchases, grants resulting from the appeals to the piety of the faithful, outright expropriations, acquisitions through appeals to the piety of the faithful, acquisitions through appeals to the courts, grants by those who embraced the monastic life — these were the principal sources of the property acquisitions made by the monasteries in the thirteenth century and after.

The rulers of the Nicene empire, the Greek state, which, by the recovery of most of the territory which the Latins had seized and the capture of

¹³⁵ There are now a number of collections of Byzantine documents relating to the monasteries. (1) Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, vols. 4, 5, 6. Volume four of this collection contains documents belonging almost exclusively to the thirteenth century. (2) *Actes de l'Athos*, i-vi, edited by Petit, Regel, Kurts and Korablev and published as appendices to *Vizantiiskij Vremennik*, vols. 10 (1903), 12 (1906), 13 (1907), 17 (1911), 19 (1912) (this volume contains the Slavonic acts of the Serbian monastery of Chilandaril), 20 (1913). Most of these documents belong to the fourteenth century, but a number of them are of the thirteenth. (3) W. Regel, *Χρυσόβουλλα καὶ γράμματα τῆς ἐν τῷ Ἁγίῳ Ὁρει Ἀθῶ μονῆς τοῦ Βοτοπεδίου* (St. Petersburg, 1898). (4) T. Florinsky, *Athonskie Akte* (St. Petersburg, 1880). (5) Goudes, *op. cit.* The documents published by Goudes belong to the later eleventh, and early twelfth century. (6) Rouillard and Collomp, *op. cit.* Only the volume containing the acts of Laura to the end of the twelfth century has thus far appeared as far as I know. But the volume which will contain the acts of Laura of the period of the Paleologi is in preparation and should appear in the not too distant future. See Rouillard, "Les actes de Laura à l'époque des Paléologues," in *Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici*, 5 (Rome, 1936) (*Atti del v Congresso internazionale di studi Bizantini, Roma 20-26 settembre, 1936*). (7) Th. Ouspensky and Benechevitch, *op. cit.* This collection contains the acts of the monastery of Vazalon, located not far from Trebizond. Most of the documents belong to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. (8) A. Soloviev and V. Mosin, *Sources for the history of southern Slavs. Series vi Sources in the Greek language. Book I: The Greek edicts of the Serbian rulers. The Serbian academy of sciences* (Belgrad, 1936). (9) N. Bees, *Σερβικὰ καὶ Βυζαντιακὰ γράμματα Μετέωρον*, in *Βυζαντις*, 2 (Athens, 1911), 1-101. (10) P. Lemerle, *Actes de Kutlunus* (Paris, 1945).

Constantinople in 1261, became the new Byzantine empire, showed the greatest interest, generosity and benevolence toward the monasteries. Among these rulers, most outstanding in this respect were John III Dukas Vatatzes (1222–1254) and Michael VIII Palaeologus (1260–1282) who not long after his seizure of power became the restorer of the Byzantine empire and its first emperor. John Vatatzes was a good soldier, an efficient administrator and a wise ruler; he was also a pious Christian whom the Greek church has honored by giving him a place among its saints.¹³⁶ His benevolence for and generosity toward the monasteries was doubtless motivated to a considerable extent by his sincere piety. Michael Palaeologus was an entirely different individual. He was an adventurer without principles bent upon the acquisition of power. He showed great military ability, clever diplomacy, and vigor in government, but his wisdom as a ruler is questionable.¹³⁷ In his attitude toward the church he was Machiavellian, and it is doubtful if he was sincerely pious. The benevolence and generosity which he showed for the monasteries were not motivated by any deep-rooted religious conviction, but by a policy of opportunism, designed primarily to strengthen his position on the throne and to assure the succession of it by his family. Michael came to power by the way of usurpation and murder, and his first concern was to consolidate his position by generous distributions to the army, the people, the aristocracy and the clergy.¹³⁸ He was particularly anxious to win the support of the clergy because, as a competent modern Greek scholar has put it, "only the church would have still been able to clothe [him] with the cloak of legality . . . and the church alone, by legalizing [his] power would have been able also to influence the people."¹³⁹ Michael was conscious of the tremendous political influences which the monks wielded, and his gifts and favors to them were doubtless designed

¹³⁶ A. Heisenberg, "Kaiser Johannes Batatzes der Barmherzige," in *Byz. Zeitschrift*, 14 (Leipzig, 1905), 160–233; N. Festa, "A propos d'une biographie de saint Jean le Miséricordieux," in *Vizantiiskij Vremennik*, 13 (St. Petersburg, 1907), 1–35. See also Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine empire*, 2:221 f.

¹³⁷ There is yet no good monograph on Michael Palaeologus. C. Chapman's book, *Michel Paléologue, restaurateur de l'empire byzantin (1261–1282)* (Paris, 1926), is poor and unreliable. I have now under preparation a monograph that will deal with the internal conditions of the empire during the reign of Michael Palaeologus.

¹³⁸ Pachymeres, *op. cit.*, 1:92. τὸ δὲ γε στρατιωτικὸν ὑπεραγαπᾶν, καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων προνοίας, κ' ἂν ἐν πολέμῳ πίπτοιεν, κ' ἂν ἀποθνήσκοιεν, γονικὰς ἐγκαθηστᾶν τοῖς παισὶ, κ' ἂν τισιν αἱ γυναῖκες κατὰ γαστρὸς ἔχουεν τὸ κυοφορούμενον. *Ibid.*, 1:97 f. καὶ τοὺς μὲν τῆς γερονσίας οὕτω μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἐθεράπευε, προνοίας τοῦτοις ἐπαύξων καὶ προστιθεῖς, καὶ χαίρειν ἀφίεις τοῖς πάσι, τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν λαμβάνουσι τὰ δ' ἐλπίζουσι τὸ δὲ στρατιωτικὸν τε καὶ τὴν πληθύν, τοὺς μὲν καθημεριναῖς φιλοτιμίαις ὠφέλλε, καὶ χρυσοβούλλοις τὰ ὑπεσχρημένα τοῦτοις ἐπλήρου, καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον εὐθυμοτέρους καθίστα ὡς ἀθανάτους τὰς τῆς ζωῆς προνοίας καὶ τὰ διδόμενα σιτηρέσια τοῖς παισὶν ἔξοντας, τοὺς δ' ἐθεράπευεν, ἀνοῖγνὺς φυλακὰς καὶ χρεῶν δημοσίων ἀπολύων τοὺς ὠφληκότας.

¹³⁹ John Sycutres, "Περὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῶν Ἀρσενιατῶν," in *Ελληνικά*, 2 (Athens, 1929), 277.

to win their support. But he was a man also who did not hesitate to resort to persecutions if some element of his policy which he considered essential for the preservation of the state — as, for example, his policy of the union of the churches — was opposed and his efforts to remove the opposition by conciliatory means had failed.

In the relations between the state on the one hand and the church and the monasteries on the other there is no instance in the thirteenth century of any attempt by the state to confiscate or restrict the extension of the immoveable property of the church and the monasteries. If anything, the state contributed in the extension of these properties. Monastic properties and the privileges enjoyed by the monasteries were confirmed, and new properties and privileges were granted to these monasteries by the special chrysobulls which the emperors of the thirteenth century issued from time to time. John Vatatzes restored the monastery of the Holy Virgin, located on Mount Lemvo, not far from Smyrna, granted to it important properties, including the entire village of Vare or Mela, and numerous privileges and exemptions.¹⁴⁰ Included among the exemptions was the freedom from all taxes and obligations, except the tax known as *agape* and that of *sitarkia*.¹⁴¹ A few years later the *sitarkia*, at least for one of the properties of the monastery, is also found among the exemptions enjoyed by Lemvo.¹⁴² When Michael Palaeologus came to power one of his first acts was to confirm the properties and privileges of the monastery of Lemvo.¹⁴³ Michael was most liberal in the issuance of chrysobulls to monasteries confirming their old possessions and privileges and granting them new ones. He says this himself in the charter (*typicon*) which he issued toward the end of his reign in favor of the monastery of Michael the Archangel, located in Mount Auxention (*Ka-ich-Dagh*) in Bithynia.¹⁴⁴ Among the monasteries to which such chrysobulls were issued were included, besides Lemvo, that of St. John the Theologian

¹⁴⁰ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 4:1 ff. On the benevolence of John Vatatzes to monasteries and churches see also Gregoras, *Historia*, 1 (Bonn, 1829), 44 f.

¹⁴¹ *Agape* literally means love, but what was the tax called *agape*? As for the *sitarkia*, there is no general agreement among scholars. Vasilievsky (*op. cit.*, 210:366 f.) thinks that this was the general land tax and George Ostrogorsky follows him: "Die landliche Steuergemeinde des byzantinischen Reiches im X. Jahrh." in *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 20 (Stuttgart, 1927), 50 f. Dölger on the other hand takes it to stand for the old Roman *annona*: F. Dölger, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der byzantinischen Finanzverwaltung*, 57 ff. I think Vasilievsky and Ostrogorsky are right. I shall discuss the problem of taxation in Byzantium in my book on Michael VIII that I am now preparing.

¹⁴² Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 4:45.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 4:26 ff.

¹⁴⁴ M. J. Gedeon, *Μιχαὴλ Παλαιολόγου τυπικὸν τῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ βουνοῦ τοῦ Αὐξεντίου σεβασμίας μονῆς Μιχαὴλ τοῦ Ἀρχαγγέλου* (Athens, 1895), 53. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὴν βασιλείον ἀναλαβόντες ἀρχὴν τὰς τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν αὐδίδμων βασιλείων διὰ χρυσοβούλλων δωρεὰς ἐν μοναστηρίοις, ἐκκλησίαις,

of Patmos,¹⁴⁵ that of Our Lady, better known as the *Nea Mone* in Chios,¹⁴⁶ that of Chilandari,¹⁴⁷ of Laura,¹⁴⁸ of Our Lady the Macrinitissa in Thessaly,¹⁴⁹ of Nea Petra,¹⁵⁰ located not far from Macrinitissa, and of others. Important land grants were made to St. John the Theologian of Patmos,¹⁵¹ Chilandari,¹⁵² and Nea Petra.¹⁵³ Michael himself rebuilt the monastery of St. Demetrius in Constantinople and endowed it heavily.¹⁵⁴ This monastery had been founded by George Palaeologus, but was destroyed, reduced to fine dust (κόνιν λεπτήν), as Michael himself says, during the Latin occupation. After its restoration by Michael, the monastery of St. Demetrius came to be known as the special monastery of the Palaeologi.¹⁵⁵ Michael's son and successor, Andronicus II, a man of sincere pious inclinations, was more generous than his father in his grants of land and privileges to monasteries.¹⁵⁶ Although, shortly after the end of the thirteenth century, because of the deterioration of the external position of the empire and the financial bankruptcy of the state he found it necessary to recall some of these grants.¹⁵⁷ The imperial grants which were made to the monasteries in the thirteenth century constituted the corner stone upon which the monasteries built by other means in the concentration of large properties in their hands.

πόλεσιν, ἄρχουσιν, καὶ προσώποις ἑτέροις, ἀπαραλλάκτως ἐστέρξαμεν τε καὶ ἐκυρώσαμεν, σὺν Θεῷ δὲ τὰς ἐκ τούτων πλείους καὶ ἐπνυξήσαμεν. One of the first steps which Michael took when he re-occupied Constantinople in 1261 was to reestablish and reorganize the monasteries in Constantinople which had been destroyed during the Latin occupation. Pachymeres, *op. cit.*, 1:164. See also G. Rouillard, "La politique de Michel VIII Paléologue à l'égard de monastères," *Études Byzantines*, I (Paris, 1943), 73-84.

¹⁴⁵ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 6:199 ff.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 5:10 ff.

¹⁴⁷ Actes de l'Athos, *Vizantiiskij Vremennik*, *Prilozhnie k xvii tomu*, p. 18, no. 8.

¹⁴⁸ G. Rouillard, "Les Actes de Laura à l'époque des Paléologues," 301.

¹⁴⁹ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 4:330 ff.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 4:333 ff; 336 ff; 340 ff.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 6:200 ff; 232.

¹⁵² Actes de l'Athos, *Vizantiiskij Vremennik*, *Prilozhnie k xvii tomu*, p. 17, no. 7.

¹⁵³ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 4:338.

¹⁵⁴ J. G. Troitzki, *Imp. Michaelis Palaeologi de vita sua opusculum necnom regulae quam monasterio S. Demetrii praescripsit fragmentum*, in *Khristianskoe Čtenie*, nos. 11-12 (St. Petersburg, 1885), 539. ἡ βασιλεία μου Θεοῦ χάριτι καὶ συνάρσει τοῦ Θείου μάρτυρος Δημητρίου ἀνίστησι τὰ πεπτωκότα ταῦτα καὶ κατεσκαμμένα ἐλευθέρα χειρὶ καὶ δαπάνῃ, καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπανάγει εὐπρέπειαν, μοναστήριόν τε ἀναδείκνυσι, καὶ μοναχοὺς ἐγκατοικίζει πρὸς Θεοῦ εὐαρέστησιν κτήσεις τε τούτοις ἀφιεροῖ καὶ προσόδων προστίθῃσι ἀφορμάς, ἐξ ὧν ἔχοιεν ἂν δαπανᾶν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀνάγκας ἀποπιπλάναι τοῦ σώματος.

¹⁵⁵ Codinus, *De officiis* (Bonn, 1839), 80.

¹⁵⁶ For instance, in 1286 Andronicus II granted to the monastery of Zographou in the village of Lozikin 400 *modioi* of land. Actes de l'Athos, *Vizantiiskij Vremennik*, *Prilozhnie k xiii tomu*, p. 27, no. 10. The same emperor granted to the monastery of Chilandari some time before 1317, 200 *modioi*. *Vizan. Vrem.*, *Prilozhnie k xvii tomu*, p. 76. Many other examples can be given.

¹⁵⁷ See below, p. 111.

Among these means, purchases, donations by the faithful, and litigations were most productive of results. The general instability of the period, the continuous wars, the heavy taxes and the ruthlessness of the officials brought general ruin to the peasants and forced many of them to sell their possessions. Those who bought them were frequently the monasteries. Acts of sale preserved, which show the deplorable condition into which the small peasants were reduced by the general disturbances of the period, are numerous. For instance, in 1271 a certain Michael Martinus and his wife sold to the founders of the monastery of Nea Petra in Thessaly their only vineyard because, as they put it, the universal shortage of grain had reduced them into destitution and threatened them together with their young children with famine.¹⁵⁸ In the following year another peasant, Constantine Katzidones by name, sold his vineyard to the same monastery because the daily incursion which his region suffered reduced him into such a degree of poverty that his family did not have the necessary food. He wanted to use the proceeds from the sale of his vineyard to buy an oxen with which he might earn his living by plowing the fields of others.¹⁵⁹ Another person sold his mill to the same monastery, again because of the universal lack of grain which had continued for a long time. Poverty and loneliness were the reasons given by a woman, Zoe by name, for the sale of her property, again to the same monastery. The price paid for this property was fixed at five *nomismata*, but obviously it was worth much more than that, for it was stipulated in the act of sale that the monastery would accept Zoe as a nun, maintain her to the end of her life, and then give her a decent burial.¹⁶⁰ The almost continuous wars decimated entire families, and the property belong-

¹⁵⁸ Miklosich et Müller, 4:400. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπειδὴ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄγαν στενοχωρίας καὶ πτωχείας ἡμῶν τῆς προσγενομένης ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς πολυχρονίου κοσμικῆς σιτοδείας κατηντήσαμεν εἰς παντελὴ ἀπορίαν ὡς καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς ὑστερεῖσθαι, κ' ἀντεῦθεν κινδυνεύομεν λιμαγχονηθῆναι σὺν τοῖς ἀηλίοις παισὶν ἡμῶν, διέγνωμεν ὡς ἐπὶ παντελεῖ διαπράσει ἐκποιήσασθαι τὸ γονικὸν μου.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 408. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπειδὴ ἀπὸ τῶν καθημερινῶν ἐφόδων τῶν ἐπερχομένων τῇ χώρᾳ ἡμῶν τῇ Βελεστίνου εἰς παντελὴ ἀπορίαν κατηντήσαμεν γυμνιτεύοντες ὡς καὶ αὐτῆς σχεδὸν τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς ὑστερεῖσθαι, δεῖν ᾧ ἤθημεν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς συνδιασκεψάμενοι ἐκποιήσασθαι ἐπὶ παντελεῖ διαπράσει τὸ ἀμπέλιον ἡμῶν . . . καὶ διὰ τοῦ τιμήματος τούτου ἐξωνήσασθαι βοὺν ἀροτῆρα καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι τὴν βότειραν γῆν, ἵνα κἂν ἐκ τούτου τὴν ζωάρκειαν ἡμῶν ἔχωμεν ἀνυστέρητον. In the same year and for the same reason his brother John sold to the same monastery his vineyards. *Ibid.*, 410. Καὶ ἡμεῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον στενοχωρούμενοι ἐκ τῆς τὸ πᾶν συνεχούσης καιρικῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀνωμαλίας καὶ πολυχρονίου σιτοδείας . . . Poverty was the reason given by another peasant, Nicolas Bardas, for the sale of his vineyard to the monastery of Nea Petra. He too wanted to buy an ox with which he would cultivate the land in order to feed and cover himself. *Ibid.*, 403. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπειδὴ ἀπὸ τῆς προσοῦσης μοι στενοχωρίας καὶ πτωχείας καὶ γυμνότητος εἰς τὸν παρόντα ἐμπερίστατον καιρὸν ἠθέλησα ἐκποιήσασθαι ἐπὶ διαπράσει παντελεῖ τὸ παρ' ἐμοῦ νεμόμενον καὶ δεσποζόμενον γονικὸν μου ἀμπέλιον . . . ὡς ἂν διὰ τοῦ τιμήματος τούτου ἐξωνήσωμαι βοὺν ἀροτῆρα καματηρὸν καὶ ἐργάζωμαι δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ κατασπέρω, εἴ τι ἰσχύσω, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γύμνωσίν μου σκεπάσω . . .

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 393-396.

ing to such families was often donated to monasteries. A certain Maria Tzarchalina gave to the monastery of Vazalon, located not far from Trebizond, her property for the salvation of her soul, that of her husband and those of her parents, adding in the act of donation, however, that her five sons were in captivity, and that if they returned they were to have their shares, but if not, these shares too were to go to the monastery.¹⁶¹ Another woman, Anna Elaphinava by name, made the monastery of Vazalon the heir for half of her property, because she had been deprived of her relatives by the incursions of the enemy.¹⁶² The same monastery also obtained the property of the nun Anysia but it was stipulated that if her relatives returned from captivity they were to have their share.¹⁶³ Monasteries were especially anxious to obtain lands contiguous to their own. A certain Irene granted to the monastery of Lemvo a field of forty *modii* for the salvation of her soul after the monks appealed to her to let them have it because it was near to other fields which they already possessed.¹⁶⁴ In the village of Palatia, not far from Miletus, there was a field owned by peasants which gave access to the monastery of St. John. The founder of this monastery, a certain Koutzomanikos, had tried hard to obtain this field for the monastery, but the peasants refused to sell. Koutzomanikos, however, entered it among the properties of the monastery in the belief that the peasants would be eventually forced to sell or donate it to the monastery. But the peasants held on to their field while the monks, finding that it was listed among their properties, laid claims to it. The case was finally brought to the courts where a decision favorable to the peasants was rendered.¹⁶⁵

Litigations over property, initiated by the monks, were numerous. Recourse to the courts was indeed one of the principal weapons used by the monasteries to extend their properties. They held tenaciously to the slightest claim, carried the case to the courts again and again, and, if necessary to the emperor, until a decision favorable to them was rendered. The case involving the property of the Gunaropuli is the best illustration of this.

¹⁶¹ Th. Ouspensky and Benechevitch, *op. cit.*, 17. εἶναι δὲ καὶ οἱ πέντε μου παῖδες αἰχμαλῶτοι. εἴαν ἔλθουν ὡς ἔχουν τὴν μοῖραν αὐτῶν. εἰ δ' οὐχί, ὡς εἶναι εἰς τὴν μονὴν ἀπὸ ὄρου καὶ ποταμοῦ, κήπου καὶ δένδρων, γῆς χερσαίας καὶ λιβαδίων.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 39. ἐπεὶ διὰ τῆς ἀπελεύσεως τῶν Ἀγαρηνῶν ἀπελείφθησαν οἱ κατὰ συγγενείαν μοι διαφέροντες etc.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 57. Καὶ ἂν τύχῃ καὶ ἔρχονται τὰ αἰχμάλωτα μου, ὡς ἔχουν τὸ μερικὸν τους. ἡ δὲ ἐδικήμου μοῖρα ὅση με διαφέρει ἐξ ὀλοκλήρου ἀφήμι αὐτὰ εἰς τὴν σεβασμίαν μονὴν τῶν Ζαβουλῶν. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔρχονται τὰ αἰχμάλωτά μου ὡς εἶναι ὅλα τῆς μονῆς.

¹⁶⁴ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 4:232. Τὴν σήμερον δὲ προσελθόντες οἱ μοναχοὶ καὶ παρακάλεσαντε ἡμᾶς καὶ μνημόσυνον ἔχειν ἐπαγγειλάμενοι ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν μονῇ διὰ τὸ πλησιάζειν τὸ τοιοῦτον χωράφιον τῶν χωραφίων τῆς τοιαύτης μονῆς, ἀποχαρίζομεθα τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν βασιλικὴν μονὴν ψυχικῆς ἕνεκα σωτηρίας ἡμῶν.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 6:156.

Two brothers, Michael and John Gunaropulos, and their cousin Nicholas, possessed a number of fields in a place called Demosion which was located in the village of Vare or Mela in the neighborhood of Smyrna. However, the metropolitan of Smyrna disputed the possession of these fields and three of his tenant peasants (*paroikoi*) occupied them by force and refused to pay any rental. The Gunaropuli were the *paroikoi* of Basil Blatteros and they appealed to him for help. In June, 1207, Blatteros protested to the emperor on their behalf and the emperor ordered an investigation.¹⁶⁶ What the result of the investigation was is not known, but in November of the same year the Gunaropuli sold one fourth of their property in Demosion to Basil Blatteros for forty *nomismata*.¹⁶⁷ In the following year Nicholas Gunaropulos, now a monk by the name of Nicodemus, sold the rest of his property in Demosion to the family of Blatteros.¹⁶⁸ Whether his cousins also sold the rest of their property in Demosion is not definitely known but in 1225 Nicodemus, in affirming that he had sold all of his property in Demosion to Basil Blatteros, added that he had heard his cousins say that they too were about to sell to Blatteros what remained of their property in Demosion.¹⁶⁹ By 1230 the property formerly owned by the Gunaropuli passed into the hands of the *vestiarites* John Rabdokanakes, who had married the daughter of Blatteros, in the form of dowry.¹⁷⁰

Demosion, as has been said, was located in the village of Vare, known also as Mela, and that village had been granted to the monastery of Lemvo in 1228 by an imperial chrysobull.¹⁷¹ The monks of Lemvo understood the grant to include all the properties located in Vare, and consequently considered the property which the Blatteros family had bought from the Gunaropuli as belonging to them. They must have tried to take possession of this property not long after the grant of Vare was made to them, for in 1230 Rabdokanakes complained to the emperor that the monks of Lemvo were trying to seize his property in Demosion and asked for an imperial order that would confirm his rights to it. As Rabdokanakes was a person of some influence, he obtained the order, which, in addition to confirming his rights to the property in question, ordered the monks to stop trying to appropriate it for themselves.¹⁷² This order, however, did not stop the monks; they continued in their efforts to take possession of this property and in 1232

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 4:217 f. For date, F. Dölger, "Chronologischen u. Prosopographisches zur byz. Geschichte des 13 Jahr.," p. 315, no. 131.

¹⁶⁷ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 4:185 f.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 183.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 189 f.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 218. For date, F. Dölger, "Chronologischen . . ." p. 315, no. 132.

¹⁷¹ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 4:2.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 218. For date, F. Dölger, "Chronologischen . . ." p. 315, no. 132.

persuaded the emperor to issue another order,¹⁷³ which, in effect, canceled the one which had been issued on behalf of Rabdokanakes. Both he and his mother-in-law were ordered to get out of Vare and to stop molesting the monks, for Vare, once held by Blatteros as *pronoia*,¹⁷⁴ now belonged to the monastery.

But Rabdokanakes was a man as tenacious and influential as the monks. He again appealed to the emperor and again succeeded in obtaining an order confirming his rights to the property in question. The order was issued in June, 1233 and stated categorically that the property belonged to him without any question; that the monks had no right to it; and that if they continued to use it they had to pay the required rental for it.¹⁷⁵ But this order did not end the case, for the monks went back to the emperor. They did not contest the contention of Rabdokanakes that his father-in-law had bought the property from the Gunaropuli, but they maintained that the sale was fraudulent and illegal, for, at the time it was transacted, the Gunaropuli were the *paroikoi* of Blatteros. And they again pointed out that the property was located within the boundaries of the village of Vare and that village had been granted to them in its entirety. Apparently this time the emperor decided to settle the question once and for all, and instead of issuing another order, he instructed Demetrius Tornikes, an important official, to investigate the case and reach a final decision. After a careful investigation Tornikes rendered a decision favorable to the monastery. He based his decision on two different counts: (1) the original sale was illegal, firstly, because the Gunaropuli had no right to sell the land, for they possessed it as *paroikoi*, and secondly, because those subject to taxation could not sell the land which they occupied to those who held that land as *pronoia*; and (2) the land in question was located in the village of Vare, where the widows of John and Michael Gunaropulus still lived as *paroikoi*, and that village had been granted to the monastery.¹⁷⁶ A provision was included in the decision, however, to the effect that if Rabdokanakes would swear that his father-in-law had actually bought the land, then the monastery would be required to reimburse to him the exact amount that had been paid for the land. The

¹⁷³ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 4:194 f. For date, F. Dölger, "Chronologischen . . ." p. 313, no. 111.

¹⁷⁴ We gather this from another document. Miklosich et Müller, 4:199.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 219 f. For date, F. Dölger, "Chronologischen . . ." p. 315, no. 133.

¹⁷⁶ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 4:199. διέγνω ὁ ῥηθεὶς ἀντάδελφος τῆς βασιλείας μου ὁ Κομνηνὸς καὶ ἀπεφώνησε, ὡς οὐκ ὤφειλον οἱ Γουναρόπουλοι διαπωλῆσαι πρὸς τὸν Βλαττερὸν τὴν τοιαύτην γῆν διὰ τὸ ὑπὸ παροικίαν τελεῖν ταύτην καὶ μὴ ὀφείλειν τοὺς ὑποτελεῖς πιπράσκειν τὰ παρ' αὐτῶν κατεχόμενα πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ λόγον προνοίας ἔχοντα αὐτὰ ὡς ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ δημοσίου χεῖρα ἀείποτα τελούντα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δίκαιον ἐστὶ τὸ τὴν τοιαύτην γῆν κατέχεσθαι μὲν παρὰ τῆς μονῆς τῶν Λέμβων, ὡς οὐσαν ἀπὸ τῶν δικαίων τοῦ χωρίου αὐτοῦ.

decision of Tornikes was confirmed by an imperial order, issued in July, 1233.¹⁷⁷

The land which was recovered by the monastery was turned over to the Gunaropuli, who, as *paroikoi* of the monastery, owed to the latter certain services and obligations. Possibly under the instigation of Rabdokanakes, who seems not to have abandoned all hope of recovering this property, the Gunaropuli did not take immediate possession of the property but sought to transfer it to some other person. In August, 1234 an imperial order was issued to Constantine Lascares, Duke of the theme of Thrakesion, ordering him to revise the census book of the village of Vare, to register the *paroikoi* living there, to determine their status and taxes on the basis of their possessions, and not to permit the Gunaropuli to transfer the land, which they once sold to Blatteros and which was recently recovered by the monastery, to another person, something which they were trying to do. If the Gunaropuli wished to occupy the land themselves, they could do so, but they had to pay the taxes to the monastery and discharge all the obligations that a *paroikos* owed to his land. If, however, they were not able to take possession of it themselves, the land was to go to the monastery.¹⁷⁸ The Gunaropuli apparently were considered the owners of the land. What had been granted to the monastery were the taxes and other obligations to which the land was subject. The monastery was anxious to remove Rabdokanakes because he was an influential person who might have not only failed to discharge the various obligations to which the land in question was subject, but might have used that land as the nucleus for the acquisition of more at the expense of the monastery.

The case was finally and definitely settled in 1236. In that year, Rabdokanakes, his wife Anna, and his mother-in-law, gave to the monastery of Lemvo a written statement in which they declared that they had unjustly held the land in Demosion; that Blatteros had never bought that land, and that he had come in possession of it by violence. Consequently, they continued, their contentions in their long dispute with the monastery over this land were without any legal foundations. They declared further that whatever rights they might still have had in the village of Vare, they transferred to the monastery.¹⁷⁹ The victory of the monastery was complete. By 1250 it had absorbed all the property of the family of the Gunaropuli. In 1240 they had sold to it what fields they still possessed and in 1250 the vineyards which

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 198 f. For date, F. Dölger, "Chronologischen . . ." p. 314, no. 115.

¹⁷⁸ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 4:182. For date, Dölger, "Chronologischen . . ." p. 313, no. 103.

¹⁷⁹ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 4:192 f.

they still had in Demosion.¹⁸⁰ By an extraordinary tenacity the monks succeeded in removing the influence of a powerful individual and then absorbed the property of the small peasants.

Another case illustrating the determination of the monks to remove the influence of powerful individuals who might have encroached upon their possessions is that concerning the property called Sphourno, which consisted of land, a water mill and some fruit trees. Sphourno had been given to the monastery of Lemvo as a gift by a certain George Kaloeidas. It had originally belonged to the Constantinopolitan monastery of the Ruphinianoi which used to rent it but eventually passed into the hands of one called Kastomonites from whom it was obtained by Kaloeidas as dowery. The latter presented it to the monastery of Lemvo in 1234. The property was tax free.¹⁸¹

In 1205 when Henry of Flanders invaded Asia Minor Sphourno was occupied by peasants from the neighboring villages, located not far from Smyrna. After the departure of the Latins the peasants returned to their own villages, but some years later a number of them came back to Sphourno, with the consent and knowledge of their lord, as the place was virtually deserted.¹⁸² Then came the restoration of the monastery of Lemvo and Sphourno was given to it by its owner.

In 1235 a general inventory was made of the properties belonging to the monastery of Lemvo and it was found that three peasants from the nearby village of Potamos, *paroikoi* of Syrgares, an influential person who held extensive lands as *pronoeae*, dwelled at Sphourno. The monks ordered them to go away, but the peasants refused and in this they were actively supported by Syrgares.¹⁸³ The monks appealed to the emperor, who ordered an investigation, declaring that if the peasants from Potamos had no right to dwell at Sphourno, they should be made to go. In their defense, which was guided by Syrgares, the peasants contended that they were occupying land formerly occupied by their fathers; that to the improvements made on this land by their fathers they had added their own; that they were thus able not only to meet the public charges, but also to grant a water mill to the monastery for the memory of their fathers; and that what the monks really wanted was to deprive them of their hereditary rights.¹⁸⁴ In the course of

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 195, 200.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 32-34.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 35.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 7. εὐρέθησαν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ προαστείῳ τὰ Σφούρνον προσκαθήμενοι ἀμετόχως καὶ τρεῖς πάροιχοι ἀπὸ τοῦ χωρίου τῶν Ποταμῶν, τελούντες ὑπὸ τὸν λίζιον βασιλικὸν καβαλλάριον τὸν Συργαρήν, οἵτινες καὶ ἐπεφωνήθησαν παρ' ἡμῶν ἐγερθῆναι ἀπὸ τῶν δικαίων τῆς μονῆς καὶ ἀπελθεῖν ἐνθα καὶ πρότερον ἐκάθηντο.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 37. Ἐκπαλαι προσκαθήμενοι οἱ γονεῖς ἡμῶν εἰς τόπον τὸν ἐπιλεγόμενον τὰ Σφούρνον

the investigation, which took about a month, the villages of the neighborhood testified unfavorably for the peasants involved in the litigation and when the decision of the court was finally reached it called for the expulsion of the peasants from Sphourno but required the monastery to give them a small compensation for the grape arbors which they had planted in front of their huts.¹⁸⁵ The decision was confirmed by the emperor, January, 1236.¹⁸⁶ But a year later the case was opened again, for Syrgares and his tenant peasants had failed to abandon Sphourno. They demanded, besides the compensation which the court had decreed the previous year, land elsewhere where the peasants could settle. The court this time sided with the peasants, the monks accepted the decision and the case was definitely closed, May, 1237.¹⁸⁷

The examples given above are ample to illustrate the ways by which the monasteries accumulated their vast properties in the course of the thirteenth century. This process of accumulation continued on into the fourteenth century. The means remained the same. Among the Athonian acts and other monastic documents of the fourteenth century there are numerous chrysobulls granting land and privileges to monasteries, acts of sales attesting to the purchase of various properties by the monasteries, especially from peasants, acts of donations by the faithful, and acts of litigation and judicial decisions involving properties in which the monasteries were concerned. To cite these various documents individually is not only cumbersome but unnecessary.

The thirteenth century was for the Greeks a century of reconstruction. To drive the Latins out of Constantinople, to make that city again the capital of the empire and the seat of the patriarchate became the central idea of the policy of the Greeks both of Epirus and Nicaea. The events of 1204 had brought about the development of a kind of Greek nationalism, especially among the Greeks of Nicaea. Nicetas Choniates wrote in connection with the capture of Thessalonica by the Normans in 1185: "Thus between us and them [the Latins] a bottomless gulf of enmity has established itself; we cannot unite our souls and we entirely disagree with each other, although

καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ Ποταμοῦ καὶ συνεστήσαντο βελτιώματα καὶ ὡς εἶχομεν ταῦτα ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ τῶν γονέων μας, προσπεκτησάμεθα καὶ ἕτερα ὑποστατικά, ὥστε δύνασθαι ἡμᾶς διδόναι τὰ ἀνήκοντα ἡμῖν τέλη καὶ δημοσιακὰ ζητήματα, εἰς δὲ τὴν μονὴν τῆς ὑπεραγίας θεοτόκου τῆς Λεμβιωτίσσης ἀπεχαρισάμεθα ὑδρομυλικὸν ἐργαστήριον εἰς μνημόσυνον τῶν γονέων ἡμῶν. τὰ νῦν δὲ ὁ καθηγούμενος τῆς τοιαύτης μονῆς οὐκ ἀρκεῖται εἰς τὸν τόπον τοῦ ὑδρομυλικοῦ ἐργαστηρίου, ἀλλὰ πειράται ἐξωθῆσαι ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν γονικῶν ἡμῶν βελτιωμάτων.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 41 ff.

we keep up our external relations and often live in the same house.”¹⁸⁸ This sentiment became much stronger following the capture of Constantinople in 1204; it was shared especially by the clergy, and this added to their prestige and power. It was the driving force in the political and religious, military and diplomatic activities of the Greeks. To restore their monasteries, to reestablish their church, to recover their capital — these became the primary objectives of the Greeks. To them they devoted all of their energy and resources. The growth of monasteries and monastic properties in the thirteenth century is to be explained at least in part by the driving desire to restore what the Latins had destroyed. A policy that would have restricted the growth of monastic properties or one that would have called for the confiscation of these properties was in the thirteenth century psychologically impossible.

In 1261 the Greeks finally reached their primary objective. Constantinople was again in their hands. The splendor that it had before 1204 was no longer there; this, of course, did matter, but what mattered more was that the Latins were out, and the queen city of the world could once again become the seat of the government and the patriarchate. No event in the history of Byzantium after 1204 gave greater satisfaction to the Greeks than the recovery of Constantinople in 1261. But if the recovery of Constantinople restored the Byzantine empire, the external dangers that that empire still faced were tremendous. The Latins did not abandon hope of recovering their losses and in the person of Charles of Anjou, whose ambition for power was unlimited and who, with the blessings of the pope had become the king of the kingdom of the two Sicilies, they found a powerful leader. Michael Palaeologus, doubtless the most energetic of the Byzantine emperors after 1261, had to devote all his energies and the resources of the empire to the task of keeping together what his predecessors and he had recovered from the Latins. This was not an easy task and in trying to achieve it he exhausted the resources of the empire, and, by his unwise policy of granting exceptional commercial privileges to the Genoese and Venetians in return for their naval aid, undermined the future economy of the state. With the aid of the Sicilian Vespers, which destroyed the power of Charles of Anjou in Sicily, the Latin danger was finally and definitely eliminated, but this did not mean peace and tranquillity for the empire, for in the meantime, other, and as it turned out, more formidable, enemies made their appearance.

¹⁸⁸ Nicetas Choniates, *op. cit.*, 391 f. οὕτω μέσον ἡμῶν καὶ αὐτῶν χάσμα διαφορᾶς ἐστήρικται μέγιστον, καὶ ταῖς γνώμαις ἀσυναφείς ἐσμέν, καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον ἀφεστήκαμεν, εἰ καὶ σώμασι συναπτόμεθα καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν πολλάκις εἰλήχειμεν οἴκησιν. I have used Vasiliev's translation, *History of the Byzantine Empire*, 2:94–95.

Michael Palaeologus was still alive when the empire began to lose ground both in Europe and in Asia Minor. In Europe the new antagonist was the Serbian king, Stephen Uroš II Milutin. Milutin had concluded an alliance with Charles of Anjou, and although the latter was never able to carry out his plans, Milutin took the field and in 1281 deprived Byzantium of northern Macedonia, including the town of Polog (Tetovo), and Skopje together with the surrounding country.¹⁸⁹ But more serious than the Serbian advance, was that of the Turks in Asia Minor. For the defense of the Byzantine possessions in Asia Minor the military policy of Michael Palaeologus and the concentration of his energies in Europe were fatal. The generations that saw the fall of Constantinople in 1453 attributed the beginning of the loss of Asia Minor to the reign of Michael Palaeologus.¹⁹⁰ Michael, indeed, by his confiscations of the holdings of the *akritoi* destroyed the morale of these frontier fighters¹⁹¹ and by the use of the troops settled in Asia Minor in the European campaigns virtually denuded Asia Minor of all troops, leaving it open to the ever increasing incursions of the various Turkish tribes. The Turks not only cleared the Byzantines from the southern bank of the Meander, but also established themselves on the northern bank, and in Bithynia other Turkish tribes reached the Sargarius and beyond, cutting all communications by land between Pontic Heraclea, Constantinople and the rest of Byzantine Asia Minor. According to Pachymeres only those fortresses located not far from the sea remained in the hands of the Byzantines.¹⁹² These things happened while Michael Palaeologus was still on the throne. With his death the situation went from bad to worse; nothing seemed to be able to stop the depredations of the Turkish tribes and the population sought safety by flight. Many settled in purely Slavonic regions in Europe, especially along the Bregalnica river.¹⁹³ Among those who fled many were soldiers who abandoned their holdings and sought to save their lives by crossing

¹⁸⁹ C. J. Jirecek, *Geschichte der Bulgaren* (Prague, 1876), 280 f.

¹⁹⁰ Phrantzes, *Chronicon* (Bonn, 1838), 23. ἐπὶ τῆς βασιλείας τοῦδε τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος διὰ τοὺς πολέμους τοὺς ἐν τῇ εὐρώπῃ παρὰ τῶν Ἰταλῶν ἀρχὴ τῶν δεινῶν τῆς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ Ρωμαϊκῆς ἀρχῆς ἐγγέγονει παρὰ τῶν Τούρκων.

¹⁹¹ On Michael's policy concerning the *akritoi*, Pachymeres, *op. cit.*, 1:18, 193 ff; Gregoras, *Historiae* (Bonn, 1829), 1:138. See also Mutačiev, *op. cit.*, 102-105; Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine empire*, 2:292-93.

¹⁹² Pachymeres, *op. cit.*, 1:311. Τῶν γὰρ δυνάμεων, πολλῶν τε καὶ θαυμαστῶν οὐσῶν, συγκατατριβομένων τοῖς δυσικοῖς καὶ κατ' ὀλίγον δαπανωμένων, τοῖς κατ' ἀνατολὴν τοσοῦτος ὁ κίνδυνος περιέστη, ὥστε μηδ' εἰς αὐτὴν Ἡράκλειαν τὴν τοῦ Πόντου βαδίζειν εἶναι πεζῇ τοὺς ὁρμωμένους ἐκ πόλεως, τῶν ἐκέισε ὁρίων τῷ Σαγγάρει περικλεισθέντων, καὶ τῶν πέραν πάντων λείαν γεγονότων οὐ Μυσῶν ἀλλὰ γε Περσῶν. μόνα δὲ τὰ πρὸς θάλασσαν φρούρια κατελείφθησαν . . . ἃ δὲ εἰ μὴ τῇ θαλάσῃ προσεχρῶντο, καὶ ταῦτα, τῶν χωρῶν κατεχομένων τοῖς Πέρσαις, πάλαι ἂν ταῖς χώραις καὶ αὐτὰ συναπώλοντο. For the conquest of the Meander regions, *Ibid.*, 1:468. See also Gregoras, *op. cit.*, 1:138, 141.

¹⁹³ Jirecek, *op. cit.*, 221.

over into Europe.¹⁹⁴ By the beginning of the fourteenth century the situation had become very critical. The Turks kept sweeping the Greeks out of Asia Minor; the treasury was empty; the army demoralized; the resources limited. In the face of such a situation Andronicus II, a man about whose piety and friendliness for the monasteries there can be no doubt, decided to take over some of the property belonging to the church and the monasteries and use it to rebuild the army. Pachymeres wrote in this connection:¹⁹⁵

The affairs of the orient were steadily becoming worse. The news that the emperor received one day was worse than the terrible news which he received the day before . . . The announcements of the awful happenings left no time for the emperor to take counsel. There were no troops with which to meet the enemy. The army was not only weak; the soldiers, abandoning their holdings (*pronoae*), turned to the west, trying only to save their lives. And to replace them by others, recruited by offering them a definite wage, was impossible. Nor was it proper to court the barbarians by negotiating with them. Besides, this was impossible for they were many and had different views. If one appeased some, he would be pillaged by the others. Under these circumstances there appeared but one remedy, to take away from the churches, the monasteries of more than one cell, and the imperial guard the lands which had been granted to them as *pronoae*, and give them to soldiers so that, cleaving to them, they might stay and fight for what belonged to them. Wherefore the patriarch sent to the emperor an olive branch unaccompanied by any message, and this encouraged him somewhat that the church would not oppose his measure.

Since the reign of Alexius Comnenus this was the first measure taken by a Byzantine emperor to deprive the church and the monasteries of some of their property. It was decided upon not by any anti-monastic bias, but by the necessity to reconstruct the army. But the measure was a mild one. It provided for the recall only of lands which had been granted as *pronoae* to the church and monasteries and by definition these lands were not the absolute property of the church and the monasteries. Granted as *pronoae* by the government, they were subject to recall. To what extent the measure was carried out is not known. It does not seem that the huge properties of the monasteries were diminished by much. The measure, however, may have served as precedent for the other attempts that were made in the course of the fourteenth century to take over monastic properties in order to distribute them among the soldiers.

In the fourteenth century, besides the measure taken by Andronicus II, several other attempts were made to reorganize the army by increasing the number of the enrolled soldiers to whom land was given by the state. The land distributed to soldiers came from the public domain, but in extreme

¹⁹⁴ Pachymeres, *op. cit.*, 2:389. αἱ μὲν γὰρ Ρωμαϊκαὶ δυνάμεις οὐχ ὅπως ἐξησθένουν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προνοίας ἀπολωλεκότες, ἀνατολὴν φεύγοντες ἐπὶ δύσεως ὤρμων, περιποιούμενοι ἑαυτοῖς μόνον τὸ ζῆν.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 2:388–390. The translation given above is free.

cases it was also taken from private individuals.¹⁹⁶ Among the lands confiscated by the state for distribution to soldiers there were lands belonging to monasteries. In 1348 the great Serbian king, Stephen Dushan, issued a golden bull to the monastery of St. George of Zablantia, located not far from Trikkala in Thessaly, by which he restored to the monastery the village of Zablantia together with the *paroikoi* whom the Sebastocrator John had taken away from it and raised to the status of enrolled soldiers. The land which John gave to them was the same land which they occupied as tenants of the monastery, land, therefore, which belonged to the monastery.¹⁹⁷ But having been raised to the status of soldiers they became free men, with no obligations other than those of soldiers. Land and tenant peasants, therefore, were taken away from the monastery. This must have happened sometime after 1343, for in that year John the Sebastocrator was appointed governor of Thessaly by John Cantacuzenus.¹⁹⁸

If the realm of intellectual and artistic activity is excluded, the fourteenth century presents a sorry spectacle in the history of the Byzantine empire. From the beginning to the end it is filled with foreign invasions, dynastic revolutions and social conflicts. Its frontiers shrunk on every side, its commercial activity came completely under the domination of the Italians, whose arrogance reached the point of insolence, and most of the land still under its jurisdiction accumulated in the hands of the monasteries, the church and the court aristocracy. Meanwhile the barbarian invasions and the civil wars, the venality of the rich and the oppressiveness of taxation brought poverty and misery to the lower classes. The dynastic wars, especially the struggle between John Cantacuzenus and John V Palaeologus

¹⁹⁶ Mutafčiev, *op. cit.*, 9–10.

¹⁹⁷ N. A. Bees, "Σερβικά καὶ Βυζαντιὰ Γράμματα Μετεώρων," in *Βυζαντις*, 2 (Athens, 1911–12), 59. "Ὅπερ [τὸ χωρίον Ζαβλάντια] ὁ σεβαστοκράτωρ ἐκείνος κὺρ Ἰωάννης ἀπέσπασε καὶ εἰς τὰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀπεκατέστησε τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ εὗρισκομένους παροίκους καὶ κατέχῃ τοῦτο μετὰ πάσης νομῆς καὶ περιοχῆς αὐτοῦ ὡς τὸ πρότερον. "Ἀπεκατέστησε," I think, should be taken in the sense of established and not restored, as I. Bogiatzides understands it. According to him, the village of Zablantia was originally occupied by soldiers, but it was taken over by the monastery either by purchase or simple seizure, and the soldiers settled in it were reduced to the status of *paroikoi* of the monastery. What the Sebastocrator John did, therefore, was to raise these peasants to their former position of soldiers: I. Bogiatzides, "Τὸ χρονικὸν τῶν Μετεώρων," in *Ἑπετηρὶς Ἑταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν*, 1 (Athens, 1924), 140 f. Although ἀπεκατέστησε could mean restored, there is no indication in the document that the tenant-peasants in question were formerly soldiers. It would be more natural to assume that they were, to begin with, tenant peasants whom the Sebastocrator John raised to the status of soldiers in which case "ἀπεκατέστησε" must be taken in its primary meaning of "established." Cf. Mutafčiev, *op. cit.*, 12.

¹⁹⁸ Cantacuzenus, *Historiae* (Bonn, 1831), 2:312. Βασιλεὺς δὲ . . . ἔπεμπε τὸν ἀνεψιὸν Ἀγγέλων Ἰωάννην, ἐπίτροπον εἶναι Θεσσαλίας. Bogiatzides (*op. cit.*, 143) wrongly identifies John Sebastocrator of this document with John I Angelus, lord of the eastern part of the despotut of Epirus who died in 1289. Cf. Mutafčiev, *op. cit.*, 12.

touched off the discontent of the populace which smoldered underneath, and this led to a series of popular revolts, social in character, which put most of the cities of the empire in the hands of the people.¹⁹⁹ The most serious of these social upheavals took place in the city of Thessalonica where a group, known as the *zealots*, took the leadership of the populace, slaughtered the aristocracy in cold blood and seized control of the city. The regime which they established in Thessalonica may be described as an independent republic. The *zealots* kept control of Thessalonica from 1342 to 1349.

In coming into power the *zealots* had a definite social program. They wanted to revitalize the life of their community by ameliorating the conditions of the poor and the downtrodden. They wanted also to check the devastations of the marauding foreign armies by building a good army of their own. These objectives, however, could not be accomplished without money and the *zealots* turned to the only source available — the property of the nobles and the monasteries. The *zealots* themselves have left no record of their aims and objectives; what is known of them is derived from a pamphlet written by Nicolas Cabasilas, one of the enemies of the *zealots* who barely escaped with his life at the time of the revolt, who recorded them in order that he might refute them.²⁰⁰

According to Nicolas Cabasilas the *zealots* confiscated, at least in part, the property of the wealthy aristocracy and that of the monasteries, but they insisted that these confiscations had no other end in view than that of the public good. The property seized was used to feed and house the poor, to provide for the priests, to adorn the churches, to arm the soldiers, and to repair the walls of the city. "Is it terrible" they asked, "if, by taking a part of the goods dedicated to the monasteries, goods which are so plentiful, we feed some poor, provide for the priests and adorn the churches? That will cause them no harm, for that which remains suffices for their wants, and is not in contradiction with the thoughts of the original donors. They had no other aim than to serve God and nourish the poor. That is our purpose too." They urged that the protection of the walls and the laws of the city was the most urgent of all things and asked further: "How is it not better if with this money we arm soldiers who will die for these churches, for these laws,

¹⁹⁹ Concerning the popular revolts in the Byzantine empire during the fourteenth century, see P. Charanis, "Internal strife in Byzantium during the fourteenth century," in *Byzantion*, 15 (Boston, 1941), 208–230.

²⁰⁰ This pamphlet of Cabasilas is entitled, *Λόγοι περὶ τῶν παρανόμως τοῖς ἄρχουσι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς τολμωμένων*, and forms a part of *MS. gr. Paris, B.N., 1213*. It has not yet been published, but lengthy passages from it have been reproduced by Sathas (*Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au moyen âge*, vol. iv, p. xxvi, note 1) and by Tafrali (*Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle*, pp. 261 ff).

for these walls, than if these same sums were spent in vain by monks and priests whose table and other needs are slight, for they stay at home, live under shelter and expose themselves to no danger? What injustices do we commit if we seek to rebuild ruined houses, care for the fields and villages, and nourish those who are fighting for the freedom of these?"²⁰¹

The *zealots* were involved in the dynastic war between John Cantacuzenus and John V Palaeologus in which they supported the latter. With the end of that conflict there was an aristocratic reaction in Thessalonica and the regime of the *zealots* was overthrown. To what extent the *zealots* had carried out their program of confiscations and redistribution cannot be determined. What property had been confiscated during the civil war, however, seems to have been returned to the original owners by John Cantacuzenus, who, by virtue of the agreement which he concluded with Anne of Savoy, the empress-regent, in February, 1347 became co-emperor, with John V as his colleague. One of the first measures which he adopted was the restoration of all landed property confiscated during the war. And while the movable property was not returned to the original owners, they were compensated in some other way, although it is not stated in what this compensation consisted.²⁰² No further steps for the solution of the social problem were taken.

There still remained the problem of defense. In 1354 the Ottoman Turks definitely established themselves in Europe and began the systematic conquest of what lands the Byzantine empire still possessed. The Byzantine army was weak and there were no funds with which to reorganize it. In his desperation John V turned to the traditional Byzantine method of reorganizing the army by the distribution of land. His plan was to settle a number of soldiers along the coast between Constantinople and Selymbria. However, some of the land located there belonged to the church of Constantinople and as it was needed for the settlement of the soldiers, the emperor entered into negotiations with the patriarch to have it turned over to him. This was in 1367, and the document containing these negotiations has been preserved.

²⁰¹ MS. gr. Paris, 1213, fol. 246v, cited by Sathas. Τὸ δεινὸν εἰ τῶν ἀνακειμένων τοῖς φροντιστηρίοις, πολλῶν ὄντων, λαβόντες ἓνα πένητας μὲν θρέψομεν, ἱερεῦσι δὲ χορηγήσομεν, νεὼς δὲ κοσμήσομεν; ταῦτα δὲ οὔτε βλάβος ἐκείνοις οἴσει, τῶν ἀπολειφθέντων ἀρκοῦντων τῇ χρείᾳ, καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ τῶν ἀναθεμένων ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν ἀπάδον· ἐσκόπουν δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ Θεὸν θεραπεύσαι καὶ πένητας θρέψαι· τοῦτο καὶ ἡμῖν τὸ ἔργον. Εἰ δὲ καὶ στρατιώτας ἀπὸ τούτων ὀπλίσομεν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶν τούτων καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν τειχῶν ἀποθανουμένους, πῶς οὐ βέλτιον ἢ παρὰ μοναχῶν ταῦτα καὶ ἱερέων ἀναλοῦσθαι μάτην, οἷς μικρὰ μὲν πρὸς τὴν τράπεζαν ἀρκεῖ, μικρὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην τοῦ βίου παρασκευήν, οἴκοι καθημένοι καὶ ὑπὸ στέγῃν ζῶσι καὶ πρὸς οὐδένᾳ παραταττομένοις κίνδυνον; . . . Τὶ οὖν ἀδικοῦμεν, εἰ καθάπερ στέγην ἰάσασθαι καὶ οἰκίαν πίπτουσιν ἀγορῶσαι, καὶ ἀγρῶν καὶ χωρῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι, τὸν ἴσον τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀγωνιζομένους τρέφειν τε κελεύομεν;

²⁰² Cantacuzenus, *op. cit.*, 3:11.

It is one of the most interesting documents concerning the relations between church and state in the fourteenth century. Following is a translation of it.²⁰³

In the month of November . . . during the sixth indiction his majesty, our master and emperor, sent to our lord, the ecumenical patriarch, through the most beloved uncle of his majesty, the most highly honored among the monks, Macarios Glabas Tarchaneiotes, a message which said the following: "The holy emperor wishes to settle soldiers in the villages situated in the country between Constantinople and Selymbria. He wishes also to give to these soldiers all the fields and land located in these villages. And since two of these villages, that of Oeconomeion and Pasparus belong to the great church his majesty requests your holiness that they be released by it so that the holy emperor may get them and do with them that which he wishes [i.e., settle soldiers in them]. He intends to keep them for one year and if he does that which he wishes he will keep them longer and will grant to the church another revenue equal to that derived from these estates. But if he does not do that which he wishes he will return these properties to the church." To this our holy lord, the ecumenical patriarch replied: "I have no right to give to any one any church property whatsoever, for, according to the commands of the holy canons I am the guardian of this property. Of the revenue of it I am, indeed, the master and I may do with it what I may desire, but not of the capital and the estates; of these I am only the guardian. And for this reason I shall never do this" [i.e., give up these villages to the emperor]. By the direction of his holiness there assembled in synod the holy and right-honorable prelates . . . , the matter was put before them and they were requested to say what they thought about it. They all replied as if with one mouth that "neither our most holy lord, the ecumenical patriarch, nor his great and holy synod had the right to give any church property to any one, for the holy canons, which prohibit the bishops to give the property of the churches under their jurisdiction to any one, prohibit it. And for this reason, although we wish to do this, we cannot do it, being prohibited from doing it by the holy canons." To this the most beloved uncle of his majesty, our lord and emperor replied. "Since you do not give him [i.e. the emperor] these properties, then yield them to him that he may hold them as others hold them and sow in them and in return give to the church a share of the produce or a rental (*μωρηγή*). Let him have them on the same basis as the others, paying the rental to the great church." And to this the holy synod replied, "We cannot do this either, for it too is prohibited by the holy canons, which command that the property of the church should not be rented to any one among the powerful, not even to the emperor." In addition to these, our holy lord, the ecumenical patriarch, and his holy synod said: "We have no liberty to grant the property of the church to any one; even if we wanted to do so, we could not do it, and for this reason we do not at all release the properties in question. But if the holy emperor wishes to take them by his own power, to do with them what he has in mind, let him do so. He gave them to the church; let him take them if he wishes. He has the power to do concerning them what he wishes. We ourselves will in no way do this, i.e., give up these properties, by our own will."

This document is remarkable in several ways. Remarkable because it shows how uncertain the emperor was of his ability to settle soldiers on the land which he sought to obtain from the church. He wanted the land for one year; he would keep it longer if within that year he succeeded in settling

²⁰³ Miklosich et Müller, *op. cit.*, 1:507-508.

it with soldiers. He was not sure that he would succeed. Remarkable, because it shows the unwillingness of the church to undergo the slightest sacrifice for the defense of the empire. Contrast this with the attitude of the patriarch Athanasius I, who, instead of raising any objections, encouraged Andronicus II to take land away from the church and monasteries and distribute it among the soldiers. Remarkable finally, because it shows how timid John V was. What a contrast with the position taken by Alexius I Comnenus and his brother Isaac when they asked the church to yield some of its property for the defense of the empire following the capture of Durazzo by Robert Guiscard in 1083. "The Sebastocrator Isaac," writes Anna Comnena, "went up to the great House of God where he had convoked an assembly of all the clergy. The members of the Holy Synod who were fellow-councillors with the Patriarch were astounded at seeing him and asked him what brought him there. He replied, 'I have come to speak to you of a matter which will be of service in this terrible crisis, and will be the means of maintaining the army.' Thereupon he began reciting the Canons about 'superfluous Church vessels' and after saying a good deal about them, he concluded with the words, 'I am compelled to compel those whom I do not wish to compel.'"²⁰⁴ It was unfortunate indeed that in what was without a doubt the most critical period in the history of Byzantium the destinies of the state were in the hands of such a man as John V.

On September 26, 1371, an important battle was fought near the Maritza river between the Ottoman Turks under Murad and the Serbs under Ugleša. It was a brilliant victory for the Ottomans, and it opened the way for the conquest of the Balkans. Scholars have been puzzled why the Greeks, who a few years before had actively sought the help of the Serbs against the Ottomans, had now failed to coöperate with them in this important battle. It has been recently suggested that the failure of the Greeks in this connection must be attributed to the special circumstances which existed in Constantinople, and especially to the fact that neither John V nor his son Manuel had yet returned from Italy at the time of the battle.²⁰⁵ But whatever the real explanation may be, the truth is that the Greeks were really alarmed by the outcome of the battle. Alarmed is, indeed, the word which accurately describes their reaction, for one of the measures which they immediately took was to secularize half of the monastic estates and turn them into *pronoëae* in order to strengthen the defenses of the empire. For the

²⁰⁴ Anna Comnena, *op. cit.*, 1:228. I have used Dawes' translation. Elizabeth A. S. Dawes, *The Alexiad of the Princess Anna Comnena* (London, 1928), 118.

²⁰⁵ P. Charanis, "The strife among the Palaeoli and the Ottoman Turks," in *Byzantion*, 16 (Boston, 1928), 118.

same reason many of the immunities enjoyed by the monasteries were withdrawn, some of the old taxes, as, for instance, the *ἐννόμιον*, i.e., the tax on pastures, the *καπηλιατικόν*, i.e., the sales tax on wine, were reimposed, and new ones were added. This information is derived from a document discovered by V. Mošin in the archives of the Athonian monastery of Vatopedi. It is a copy of a *prostagma*, i.e. order, issued in December, 1408 by Manuel II Palaeologus by which he eased somewhat the economic situation of the monasteries. Part of the land which had been taken away from them immediately after the battle of the Maritza river was restored to them; the monasteries were also freed from the tax on pastures and that on the sale of wine.²⁰⁶ The issuance of this order was doubtless prompted by the erroneous belief that the Ottoman danger had disappeared as a result of the battle of Ancyra in 1402 and the civil wars among the sons of Bayazid that followed.

The accumulation of huge properties in the hands of the monasteries and the exemptions and privileges granted to these monasteries were, without a doubt, detrimental to the general welfare of Byzantine society, and reduced sharply the financial power of the state. But the direct losses which the treasury suffered because of the exemptions enjoyed by the monasteries were perhaps less serious than the losses suffered indirectly because of the virtual disappearance of the free peasant holdings, largely, if not entirely, through the accumulation of the huge monastic properties. The free peasant had been the bulwark of the state in its great days, as one of the emperors of the tenth century pointed out when he said that "it is the many, settled on the land, who provide for the general needs, who pay the taxes and furnish the army with its recruits. Everything falls when the many are wanting."²⁰⁷ There were still some free peasant proprietors in the fourteenth century, but in their social and economic conditions they were hardly distinguishable from the vast majority of their fellows who eked out their living as tenant peasants. The factors that brought about the depression of the peasant class were, of course, many, but the accumulation of the huge monastic properties was perhaps the most important. This was seen clearly by some of the emperors. Lacapenus included the administrators of monasteries among the powerful to whom it was prohibited to acquire the property of small peasants; Nicephorus Phocas, because he saw that the growth of

²⁰⁶ V. Mošin, "Δουλικὸν Ζευγάριον (Sur la question du servage à Byzance)" (in Russian) in *Annales de l'institut Kondakov*, 10 (Prague, 1938), 130. I give above the summary of the document as given by Mošin. Mošin has promised to publish the text, but as far as I know he has not done so yet.

²⁰⁷ Zachariae von Lingenthal, *op. cit.*, 3:247. ἡ γὰρ τῶν πολλῶν κατοίκησις πολλὴν δείκνυσι τῆς χρείας τὴν ὠφέλειαν, τὴν τῶν δημοσίων συνεισφορὰν, τὴν τῶν στρατιωτικῶν λειτουργημάτων συντέλειαν ἃ πάντως ἀπολείψει τοῦ πλήθους ἐκλελοιπότης.

monastic properties reduced the economic productivity of the empire, went much further and prohibited the foundation of new houses and the extension of the immovable properties of the old ones; Basil II tried to protect the small peasant holdings by prohibiting the foundation of large monasteries in peasant communities and on peasant property. These measures were social in character, designed to improve the general welfare of Byzantine society, and indirectly to serve the interests of the state. The measures involving the confiscation of church and monastic properties taken by subsequent emperors were more restricted in their aim. They were taken primarily in order to meet some crisis, usually military in nature, and when that crisis was over they were relaxed. Neither the social legislations of the emperors of the tenth century nor the confiscatory measures of those who followed had any lasting effects. The monasteries with their huge properties survived the state.²⁰⁸

Why were these measures ineffective? It was because Byzantine society was far from being purely materialistic. Monasticism was an institution to which all the Byzantines, great and small, were fervently attached.²⁰⁹ Besides its spiritual attractions, monasticism offered certain other benefits which were of primary importance in the society of Byzantium. Monasteries were peaceful asylums as well as institutions of confinement. In case of trouble there were two alternatives for every emperor: the gallows or the monastery. Many are the Byzantine emperors who ended their lives peacefully behind the walls of a monastery. The same is true of many officials. One went to a monastery because he had lost everything in the world; another went there as a token of thankfulness to God because he had prospered. For many the question of burial was of fundamental importance, and as a ground for burial a monastery was much more preferable than any other place. Every Byzantine cherished the hope of finding his own monastery where he could retire in case of trouble or in old age, and where he could be buried when he died. Not many were those who had the means to build a monastery and who did not build one. That is the reason why so many monastic houses with many lands and other property came into existence in Byzantium. To check by legislation an institution as deeply rooted in society as monasticism was in Byzantium was impossible.

²⁰⁸ According to a French scholar about one half of the territory of the empire when the empire was ended by the Turks belonged to the church and monasteries. Ferradou, *op. cit.*, 165.

²⁰⁹ Concerning the various reasons for this fervent attachment to monasticism see the excellent account by Skabalanovich, *op. cit.*, 426 ff.

The Chronicle of Monemvasia and the Question of the Slavonic Settlements in Greece

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Source: *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, Vol. 5 (1950), pp. 139+141-166

Published by: Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1291076>

Accessed: 20-05-2019 00:25 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*

THE CHRONICLE OF MONEMVASIA
AND THE QUESTION
OF THE SLAVONIC SETTLEMENTS
IN GREECE

PETER CHARANIS

AMONG the short Byzantine chronicles, that concerning the *Foundation of Monemvasia* is perhaps the most curious and interesting. The most curious because, despite the importance of its contents, neither its author nor the date of its composition is known; the most interesting because of the notices which it contains concerning the establishment of Slavonic settlements in Greece, especially in the Peloponnesus, during the Middle Ages. Those who have dealt with the problem of these settlements have used it, either discounting its importance or emphasizing it unduly, their attitude depending upon their view concerning the magnitude, chronology, and significance of these settlements.¹ Notwithstanding its brevity, it has been the subject of two rather lengthy monographs wherein the attempt was made to determine its sources, the trustworthiness of its information, its author, and the date of its composition,² but the results have not been entirely conclusive. It is the object of this paper to reëxamine the question of the trustworthiness and the date of the composition of this chronicle.

The chronicle was first published in 1749 by Joseph Pasinus and his collaborators in their catalogue of the manuscripts of the royal library of Turin, from a manuscript written in the sixteenth century.³ Pasinus' edition was the only edition available until 1884 when S. P. Lampros reissued it, together with two other versions which he found in two manuscripts, the one belonging to the monastery of Koutloumousion, the other to that of the Iberikon, both monasteries of Mount Athos.⁴ According to Lampros, the manuscript of the Iberikon was written in the sixteenth century, that of Koutloumousion probably in the sixteenth, although there are some indications which point to the seventeenth.⁵ In 1909 these three versions were re-

¹ Fallmerayer was the first to call attention to this chronicle and used it to bolster his fantastic theory that the ancient Greek race disappeared completely. Jacob Ph. Fallmerayer, *Fragmente aus den Orient*, 2nd edition by Georg M. Thomas (Stuttgart, 1877), p. 508, note 2. Opponents of the theory of Fallmerayer tried to discount the importance of this chronicle. See, for instance, K. Hopf, "Geschichte Griechenlands vom Beginn des Mittelalters bis auf unsere Zeit," in Ersch and Gruber, *Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste*, 85 (Leipzig, 1867), 106ff.; and K. Paparrhegopoulo, *Σλαβικά ἐν ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς χώραις ἐποικήσεις*, in *Ἱστορικαὶ Πραγματεῖαι* (Athens, 1858), p. 247, note 25. Others have looked at it more impartially. See A. A. Vasiliev, "The Slavs in Greece" (in Russian), *Vizantiiskij Vremennik*, 5 (St. Petersburg, 1898), 411, 655ff. Vasiliev's work, although written fifty-two years ago, is still fundamental on the question of the Slavs in Greece. I read it with the aid of Mrs. Nathalie Scheffer.

² S. P. Lampros, *Τὸ περὶ κτίσεως Μονεμβασίας χρονικόν*, in his *Ἱστορικὰ Μελετήματα* (Athens, 1884), pp. 97-128. N. A. Bees, *Τὸ "περὶ τῆς κτίσεως τῆς Μονεμβασίας" χρονικόν*, in *Βυζαντίς*, 1 (Athens, 1909), 37-105.

³ *Codices manuscriptorum bibliothecae regii Taurinensis Athenaei*, 1 (Turin, 1749), 417f.

⁴ Lampros, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-109.

⁵ Lambros (Lampros), *Catalogue of the Greek Manuscripts on Mount Athos* (Cambridge, 1895-1900), 1:301; 2:86.

printed by N. A. Bees with some corrections,⁶ and three years later a fourth version, found in a manuscript belonging to the Collegio Greco in Rome, was published by Lampros.⁷

Among these various versions there are substantial differences. The Iberikon deals primarily with the Avar and Slavic invasions of the Balkan peninsula, including Greece, in the sixth century; the settlement of the Slavs in the Peloponnesus, and their subjugation to the authority of the emperor during the reign of Nicephorus I. There is no mention of any event beyond the reign of Nicephorus I. The Koutloumouision and Turin versions on the other hand include, besides the main contents of the Iberikon, a number of other notices which deal primarily with events and persons connected with the metropolitan sees of Monemvasia and Lacedaemon, especially the latter. Chronologically these later notices cover the period from 1083 to about the middle of the fourteenth century, but most of them refer to the second half of the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth. The Roman version consists of these later notices and includes none of the contents of the Iberikon. Between the Iberikon version on the one hand and the Koutloumouision and Turin versions on the other there are a number of other differences, but these are of minor significance.

The difference in contents between the Iberikon on the one hand and the Turin and Koutloumouision versions on the other was the principal argument used by Lampros in support of his opinion that these versions represent two different traditions of which the Iberikon was the original and the earliest, while the other, represented by the Turin and Koutloumouision manuscripts, was a reproduction of the Iberikon version with additional notices added by a later scribe. And, since the Iberikon version ends with the subjugation of the Slavs in the region of Patras during the reign of Nicephorus I when Tarasius, who died in 806, was still patriarch, while of the later notices found in the Turin and the Koutloumouision versions and missing in that of the Iberikon the earliest refers to the raising of the see of Lacedaemon to the status of a metropolis in 1083, Lampros came to the conclusion that the original version — the Iberikon — must have been written sometime between 806 and 1083.⁸ As for the Turin and Koutloumouision versions, Lampros thought that they must have been written toward the end of the thirteenth century.⁹

The conclusions of Lampros were rejected by N. A. Bees, who re-

⁶ Bees, *op. cit.*, pp. 61–73.

⁷ Lampros, *Νέος κώδιξ τοῦ χρονικοῦ Μονεμβασίας*, in *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων*, 9 (Athens, 1912), 245 ff.

⁸ Lampros, *Τὸ περὶ κτίσεως Μονεμβασίας χρονικόν*, p. 118.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 128.

examined the problem in detail. Bees rightly observed that it is impossible to accept the view of Lampros that the original version was written before 1083 simply because the additions found in the other versions begin with that year.¹⁰ Nor is Lampros' view that these additions were appended to the original toward the end of the thirteenth century any more acceptable, for among them there are chronological notices that refer to the fourteenth century.¹¹ Indeed, Bees rejects the notion that the Iberikon is the original and earliest version, thinks that it is a simple variation of the other two, and considers the differences among them as accidental. He believes that the whole chronicle was composed sometime between 1340 and the sixteenth century, because one of the notices refers to the year 1340 while the manuscripts in which the chronicle has been found belong to the sixteenth century.¹²

When Bees published his study, the Roman version was not yet known. The peculiarity of this version is that it includes none of the contents of the Iberikon. In other words, it contains only the later notices which are found only in the Turin and Koutloumoussion versions — notices which, according to Lampros, had been appended to the original chronicle later. In publishing the Roman version, Lampros remarked that its peculiarity confirmed his earlier view that the later notices of the Turin and Koutloumoussion versions form a section independent of the part which constitutes the Iberikon version.¹³ Indeed, the existence of two manuscripts — the one containing the part with the earlier notices, the other, that with the later notices — lends support to the argument of Lampros that these two parts were originally independent and that later someone put them together, producing thus the version represented by the Turin and the Koutloumoussion manuscripts. And since the Iberikon is much more precise and complete in its notices, it is quite probable that it represents the original redaction of the chronicle, while the Turin and Koutloumoussion versions are imperfect copies of it with the later notices added.

On determining the date of the composition of the original chronicle, that is, the Iberikon version, Lampros failed to notice one important detail. In his account of the subjugation of the Slavs near Patras during the reign of Nicephorus I, the author of the chronicle refers to that emperor as "the Old, who had Staurakios as son."¹⁴ This detail is of chronological importance

¹⁰ Bees, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 98–99.

¹³ Lampros, *Νέος κώδιξ τοῦ χρονικοῦ Μονεμβασίας*, p. 250. Lampros says that this is a manuscript of the thirteenth century, but surely there must be a mistake, for certain notices of the chronicle definitely refer to the fourteenth century.

¹⁴ Bees' edition, p. 68: *Νικηφόρου τοῦ παλαιοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος (υἱὸν) Σταυράκιον*.

because it places the composition of the chronicle after the reign of Nicephorus Phocas (963–969). This was pointed out by S. Kougeas,¹⁵ who called attention to another expression of the chronicle which also helps to determine the date of its composition. This is the reference to the Tzacones, where it is said that this name had been lately given to them,¹⁶ and as is well known the first mention of the Tzacones is made by Constantine Porphyrogenitus.¹⁷ These observations led Kougeas to conclude that that part of the chronicle which constitutes the Iberikon version was composed during or not much after the reign of Nicephorus Phocas.¹⁸

There is another expression in the chronicle which lends support to the view of Kougeas. In describing the depredations of the Avars and Slavs in the Peloponnesus in 584, the author of the chronicle writes that many of the Greeks fled and found refuge in Calabria and Sicily. Those who went to Calabria came from Patras and settled in the region of Rhegium; those who went to Sicily came from Lacedaemon, where, says the chronicle “they still live in a place called Demena, are called Demenitae instead of Lacedaemonitae, and preserve their own Laconian dialect.”¹⁹ Since the publication of Amari’s work, *Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia*, Demena as the name of a region in the northeastern part of Sicily and that of a town located in that region is well known,²⁰ but all of the references to the town belong to the ninth and tenth centuries. This fact has led Amari to declare that the town Demena existed until the tenth century, possibly until the eleventh, although that is doubtful.²¹ But if the Lacedaemonians who had fled to Sicily still lived in Demena at the time of the composition of the chronicle, it means that Demena still existed, and this would place the composition of the chronicle not later than the end of the tenth century or the beginning of the eleventh.

The date of the composition of a document is, of course, of great importance, but more important still is the nature of its sources and the credibility

¹⁵ S. Kougeas, ‘Ἐπὶ τοῦ καλουμένου χρονικοῦ “Περὶ τῆς κτίσεως τῆς Μονεμβασίας”, in Νέος Ἑλληνομνημῶν, 9 (Athens, 1912), 477.

¹⁶ Bees’ edition, p. 67: οἱ καὶ ἐπ’ ἐσχάτων Τζακωνῖαι ἐπωνομάσθησαν.

¹⁷ Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De cerimoniis*, 1 (Bonn, 1829), 696.

¹⁸ Kougeas, *op. cit.*, p. 478.

¹⁹ Bees’ edition, p. 66: οἱ καὶ εἰς ἔτι εἰσὶν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν τόπῳ καλουμένῳ Δέμενα καὶ Δεμενῖται ἀντὶ Λακεδαιμονιῶν κατανομαζόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν τῶν Λακόνων διάλεκτον διασώζοντες.

²⁰ Michele Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia*, 2nd edition (Catania, 1933), 1:609 ff. On Demena see also Sac. Luigi Vasi, “Notizie storiche e geografiche della città e valle di Demona,” in *Archivio storico Siciliano*, nuova serie, anno X (Palermo, 1885), pp. 1–15.

²¹ Amari, *op. cit.*, 1:612, note XV: “Confrontando le quali testimonianze, e avvisandomi che nei diplomi notati dal n° VII al XIV si tratti anco della provincia, io credo provata la esistenza di Demana castello infino al decimo secolo, di Demana provincia dall’ undecimo in poi; ma parmi assai dubbio che il castello durasse fino all’ undecimo secolo, e certo che a metà del duodecimo fosse abbandonato o avesse mutato nome.”

of its contents. The contents of the chronicle of Monemvasia have been carefully analyzed by both Lampros and Bees. The latter, while making some additions to what Lampros had said concerning the sources of the Iberikon version, devoted his attention primarily to the second part of the chronicle, and of this part there will be no question here. Suffice it to say that Bees has come to the conclusion that it is worthy of trust and "valuable for the history of the Peloponnesus and indeed of Lacedaemon, especially of the fourteenth century, since it preserves some names and notices of things absolutely unknown from other sources."²² But, however valuable this part of the chronicle may be for the history of the Peloponnesus in the fourteenth century, its contributions are of less general import than those of the first part, that is, the part which constitutes the Iberikon version. For the latter deals with no less a problem than the fate of the Greek people, particularly those inhabiting the Peloponnesus, during the early Middle Ages.

Lampros scrutinized the Iberikon version very carefully and was able to establish most of its sources. On the basis of the works of the Byzantine writers available to him which relate the same events related by the chronicle, he came to the conclusion, a conclusion which was then sound, that the author of the chronicle drew his information primarily from Menander, Evagrius, Theophylact Simocatta, and Theophanes.²³ But there are a number of notices for which Lampros was not able to find the source. He observed, for instance, that the name of the first metropolitan of Patras, Athanasius, who according to the chronicle was appointed and raised to the status of metropolitan during the reign of Nicephorus I, following the liberation of Patras from the Slavs, is found nowhere else. He made the same observation with respect to the statement of the chronicle that the Byzantine commander who liberated Patras from the Slavs was named Skleros and belonged to an Armenian family. These two problems, however, were solved by Bees, who offered evidence, independent of the chronicle, that both of these personages existed and had served in the capacities mentioned by the chronicle.²⁴

Lampros also observed that nowhere else was he able to find the etymology of *Maniatae*.²⁵ This statement is puzzling, for nowhere in the chronicle

²² Bees, *op. cit.*, p. 104 f.

²³ Lampros, *Τὸ περὶ κτίσεως Μονεμβασίας χρονικόν*, p. 109 ff.

²⁴ Bees, *op. cit.*, p. 78. Bees' reference about Skleros is to *Scriptor incertus de Leone Bardae F*, where it is said (Bonn, p. 336) that Leo Skleros was appointed strategus of the Peloponnesus by Michael I. It is not improbable, as Bees remarks, that Skleros had previous experience with the Peloponnesus and that was the reason for his appointment by Michael I. It must be pointed out, however, that this reference had already been cited by Vasiliev in the same connection. Vasiliev, *op. cit.*, p. 422.

²⁵ Lampros, *Τὸ περὶ κτίσεως Μονεμβασίας χρονικόν*, p. 117: οὐδαμοῦ γίνεται λόγος περὶ τοῦ ἐτύμου τῶν Μανιατῶν.

is there any question of the *Maniatae*. Apparently Lampros, as did also Hopf,²⁶ understood *Maniatae* by the *Demenitae* of the chronicle, probably because neither he nor Hopf knew anything about the Sicilian town of Demena. But Demena, as has been pointed out above, was a Sicilian town well known in the tenth century. How it got its name is not absolutely clear. Amari thinks that it was named after the inhabitants and supposes that the name was applied to the region and to the town at about the same time.²⁷ If this opinion is correct, then the name Demena may have been derived from *Demenitae*, the name by which, according to the chronicle, the Lacedaemonians who settled in Sicily came to be known. The chronicle says: "Some sailed to the island of Sicily and they are still there in a place called Demena and are called *Demenitae* instead of *Lacedaemonitae*."²⁸ A writer of the early fifteenth century understood *Demenitae* to be a barbarous form of Lacedaemonians. After speaking of those elements among the Laconians who settled in the mountains of Cynuria in the Peloponnesus and in the course of time barbarized their name into Tzacones, a corruption of Lacones, this writer then mentions the settlement of other Spartans in Sicily, and adds that they, too, as time went on, barbarized their name and came to be known as *Demenitae*.²⁹ It is quite probable that to this writer *Demenitae*

²⁶ Hopf, *op. cit.*, 85:108.

²⁷ Amari, *op. cit.*, 1:609 f.: Quanto al Val Demone, l'etimologia si é riferita ai boschi (Vallis Nemorum); si è riferita ai demonii dell' Etna, tenuto spiraglio d'inferno (Vallis Doemonum); altri più saviamente l'ha tratto da un forte castello, ricordato nelle memorie del nono secolo e abbandonato di certo nel duodecimo. Sembrami più probabile che i nomi della provincia e del castello fossero nati insieme dall' appellazione presa per avventura dagli abitatori di tutta quella regione: Perduranti, cioè, o Permanenti, nella fede, si aggiunga dell' impero bizantino. Perocchè un cronista greco del nono secolo, trattando delle città di Puglia rimase sotto il dominio di Constantinopoli, adopera il verbo analogo a così fatta voce (Teofane continuato, lib. V., cap. LVIII, p. 297: Καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου διέμειναν πιστοὶ βασιλεῖ τοιούτων ἐξηγούμενοι κάστρων); e una delle varianti con che questa ci è pervenuta è appunto *Tondemenon* che si riferisce, senza dubbio, non al territorio ma agli abitatori. On page 610, note 2, Amari explains: il participio presente del verbo διαμένω (permaneo, perduro) al genitivo plurale farebbe τῶν διαμενόντων, che l'uso volgare par abbia contratto in *Ton Demenon*. To us this etymology seems very improbable. Theophanes Continuatus used διαμένω because it was precisely the verb which he needed; no particular significance should be attached to it. Had he said that because the inhabitants of these cities remained faithful they came to be known as διαμένοντες, then the theory of Amari might be plausible, but he did not say that.

²⁸ See note 19 for the Greek text.

²⁹ Lampros, Δύο ἀναφοραὶ μητροπολίτου Μονεμβασίας πρὸς τὸν πατριάρχην, in Νέος Ἑλληνομνημῶν, 12 (Athens, 1915), 286: Προσκοκίλαντες δὲ εἰς Μεσσήνην, ᾤκησαν ἐκεῖσε καὶ Δεμενίτας αὐτοὺς ὃ μακρὸς εἶπε χρόνος, βαρβαρίσαντας καὶ αὐτοὺς τοῦνομα. We shall speak more of this document later. As for the etymology of Tzacones it is now generally accepted that it is derived from the phrase ζῶ Λάκωνες. See C. Amantos, Τσακῶνια-Sclavonia, in Ἀφιέρωμα εἰς Γ.Ν.Χατζιδάκην (Athens, 1921), pp. 130-134. On page 132 of his article, Amantos includes A. Vasiliev among those who derive the term Tzacones from the Slavic zakon and accordingly consider the Tzacones as Slavs. His reference is to Vasiliev's important article on the Slavs in Greece which we have already cited (above, note 1). I have carefully checked, with the aid of Vasiliev himself, this article (p. 422, n. 5) and I have found no statement such as

appeared to be a corruption of Lacedaemonitae, a term actually used by the chronicle instead of the classical Lacedaemonians. What he thought happened was the dropping of the first two syllables from Lacedaemonitae and the simplification of the spelling of what remained — Demenitae instead of Daemonitae. The form Demona instead of Demena occurs several times in the sources. But on this popular etymology of Demenitae from Lacedemonitae, and consequently Demena from Lacedaemon, we do not insist.

Among the several other notices of the chronicle for which neither Lampros nor Bees was able to find another source, there are two which are of capital importance for the history of Greece, Sicily, and southern Italy during the Middle Ages. Following is the passage where the first of these notices is found.³⁰ The whole passage is reproduced because it is necessary as a reference in the discussion of its source:

Ἐν ἐτέρᾳ δὲ εἰσβολῇ ἔχειρώσατο πᾶσαν τὴν Θεσσαλίαν καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν τὴν τε παλαιὰν Ἑπειρον καὶ Ἀττικὴν καὶ Εὐβοίαν. Οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ἐφορμήσαντες πολέμῳ ταύτην εἶλον καὶ ἐκβαλόντες τὰ εὐγενῆ καὶ ἑλληνικὰ ἔθνη καὶ καταφθείραντες κατῴκησαν αὐτοὶ ἐν αὐτῇ. Οἱ δὲ τὰς μαιφόνους αὐτῶν χεῖρας δυνηθέντες ἐκφυγεῖν, ἄλλος ἄλλαχῇ διεσπάρησαν. Καὶ ἡ μὲν τῶν Πατρῶν πόλις μετῴκησθη ἐν τῇ τῶν Καλαβρῶν χώρα τοῦ Ῥηγίου, οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι ἐν τῇ νήσῳ τῇ καλουμένῃ Ὀρόβῳ, οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι ἐν τῇ νήσῳ τῇ καλουμένῃ Αἰγίνῃ μετῴκησαν. Τότε δὲ καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες τὸ πατρῶν ἐδαφος καταλιπόντες οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Σικελίας ἐξέπλευσαν, οἱ καὶ εἰς ἔτι εἰσὶν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν τόπῳ καλουμένῳ Δέμενα καὶ Δεμενίται ἀντὶ Λακεδαιμονιτῶν κατονομαζόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν τῶν Λακῶνων διάλεκτον διασώζοντες. Οἱ δὲ δύσβατον τόπον παρὰ τὸν τῆς θαλάσσης αἰγυαλὸν εὐρόντες καὶ πόλιν ὀχυρὰν οἰκοδομήσαντες καὶ Μονεμβασίαν ταύτην ὀνομάσαντες διὰ τὸ μίαν ἔχειν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ εἰσπορευομένων τὴν εἴσοδον ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει κατῴκησαν μετὰ καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου αὐτῶν ἐπισκόπου. Οἱ δὲ τῶν θρεμμάτων νομεῖς καὶ ἀγροικικοὶ κατῴκησθησαν ἐν τοῖς παρακειμένοις ἐκέῖσε τραχινοῖς τόποις, οἱ καὶ ἐπ' ἐσχάτων Τζακωνίαι ἐπονομάσθησαν. Οὕτως οἱ Ἀβαροὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον κατασχόντες καὶ κατοικήσαντες ἐν αὐτῇ διήρκεσαν ἐπὶ χρόνοις διακοσίοις ὀκτωκαίδεκα μῆτε τῷ τῶν Ῥωμαίων βασιλεῖ μῆτε ἐτέρῳ ὑποκείμενοι, ἤγουν ἀπὸ τοῦ ,ς' ἤς' ἔτους τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κατασκευῆς ὅπερ ἦν ἔκτον ἔτος τῆς βασιλείας Μαυρικίου, καὶ μέχρι τοῦ ,ς^{ου} τιγ' ἔτους, ὅπερ ἦν τέταρτον ἔτος τῆς βασιλείας Νικηφόρου τοῦ παλαιοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος (υἱὸν) Σταυράκιον. Μόνου δὲ τοῦ ἀνατολικοῦ μέρους τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἀπὸ Κορίνθου καὶ μέχρι Μαλέου τοῦ Σθλαβηνοῦ ἔθνους διὰ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ δύσβατον καθαρεύοντος, στρατηγὸς Πελοποννήσου ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μέρει ὑπὸ τοῦ Ῥωμαίων βασιλέως κατεπέμπετο. Εἰς δὲ τῶν τοιούτων στρατηγῶν ὀρμώμενος μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς μικρᾶς Ἀρμενίας, φατριᾶς δὲ τῶν ἐπονομαζομένων Σκληρῶν συμβαλὼν τῷ Σθλαβηνῷ ἔθνει πολεμικῶς εἰλὲ τε καὶ ἡφάνισε εἰς τέλος καὶ τοῖς ἀρχῇθεν οἰκίητοσι ἀποκαταστήναι τὰ οἰκία παρέσχεν. Τοῦτο μαθὼν ὁ προειρημένος βασιλεὺς

would justify Amantos' opinion. Indeed, while Vasiliev makes here no categorical statement on the problem, restricting himself to a summary of the conclusions of other scholars, I know, from several conversations that I have had with this distinguished Russian-American scholar, that he considers the term Tzacones to be certainly related to that of Lacones. On Tzacones see further G. N. Hatzidakis, *Τσάκωνες*, in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 27 (Leipzig, 1927), 321–324; Dölger, *Byz. Zeitschrift*, 26:107. For a different etymology, see Ph. Koukoules, *Τσακωνία καὶ Τσάκωνες*, in *Byz. Zeitschrift*, 26:317–327. For the Tzaconian dialect see H. Pernot, *Introduction à l'étude du dialect Tsakonien* (Paris, 1934).

³⁰ Bees' edition, pp. 65–70. The Iberikon version.

Νικηφόρος καὶ χαρὰς πλησθεὶς διὰ φροντίδος ἔθετο τὸ καὶ τὰς ἐκείσε πόλεις ἀνακαινίσαι καὶ ἃς οἱ βάβαροι κατηδάφισαν ἐκκλησίας ἀνοικοδομήσαι καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς βαρβάρους Χριστιανοὺς ποιῆσαι. Διὸ καὶ ἀναμαθὼν τὴν μετοικεσίαν οὗ διατρίβουσιν οἱ Πατρεῖς κελεύσει αὐτοῦ τούτους τῷ ἔξ ἀρχῆς ἐδάφει ἀπεκατέστησε μετὰ καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου αὐτῶν ποιμένος, ὃς ἦν τὸ τηρικαῦτα Ἀθανάσιος τοῦνομα, καὶ μητροπόλεως δίκαια ταῖς Πάτραις παρέσχετο, ἀρχιεπισκοπῆς πρὸ τούτου χρηματιζούσης. Ἀνφοδόμῃσέ τε ἐκ βάθρων καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀγίας ἐκκλησίας, πατριαρχοῦντος ἔτι Ταρασίου . . .

Here is a translation:

In another invasion they [the Avars] subjugated all of Thessaly and Greece, Old Epirus, Attica and Euboea. They made an incursion also in the Peloponnesus, conquered it by war, and, destroying and driving out the noble and Hellenic nations, they settled in it themselves. Those among the former [the Greeks] who succeeded in escaping from their blood-stained hands dispersed themselves here and there. The city of Patras emigrated to the territory of Rhegium in Calabria; the Argives to the island called Orobe; and the Corinthians to the island called Aegina. The Lacones too abandoned their native soil at that time. Some sailed to the island of Sicily and they are still there in a place called Demena, call themselves Demenitae instead of Lacedaemonitae, and preserve their own Laconian dialect. Others found an inaccessible place by the seashore, built there a strong city which they called Monemvasia because there was only one way for those entering, and settled in it with their own bishop. Those who belonged to the tenders of herds and to the rustics of the country settled in the rugged places located along there and have been lately called Tzaconiae. Having thus conquered and settled the Peloponnesus, the Avars have held it for two hundred and eighteen years, that is, from the year 6096 [A.D. 587] from the creation of the world, which was the sixth year of the reign of Maurice, to the year 6313 [A.D. 805], which was the fourth year of the reign of Nicephorus the Old who had Staurakios as son. They were subject neither to the emperor of the Romans nor to anyone else. And only the eastern part of the Peloponnesus, from Corinth to Malea, because of its ruggedness and inaccessibility remained free from the Slavs and to that part a *strategus* [governor] of the Peloponnesus continued to be sent by the emperor of the Romans. One of these governors, a native of Lesser Armenia, and a member of the family called Skleroi came into hostile blows with the Slavic tribes, conquered and obliterated them completely, and enabled the ancient inhabitants to recover their own. When the aforementioned emperor Nicephorus heard these things he was filled with joy and became anxious to renew the cities there, to rebuild the churches that the barbarians had destroyed, and to Christianize the barbarians themselves. And for this reason, having inquired about the colony where the people of Patras lived, he had them reestablished by his order together with their own shepherd [bishop], whose name at that time was Athanasius, on their ancient soil. He also granted to Patras, which was a bishopric before this, the prerogatives of a metropolis. And he rebuilt their city [Patras] and the holy churches of God from the foundations when Tarasius was still patriarch.

Now to examine the sources of this all-important passage. At first glance the notice concerning the invasion of Greece seems to have been taken

from Evagrius, who is mentioned in the chronicle as one of its sources.³¹ This was the view adopted by Paparrhegopoulo,³² but, as the chronicle names the various regions of Greece invaded by the Avars and Slavs, while Evagrius simply says "all Greece,"³³ both Lampros and Bees refrained from expressing an opinion on this point. Indeed nowhere else among the known sources is there any mention of the exact region of Greece invaded by the Avars and Slavs. Menander speaks of an invasion of Greece during the reign of Tiberius but, like Evagrius, he does not name the exact regions that were invaded.³⁴ Nor does the account of John of Ephesus add very much more.³⁵ It can either be that the author of the chronicle took Evagrius' expression "all Greece" and broke it up on the basis of some local tradition, as Paparrhegopoulo supposes, or that he had before his eyes a source, now lost, which gave an account of the exact regions of Greece invaded by the Avars and the Slavs.³⁶ That the latter was the case will be presently demonstrated.

The statement of the chronicle that the Avars held the Peloponnesus for two hundred eighteen years — that is, from 587 to 805 — is known also from another source, the synodical letter of the patriarch Nicholas (1084–1111) to the emperor Alexius Comnenus.³⁷ As most commentators of the chronicle considered it to be a product of a late period they showed no hesitation in

³¹ *Ibid.*, 61: Οὗτοι (οἱ Ἀβάραι), καθὼς ὁ Εὐάγριος λέγει ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς ἱστορίας . . .

³² Paparrhegopoulo, *op. cit.*, p. 247, note 25.

³³ Evagrius, edited by Bidez and Parmentier, VI, 10: οἱ Ἀβάρεις δις μέχρι τοῦ καλουμένου μακροῦ τείχους ἐλάσαντες, Σιγγηδόνα Ἀγχιάλόν τε καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν καὶ ἑτέρας πόλεις τε καὶ φρούρια ἐξεπολιόρκησαν καὶ ἡνδραποδίσαντο, ἀπολλύντες ἅπαντα καὶ πυρπολοῦντες, τῶν πολλῶν στρατευμάτων κατὰ τὴν Ἐφῶν ἐνδιατριβόντων.

³⁴ C. Müller, *Fragmenta historicorum graecorum*, 4 (Paris, 1851), 252 (frag. 48): ὅτι κεραϊζομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑπὸ Σκλαβηνῶν καὶ ἀπανταχόσε ἀλλεπαλλήλων αὐτῇ ἐπηρηγμένων τῶν κινδύνων, ὁ Τιβέριος . . . πρεσβεύεται ὡς Βαϊανόν.

³⁵ John, Bishop of Ephesus, *The Third Part of the Ecclesiastical History of John, Bishop of of Ephesus*, tr. by R. Payne Smith (Oxford, 1860), p. 432: "That same year, being the third after the death of king Justin, was famous also for the invasion of an accursed people, called Slavonians, who overran the whole of Greece, and the country of the Thessalonians, and all Thrace, and captured the cities, and took numerous forts, and devastated and burnt, and reduced the people to slavery, and made themselves masters of the whole country, and settled in it by main force, and dwelt in it as though it had been their own without fear."

³⁶ John of Biclar who was in Constantinople from 558 to 575 says in his chronicle that the Slavs devastated parts of Greece, but does not mention any of these parts. The chronicle of John was published by Mommsen in *Mon. Germ. Hist., Chronica Minora* (1893), vol. II. Here is his text as cited by Vasiliev, *op. cit.*, p. 410, note 5: "Sclavini in Thracia multas urbes Romanorum pervadunt, quas depopulates vacuas reliquere; Avars Thracias vastant et regiam urbem a muro longo obsident; Avars a finibus Thraciae pelluntur et partes Graeciae atque Pannoniae occupant." These invasions are placed by John during the reigns of Justin and Tiberius.

³⁷ J. Leunclavius, *Juris Graeco-Romani, tam canonici quam civilis, tomi duo . . . ex variis Europae Asiaeque bibliothecis eruti* (Frankfurt, 1596), p. 278 f.: τῶν Ἀβάρων . . . ἐπὶ διακοσίοις δέκα ὀκτὼ χρόνοις ὅλοις κατασχόντων τὴν Πελοπόννησον, καὶ τῆς Ῥωμαϊκῆς ἀρχῆς ἀποτεγομένην, ὡς μηδὲ πόδα βαλεῖν ὅλως δύνασθαι ἐν αὐτῇ Ῥωμαίων ἄνδρα.

accepting the letter of the patriarch as the source of the chronicle. Lampros himself was somewhat puzzled, for if the patriarchal letter served as a source in the composition of the chronicle, then the chronicle was composed either during or after the patriarchate of Nicholas, but he had already expressed the view that the composition of the chronicle must be placed in the period between 806 and 1083. Accordingly he dismissed the question, saying that he thought it superfluous to deal with it, since Paparrhegopoulo had already dealt with it at length.³⁸ But Paparrhegopoulo entertained no doubts at all that what the chronicle says about the length of time that the Avars and the Slavs held the Peloponnesus was taken from the letter of the patriarch.³⁹ Actually, however, as it will be presently seen, the author of the chronicle drew his information from an entirely different source.

The notice concerning the subjugation of the Slavs in the territory of Patras and the recovery of that city by the Byzantines as well as its promotion to the status of a metropolis during the reign of Nicephorus I has been thought to be derived either from the letter of the patriarch or from the *De administrando imperio* of Constantine Porphyrogenitus.⁴⁰ But neither in the patriarchal letter nor in the account of Porphyrogenitus⁴¹ is there question concerning the rebuilding of the city of Patras by Nicephorus and its resettlement with the descendants of those who had emigrated to the territory of Rhegium in Calabria at the time of the invasion of the Avars and Slavs. Besides, between the account of the chronicle and that of Porphyrogenitus there are some other important differences. Porphyrogenitus does not give the name of the Byzantine general who subdued the Slavs; he represents the city of Patras and the surrounding territory as being already in the hands of the Greeks; and he says that in this conflict the Slavs were aided by Africans and Saracens. In view of these important differences, it is absolutely clear that the account of the chronicle is independent of that of Constantine Porphyrogenitus.

It remains now to consider what is perhaps the most important notice of the entire passage — that concerning the invasion of the Peloponnesus by the Avars and the dispersion of the ancient inhabitants of the peninsula, “the noble and Hellenic nations,” as the chronicle puts it. That Slavs settled in the Peloponnesus is, of course, a well-known fact, but it is still disputed whether they settled there in the sixth century, during the reign of Maurice,

³⁸ Lampros, *Tò περί κτίσεως Μονεμβασίας χρονικόν*, p. 117.

³⁹ Paparrhegopoulo, *op. cit.*, p. 247, note 25. Bees, too (*op. cit.*, p. 82), accepts the letter of patriarch Nicholas as the source of the chronicle.

⁴⁰ Bees, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁴¹ Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De administrando imperio* (Bonn, 1840), p. 217 ff. In this account Constantine seems to describe an attack of the Slavs against Patras after that city had been resettled with Greeks. See below, note 53.

or at a later epoch. The question remains open because the reference in the chronicle finds no definite confirmation in the known sources, except the synodical letter of the patriarch Nicholas, but, since that letter, so far as the settlement of the Slavs in the Peloponnesus is concerned, is considered by those who belittle the value of the chronicle to be the source of the chronicle, it carries little weight as a confirmation of the chronicle. The three important sources of the Avar and Slavonic invasions of the last quarter of the sixth century — the works of Evagrius, Menander, and John of Ephesus — say simply that the Avars devastated all Hellas. But "Hellas" has been interpreted by those who do not accept the authority of the chronicle to refer not to Greece proper, but to Illyricum as a whole, that is, the Byzantine possessions in the Balkan peninsula.⁴² As late as 1939, the Greek scholar Amantos wrote, "By Hellas the archaist Menander means the Byzantine regions up to the Danube, including modern Bulgaria." It is thus also that he explained the passage in Evagrius and referred to Theophanes, who, writing about the same incident, uses the term "Illyricum" where Menander and Evagrius have used "Greece," in support of his view.⁴³ Accordingly, the works of Evagrius, Menander, and John of Ephesus cannot be cited as confirming the statement of the chronicle that Avars and Slavs settled in the Peloponnesus in the sixth century, and consequently that statement remains without any confirmation. That there is confirmation, however, will be seen in what follows.

The statement of the chronicle concerning the invasion of the Peloponnesus by the Avars and the Slavs could be said to have the support of Evagrius, Menander, and John of Ephesus if "Hellas," as they use it, is taken, as it should, to refer to Greece proper. But neither Evagrius, nor Menander, nor John of Ephesus nor any other known source that treats of the Avar and Slavonic invasions of the Balkan peninsula during the sixth and seventh centuries makes the slightest allusion to the dispersion of the Peloponnesians and the emigration of some of them to Sicily, Italy, and elsewhere as a result of the Avar invasion. Accordingly this notice in the chronicle has been treated with caution or rejected outright. With the ex-

⁴² Paparrhegopoulo, *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους*, edited by P. Karolides (Athens, 1925), III, 155, 158 f. Hopf (*op. cit.*, p. 91) interpreted the passage of Evagrius as follows: "Nur unkenntniss der Geographie konnte den Syrer Evagrius veranlassen nächst den bekannten Städten Singidon und Anchialos noch, 'von ganz Hellas und andern Städten und Burgen zu reden,' entweder dachte er sich unter Hellas eine Stadt oder Burg, was am wahrscheinlichsten, oder er übertrug den antiken Namen des eigentlichen Griechenlands auch auf die thrakisch-makedonischen Provinzen des Römerreichs."

⁴³ Constantine I. Amantos, *Ἱστορία τοῦ Βυζαντινοῦ Κράτους*, I (Athens, 1939), 281 ff. See also Charanis' review of this book in *Byzantion*, 15: 472. In a more recent study Amantos has sought to reinforce his interpretations of the term Hellas. Amantos, *Οἱ Σλάβοι εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα*, in *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher*, 17 (Athens, 1944), 215, especially note 2.

ception of Fallmerayer, none of the scholars who have treated the question of the Slavonic settlements in Greece have put much reliance upon it.⁴⁴ Nor is it cited by any of the scholars, as far as the present writer has been able to ascertain, who have dealt with the problem of the Hellenization of Sicily and southern Italy during the early Middle Ages.⁴⁵

Contrary to the general impression, however, not only this notice but a number of other elements of the passage that we have translated above is worthy of the greatest trust, for it is confirmed by no less an authority than Arethas of Caesarea. This fact was made known by S. Kougeas in a note published in 1912, in which was included a scholium written by Arethas himself in the margin of the Dresden manuscript which contains the brief chronicle of patriarch Nicephorus (806–815), a manuscript which was written in 932. Following is Arethas' text.⁴⁶

Τῷ τετάρτῳ ἔτει τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ ἡ Πατρῶν τῆς Πελοποννήσου τῆς πατρίδος ἡμῶν μετοικία ἀπὸ τῆς Καλαυρῶν πόλεως τοῦ Ῥηγίου ἀνεκομίσθη εἰς τὸ ἀρχαῖον πόλισμα τῶν Πατρῶν. Ἐφνυαδεύθη γὰρ ἦγον μετῴκηθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Σκλαυηνῶν ἔθνους πολέμῳ ἐφορμησάντων Θεσσαλῶν τῇ πρώτῃ καὶ δευτέρᾳ καὶ προσέτι Αἰνιάσι τε καὶ Λοκροῖς ἀμφοτέροις Ἐπικνημιδίοις τε καὶ Ὀζόλαις καὶ δὴ καὶ τῇ παλαιᾷ Ἠπείρῳ καὶ Ἀττικῇ καὶ τῇ Εὐβοίᾳ καὶ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ ἐκβαλόντων μὲν τὰ ἐγγενῆ ἑλληνικὰ ἔθνη καὶ καταφθειράντων, κατοικισθέντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἀπὸ βασιλείας Μαυρικίου ἔτους εἰς μέχρι τετάρτου ἔτους Νικηφόρου, ἐφ' οὗ τοῦ ἀνατολικοῦ μέρους Πελοποννήσου ἀπὸ Κορίνθου καὶ μέχρι Μαλεάς τοῦ Σκλαυηνοῦ καθαρεύοντος, εἰς ὃ καὶ στρατηγὸς κατεπέμπετο τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ. Ἐκ τούτων τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπὸ τῆς μικρᾶς ὁρμώμενος Ἀρμενίας, φατρίας δὲ τῶν ἐπονομαζομένων Σκληρῶν, συμβαλὼν τῷ Σκλαυηνῶν ἔθνει, πολεμικῶς εἰλὲν τε καὶ ἠφάνισεν εἰς τέλος καὶ τοῖς ἀρχήθεν οἰκήτορσιν ἀποκαταστήναι τὰ οἰκία παρέσχεν. Βασιλεὺς γὰρ ὁ εἰρημένος ἀναμαθὼν τὴν μετοικίαν οὐ διατρίβειν κελεύσει αὐτοῦ τὸν τε λαὸν τῷ ἔξ ἀρχῆς ἐδάφει ἀποκατέστησεν καὶ μητροπόλεως δίκαια ταῖς Πάτραις παρέσχετο, ἀρχιεπισκοπῆς πρὸ τούτου χρηματιζούσης.

Here is a translation:

In the fourth year of his reign [reign of Nicephorus] took place the transfer of Patras of the Peloponnesus, our country, from the Calabrian city of Rhegium to the ancient city of Patras. For it had been driven away or rather forced to migrate by the

⁴⁴ Vasiliev (*op. cit.*, pp. 411, 412) uses it, but without much emphasis.

⁴⁵ See, for instance, Lynn White, "The Byzantinization of Sicily," in *American Historical Review*, 42 (1936), 1 ff. This article in a somewhat compressed form was reprinted in White's *Latin Monasticism in Norman Sicily* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1938), chapter 3. In an article which I devoted to the problem of the Hellenization of Sicily and southern Italy during the early Middle Ages I have made use of the material found in the chronicle of Monemvasia. See Charanis, "On the Question of the Hellenization of Sicily and Southern Italy during the Middle Ages," *The American Historical Review*, 52 (1946), pp. 74–86.

⁴⁶ Kougeas, *op. cit.*, p. 474 f. On the historical accuracy of the scholia of Arethas see further N. A. Bees, Αἱ ἐπιδρομαὶ τῶν Βουλγάρων ὑπὸ τὸν τζάρον Συμεὼν καὶ τὰ σχετικὰ σχόλια τοῦ Ἀρέθα Καισαρείας, in *Ἑλληνικά*, 1 (Athens, 1928), 337–370; Kougeas, Ἐρευναι περὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς λαογραφίας κατὰ τοὺς μέσους χρόνους. Α'. Αἱ ἐν τοῖς σχολίοις τοῦ Ἀρέθα λαογραφικαὶ εἰδήσεις, in *Λαογραφία*, 4 (Athens, 1913/14), 236–269. The most complete work on Arethas is by Kougeas, *Ὁ Καισαρείας Ἀρέθας καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ* (Athens, 1913).

nation of the Slavs when they invaded the First and Second Thessaly and in addition the country of the Aeniantes and that of the Locrians, both the Epiknemidian and Ozolians, and also ancient Epirus, Attica and Euboea and the Peloponnesus, driving away and destroying the noble Hellenic nations. They [the Slavs] dwelt there from the sixth year of the reign of Maurice to the fourth year of that of Nicephorus at whose time the governor for the Peloponnesus was sent to the eastern part of the Peloponnesus, from Corinth to Malea, because that part was free of Slavs. One of these governors, a native of Lesser Armenia, and a member of the family called Skleroi, clashing with the Slavic tribes, conquered them in war and obliterated them completely and enabled the ancient inhabitants to recover their own. For the mentioned emperor, having inquired where the colony was, reestablished the people on the ancient soil and granted to Patras, which was a bishopric before this, the prerogatives of a metropolis.

It takes only a superficial comparison of Arethas' scholium with the passage of the chronicle cited and translated above to see the close relationship between the two. In some instances the one repeats the other verbatim. Arethas focuses his attention on his native city of Patras and consequently his scholium is much compressed, leaving out a number of notices included in the chronicle. This fact is important for it shows that the author of the chronicle did not draw his information from Arethas' scholium. Nor could Arethas draw his information from the chronicle, for when he wrote his scholium the chronicle did not yet exist. These observations lead but to one conclusion: both Arethas and the chronicle drew their information from the same source, now lost — a source which was written sometime between 805, the year during which Patras was rebuilt and raised to the status of a metropolis, and 932, the year during which Arethas wrote his scholium.

If, as seems probable, this source was a chronicle whose author had drawn his information from Menander, Evagrius, Theophylact Simocatta, and some other source which is now lost, the reason why some of the notices of the chronicle of Monemvasia are easily traceable to Evagrius, Menander, and Theophylact Simocatta⁴⁷ would be explained. It seems improbable that the author of the chronicle of Monemvasia referred to these various works separately, drawing this notice from one, and that from another. Most probably he had before his eyes one work, and from that one work he compiled his own notices.

There is some evidence that a historical work covering the period from at least the middle of the sixth century to the second decade of the ninth century existed. In 1936 the Bulgarian scholar Dujčev published a fragment

⁴⁷ Certain notices of the chronicle can be traced to Theophanes (see Lampros *Τὸ περὶ κτίσεως Μονεμβασίας χρονικόν*, pp. 111–113; Bees, *op. cit.*, p. 81) but this may mean simply that Theophanes drew his information from the same source as the chronicle.

which deals with the last expedition of Nicephorus I in Bulgaria. This fragment was immediately studied by Henri Grégoire, who came to the conclusion that it is an extract of a contemporary work whose author was a historian of the first order, the same who wrote the fragment of the *Scriptor Incertus de Leone Armenio*, and that this work was a "continuation" of another "of the type and in the style of a Malalas," which went as far as Leo the Armenian.⁴⁸ It is not impossible that this work was the source of the chronicle of Monemvasia and the scholium of Arethas. It is significant that the only other place, besides the chronicle of Monemvasia and the scholium of Arethas, where a Skleros is mentioned as governor of the Peloponnesus at the beginning of the ninth century is the *Scriptor Incertus de Leone Armenio*.⁴⁹

This lost historical work, whatever its nature, was doubtless also the source from which the author of the chronicle of Monemvasia, the Iberikon version, drew the other important notice for which neither Lampros nor Bees was able to find another source. The notice concerns the reconstruction of the city of Lacedaemon by Nicephorus I and its settlement with a mixed population, brought from other parts of the empire. Here is the text: Τὴν δὲ Λακεδαίμονα πόλιν ἐκ βάθρων καὶ αὐτὴν ἀνεγείρας καὶ ἐνοικίσας ἐν αὐτῇ λαὸν σύμμικτον Καφήρους τε καὶ Θρακησίους καὶ Ἀρμενίους καὶ λοιποὺς ἀπὸ διαφόρων τόπων τε καὶ πόλεων ἐπισυναχθέντας ἐπισκοπὴν καὶ αὖθις ταύτην κατέστησε καὶ ὑποκέισθαι τῇ τῶν Πατρῶν μητροπόλει ἐθέσπισεν. To translate: "And he also built from the foundations the city of Lacedaemon, settled it with a mixed people, Caferoe,⁵⁰ Thracians,⁵¹ Armenians and others whom

⁴⁸ Henri Grégoire, "Un Nouveau Fragment du 'Scriptor Incertus de Leone Armenio,'" in *Byzantion*, 11 (Brussels, 1936), 417 ff. Grégoire shows also (*ibid.*, p. 417) that Theophanes used this source.

⁴⁹ *Scriptor Incertus de Leone Bardae F.*, published together with the chronicle of Leo Grammaticus (Bonn, 1842), p. 336: Λέοντα τὸν ἐπιλεγόμενον τοῦ Σκληροῦ, καὶ ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν στρατηγὸν εἰς Πελοπόννησον.

⁵⁰ Lampros (*Τὸ περὶ κτίσεως Μονεμβασίας χρονικόν*, p. 113, note 1) was not able to identify the Caferoe and raised the question whether they were not the same as the Cabeiroe. The same suggestion is made by Vasiliev (*op. cit.*, p. 657, note 2), but who were the Cabeiroe? Theophanes Continuatus (Bonn, p. 55) mentions the Cabeiroe among the troops of Thomas the Slavonian at the time of his revolt against Michael II, but Genesis (Bonn, p. 33) has Saberoe (Saberoe is the reading of the manuscript, but for some unexplained reason the editor changed it to Cabeiroe) and as Genesis generally represented the better tradition one should read Saberoe in Theophanes Continuatus. Nicephorus Bryennius (Bonn, p. 29) mentions the Cabeiroe as among the troops of Mahmud of Ghazna (eleventh century), but the Cabeiroe of Bryennius are people of the Oxus regions and by no means Christians. According to Theophanes, the people settled in Scлавina by Nicephorus were Christians. William of Tyr (*Hist. Rerum Transmarin.*, Migne, P.L. 201: 221) calls the Oxus "Cobar," a name which may give the clue to the identification of the Cabeiroe, i.e., people of the region of Cobar, the inhabitants of Khwārizin. It is also possible, as suggested by both Lampros and Vasiliev, that the Cabeiroe were remnants of the Cabaroe, mentioned by Constantine Porphyrogenitus (*De administrando imperio*, p. 171 ff). In any case these Cabeiroe have nothing

he brought together from various places and cities, made it again a bishopric and put it under the jurisdiction of the metropolis of Patras.”

No source known says anywhere anything about the reconstruction and the re peopling of Lacedaemon by Nicephorus I, not even the Turin and the Koutloumousion versions of the chronicle of Monemvasia. And Arethas, of course, is silent on this point – a silence which is not hard to understand because Arethas restricted his remarks to his native city of Patras, its emigration during the reign of Maurice and its reconstruction during the reign of Nicephorus I. But the silence of the other sources by no means lessens the trustworthiness of this passage. It doubtless came from the work whence the author of the chronicle drew all his information, and that work is now lost. Besides, there is nothing in this passage which is inconsistent with Byzantine practices. The transplanting of peoples from one region to another for reasons of state was frequently resorted to in Byzantium before and after the reign of Nicephorus I.⁵² Nicephorus himself re peopled Patras with Greeks whom he had brought from Calabria. About this action there can be no doubt, in view of the testimony of both Arethas and the chronicle. If Nicephorus rebuilt Patras there is no reason to doubt the other statement of the chronicle that he also rebuilt Lacedaemon. The rebuilding of both Patras and Lacedaemon were measures doubtless taken by Nicephorus in order to keep the Slavonic tribes that still remained in the Peloponnesus in check. That Nicephorus sought to break the power of the Slavs by transplanting to their midst peoples from other regions of the empire is confirmed by Theophanes, who states that in 810 Nicephorus ordered the settlement of Christians from every province of the empire in the regions known as Sclavinias. Where these Sclavinians were located cannot be definitely determined, but in the light of what the chronicle of Monemvasia

to do with the Caferoe of the *Chronicle of Monemvasia*. Caferoe is doubtless the result of a confusion, and it is not unlikely that the Kibyraeotae are meant. The author of the chronicle may have had before him an abbreviated form of Kibyraeotae (Κιβυρρ. or Κοιβαρρ.) which he did not understand. For Κιβυρρ. as an abbreviation for Κιβυραῖοι see V. Benešević, “Die byzantinischen Ranglisten,” in *Byzantinisch-neugriechische Jahrbücher*, 5 (Athens, 1926/1927), 120. On the Cabeiroe see further G. Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica. II. Sprachreste der Türkvölker in den Byzantinischen Quellen* (Budapest, 1943), p. 132.

⁵¹ The Thracians were so called because they dwelled in the Thracian theme. Consequently it is impossible to determine the racial origin of those who were transferred to Lacedaemon. But the Thracian theme was deeply Hellenized, indeed almost Greek, and the people involved in the transfer, if not Greeks, were certainly Hellenized. There may also be a confusion in the case of the Armenians in that Armeniacs, i.e., people of the Armeniac theme, may be meant. In that case they may have been Greeks, for the Armeniac theme contained an important Greek element. But even if they were Armenians, they doubtless belonged to the Hellenized element of that very important people.

⁵² For examples of such transfers of population see Charanis' review of Amantos' *Ἱστορία τοῦ Βυζαντινοῦ Κράτους*, in *Byzantion*, 15: 471 f.

says it may very well be that one of them was in western and central Peloponnesus.⁵³

It would be interesting to know how and when the original source used by the chronicle and Arethas disappeared. It was known in 932, the year during which Arethas wrote his scholium, and, if the opinion put forward in this study about the date of the composition of the Iberikon version of the chronicle of Monemvasia is correct, it was known also at the end of the tenth century or the beginning of the eleventh. It is not impossible that it served also as a source for the synodical letter of the patriarch Nicholas to Alexius I. The statement of the patriarch that the Avars held the Peloponnesus for two hundred and eighteen years until they were defeated at the time of Nicephorus I appears also in the chronicle, and this number of years could be computed also from Arethas' scholium. Therefore, this number must have been in the original source whence the patriarch also took it. But, as the synodical letter of the patriarch was written later than either Arethas' scholium or the chronicle, it is not impossible that the patriarch drew his information from either the one or the other. Still he must have used another source too, for his story, related also by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, of how St. Andrew routed the Slavs, appears neither in the chronicle nor in Arethas' scholium. It is quite possible, of course, that all this was in the introduction of the chrysobull which Nicephorus I granted to the metropolitan of Patras when he raised the see of Patras to the status of a metropolis,

⁵³ Theophanes, *Chronographia*, edited by C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1883), 1: 486: Τούτῳ τῷ ἔτει, (A.M., 6302, Alexandrian era), Νικηφόρος . . . Χριστιανοὺς ἀποικίσας ἐκ παντὸς θέματος ἐπὶ τὰς Σκλαυινίας γενέσθαι προσέταξεν. Vasiliev (*op. cit.*, 422) interprets Sclavinia here to refer to Greece, but more especially to the Peloponnesus; and Hopf concedes (*op. cit.*, 98–99) that Peloponnesus may have been included among the regions in which the new settlements were established. According to Arethas' scholium, Patras was rebuilt and settled with Greeks in 805, a date also confirmed by the chronicle of Monemvasia, for it says that Patras was rebuilt when Tarasius was still patriarch. Tarasius died in 806. No date is given about the rebuilding of Lacedaemon, but if the Sclavinia of Theophanes is taken to refer to Greece, the rebuilding of Lacedaemon must have taken place in 810. Hopf suggests that the siege of Patras by the Slavs as described by Porphyrogenitus (*De administrando imperio*, 217 ff.) may have been caused by an attempt to establish Greek colonies in their midst and refers to the quoted passage from Theophanes in support of his suggestion. Hopf also places the siege of Patras by the Slavs in 807 or not long after. This would mean that the Slavs, following their first defeat and the resettlement of Patras by Greeks, made an effort to regain the city and called the Arabs to their aid, as is related by Constantine Porphyrogenitus. A siege of Patras by the Slavs after that city had been resettled by Greeks would explain the statement of Porphyrogenitus that at the time of this siege Patras was inhabited by Greeks. Moreover, the attack of the Slavs against the newly built city of Patras must have convinced Nicephorus that the Hellenic element in the Peloponnesus needed reinforcement, hence his order to settle there Christians brought from the other parts of the empire.

and the patriarch Nicholas, who was acquainted with that chrysobull, may have drawn his information from it.⁵⁴

Not until the first half of the fifteenth century is there another trace which seems to indicate that the source, or at least a corrupted form of it, used by Arethas for his scholium and by the author of the Iberikon version of the chronicle of Monemvasia, still existed. This was a petition addressed to patriarch Joseph II in 1429 by the metropolitan of Monemvasia, Cyril, and written by no other than Isidore of Kiev, who, after the council of Florence, remained faithful to the union and became a cardinal.⁵⁵ The petition was occasioned by a dispute between the metropolitan of Monemvasia and the metropolitan of Corinth concerning the jurisdiction over certain episcopal sees in the Peloponnesus, namely Maine and Zemena.⁵⁶ The question was raised concerning the circumstance under which these bishoprics had come under the jurisdiction of Monemvasia and whether these circumstances still justified their retention by Monemvasia or whether they should not be returned to Corinth, to which they originally belonged. In writing this petition Isidore made full use of official and unofficial documents, in-

⁵⁴ According to Constantine Porphyrogenitus (*De administrando imperio*, p. 219) Nicephorus granted to the church of St. Andrew of Patras the defeated Slavs together with their families and property, apparently in the capacity of serfs, and confirmed the grant by a *sigillum*. It is not unlikely that in the introduction of the document there was a brief summary of the history of Patras and its relation to the Slavs down to the resettlement of the city by Greeks. In the later period, brief historical summaries were often included in imperial chrysobulls granted to cities. See for instance the chrysobull that Andronius II granted to the metropolis of Monemvasia in 1301. This chrysobull has been recently reëdited by St. Binon, "L'Histoire et la légende de deux chrysobulles d'Andronic II en faveur de Monembasie," *Echos d'Orient*, 37 (Paris, 1938), 310 ff. The one published by Miklosich and Müller (*Acta et diplomata graeca*, 5: 161) is not genuine.

⁵⁵ This document was published by Lampros in 1915 without indicating the author, (Δύο ἀναφοραί μητροπολίτου Μονεμβασίας πρὸς τὸν πατριάρχην, in *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων*, 12: 272–318). Lampros recognized the value of the document and promised an exhaustive commentary, but never carried out his promise. G. Mercati identified the author of this document as Isidore of Kiev and showed that it was composed in 1429: G. Mercati, *Scritti d'Isidoro il Cardinale Ruteno et codici a lui appartenuti che si conservano nella biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana* (*Studi e Testi*, 46; Rome, 1926), p. 8. Since then the value of this document has been generally recognized. See V. Laurent, "La Liste épiscopale du synodicon de Monembasie," *Echos d'Orient*, vol. 33 (Paris, 1933), p. 152, note 1. Binot (*op. cit.*, 287) writes concerning the document: "La seconde, de 1429, mériterait un commentaire approfondi. S'il est vrai que la prudence doit présider à l'interprétation de cette lettre, qui est un plaidoyer plus qu'une page d'histoire, elle constitue un document historique de première qualité. Son auteur, disert et habile, a puisé aux meilleures sources: il cite pêle-mêle et sans ordre apparent, chrysobulles, prostagmata et sigillia patriarchaux; . . . il recourt à d'anciens manuscrits, à des histoires et même à des lettres de Guillaume de Villehardouin. La valeur démonstrative de la requête est indéniable." The editors of *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* (24: 269) announced the publication of this text with the following remark: "Ediert aus Cod. Vatic. Palat. 226 die für die Geschichte des Peloponnes Zeitalter der Palaiologen wichtigen Texte." As for the metropolitan of Monemvasia for whom this document was written, see Laurent, *op. cit.*, p. 151 f.

⁵⁶ Concerning this dispute between Corinth and Monemvasia see Binot, *op. cit.*, p. 286 f.

cluding histories and letters. He was particularly anxious to prove that the capture of Corinth first by the Avars during the reign of Maurice and then by the Latins as a result of the fourth crusade had no relation to the elevation of Monemvasia to the status of a metropolis. Here is his text concerning the capture of Corinth by the Avars and the foundation of Monemvasia:

Διοῖν τοίνυν θεωρουμένων ἀλώσεων τῆς Κορίνθου μετὰ τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπικράτειαν τῆς Πελοποννήσου, μᾶς μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ἡμερῶν Ἰουστινιανοῦ τοῦ μεγάλου, ὅς δι' αὐτὸ καὶ τὸν ἐκείσε ἰσθμὸν ὕστερον ἐτείχισε· κατ' αὐτὸν γὰρ τριῶν σκυθικῶν γενῶν τὸν Ἰστρον διαπερασάντων, Κοττιγάρους, Οὐττιγάρους καὶ Οὐνιγάρους τούτους ὠνόμαζον, τὸ μὲν ἐν τούτων γένος Μυσίαν τὴν ἄνω καὶ Παννονίαν καὶ Δαλματίαν καὶ τὰ μέχρις ἐς Ἴονιον κόλπον ἐκ μᾶς ἐφόδου κατέδραμεν, Οὐττιγάρου δὲ Θράκην πᾶσαν καὶ τὴν ἐν Ἑλλήσποντῳ Χερρόνησον καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς Ἑβρου πάντα μέχρι τῶν τῆς Κωνσταντίνου προαστείων, οὓς δὴ καὶ ἀνεχάτισε Βελισάριος, καταστρατηγησάμενος καὶ συντρίψας αὐτοὺς, Οὐνιγάρου δὲ Μακεδονίαν καὶ Θετταλίαν καὶ Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς Θερμοπυλῶν ληιάμενοι πάντα καὶ μέχρι Κορίνθου φθάσαντες, εἶλον παραχρήμα τὴν πόλιν καὶ αὐτοβοεῖ. Σπαρτιατῶν δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅσον συρφετῶδες καὶ ἀγελαῖον τὴν ἐκείνοις κοινὴν ἀκούσαντες ἄλωσιν, τοῖς ἐμπεριελημμένοις τῇ Λακεδαίμονι καὶ ἐπανεστηκόσιν αὐτάρκως προσφυγόντες ὄρεσι, τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον τὸ Παρθένιον ὄρος, ταῖς ἐκείνου χαράδραις καὶ τοῖς σπηλαίοις καὶ τοῖς βαράθροισι ἐγκαταδεδυκότες, αὐτοὺς ὑπεξείρυσαν ἐκείνου δὴ τοῦ βαρβαρικοῦ ρεύματος, καὶ, σώζοντες ἔτι τὸ παλαιὸν ἐκεῖνο τῶν Λακῶνων ὄνομα, Τζάκωνας ἀντὶ Λακῶνων ἑαυτοὺς ὑποβαρβαρίζοντες λέγουσιν. Οἱ δ' αὖ ἐτύγχανον ἐμπορικὸν ἄγοντες ἐπιτήδευμα, φθάσαντες παρὰ τὸ Γύθειον ἐπίνειον δὲ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν ἐκεῖνο· γυναιξὶν ἅμα καὶ τέκνοις, πληρώσαντες τὰς σφῶν αὐτῶν ναῦς, παρὰ Σικελίαν ἔθειον· προσοκείλαντες δὲ εἰς Μεσσήνην, ἔκησαν ἐκείσε, καὶ Δεμενίτας αὐτοὺς ὁ μακρὸς εἶπε χρόνος, βαρβαρίσαντας καὶ αὐτοὺς τοῦνομα· οἱ δὲ εὐγενέστεροι τούτων καὶ τῆς λαμπρᾶς τύχης καὶ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων, μαθόντες τὰ τῶν Κορινθίων ἐκεῖνα δὴ τὰ παγχάλεπα καὶ αὐτοὶ δέισαντες μὴ τὰ ὅμοια καπὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς γένηται, πρὸς Μονεμβασίαν ὡς εἶχον ἐχόρουν εὐθὺς ὄλῳ ποδὶ, νησίον ἐπικείμενον τῇ Λακωνικῇ, νησίον ὑψηλὸν καὶ ἐπίμηκες καὶ ἀπότομον εἰδότες πάντη καὶ τῆς θαλάττης ἱκανῶς ὑπερκείμενον καὶ φιλονεικοῦν ὡς πρὸς τὸν αἰθέρα προσαμύλλασθαι καὶ παραψαύειν αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον δοκεῖν καὶ πανταχόθεν περιελημμένον κρημνοῖς ὀρθίοις καὶ ἀβάτοις καὶ πᾶσι σχεδὸν τοῖς ὑπ' οὐρανὸν ἄβατόν τε καὶ ἀνεπιχείρητον, τῶν προκατειληφτότων καὶ μόνων ἄνευ τυγχάνον, τὸ μέχρι τότε μηδεμίαν ἐσχηκὸς οἴκησιν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦ τῆς Μονεμβασίας μεταλαχόν ὀνόματος. Ποῦ τοίνυν ἐνεχώρει, φυγάδας καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ἅμα φυγάσι καὶ Κορινθίοις προξένους γίγνεσθαι καὶ τούτων ὑποδοχεῖς ἢ τὸν ἐπίσκοπον σφῶν ἐκείνους ἐγκατοικίζειν αὐτῇ τὸν πλάνητας;

Following is a translation:

Of the two known captures of Corinth after the Roman domination of the Peloponnesus, one took place during the reign of Justinian the Great, who, on account of it, afterwards fortified the isthmus there. For in his time three Scythian tribes, called Cotrigurs, Utigurs, and Unigurs, crossed the Danube. One of these tribes overran by one attack upper Mysia, Pannonia, and Dalmatia as far as the Ionian sea, while the Utigurs invaded all of Thrace and the Chersonese on the Hellespont and all the territory within the Hebrus as far as the suburbs of Constantinople. However, Belisarius, deceiving them by a stratagem, checked and cut them to pieces. But the Unigurs, ravaging Macedonia and Thessaly and Greece and the territory beyond Thermopylae, arrived as far as Corinth and straightway and with one blow captured the city. When the lower and common element among the Spartans heard of this conquest, a conquest which

was common [i.e., important] to them, they fled in sufficient numbers into the high mountains which envelop Lacedaemon, especially mount Parthenion, and crept into its gullies, caves, and hollows and thus drew themselves away from the barbarous flood. And they still preserve that ancient name of Lacones, but speaking barbarously they call themselves Tzacones instead of Lacones. Those on the other hand who were engaged in commerce went to Gytheion — that was the seaport of the Spartans — with their wives and children and, boarding their ships, speeded towards Sicily, and disembarking in Messene, settled in the neighborhood and in the course of time they too barbarized their name and came to be called Demenitae. But the nobler, the brilliantly fortunate, and the more prosperous among the Spartans, having learned of the great difficulties of the Corinthians and fearing lest the same thing might happen to them, straightway, as they were, proceeded with all haste to Monemvasia, a small peninsula located in Laconia. For they saw that this peninsula was high and long and cut off from every side and situated well above the sea, rivaling the sky in height and seeming to touch it. It was surrounded by steep and impassable cliffs which made it inaccessible to, and unassailable by, any being under the sun with the exception of those only who happened to occupy it first. It was neither inhabited until then, nor did it have the name of Monemvasia. How was it possible then for the Lacedaemonians who were themselves refugees at the same time as the Corinthians to be the succorers and receivers of the latter or for their bishop to settle them in it [the Peloponnesus], a wanderer, as it were, settling wanderers?

A comparison of the text of Isidore with that of the Iberikon version of the chronicle of Monemvasia reveals certain important differences between the two. There are a number of elements which are in the chronicle, as for instance the emigration of the people of Patras to Calabria, the settlement of the Corinthians in the island of Aegina, the emigration of the Argives to Orobe, and others which do not appear in the text of Isidore. On the other hand, while the story of the emigration of the Laconians is substantially the same as that of the chronicle, the text of Isidore has a number of new elements. The Spartans who went to Sicily were principally merchants; they disembarked at Messene. Parthenion is named as one of the mountains into which the peasants among the Spartans fled.⁵⁷ But where the two texts differ most radically is in the date of, and the circumstance under which, the events which they both relate took place. And this raises the question whether Isidore did not use a different and a less accurate source than the one used by Arethas and the author of the chronicle.

Isidore puts the invasion of Greece and the consequent dispersion of

⁵⁷ One is tempted to wonder whether Gytheion, mentioned by Isidore as the port whence the Spartans left for Sicily, was actually in his source or whether he did not add it himself in order to display his learning. His wording, ἐπίνειον δὲ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν ἐκεῖνο (Γύθειον), differs very little from the wording of Strabo, (8.3,12) in speaking of the same port: Γυθίου, τοῦ τῆς Σπάρτης ἐπινείου. Isidore is known to have possessed a codex of Strabo. See Remigio Sabbadini, "La traduzione guariniana di Strabone," in *Il libro e la Stampa*, n.s., 3 (1909), 14. I owe this information to my friend Milton Anastos.

the Peloponnesians in the reign of Justinian. The invasion which he describes has certain elements in common with that undertaken by the Cotrigur chief Zabergan in 558 as related by Agathias.⁵⁸ But between Agathias' account and that of Isidore there are a number of very important differences. According to Agathias, Zabergan divided his forces into two groups; one of these groups he sent against Greece; the other he directed against the Thracian Chersonese. The latter group, however, was in turn also divided, with one section charged with the capture of the Chersonese, while the other was led against Constantinople by Zabergan himself. The three groups were separately defeated, that under Zabergan by Belisarius, who used a clever stratagem, that at the Chersonese by Germanus, and that which had been sent against Greece by the garrison at Thermopylae. The statements of Isidore that one of the three groups into which the Cotrigurs were divided overran Mysia, Pannonia, and Dalmatia as far as the Ionian sea, and that as a consequence of this invasion Justinian fortified the Isthmus of Corinth finds no confirmation in Agathias. And as for Greece the two texts are contradictory. Agathias definitely states that the Cotrigurs were stopped at Thermopylae and were not able to penetrate into Greece,⁵⁹ but, according to Isidore's account, they swarmed over Greece and captured the city of Corinth. Obviously Agathias was not directly Isidore's source, for the invasion which the latter describes is made up of elements drawn not only from different sources, but belonging to different invasions.

Certainly there are elements in the account of Isidore which seem to refer to the great invasion of 539 as related by Procopius.⁶⁰ Procopius calls the barbarians who were responsible for that invasion Huns; other Byzantine writers refer to them as Bulgars.⁶¹ Breaking into the Balkan peninsula, they plundered Illyricum from the Ionian sea to the suburbs of Constantinople; stormed the Thracian Chersonese; and, invading Greece, bypassed Thermopylae, overran the country, and "destroyed," says Procopius, "almost all the Greeks except the Peloponnesians." The three regions where, according to Procopius, the barbarians operated in this invasion were Illyricum to the Ionian sea; Thrace, including the Chersonese; and Greece. These are precisely the regions which, according to Isidore, were devastated by the

⁵⁸ Agathias, *History* (Bonn, 1828), p. 301 ff.; J. B. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire* (London, 1923), 2: 304 ff.

⁵⁹ Agathias, *op. cit.*, p. 330. οἱ δὲ ἀνὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πρότερον ἐσταλμένοι, οὐδέν τι ἀξιαφήγητον ἔδρασαν, μήτε τῷ Ἰσθμῷ προσβαλόντες, μηδέ γε τὴν ἀρχὴν τὰς Θερμοπύλας παραμειψάμενοι διὰ τὴν φρουρὰν τῶν ἐκείσε ἰδρύσθαι τεταγμένων Ῥωμαίων.

⁶⁰ Procopius, *De bello persico*, II.4; cf. *De bello gothico* III.14; III.40 where invasions of the Slavs are recorded.

⁶¹ Theophanes, *op. cit.*, p. 217. Malalas (p. 437), like Procopius, calls them Huns. Vasiliev (*op. cit.*, p. 408) calls them Bulgars.

Cotrigurs, Utigurs, and Unigurs. However, Procopius does not say in this passage that the barbarians took Corinth or that Justinian fortified the isthmus as a result of this invasion. And neither Agathias nor Procopius mentions the Unigurs in connection with the invasions which both of them describe. There seems to be little doubt that Isidore confused three different invasions, that of the Bulgars of 539, that of the Cotrigurs of 558, and that of the Avars during the reign of Maurice.

How is Isidore's confusion to be explained? It is quite possible that Isidore, for some motive, wanted to place the foundation of Monemvasia in the reign of Justinian, hence the invasion as a result of which Monemvasia was founded had to be in the reign of Justinian. It must be remembered that the text in which this account of Isidore occurs was a petition addressed to the patriarch in defense of the rights of the see of Monemvasia, a petition in which every effort was made to glorify Monemvasia. The text is based on good sources and is on the whole accurate, but it is not entirely free from errors. Besides the confusion of the invasions there is another serious error: it is the attribution of the liberation of Monemvasia from the Franks and its promotion to the status of a metropolis to Andronicus II.⁶² It is hard to believe that Isidore, who in the whole text displays exceptional knowledge of documents, histories, and letters that relate to Monemvasia, did not know that the liberator of Monemvasia was not Andronicus II, but Michael VIII. It seems rather that he willfully committed the error because he wanted to dissociate the promotion of Monemvasia to the rank of a metropolis from Michael VIII, who from the point of view of the church was not quite acceptable, and to associate it with Andronicus II, whose piety and subservience to the church were well known. Similarly, the motive for placing the invasion as a result of which Monemvasia was founded in the reign of Justinian was that Isidore wanted to associate the foundation of Monemvasia with the reign of Justinian the Great.

This explanation would account for the error in the date of the foundation of Monemvasia but not for the confusion of the different invasions of the sixth century. Did Isidore read Procopius, Agathias, and a history of the Avar invasion and then drew a composite account of the invasion as a result of which Monemvasia was founded? Not likely. More likely he drew his information from one source, a source where the confusion of the invasions and the wrong date of the foundation of Monemvasia already existed. That he used a source other than Agathias and Procopius is shown by his state-

⁶² Lampros, *Δύο ἀναφοραὶ μητροπολίτου Μονεμβασίας πρὸς τὸν πατριάρχην* (p. 290): 'Ἀλλὰ λοιπὸν ἦν τῷ τῆς λατινικῆς ἀπαλλάξαντι τὴν Μονεμβασίαν δουλείας ἐς μητρόπολιν τετιμῆσθαι. Καὶ τὶς οὗτος ἦν; 'Ὁ πάντ' εὐσεβὲς καὶ στερρὸς τῶν δογμάτων τῆς ἐκκλησίας [ὑπέρμαχος], ὁ δεῦτερος τῶν Παλαιολόγων, ὁ κύρ Ἀνδρόνικος.

ment that Justinian fortified the isthmus of Corinth as the result of the capture of Corinth, and by his attribution of the invasion of Greece to the Unigurs. That the isthmus of Corinth was fortified by Justinian is known from another work of Procopius,⁶³ but there is nothing in that account that would explain Isidore's statement that the isthmus was fortified after the capture of Corinth by the barbarians. Indeed nowhere does Procopius say that Corinth was taken by the barbarians. Nor does Agathias or Procopius attribute the invasion of Greece to the Unigurs.⁶⁴ Agathias has Cotrigurs, and Procopius has Huns. It seems quite probable, therefore, that Isidore used a source which had already deviated from the true tradition in so far as the chronology and the order of the events were concerned but which contained elements of whose historical accuracy there can be no doubt. To these elements belongs Isidore's account of the dispersion of the Peloponnesians, an account which must have been originally drawn from the same source that Arethas and the author of the chronicle used. Isidore's account, therefore, goes back indirectly to the source of Arethas and the author of the chronicle, but whether that source still existed at the time Isidore wrote cannot be determined. Isidore's account does prove, however, that the tradition of the dispersion of the Peloponnesians and the emigration of some to Italy as a result of the invasions of the barbarians in the sixth century was known in the fifteenth century and was accepted as a fact by the educated.

Before the publication of Arethas' scholium and Isidore's text, the chronicle of Monemvasia was the only source known which said definitely that Slavs settled in the Peloponnesus in the sixth century; that, in settling there, they exterminated many of the ancient inhabitants; and that many among the latter fled and settled elsewhere. This fact may have justified to some extent the skepticism with which this chronicle was regarded by most scholars. But with the publication of Arethas' scholium and Isidore's text this skepticism has no longer any foundation, for virtually every

⁶³ Procopius, *De aedificiis*, IV.2. It is likely that Justinian fortified the Isthmus not long after the invasion of 539, but Procopius does not say so. See J. B. Bury, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 308, note 4. On these fortifications see H. Megaw, "On the Date of the Fortifications of Corinth," *The Annual of the British School of Athens*, 32 (1931/32), 69-79. Megaw gives no exact date.

⁶⁴ The Unigurs (ὀνίγαροι, ὀνιγοῦροι, ὀννονγοῦροι, ὀνογοῦροι) were known to the Byzantines in the fifth and sixth centuries, but no known source speaks of an invasion of the empire by them in the sixth century. It is not unlikely, however, that elements of this people joined the Cotrigurs in their great invasion of 558. Menander (*op. cit.*, p. 202) calls the followers of Zabergan "Huns." More probably they are the Huns of Procopius who invaded the empire in 539, called also Bulgarians by other sources. In a text of the early eighth century we read ἔθνους τῶν Οὐννογοῦρων βουλγάρων. In other words, there were certain Bulgars who were also called ὀννονγοῦροι. Julius Moravcsik, "Zur Geschichte der Onoguren," in *Ungarische Jahrbücher*, 10 (Berlin and Leipzig, 1930), 67. Moravcsik considers this people as the ancestors of the later Hungarians. See also Moravcsik, "Les Sources byzantines de l'histoire hongroise," *Byzantion*, 9 (Brussels, 1934), 666-673. Also Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica*, II: 189.

notice contained in the chronicle is confirmed by another source. Lampros, writing in 1884, said that "the basis of the chronicle . . . is historical and old," but at some later date, perhaps at the time the Turin and Koutloumoussion versions were written, there were introduced into the original version "mythical accounts about the emigration and return of the Peloponnesians."⁶⁵ Years later virtually the same view was expressed by Bees.⁶⁶ That was because neither Lampros nor Bees was able to find another source that confirmed the chronicle. The discovery of Arethas' scholium rendered the opinion of both Lampros and Bees obsolete. Kougeas, in publishing Arethas' scholium, remarked that the scholium of Arethas refutes the view of Lampros "according to which what is said in the chronicle about the emigration and dispersion of the Peloponnesians at the time of Maurice and their return at the time of Nicephorus was considered to be tales and made up additions" of later writers.⁶⁷ With the objections of Lampros disposed of there remains virtually nothing in the chronicle that cannot be confirmed by other sources, and it can now be affirmed in unmistakable and unambiguous terms that the chronicle of Monemvasia is absolutely trustworthy and constitutes one of the most precious sources on the Avar and Slav penetration of Greece during the reign of Maurice.

From this observation there follow certain inescapable conclusions. It can no longer be doubted that Slavs settled in the Peloponnesus during the reign of Maurice; that, in settling, they exterminated part of the ancient population and forced others to disperse and emigrate. It is no longer possible either to interpret the term "Greece" as used by Evagrius and Menander to mean anything else than Greece proper, or to discuss the question of the hellenization of Sicily and southern Italy in the seventh century without some reference to the Greek settlements which the Peloponnesians who fled before the Avars and Slavs established there. But it by no means follows that the Greek element completely disappeared from the Peloponnesus and that the modern Greeks are Christians of Slavonic descent in whose veins flows "not a single drop of real pure Hellenic blood."⁶⁸ For the source, on whose authority it must be said that Slavs settled in the Peloponnesus in the

⁶⁵ Lampros, *Tò περί κτίσεως Μονεμβασίας χρονικόν*, p. 128. Hopf (*op. cit.*, 85: 107-108) had already called the account of the chronicle concerning the emigration of the Peloponnesians a myth, a confusion with the Greek colonizations of Sicily and Italy in ancient times or possibly with the Albanian migration of the fourteenth century. Hopf thought that the chronicle had been written in the sixteenth century.

⁶⁶ Bees, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

⁶⁷ Kougeas, *op. cit.*, p. 476.

⁶⁸ Fallmerayer, *Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea während des Mittelalters* (Stuttgart, 1830), I, iii-xiv, as quoted by A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire*, I (Madison, Wisconsin, 1928), 213-214.

sixth century, says also that they did not penetrate the eastern part of it, which was settled and remained settled by Greeks. But this is not all. When under Irene, but more especially under Nicephorus, the authority of the imperial government was reestablished in the Peloponnesus as a whole, the Hellenic element which had remained there was powerfully reinforced and the Slavonic influence began gradually to decline. The most important step in the realization of this end was the resettlement of certain parts of the Peloponnesus, such as Patras and Lacedaemon, with new elements brought from other parts of the empire — elements some of which were pure Greek, like those who were brought from Calabria, others less pure, but doubtless hellenized. Constantinople saved the Greek race in Greece itself, and among the emperors who contributed most in the accomplishment of this end Nicephorus I must henceforth be given first place.

POST SCRIPTUM

When this work was composed I did not have access to a number of publications which had appeared in Europe during the war or immediately after. Additional publications have appeared since.

Among these publications the work by Max Vasmer is no doubt the most significant.¹ A book of 350 pages, it is devoted primarily to the examination of the etymology of toponyms in Greece in an effort to determine the distribution and extent of the Slavonic settlements. There is one chapter dealing with the literary sources, but no mention is made of the chronicle of Monemvasia or of the scholium of Arethas; the latter, of course, gives the former its significance. Very interesting, however, is the distribution of the toponyms in the Peloponnesus which Vasmer considers as Slavic. This distribution is as follows: ² Corinth 24, Argolis 18, Achaia 95, Elis 35, Triphylia 44, Arcadia 94, Missenia 43, Laconia 81. These figures confirm what the chronicle of Monemvasia says, that the eastern part of the Peloponnesus was least affected by the Slavonic penetration. Vasmer accepts the view that Slavs settled in the Peloponnesus as early as the sixth century.³

Shortly after the publication of Vasmer's work two studies dealing with the same general subject appeared in Greece. The one was by C. Amantos; ⁴ the other by Dion. Zakythinos.⁵ The work of Amantos is actually a review of Vasmer's book, where the reviewer makes some contributions of his own.

¹ Max Vasmer, *Die Slaven in Griechenland* (Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Jahrgang 1941. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Nr. 12) (Berlin, 1941).

² *Ibid.*, 317.

³ *Ibid.*, 14 f.

⁴ C. Amantos, *Οἱ Σλάβοι εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα*, in *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher*, 17 (1944), 210–221.

⁵ Dion. Zakythinos, *Οἱ Σλάβοι ἐν Ἑλλάδι* (Athens, 1945).

These contributions are almost wholly philological in character and do not affect our study here. It may be noted, however, that Amantos still holds to the theory that when Evagrius and Menander speak of the devastations of Greece by the Avars and Slavs toward the end of the sixth century, by Greece they mean not Greece proper, but the possessions of the empire in the Balkan peninsula. Accordingly, as against Vasmer, he denies that Slavs settled in Greece toward the end of the sixth century.

Of the work of Zakythinos I have written at length elsewhere.⁶ It is a good book, based upon the sources and the most scholarly of modern works. To both the chronicle of Monemvasia and the scholium of Arethas Zakythinos devotes considerable discussion and comes to the conclusion that they were drawn from the same source, a source, however, whose "original core must be sought, far from the written tradition, in the oral richness of the Peloponnesian people," and consequently "the information according to which the Peloponnesus was subjected definitely by the Slavs in the year 588, lacks any significance." In the long review which I devoted to this book I tried to show why these conclusions are not acceptable. Zakythinos himself seems to have changed his views in another study which he has published more recently. He writes: "Nevertheless, if we have some difficulty in admitting that the chronicle of Monemvasia 'constitutes one of the most precious sources of the history of the Byzantine empire,' we are, on the other hand, disposed to acknowledge a historical value in certain of its parts. Despite its legendary presentation, the information concerning the emigration *en masse* and the internal movement of the population, constitute a solid historical core."⁷

The chronicle of Monemvasia was the subject of a dissertation submitted for the doctorate to the Faculty of Philology of the University of Athens and published in 1947.⁸ This book consists of two parts. The one is a study of the chronicle of Monemvasia, its various versions, its sources, nature, date of its composition, and its meaning. The other, and by far the longer, deals with the problem of the etymology of the term Tsacones. For a detailed and critical account of this book I refer the reader to the long review which I devoted to it.⁹

The question of the Slavonic settlements in the Peloponnesus was also treated by the well-known Greek scholar, S. P. Kyriakides.¹⁰ The study of

⁶ See the post scriptum to my article, "Nicephorus I, the Savior of Greece from the Slavs (810 A.D.)," *Byzantina-Metabyzantina*, 1 (1946), 86-92. See also *Byzantinoslavica*, 10 (1949), 94-96.

⁷ Dion. Zakythinos, "La population de la morée byzantin," *L'Hellénisme Contemporain*, 2^{ème} série, 3^{ème} Année (Athens, 1949), 23 f.

⁸ Sp. A. Pagoulatos, *Οἱ Τσακωνες καὶ τὸ περὶ κτίσεως τῆς Μονεμβασίας χρονικόν* (Athens, 1947).

⁹ *Byzantinoslavica*, 10 (1949), 92-94.

¹⁰ S. P. Kyriakides, *Βυζαντινὰ Μελέται. Οἱ Σλάβοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ* (Salonica, 1947).

Kyriakides is, to a considerable extent, a study of the sources. On two of these sources the author lays particular stress: (1) the passage in the *De Administrando* of Constantine Porphyrogenitus concerning the revolt of the Slavs and their attack upon Patras during the reign of Nicephorus I; and (2) the famous synodical letter of the patriarch Nicholas (1084–1111) to the emperor Alexius Comnenus. On the basis of these two sources he builds an extremely ingenious hypothesis by means of which he seeks to invalidate as historical sources both the chronicle of Monemvasia and the scholium of Arethas. To this book of Kyriakides I have devoted a special study. I show there that the arguments he uses to bolster his conclusions have no validity.¹¹

Four other works on the subject of the Slavonic settlements in Greece need to be mentioned: A book by Alexander N. Diomedes, the well-known Greek financier and politician who in recent years has shown considerable interest in the history of Byzantium and has made some important contributions; this book, which came out in 1946, is a useful summary of the question as that question is treated in Greece.¹² A study by D. Georgakas in which the author takes issue with Vasmer on the etymology of certain toponyms.¹³ The essay on the history of the Peloponnesus which Georg Stadtmüller contributed to a general work dealing with that peninsula which was published in Athens during the war, for the German soldiers.¹⁴ Stadtmüller accepts the view that Slavonic settlements were established in the Peloponnesus during the reign of Maurice and that the power of the Slavs there was not broken until the beginning of the ninth century. And finally the capital work on Philippi and eastern Macedonia published by Paul Lemerle. Lemerle's discussion of the question of Slavonic settlements in Greece is relegated to a long footnote and his treatment is not systematic. He contents himself with posing the problem, citing some of the sources and discussing the position of modern Greek scholars.¹⁵ That Slavs established themselves in the Peloponnesus he does not doubt, but expresses no definite view as to the date of their coming. He mentions neither the chronicle of Monemvasia nor the scholium of Arethas.

¹¹ *Byzantinoslavica*, X (1949), 254–259.

¹² A. N. Diomedes, *Βυζαντινὰ Μελέται*. Β'. Αἱ Σλαβικαὶ ἐπιδρομαὶ εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ τοῦ Βυζαντίου (Athens, 1946).

¹³ D. Georgakas, "Beiträge zur Deutung als Slavisch Erklärter Ortsnamen," *Byzant. Zeitschrift*, 41 (1942), 351–381.

¹⁴ *Der Peloponnes. Landschaft. Geschichte. Kunststätten*. Von Soldaten für Soldaten. Herausgegeben von einem Generalkommando (Athens, 1944), 42–159.

¹⁵ Paul Lemerle, *Philippe et la Macédoine orientale à l'époque chrétienne et byzantine* (Paris, 1945), p. 116, n. 3.

On the Capture of Corinth by the Onogurs and Its Recapture by the Byzantines

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Source: *Speculum*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Jul., 1952), pp. 343-350

Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Medieval Academy of America

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2853090>

Accessed: 20-05-2019 00:04 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Medieval Academy of America, The University of Chicago Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Speculum*

ON THE CAPTURE OF CORINTH BY THE ONOGURS AND ITS RECAPTURE BY THE BYZANTINES

By PETER CHARANIS

IN the history of the Byzantine possessions in the Balkan peninsula there is perhaps no period more obscure than that of the seventh century. What can be gleaned from the fragmentary state of the sources is awfully little and that not always clear. This is particularly true of the chronology of the events. Yet, what happened in the seventh century was of such great importance in the subsequent history of the Balkan peninsula that scholars have left no stone unturned in an effort to establish the sequence of events and clarify the numerous problems connected with them. Among the more recent attempts in this direction that made by Professor Setton is perhaps the most elaborate. He seems to have spared no effort and neglected no reference in order to throw new light on events of the seventh century. One is overwhelmed by his documentation.¹

Professor Setton's study may be divided into three parts. In the first part he gives a useful summary of the state of our knowledge concerning the early history of the Bulgars in their homeland and in the Balkan peninsula; in the second part he discusses, questioning their validity, a group of related sources, including the *Chronicle of Monemvasia*, which refer to the Avaro-Slavic penetration of Greece in the eighties of the sixth century; in the third part he makes what appear to be concrete and original contributions. 'Certain historical and archaeological evidence,' he thinks, 'suggest . . . the extreme probability of the occupation of Corinth by the Onogur Bulgars in the middle of the seventh century,' more precisely, 'some time after 641-642.' But not too long after 641-642, for 'the Onogurs could not have held Corinth much more than fifteen years or so' and Corinth was recovered by Constans II, the Byzantine emperor in 657-658. As these and other conclusions to which Professor Setton arrived in this study are of considerable importance for the history of Greece in the sixth and seventh centuries, a reexamination of the basis on which they were reached is by no means unjustifiable.

The historical evidence to which Professor Setton refers as suggesting 'the extreme probability of the occupation of Corinth by the Onogur Bulgars . . . sometime after 641-642' is a petition written by Isidore of Kiev and addressed to Patriarch Joseph II in 1429 by Cyril, the metropolitan of Monemvasia. The passage, as quoted by Professor Setton, reads:

And now two sacks of Corinth were witnessed during the period of Roman domination over the Peloponnesus, one in the days of Justinian the Great, who on this account later fortified the Isthmus and the other as a consequence of the Fourth Crusade, for in Justinian's time three Scythian tribes, called the Kutrigurs, Utigurs, and Onogurs [*Κοτρίγυροι, Ουτρίγυροι καὶ Ονόγυροι*], having crossed the Danube, one of these tribes ravaged upper Moesia, Pannonia, and Dalmatia and the regions right up to the Ionian Sea in a single expedition, while the Utigurs ravaged all Thrace and the Hellespontine Chersonese and all the territories on this side of the Hebrus to the very walls of the city of Constantine, and these Belisarius checked, outwitting and crushing them, *but the Onogurs laying waste Macedonia, Thessaly, Greece, and everything within Thermopylae, and pillaging even as far as Corinth, they straightway took the city without a single blow.*

Professor Setton ends his quotation at this point. But there is more to the passage from the petition of Isidore of Kiev. This, for some unknown reason, Professor Setton chose to ignore but, since it is significant for the interpretation for the entire passage, we reproduce it here. After saying that the Onogurs took Corinth without a single blow, Isidore adds:² When the lower and common element among the Spartans heard of this capture . . . they fled in sufficient numbers into the high mountains which envelop Lacedaemon,

especially Mount Parthenion, and crept into its gullies, caves, and hollows and thus drew themselves away from the barbarous flood. And they still preserve that ancient name of Lacones, but speaking barbarously they call themselves Tzacones instead of Lacones. Those on the other hand who were engaged in commerce went to Gytheion — that was the seaport of the Spartans — with their wives and children and, boarding their ships, speeded towards Sicily, and disembarking in Messene, settled in the neighborhood and in the course of time they too barbarized their name and came to be called Demenitae. But the nobles, the brilliantly fortunate, and the more prosperous among the Spartans, having learned of the great difficulties of the Corinthians, and fearing lest the same thing might happen to them, straightway, as they were, proceeded with all haste to Monemvasia, a small peninsula located in Laconia . . .

While retaining as a fact the report of Isidore of Kiev concerning the fall of Corinth Professor Setton rightly rejects the time and circumstances given by that author for this event. There is indeed no doubt that Corinth at one time fell into the hands of barbarians, but this fall did not take place during the reign of Justinian. It took place at some other time. When is a matter that cannot be established on the passage of Isidore of Kiev; there is need of other references. Now, in *all* the literature of the Middle Ages, Greek, Latin and Oriental, there is *not a single known reference* which speaks of the capture of Corinth in the seventh century by barbarians, whether Onogurs or others. And yet, though there is no such reference, it is the opinion of Professor Setton that the fall of Corinth, erroneously put by Isidore of Kiev in the reign of Justinian, actually took place not long after 641–642. How he has arrived at this conclusion is most curious and extraordinary.

In the *Miracula Sancti Demetrii* we read that about sixty years after the Avar devastations in the Balkan peninsula described in the *Miracula*, a revolt, headed by a certain Kouver, broke out in the camp of the Avars.³ On the assumption — a fair one — that the Avar devastations referred to in the *Miracula* are those of the years 578–585 as described by other sources, Henri Grégoire and some others before him have placed the revolt of Kouver sometime between 638 and 645.⁴ The rank and file of the followers of Kouver was composed of a mixed crowd, descendants of those natives of the Balkan peninsula, who had been carried away by the Avars, and the Avars, Bulgars and other barbarians in the camp of the Khan with whom they had intermarried. This motley crowd Kouver led toward Thessalonica and there entered into an intrigue in order to take the city. But his plot failed and, as some of his followers began to desert him, he moved westward and settled in the plain of Monastir. It is there that the text of the *Miracula* leaves him.

Now, according to Grégoire, the Kouver of the *Miracula* is the same person as the Kouvratos or Krovatos mentioned by other Byzantine texts as the chief of the Onogundur Bulgars.⁵ While still a young man this Kouvratos had gone to Constantinople, was there baptized and entered into a life-long friendship with Heraclius, then emperor of Byzantium. In the dynastic struggle which followed the death of Heraclius in 641 Kouvratos supported the interests of Martina and her children as against those of Constans II. To quote the chronicler who reports this: 'Now touching him [Kouvratos] it is said that he supported the interests of the children of Heraclius, i.e., the children of Martina and opposed those of Constantine. And in consequence of this evil report all the soldiers in Constantinople and the people rose up.'⁶

Professor Setton concludes: 'The Onogur Bulgars were in the plain of Monastir, in continental Greece [Monastir is actually in Yugoslavia], just before the middle of the seventh century. After the death of Heraclius there was every reason for an Onogur attack, from that convenient location, upon what was, presumably, the chief city of the Peloponnesus.'⁷ 'It was some time after 641–642 that a detachment of Onogur Bulgars, whether under, conceivably one of the sons of Kovrat [Kouvratos], or under some other lieutenant, attacked and captured Corinth.'⁸ There is, of course, as the reader can readily see, nothing in the *Miracula* nor in the other texts which describe the activities of Kouver-

Kouvratos, that can give the slightest justification to this conclusion. Indeed, if, as Setton,⁹ following Grégoire,¹⁰ believes, Kouver-Kovratos is none other than the Chrovatos, who, according to Constantine Porphyrogenitus, led the Croats into Dalmatia,¹¹ then the motley crowd which he stationed in the plain of Monastir must have moved, when it did move, in the direction of Dalmatia and not of Greece.

There is, however, something more to the argument of Professor Setton. He believes that there is evidence which shows that in 657–658 Corinth was recaptured by the Byzantines and that this event left traces, in the form of certain archaeological objects, indicating that it was from the Onogurs that Corinth was retaken. And, as Corinth, according to Professor Setton, was not captured by barbarians before the seventh century, the Onogurs expelled in 657–658 must have been the Onogurs who had taken Corinth in 641–642. Now to examine this evidence.

In the ninth-century chronicle of Theophanes Confessor we read that in 657–658, Constans II, then emperor of Byzantium, made an expedition “into Scлавinia, and he took many prisoners and subdued the land.”¹² Elsewhere and in another connection Theophanes speaks of Scлавinias,¹³ presumably regions of the empire inhabited by Slavs. But neither in the one nor in the other case does he give precise indication as to the location of these Scлавinias and, as a consequence, they cannot be located without additional historical evidence. Now, in the case of the Scлавinia conquered by Constans II there is no such evidence, as Professor Setton himself admits when he writes:¹⁴ ‘M. Bréhier states, simply and truly, “On ignore dans quelle région eut lieu cette expedition. On suppose qu’elle dégagée Thessalonique”.’ And yet it is on this passage and on this passage alone of Theophanes that Professor Setton bases his conclusion that Corinth was recaptured by the Byzantines under Constans in 657–658. In his words: ‘I believe it to be most likely that one effect of part, at least, of the military preparations of 657–658 was the relief of Corinth, which must have suffered so much from its capture by the Onogurs and its recapture by the Byzantines, that it may have ceased to exist as an inhabited community.’¹⁵ Any one can see, of course, that in the passage of Theophanes concerning the expedition of Constans II into Scлавinia there is not the slightest suggestion of a campaign in the Peloponnesus. Professor Setton, however, does not rest his case on the literary sources alone; he relies greatly on archaeological evidence and to this evidence we now turn our attention.

In a square tower not far below the fortified west entrance to Acrocorinth excavators have found a number of graves among which two are of particular significance. In the one there were six bodies; in the other two. There were found in addition numerous objects, chiefly buckles and weapons. Archaeologists differ as to the provenience of these objects,¹⁶ but they seem to have belonged to some nomadic people from the north. Professor Setton thinks that it is better to regard the bodies and the objects found in these graves as Onogur, ‘since Isidore of Kiev obviously preserves a reminiscence of a Peloponnesian tradition to precisely this effect.’¹⁷ It is impossible, we think, to identify these objects this precisely, but we shall follow Setton in calling them Bulgar, although they were probably common to all the nomads of the north. Among these objects Professor Setton singles out the buckles and calls them ‘Bulgaric buckles.’

The barbarians, whose bodies, along with the weapons and other objects belonging to them, have been found in Corinth, presumably died in attacking the city or in defending themselves after they became masters of it. Nothing among the objects themselves, however, gives the slightest indication as to when either one of these events may have taken place and if they are to be exactly dated there is need of evidence drawn from other sources. Now, as we have repeatedly pointed out, there is nothing in the Byzantine literary tradition which in any way suggests the conquest of Corinth by barbarians or its recapture by the Byzantines in the seventh century. Still, despite this lack of evidence, Professor Setton thinks he has been able to give a seventh-century date for these objects and so prove that barbarians, Onogurs in his opinion, took Corinth in the seventh century. He arrives at this date in a most peculiar way.

Evidence drawn from two Greek texts shows that belts called Bulgar and supposedly fitted with 'Bulgaric' buckles were used in the Byzantine army.¹⁸ Neither the one nor the other of these texts is dated, but, as Professor Setton himself says, they belong either to the last years of the sixth century or the early years of the seventh. These texts prove, if they prove anything, that about the turn of the sixth century belts called Bulgar were used by the Byzantines, but from which of the various Bulgar tribes they were adopted these texts do not say. Moreover, before the Byzantines came to use them, they must have known them for some time and this brings us in the sixth century when Bulgar and other barbarian tribes roamed in the Balkan peninsula. Professor Setton, however, associates these texts with finds of buckles made in Thessalonica, Athens, Corinth, Corfu, southern Italy and Sicily and comes to the conclusion that the buckles of these finds belong to the middle of the seventh century. 'Buckles like those in the graves at Corinth,' he writes, 'have been found with suspicious regularity along the entire route of Constans II,' i.e., the route which this emperor took when in 660 he left Constantinople in order to go to Sicily. They are buckles, he intimates, dropped by the troops of Constans and show that these troops were equipped with belts fitted with the kind of buckles found in Corinth. The Corinthian buckles, therefore, belong to the middle of the seventh century. Worn by the Bulgars who had occupied Corinth, they must have been dropped in the course of a violent struggle, the one which resulted in the expulsion of the Bulgars from Corinth. They show, therefore, that the statement of Theophanes to the effect that in 657-658 Constans II made an expedition 'into Slavina' must be interpreted to include a campaign which resulted in the capture of Corinth.¹⁹

In all this, of course, there is nothing concrete except the fact that buckles have been found in certain localities in the Balkan peninsula and elsewhere. How they got there is a matter which one may explain in various ways. The most satisfactory and probably the closest to the truth is the explanation suggested by a statement which Professor Setton himself makes elsewhere in his paper. Speaking of the buckles found in southern and northern Italy Professor Setton writes: 'Some of the buckles found in South Italian graves, together with those few found in northern Italy, came into possession of the Lombards through, presumably, the Avars, themselves in close contact with the Bulgars and the Byzantines.'²⁰ Now the Avars, in whose ranks there were various Bulgar and Slavic tribes, roamed in the Balkan peninsula, around Thessalonica and Greece, especially in the years 578-585.²¹ It is to them, as G. R. Davidson suggests,²² that the objects found in the graves at Corinth should be traced. As to the coins belonging to the reign of Constans II which one has found in Corinth, they should be associated with the voyage which that emperor made to Sicily during which he is known to have stopped at Athens and probably also at Corinth.

It will perhaps be helpful at this point to reduce the evidence produced by Professor Setton to its simplest form. It consists of the following elements:

1. A statement of Isidore of Kiev (fifteenth century) that Onogurs took Corinth during the reign of Justinian.
2. The statement in the *Miracula Sancti Demetrii* that a certain Kouver camped in the plain of Monastir with a motley crowd of Slavs, Bulgars and possibly Greeks.
3. The probability that Kouver was at Monastir in 641.
4. The probable identity of Kouver with Kouvratos, called Onogundur by one Byzantine source, Hun by another.²³
5. The intervention of Kouvratos in the dynastic struggle of Byzantine in favor of Martina, the widow of Heraclius, following the death of Heraclius in 641.
6. The statement of Theophanes that in 657-658 Constans II made an expedition in Slavina.
7. Certain archaeological objects, bearing no date, but probably belonging to barbarians from the north, found in two graves at Corinth. Among these objects there are a number of buckles.

8. Buckles similar to those of Corinth found in Thessalonica, Athens, Corfu, southern Italy and Sicily.
9. Two texts indicating that toward the turn of the sixth century certain belts called Bulgar were used in the Byzantine army.
10. Coins belonging to the reign of Constans II found in Corinth.

This is the evidence on which Professor Setton bases his conclusion of the capture of Corinth by the Onogurs not long after 641–642 and its recapture by the Byzantines under Constans II, in 657–658. It suffices to cast but a superficial glance at this evidence to realize how groundless Professor Setton's conclusion is.

Yet Professor Setton is right when he says 'that the weight of the evidence . . . is entirely in favor of the fundamental truth of Isidore's statement' concerning the capture of Corinth. Corinth was in fact taken by barbarians from the north. The event took place during the reign of Maurice (582–602) and is reported by two independent sources. The one is the Syriac chronicle of Michael Syrus, a work composed in the twelfth century, but based on the work of John of Ephesus, a contemporary of the event.²⁴ The other is the Greek chronicle, known as the *Chronicle of Monemvasia*, written not later than the second half of the eleventh century and based on some work composed in 932 or earlier, probably at the beginning of the ninth century.²⁵ Both Michael Syrus and the *Chronicle of Monemvasia* describe the Avaro-Slav invasions of the Balkan peninsula and Greece which took place in the years 578–588. The Slavs, says Michael, took many prisoners and carried away many objects from the churches, as, for example, the *ciborium* of the church of Corinth which their king used as a throne to sit on. The *Chronicle of Monemvasia* says that as a result of the invasions of the Peloponnesus by the Avars, many of the Peloponnesians emigrated, the Corinthians going to the island of Aegina, which, of course, is not very far from Corinth. Neither the one nor the other of these reports can be seriously doubted. Michael Syrus took his information from John of Ephesus who was a contemporary of the event; the *Chronicle of Monemvasia* has been shown to be based on a good historical tradition. Professor Setton, to be sure, using arguments advanced by Kyriakides, has tried to discredit the validity of the *Chronicle of Monemvasia*, but none of his arguments has a concrete basis. They are all suppositions which cannot be verified.²⁶

But if the Avaro-Slavs took Corinth, as indeed they did, they did not keep it very long. We are told by the *Chronicle of Monemvasia* that 'having taken and settled in the Peloponnesus, the Avars lasted in it for two hundred and eighteen years, from 587 to 805.' But not in Corinth, for Corinth with the eastern part of the Peloponnesus remained in the hands of the Byzantines. And yet, according to the same chronicle, the Avars had also taken Corinth as well as the Argolis.²⁷ This apparent contradiction can mean only one thing, that Corinth, together with the Argolis, was recovered by the Byzantines and that this recovery took place shortly before 587. Evidence drawn from the *Miracula Sancti Demetrii* seems to corroborate this.

On Sunday, 22 September, when Maurice was emperor, we read in the *Miracula*, an Avar army, composed of Slavs, Bulgars, and other barbarians, appeared before the city of Thessalonica. The barbarians, we read further, had chosen the most opportune moment for their attack, for the best elements of the troops of the city, together with the prefect, were in Greece on public business.²⁸ This was either in 586 or 597, for these are the only two years during the reign of Maurice that 22 September fell on a Sunday. Scholars have differed as to which one of these years they should accept, but the weight of the evidence is in favor of 586.²⁹ Thus, in 586 a good Byzantine army was in Greece. We are not told the exact nature of the public business it had to transact, but, given the situation which then existed in Greece (this is the period of the great Avaro-Slav penetrations), it was doubtless sent there in order to fight. One of the results of this expedition may very well have been the recovery of Corinth and Argolis. Professor Setton has cited certain well known letters of Gregory the Great, one of them addressed to Anastasius, bishop of Corinth and dated February 591, as proof that Corinth was never taken by the bar-

barians during the reign of Maurice.³⁰ These letters, of course, only prove that in 591 Corinth was in Byzantine hands; they corroborate the *Chronicle of Monemvasia* that the Avaro-Slavs did not keep Corinth; and lend support to the suggestion that Corinth may have been recovered by the Byzantines in 586. But it was long before Corinth recovered from the blows dealt to her by the Avaro-Slavs. All evidence belonging to the seventh century indicates that the lower town ceased to exist and that all activity was concentrated on the Acrocorinth.³¹

Now to return to Isidore of Kiev. That ecclesiastic quite obviously confused into one three different invasions in the sixth century.³² One of these invasions is that of 539 as related by Procopius. Procopius calls the barbarians who were responsible for that invasion Huns; other Byzantine writers refer to them as Bulgars. Breaking into the Balkan peninsula, they plundered Illyricum from the Ionian Sea to the suburbs of Constantinople; stormed the Thracian Chersonese; and, invading Greece, 'destroyed,' says Procopius, 'almost all the Greeks except the Peloponnesians.' Now these are precisely the regions which, according to Isidore, were devastated by the Kutrigurs, Utigurs and Onogurs. The Kutrigurs, Utigurs and Onogurs were, of course, all Bulgars.

The second of these invasions is that of the Kutrigur chief Zabergan which took place in 558. Zabergan divided his forces into three groups. One he sent against Greece; another against the Thracian Chersonese; and the third he led in person against Constantinople. All three groups were separately defeated. The one against Greece was stopped at Thermopylae; the one against the Thracian Chersonese was defeated by Germanus; and the group led by Zabergan was turned back by Belisarius who used a clever stratagem. It will be recalled that, in the account of Isidore, it is Belisarius who, by a clever stratagem, scatters the barbarians sent against Constantinople.

The third of these invasions is that of the Avars which took place during the reign of Maurice and resulted in the capture of Corinth. Isidore here drew his information from the literary traditions whence derive also the *Chronicle of Monemvasia* and the *Scholium* of Arethas. This is clear from his account of the dispersion of the Lacedaemoneans following the fall of Corinth.

There is, however, one element in the account of Isidore of Kiev which we do not find in the accounts describing the invasions of 539, 558 and that of the Avars during the reign of Maurice which resulted in the capture of Corinth. It is Isidore's reference to the Onogurs as the people who captured Corinth. This part, however, is not as significant as Professor Setton thinks. The Onogurs were the first among the Bulgars to have been conquered by the Avars.³³ The latter recruited their armies by drawing from the peoples whom they conquered. In these armies the Slavic and Bulgar elements are known to have been considerable.³⁴ The Byzantine writers hardly ever state to which branch of the Bulgar people the Bulgar element in the Avar armies belonged. It was probably drawn from all. We know, however, that it included Kutrigurs³⁵ and no doubt also Onogurs as can be inferred from the fact that the Onogur Kouver-Kouvratos was a chief of Bulgars in the Avar armies. It is extremely probable, therefore, that the Avar army which took Corinth during the reign of Maurice includes also Onogurs, hence the statement of Isidore of Kiev that Onogurs took Corinth.

The issue of *SPECULUM*, in which Professor Setton's study appeared, contained also an article concerning a Byzantine statue base found at Corinth.³⁶ According to the author, the 'base supported a bronze statue approximately two-thirds life size.' The inscription indicates that the statue was dedicated to an 'Augustus Flavius Constan' who is referred to as 'Victorious.' The 'Constan' is an abbreviation and could stand for Constantine, Constantius, or Constans. The base with the statue could belong either to the fourth or seventh century since both the dynasty of Constantine the Great and that of Heraclius were Flavii. After some hesitation the author of this article decided in favor of the seventh century and identified the 'Constan' of the inscription with Constans I. The history of art is a field in which we have no competence and we would prefer to let those qualified to deal with the problem. We would like to make the observation, however, that the Corinth

of the seventh century was too miserable to be able to finance or cast a bronze statue two-thirds life size. It should also be pointed out that the author of this article was swayed by Professor Setton's thesis that Onogurs took Corinth shortly after 641 and that it was recaptured by the Byzantines under Constans II in 657-658. The Onogurs, of course, did not take Corinth shortly after 641 and the Byzantines did not recapture it in 657-658.

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

¹ Kenneth M. Setton, 'The Bulgars in the Balkans and the Occupation of Corinth in the Seventh Century,' *SPECULUM*, xxv (1950), 502-543.

² For the Greek text with an English translation, see Peter Charanis, 'The Chronicle of Monemvasia and the Question of the Slavonic Settlements in Greece,' *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, No. V (1950), 158-159.

³ L'Abbé A. Tougaard, *De l'histoire profane dans les actes grecs des Bollandistes* (Paris, 1874), pp. 186 ff.

⁴ Henri Grégoire, 'L'origin et le nom des Croates et des Serbes,' *Byzantion*, xvii (1945), 110 f.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 91, 100 ff.

⁶ *The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu*, tr. by R. H. Charles (London, 1916), pp. 197 f.

⁷ Setton, *op. cit.*, p. 525.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 521 f.

⁹ *Idem.*

¹⁰ Grégoire, *op. cit.*, pp. 91, 104 ff.

¹¹ Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De Administrando Imperio*, edited by G. Moravcsik and translated into English by R. J. H. Jenkins (Budapest, 1949), pp. 146 ff.

¹² Theophanes, *Chronographia*, edited by Carolus de Boor (Leipzig, 1883), i, 347.

¹³ *Ibid.*, i, 486.

¹⁴ Setton, *op. cit.*, p. 522.

¹⁵ *Idem.*

¹⁶ G. R. Davidson, 'Archaeological Evidence for a Slavic Invasion of Corinth,' *American Journal of Archaeology*, xl (1936), 128 f.; and 'The Avar Invasion of Corinth,' *Hesperia*, iv (1937), 227-240; H. Zeis, 'Avarenfunde in Korinth?' *Serta Hoffilleriana* (Zagreb, 1940), 95-99. Cf. A. Bon, 'Le Problème slave dans le Péloponèse à la lumière de l'archéologie,' *Byzantion*, xx (1950), 16 ff.

¹⁷ Setton, *op. cit.*, p. 520.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 523 f.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 523-525.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 543, n. 161.

²¹ Grégoire, *op. cit.*, pp. 108 ff.

²² See note 16. Concerning the provenience of these objects however, there is still considerable discussion. In a letter addressed to me and dated 30 April 1951. Dr Hans Hintermaier of Krumpendorf, Austria, writes: 'I . . . would like to inform you that after the competent opinion of Professor Werner these finds [the finds of Corinth] can not be considered as Avar finds . . . I am inclined to the same opinion knowing quite well nearly all European Avar finds by autopsy in the museums. The belt appendices and buckles are of Byzantine form and such Byzantine buckles are very frequent in the Hungarian finds of the Avar period.' See further H. Zeis as referred to in note 16.

²³ The patriarch Nicephorus (edition Bonn, p. 27) calls him Onogundar; John of Nikiu (*op. cit.*, p. 197) calls him Hun.

²⁴ *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, edited and translated by J. B. Chabot, ii (Paris, 1901), 362. On the source and significance of this passage, L. Niederle, *Slov. Starožitnosti*, ii (Prague, 1906), 213. I consulted Niederle with the help of M. Petrovich.

²⁵ On the *Chronicle of Nonemvasia* see Charanis, *op. cit.*, pp. 147 ff.

²⁶ Concerning the book of Kyriakides see Charanis, 'On the Question of the Slavonic Settlements in Greece during the Middle Ages,' *Byzantinoslavica*, x (1949), 255 ff.

²⁷ Charanis, 'The Chronicle of Monemvasia . . .,' p. 147.

²⁸ Tougard, *op. cit.*, p. 98. πλειόνων δὲ καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐπιλέκτων νεανιῶν τοῦ τε στρατιωτικοῦ, καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ στρατευομένων πραιτωρίῳ ἅμα τῷ τηνικαῦτα τὴν ἐπάρχων μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχοντι ἀρχήν, κατὰ τὴν ἐλλήνων χώραν δημοσίων ἑνεκα χρειῶν ἀποδεδημηκότων.

²⁹ St. Stanojević, *Vizantijska i Srbi*, II (Novi Sad, 1906), 209; K. Jireček, *Istorijska Srba*. tr. into Serbian and enlarged by J. Radonić (Beograd, 1922), I, 64. I consulted these two books in Serbian with the help of M. Petrovich. See also O. Tafrali, *Thessalonique des origines au XIV^e siècle* (Paris, 1919), p. 104.

³⁰ Setton, *op. cit.*, pp. 519 and 537, n. 128. P. Jaffé — G. Wattenbach, *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, I (Leipzig, 1885), 145, n. 1095.

³¹ Bon, *op. cit.*, 17 f. See also his *Le Peloponnèse Byzantin jusqu'en 1204* (Paris, 1951), p. 52.

³² On the passage of Isidore of Kiev and its possible sources see Charanis, 'The Chronicle of Monemvasia . . .', pp. 157–162.

³³ *Excerpta de legationibus gentium e Menandro* in *Excerpta de Legationibus*, ed. C. de Boor (Berlin, 1903), p. 442; Theophylact, *Historia* (Bonn, 1836), p. 284.

³⁴ For Bulgars in the Avar armies: Theophanes, *op. cit.*, pp. 275; 315; Tougard, *op. cit.*, 186 ff., 180; George of Pisidia, *Bellum Avaricum* (Bonn, 1837), pp. 55, 63.

³⁵ *Excerpta de legationibus gentium e Menandro*, p. 458.

³⁶ John H. Kent, 'A Byzantine Statue Base at Corinth,' *SPECULUM*, XXV (1950), 544–546.

American Society of Church History

Aims of the Medieval Crusades and How They Were Viewed by Byzantium

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Source: *Church History*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jun., 1952), pp. 123-134

Published by: [Cambridge University Press](#) on behalf of the [American Society of Church History](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3161078>

Accessed: 17-03-2015 01:44 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Cambridge University Press and American Society of Church History are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Church History*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

AIMS OF THE MEDIEVAL CRUSADES AND HOW THEY WERE VIEWED BY BYZANTIUM.¹

PETER CHARANIS

Rutgers University

The history of medieval crusading may be conveniently divided into two chapters. The first of these chapters would end with 1291 when Acre was lost by the Christians and would cover the period extending backward to 1095 when the first crusading expedition was launched. During this period the western Christians conquered and lost the Holy Lands. They also established themselves in Greece and the Greek archipelago. The second chapter would come down to 1395, the year of the battle of Nicopolis, or possibly 1444, the year of Varna. During this period, though there is considerable talk and some action for the recovery of the Holy Land, the struggle has really become one for the defense of Europe against the invading Turks.²

The motivating forces which prompted the various crusading expeditions were many and complex and for that reason difficult to determine. I know of no body of material the study of which will give a clear and definite idea of what they were. To find them, if indeed it is possible to find them, we shall have to examine each expedition in detail. That obviously, unless we resort to generalities, will be a long and tedious task. But among these expeditions the one which laid the pattern for the rest was that launched in 1095 at Clermont. We shall, therefore, analyze that expedition, determine its motives if we can, and draw any inference which may explain the nature of those that came later.³

The crusade of 1095 was a holy war having as its objective the liberation of the Holy Land. It had, however, a distinct form of its own. The essence of this form lay not in the fact that it was directed against the infidels, nor in the fact that its ultimate military objective was the liberation of the Holy Land. These are features that can be found in previous wars. The Spanish wars of the eleventh century, for instance, were fought in the name of the faith,⁴ as was also the war of the Normans in Sicily,⁵ though in both instances the desire for conquest was no doubt the stronger motive. The Byzantines fought their great wars in the tenth century not only in the name of the faith, but envisaged also the liberation of Jerusalem. "I shall conquer your lands," Nicephorus Phocas wrote to the caliph, "and I shall go as far as Mecca where I shall erect a throne to the greatest of beings," *i. e.*, Jesus. "Then I shall direct myself towards Jerusalem, a city rendered

illustrious for us by the most powerful Being. . . . I shall conquer all the Orient and the Occident and I shall spread everywhere the religion of the cross."⁶ The same objective was expressed by the successor of Nicephorus, John Tzimiskes. Describing his successful campaign of 974 against the Moslems in Syria and Palestine to the Armenian king Ashod III, Tzimiskes wrote:⁷ "Our desire was to liberate the Holy Sepulchre from the outrages of the Moslems."

A feature of the crusade of 1095 was the fact that those losing their lives while participating in it were absolved of their sins.⁸ As an enticement for the faithful to enlist in the expedition the grant of indulgence was very important and was to become a permanent feature of the crusade viewed as an institution. But the grant of indulgence by itself was not what gave the expedition of 1095 as a holy war its peculiar form, for indulgences for fighting the infidels had been granted before, as for instance, in the Spanish wars of the eleventh century.⁹ It was rather the fact that it was called, organized and conducted under the auspices of the papacy that did this. The holy war, hitherto conducted haphazardly, was, at Clermont, taken over by the church. It became the medieval crusade.

There is little doubt, although Urban's speech in its original form has not come down to us,¹⁰ that the pope made the liberation of Jerusalem the principal theme of the appeal which he made at Clermont. But the question is to know what were the motives which moved the pope to make his appeal when he did. In the motives of the pope lay the objectives of the crusade.

Now motives in general are difficult to discover, but they are more difficult still when documentation, as in this case, is fragmentary. This explains why there has been no agreement on the part of scholars as to the motives which prompted Urban to call his crusade. For some, it was because he desired to promote and make safe the pilgrimages to Jerusalem that he made his appeal for the war.¹¹ For others, it was because he wished to bring fraternal succor to the Christians of the East.¹² Others still view Urban's war as an attempt to direct the increasing energies of Europe away from home and so insure the observance of the truce and peace of God.¹³ Some believe that what the pope wanted was the establishment of a feudal state in Palestine under the suzerainty of Rome,¹⁴ while others think that his main objective was to increase the power and the prestige of the papacy.¹⁵ There are those also who believe that the end of the Greek schism and the ultimate unification of all Christendom under the aegis of Rome was what the pope had uppermost in his mind.¹⁶

In one or more of these explanations lies, I think, the solution of the problem. But in which one? Our answer to this question would be greatly facilitated if we could discover the happening, which, occurring

as near to 1095 as possible, suggested to the pope the idea of liberating Jerusalem. We can find such a happening, I think, if we turn our attention to the relations which existed then between the Byzantine emperor, Alexius Comnenus, and the Papacy.

There is no doubt now that the relations between Urban and the Byzantine emperor became cordial almost from the very beginning of Urban's pontificate. The documentation for this is too ample, indeed official, to need any further elaboration.¹⁷ In the establishment of this cordiality, it was the pope who took the initiative, but the emperor was no less anxious to come into some kind of agreement. The big problem, of course, which stood in the way was the fact that for almost seventy years now¹⁸ there had been no communion between the church of Constantinople and that of Rome and the obstacles to the reestablishment of communion were insurmountable. These obstacles were, on the one hand, the deep-rooted attachment of the Greeks to their ecclesiastical autonomy, and, on the other, the universalism of the papacy.¹⁹ Negotiations, however, were not impossible, for the papacy believed that the emperor could force the Greek church to do his bidding, while the emperor had at his disposal the well known Byzantine doctrine of *economia*, which he might use to apply pressure on the Greek church, if, for political reasons, an agreement with the papacy was desirable.

Negotiations actually began in 1088 at the suggestion of Urban. These negotiations envisaged the union of the churches, but political considerations were doubtless also involved.²⁰ On the one hand, the pope, struggling to maintain himself against a rival who had the support of Henry IV, was no doubt anxious to prevent a rapprochement between the latter and the Greek emperor, such as had taken place during the pontificate of Gregory VII.²¹ Alexius, on the other hand, hoped probably that an understanding with the pope, who was on excellent terms with Roger of Sicily, might help to prevent another invasion of his realm by the Normans in Italy. But whether it was this or another objective which Alexius had in mind, there can be no doubt that whatever it was, it was political in nature. For it is difficult to assume that Alexius would go against the tradition of the Greek church in order just to satisfy the papacy. That no Byzantine emperor ever did either before or after Alexius, and Alexius was every inch a Byzantine and one among the cleverest.

The negotiations between pope and emperor were crowned with success, at least temporarily. The excommunication, which had been imposed on the Byzantine emperor by Gregory VII, was removed and the Latin churches in Constantinople were reopened. There is some evidence also, although it is by no means conclusive, that Urban's name was temporarily inscribed in the diptychs of the church of Constantinople²² pending the holding of a council which, it was hoped, would set-

tle the difference which separated the two churches and so bring about their union. The council was never held and consequently the union of the churches was not effected, but the important point to emphasize is this, that, throughout the negotiations, Alexius urged the point of view of the pope as against the arguments of the Greek clergy. This willingness of the Byzantine emperor to push the union with Rome must have impressed the pope and led him to hope that the union of the churches might still be brought about. Meanwhile pope and emperor remained on cordial terms. This the Byzantine emperor tried to exploit in order to raise troops in the west for his wars against his enemies. It is in this effort of Alexius to use the papacy for the recruitment of troops in the west that lies the secret of Clermont, but to unravel this secret one must go back to the council of Piacenza, held in the spring of 1095, and where Byzantine ambassadors appeared to ask the pope to help their emperor in his struggle against the infidels.

Chalandon, the historian of the reign of Alexius Comnenus, following Riant, has denied that at Piacenza Alexius had appealed to the western church for military assistance.²³ He gives as his reason this, that by 1095, the year of the council of Piacenza, the situation of the Greek empire had so improved that there was no need for Alexius to make humble appeals to the west for aid. But to say this is to misinterpret the position of the Byzantine emperor, for underlying this statement is the assumption that Alexius, having successfully repulsed the attacks against Constantinople, would remain still, making no efforts to recover the lands which the Turks had seized. There is, of course, no basis for this assumption. No one in Byzantium had relinquished the rights of the empire over Asia Minor. After all, Mentzikert had been fought only twenty-four years before, and it was not quite fifteen years since Nicaea had been occupied by the Turks. But we know for certain that in 1095 or thereabout Alexius contemplated taking the offensive against the Turks.²⁴ For this, however, he needed more troops than he could raise in his own domain, hence his appeal at Piacenza. These troops were for offense, not defense.

We are told that at Piacenza, Urban II urged many of those present to furnish the aid asked by the Byzantine emperor, "even engaging them to promise under oath to go there with the consent of God and bring to this same emperor, to the best of their power, their most faithful aid against the pagan."²⁵ But the significance of Piacenza lies not in this; it lies in something more momentous: In the plea for help which the Byzantine ambassadors made before the assembled prelates at Piacenza, they put the emphasis on the necessity of liberating the Holy Lands. Listen to the chronicler who reports this—he is talking about Alexius who, he says, was now ready to take the offensive against the Turks):

"Having considered, therefore, that it was impossible for him alone to undertake the battle on which everything depended, he recognized that he would have to call on the Italians as allies and he affected this with considerable cunning, adroitness and deeply laid planning. For finding a pretext in the fact that this nation considered unbearable the domination of Jerusalem and the life-giving Sepulchre of Our Saviour Jesus Christ by the Persians and seeing therein a heaven-sent opportunity, he managed, by dispatching ambassadors to the bishop of Old Rome and to those whom they would call kings and rulers of those parts (*i. e.*, the west), and by the use of appropriate arguments, to prevail over not a few of them to leave their country and succeeded in directing them in every way to the task. That is the reason why many of them, numbering thousands and tens of thousands, having crossed the Ionian Sea, reached Constantinople with all speed. And, having exchanged assurances and oaths with them, he advanced towards the east. With the aid of God and their alliance and by his own efforts he speedily expelled the Persians from Roman territories, liberated the cities and restored his sway in the east to its former glory. Such was this emperor: great in the conception of plans and the doing of deeds."²⁶ This description of Alexius as "great in the conception of plans and the doing of deeds" is perhaps more accurate than that given by Gibbon when he writes: "In a style less grave than that of history I should perhaps compare the emperor Alexius to the jackal, who is said to follow the steps, and to devour the leavings, of the lion."²⁷

There is no doubt, writes Fliche—and he did not know our passage—that the thought of the crusade was strange to the pope when he left for France after Piacenza, but it seems none the less sure that the pontiff had been moved by the tale about the sufferings of the Christians of the east which the Byzantine ambassadors had recounted at Piacenza and that would lead him in the course of the year 1095 to form the project of the crusade. In this statement Fliche recognizes the significance of the council of Piacenza in the evolution of Urban's thought about the crusade.²⁸ We have been able to go still further. We have shown that the question of liberating Jerusalem was brought up at Piacenza; it was brought up by the Byzantines in the interest of imperial policy. We have thus found the happening which, occurring shortly before Clermont, suggested to the pope the idea of a war that would free the Holy Land. We are not here implying, of course, that this idea was not known in the west.²⁹ If it were not known it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to bring about its execution. It is the timing of the suggestion in relation to Clermont that we are emphasizing.

Now that we know how the pope came to conceive the project of his crusade we can look for his motives in the different versions we have of the speech he delivered at Clermont, in the pope's instructions

to the assembling crusaders and in his relations with the Byzantine emperor. These documents and what we know of Urban's relations with the Byzantine emperor reveal, I think, three dominant motives:³⁰ the spiritual exaltation that would come upon the whole of Christendom if the holiest of its cities were liberated; the desire to bring succor to the eastern Christians and the hope that thereby one might bring to an end the Greek schism; and finally, the expectation that the war, by drawing the more bellicose elements away from the west, would help in the enforcement of the truce and peace of God. These were the pope's motives. What he knew of the wars in Spain and the frequent pilgrimages to Jerusalem must have been the factors which led him to believe that his plea would meet with a ready response.

The motives of the pope were not, of course, the motives of all those who actually participated in the expedition. Many of the participants, among the leaders especially, men like Bohemond, Tancred, Baldwin and the Genoese and Pisans, were moved by more worldly considerations.³¹ The rank and file, however, despite the depredations that they might have caused even among Christians, were led to join the expedition by a sincere and simple piety. Anna Comnena, who did not particularly like the Latins, is a witness to this.³²

The crusade as it was conceived and organized by the pope was something which the Byzantine emperor had not anticipated. The liberation of Jerusalem was for him only a pretext. His real purpose in sending an embassy to Piacenza was to prevail upon the pope to help him recruit troops for his contemplated offensive for the recovery of Asia Minor. Here I would like to repeat a story with which Gibbon introduces his account of the arrival of the crusading armies in Constantinople.³³ "In some Oriental tale," writes Gibbon, "I have read the fable of a shepherd who was ruined by the accomplishment of his own wishes; he had prayed for water; the Ganges was turned into his ground, and his flock and cottage were swept away by the inundation." Then Gibbon continues: "Such was the fortune, or at least the apprehension, of the Greek emperor Alexius Comnenus . . . His ambassadors had solicited a moderate succour, perhaps of ten thousand soldiers; but he was astonished by the approach of so many potent chiefs and fanatic nations." "The approach of so many potent chiefs and fanatic nations" doubtless astonished Alexius, but, unlike the shepherd of Gibbon's tale, Alexius was not swept away by the inundation. With an adroitness rarely exhibited in history, not only did he avoid any major clashes with the crusading armies but managed to direct them in such a way as to realize, at least in part, his main objective, the reconquest of Asia Minor from the Turks.

The reconquest of Asia Minor was Alexius' main objective, but as the crusading armies arrived in Constantinople, he seems to have

thought of still another: The creation of a Latin state in the Orient under his suzerainty which might serve as buffer between his empire as he hoped to reconstitute it and the Islamic world. We are told by the author of the *Gesta Francorum* that Alexius promised to grant Bohemond, if the latter took the oath of fidelity to him, a piece of land *ab Antiochia retro* fifteen days march in length and eight days march in width.³⁴ I am aware, of course, that the authenticity of this passage has been contested, but frankly I cannot follow the reasoning for its rejection.³⁵ I fail to see how the phrase *ab Antiochia retro* can be translated in any other way than *au delà d' Antioch* as Brèhier translates it³⁶ or "beyond and behind Antioch" as E. Jamison does.³⁷ Thus translated, there can be no question of Antioch's being included in the grant promised by the emperor to Bohemond and consequently the arguments put forth for the rejection of the passage lose all their potency. The region involved was located beyond Antioch, no doubt in the direction of Aleppo, over which the Byzantines could still have a vague claim, as the emirs of Aleppo, down to about the middle of the eleventh century, acknowledged the suzerainty of the empire. The passage of the *Gesta* is perfectly understandable and should be retained as authentic. Bohemond, placed in command of a region in the midst of the Moslem world, would not only serve as a buffer for the empire but would be permanently removed from Italy. Such indeed seems to have been the thought of Alexius, but in this he failed completely, for Bohemond chose to keep Antioch. This, as is well known, not only brought about the final break between Alexius and the crusaders, but was to prove a continuous source of trouble between Greeks and Latins.

The crusade which Urban molded at Clermont and immediately after, became an institution which for centuries to come would be used to agitate Europe and the Near East. The essence of that institution, as we have said, was the fact that it could be authorized only by the papacy. As it was originally fashioned it was to be used to protect the interests of Christendom against the infidels, but the infidels were not the only ones who might endanger these interests. Moreover, the interests of Christendom came to be looked upon as being synonymous with those of the papacy. The crusade, as a consequence, became an instrument to be used by the papacy as the papacy saw fit. It might be authorized against the infidels, as indeed it was, or it might be called against schismatics as was the crusade of 1107, authorized by Pope Paschal II in order to help Bohemond in his struggle against the Byzantine emperor Alexius I. It could be used, and was used, to extirpate heresies—the Albigensian crusade immediately comes to mind—or to fight secular rulers—one thinks of the crusades against the later Hohenstaufens and Peter of Aragon—whose policies clashed with those of the papacy. It was even used against the personal enemies of the pope as was the crusade which

Boniface VIII directed against the Colonna family.³⁸ These uses, to be sure, were repeatedly denounced as abuses and contributed not a little in eventually discrediting the crusade,³⁹ but given the nature of the crusade and the absolutism of the papacy, they were only a natural development. Crusading, of course, was a complex phenomenon in which many and varied motives—and that of piety was one of the strongest—were involved, but the crusade as an institution became, as time went on, an instrument of absolutism, which, to be sure, sometimes got out of control.

This instrument, which Alexius had helped to fashion, the Greeks came to view either as a dangerous thing or as a means of aid in their struggle to preserve their empire. If Manuel Comnenus agreed to permit the armies participating in the Second Crusade to march through his territories it was largely because he feared that if they went by way of Sicily they might be won over by Roger II who was then planning an attack against the Byzantine empire. But he hoped also that he might use these armies in the defense of the empire, as is shown by the fact that he tried to win Louis VII in an alliance against Roger of Sicily.⁴⁰ He failed in this; his object thereafter was to weaken the crusading armies so that they would not accomplish anything that might prove dangerous to his empire. Above all, he did not want the principality of Antioch strengthened. In expressing this view, I am basing myself not on Odo of Deuil,⁴¹ who is notoriously anti-Greek, but on the Byzantine historian Nicetas Choniates.⁴²

Manuel, like his illustrious grandfather, managed to prevent the crusaders from inflicting major injuries on his empire. But the Second Crusade, like the First, contributed greatly in the growth of antagonism between Greek and Latin. This antagonism, fostered by the ecclesiastical bigotry of both sides, the economic stranglehold which the Italians had come to have upon the empire, and the hostility of the Greeks against the increasing influence of the Latins in the administration of the empire, was to make of the crusade the means for the destruction of the empire. Already during the Second Crusade there was an element in the camp of Louis VII—it was headed by Godfrey de la Roche, bishop of Langres—which urged the capture of Constantinople.⁴³ Some years later, at the time of the Third Crusade, the Angeli were frightened when they heard of the coming of Frederick Barbarossa and quickly entered into negotiations with Saladin.⁴⁴ The destruction of the Byzantine empire was finally achieved by the fourth expedition. The empire was later, at least in part, restored, but the Fourth Crusade made the chasm which had come to separate Greek and Latin virtually unbridgeable. This chasm was to be widened still more in the course of the next three centuries. And here again the crusade contributed its part. For the Byzantine emperors in their efforts either to avoid the use of the crusade

against the empire or to get its help in their struggle against the Ottomans had to agree to the union of the churches on terms dictated to them by Rome. But this was against the wishes of the majority of the Greek clergy and the Greek people. Dissension at home and an increased hatred of the Latins was the consequence. Many Greeks came to prefer the Turks rather than submit to the Latins. Thus the crusade, launched in part in order to bring about the unity of Christendom, became in the course of its history, a source of disunity.

In the approximately three hundred and fifty years of its existence the crusade did much harm both in the east and in the west. Whether it did any good is open to doubt. But crusading, as a historical phenomenon, was a significant movement.

1 This paper was read at the sixty-sixth annual convention of the American Historical Association, held in New York City on December 28, 29, 30, 1951.

2 A group of American and European scholars are now engaged in the writing of a five-volume work which will cover the entire crusading movement. For the prospectus of this work see K. Setton, in *Speculum*, XXVI (1951), 578ff. Meanwhile Steven Runciman has begun the publication of *A History of the Crusades* which will be completed in three volumes, of which the first has made its appearance: S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades — Volume I: The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem*. (Cambridge, 1951). Some of the older works remain, of course, useful. Among them we cite the following: F. Wilken, *Geschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Leipzig, 1807-32), 7 volumes; R. Röhricht, *Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem* (1100-1291) (Innsbruck, 1898); B. Kügler, *Geschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Berlin, 1891); T. A. Archer and C. L. Kingsford, *The Crusades: The Story of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (London, 1895); L. Bréhier, *L'Eglise et L'Orient au Moyen Age: Les Croisades* (Paris, 1928); R. Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades et du Royaume Franc de Jerusalem* (Paris, 1934-36), 3 volumes; A. S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 1938). Atiya does not treat of Varna, but about that campaign we have now a monograph: O. Halecki, *The Crusade of Varna. A Discussion of Controversial Problems* (New York, 1943). Volume five of the projected work mentioned at the beginning of this note will include a general bibliography.

3 The First Crusade, as is natural, has been repeatedly treated. Besides the works already cited one may add the following: H. von Sybel, *Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzuges*, 2nd edition (Leipzig, 1881); R. Röhricht, *Geschichte des*

ersten Kreuzzuges (Innsbruck, 1901); A. C. Krey, *The First Crusade. The Accounts of Eye-Witnesses and Participants* (Princeton, 1921); F. Chalandon, *Histoire de la Première Croisade jusqu'à l'Élection de Godefroi de Bouillon* (Paris, 1925). Other works, pertinent to this study, will be cited in the course of the paper.

4 P. Boissonnade, *Du Nouveau sur la Chanson de Roland* (Paris, 1923), 5ff.; Boissonnade, "Cluny, la Papauté et la première grande Croisade internationale contre les Sarrasins d'Espagne," *Revue des Questions Historiques*, CXVII (1932), 257-301; P. Rousset, *Les Origines et les Caractères de la Première Croisade* (Neu-Châtel, 1945), 31-35.

5 E. Jordan, "La Politique Ecclésiastique de Roger Ier et les Origines de la Légation Sicilienne," *Le Moyen Age*, 2e série, XXIV (1922), 237-284; continued, *Ibid*, XXV (1923), 32-65; Rousset, *op. cit.*, 36-39.

6 G. Schlumberger, *Un Empereur Byzantin au Dixième Siècle: Nicéphore Phocas*. Nouvelle édition (Paris, 1923), 349f.

7 Matthew of Edessa, *Chronicle*, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Documents Arméniens*, I (Paris, 1869), 13-20.

8 On this point Urban II is reported by Fulcher of Chartres to have said the following at Clermont: "Remission of sins will be granted for those going thither, if they end a shackled life either on land or in crossing the sea, or in struggling against the heathen. I, being vested with that gift from God, grant this to those who go." *Fulcheri Carnotensis Historia Hierosolymitana*, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Documents Occidentaux*, III (Paris, 1866), 324. The translation is that of M. E. McGinty, Fulcher of Chartres, *Chronicle of the First Crusade* (Philadelphia, 1941), 16. In his letter to the assembling Crusaders Urban II refers to the crusade "as a preparation for the remis-

- sion of all their [the participants] sins." *Archives de l'Orient Latin*, I (Paris, 1881), 220. On this whole point see further N. Paulus, *Geschichte des Ablasses im Mittelalter* (Paderborn, 1922-3), I, 195ff; E. Magnin, "Indulgences," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, XVII (Paris, 1923), 1607; H. C. Lea, *A History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences in the Latin Church*, (Philadelphia, 1893), III: 9-10.
- 9 C. Erdmann, *Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens (Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte*, VI, Band) Stuttgart, 1935, 125. Cf. Rousset, *op. cit.*, 48ff. The remission of sins under certain conditions had also been promised to those participating in the expedition which Robert Guiscard organized against Byzantium in 1080. Gregorii VII *Registrum*, VIII, 6: Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, CXLVIII (Paris, 1853), 580f.
 - 10 Urban's speech at Clermont has been differently reported by a number of chroniclers. Two of these chroniclers (Robert the Monk and Baldric of Bourgueil) say that they were present at Clermont; it is quite probable that two others (Fulcher of Chartres and Guibert of Nogent) were also there. A fifth (William of Malmesbury) reports that he derived his information from persons who actually heard the speech. All these chroniclers recorded their version of Urban's speech some years after Clermont. On this whole question see D. C. Munro, "The Speech of Pope Urban II at Clermont, 1095," *The American Historical Review*, XI (1905), 231-242.
 - 11 Bréhier, *op. cit.*, 54; A. Hatem, *Les Poemes épiques des croisades, genèse, historicité, localisation* (Paris, 1932), 72; J. Calmette, *Le Monde Féodal*, Vol. 4 of the collection *Clio* (Paris,) 382; E. Joranson, "The Great German Pilgrimage of 1064-1065," in *The Crusades and other Historical Essays Presented to Dana C. Munro* (New York, 1928), 42-43.
 - 12 F. Duncalf, "The Pope's Plan for the First Crusade," in *The Crusades and Other Historical Essays . . .*, 45; B. Leib, *Rome, Kiev et Byzance à la Fin du XIe Siècle* (Paris, 1924), 181.
 - 13 Rousset, *op. cit.*, 194ff.; Bréhier, *op. cit.*, 60-61.
 - 14 J. L. LaMonte, "La Papauté et les Croisades," in *Renaissance*, II and III (1945), 158. In this article LaMonte gives a brief summary of some of the explanations offered for the motives of Urban II.
 - 15 K. Hampe, *Deutsche Kaisergeschichte in der Zeit der Salier und Staufer*, 7th edition (Leipzig, 1937), 76. Cf. M. W. Baldwin, "Some Recent Interpretations of Pope Urban II's Eastern Policy," *The Catholic Historical Review*, XXV (1940), 462.
 - 16 A. C. Krey, "Urban's Crusade—Success or Failure," *American Historical Review*, LIII (1948), 235-50; M. N. Baldwin, "The Papacy and the Levant during the Twelfth Century," *Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America*, III (1945), 277-287. Leib, *op. cit.*, 181; Runciman (*op. cit.*, 102ff) seems to imply that the desire for the union of the churches was a dominant motive in the thoughts of Urban.
 - 17 W. Holtzmann, "Die Unionsverhandlungen zwischen Kaiser Alexios I und Papst Urban II in Jahre 1089," *Byz. Zeitschrift*, XXVIII (1928), 38-67; P. Charanis, *The American Historical Review*, LIII (1948), 941-944.
 - 18 Precisely when the break came is not known, but it was some years before 1054, probably during the patriarchate of Sergius II (1001-1019). On this question see Martin Jugie, *Le Schisme Byzantin* (Paris, 1941), 166 ff.
 - 19 There has been a tendency in recent years to minimize the significance of the schism of the eleventh century, for instance Runciman (*op. cit.*, 100), referring to 1087, the year of the death of Gregory VII, writes: "There was as yet no actual schism." See also G. Every, *The Byzantine Patriarchate*, 451-1204 (London, 1947), 153 ff. This point of view, I think, is much of an exaggeration. I shall treat of it in another study, but see P. Charanis, *The American Historical Review*, LIII: 943 f.
 - 20 A. Fliche, *La Réforme grégorienne et la Reconquête chrétienne*, volume 8 of *Histoire de l'Eglise*, edited by A. Fliche and V. Martin (Paris, 1946), 236 f.
 - 21 F. Chalandon, *Essai sur le Règne d'Alexis Ier Comnène*, 1081-1118 (Paris, 1900), 68ff.
 - 22 Jugie, *op. cit.*, 242; V. Grumel, "Jerusalem entre Rome et Byzance: Une lettre inconnue du patriarche de Constantinople Nicolas III à son collègue de Jérusalem (vers 1089)," *Echos d'Orient*, XXXVIII (1939), 115. Both Jugie and Grumel express the view that Urban's name was temporarily inscribed in the diptychs of the church of Constantinople, but see my critique of this view in *The American Historical Review*, LIII: 943. Runciman, without citing either Jugie or Grumel, rejects this view completely; Runciman, *op. cit.*, 103.
 - 23 Chalandon, *Essai sur le règne d'Alexis Ier Comnène . . .*, 155ff; also, *Histoire de la première croisade . . .* 17-18 Comte Riant, "Inventaire critique des lettres historique des croisades: Ier partie," *Archives de l'Orient Latin*, I (Paris, 1881), No. XXXV, p. 101-105. See also Edward Tuthill, "The Appeal of Alexius for aid in 1095," *The University of Colorado Studies*, IV (Boulder, 1907), 135-143.
 - 24 Without knowing the document upon which this study is based, Fliche wrote in 1927: "Without a doubt, as Chalan-

- don observes, the situation of the Greek empire in 1095 was not alarming, but could not Alexius I nourish at this date the project of restoring the Byzantine power in Asia by recovering the regions occupied by the Turks . . . ? For the realization of such a dream foreign aid could be, if not indispensable, at least, very useful." Fliche, "Urbain II et la croisade," *Revue d'Histoire de l'Eglise de France*, XIV (1927), 291-293. For further references to scholars who have rejected Chalandon's view, see P. Charanis, "Byzantium, the West and the Origin of the First Crusade," *Byzantion*, XIX (1949), 25f. See also D. C. Munro, "Did the Emperor Alexius I ask for aid at the Council of Piacenza, 1095?", *The American Historical Review*, XXVII (1922), 731-733; M. W. Baldwin, "Some Recent Interpretations of Pope Urban II's Eastern Policy," *The Catholic Historical Review*, XXV (1940), 460.
- 25 Bernold of St. Blaise, *Chronicon*, MGH, SS, V, p. 462.
- 26 The chronicler in question is Theodore Skutariotes who wrote during the second half of the thirteenth century. Despite the fact that his testimony is late, its credibility, as I have shown in a special study, where I also give the passage quoted above in the Greek original, cannot be questioned. See Charanis, *Byzantium, the West and the Origin of the First Crusade* 30 ff. The text with an English translation was also published by me in *Speculum*, XXIV (1949), 93-94. Skutariotes does not mention the Council of Piacenza, but, in view of the conditions of the empire which his passage presupposes, the imperial ambassadors of whom he speaks must have been those who are reported by Bernhold to have spoken at Piacenza. Bernhold, *op. cit.*, 462. On Skutariotes and the credibility of his chronicle, especially for the period of the early Comneni, see further G. Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica I. Die Byzantinischen Quellen der Geschichte der Türkenvölker* (Budapest, 1942), 329f.
- 27 Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, edited by J. B. Bury (London, 1898), VI: 322.
- 28 Fliche, *La Réforme grégorienne et la Reconquête chrétienne 1057-1125*, 273. Cf. Erdmann, *op. cit.*, 301ff; W. Holtzmann, "Studien zur Orientpolitik des Reformpapsttums und zur Entstehung des ersten Kreuzzuges," *Historische Vierteljahrsschrift*, XXII (1924-25), 190ff.
- 29 On December 7, 1074 Gregory VII wrote to the emperor Henry IV that he was organizing an expedition of fifty thousand men in response to the appeals of the Greeks. If possible he would command it himself and would go as far as Jerusalem. Gregory VII, *Registrum*, Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, CXLVIII, 385-387. On this question of the origin of the idea of a united Christian effort for the liberation of the Holy Land see Erdmann, *op. cit.*, 145 ff; Ursula Schwerin, *Die Aufrufe der Päpste zur Befreiung des Heiligen Landes von den Anfängen bis zum Ausgang Innocenz IV* (Berlin, 1937), 68ff. Concerning the encyclical of Sergius IV which Erdmann accepts as authentic, see A. Gieysztor, "The Genesis of the Crusades: The Encyclical of Sergius IV (1009-1012), I," *Medievalia et Humanistica*, V (1948), 3-24; II, *Ibid*, VI (1950), 3-35.
- 30 The speech of Urban II as reported by the chroniclers: Fulcher of Chartres, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Historiens Occidentaux*, III (Paris, 1866), 323-324; Robert the Monk, *Ibid*, 727-730; Baldric of Bourgueil, *Ibid*, IV (Paris, 1879), 12-15; Guibert of Nogent, *Ibid*, IV; 137-140; and William of Malmesbury, *De Gestis Regum Anglorum*, edited by William Stubbs, *Rolls Series*, II (London, 1889), 393-398. On Urban's instructions to the assembling crusaders see, "Urbain II aux princes de Flandres et à leurs sujets," in *Archives de l'Orient Latin*, I (Paris, 1881), 220.
- 31 This motive for gain is well illustrated by the reaction of Tancred at the time of the siege of Antioch to the suggestion that a contingent of crusaders should occupy the fort of Antioch which was located near the monastery of Saint George on the left bank of the Orontes. "If I knew," he said, "what profit will come to me, I would occupy the fort with my men alone." L. Bréhier (editor and translator), *Histoire Anonyme de la Première Croisade* (Paris, 1924), 98.
- 32 Anna Comnena, *Alexiad*, II (Bonn, 1878), 32.
- 33 Gibbon, *op. cit.*, 287.
- 34 Bréhier, *Histoire Anonyme de la Première Croisade*, 30.
- 35 A. C. Krey, "A Neglected Passage in the Gesta and Its Bearing on the Literature of the First Crusade" in *The Crusades and Other Historical Essays Presented to Dana C. Munro* (New York, 1928), 57-78.
- 36 Bréhier, *Histoire Anonyme* . . . , 31.
- 37 E. Jamison, "Some Notes on the *Anonymi Gesta Francorum*, with Special Reference to the Norman Contingent from South Italy and Sicily in the First Crusade," in *Studies in French Language and Mediaeval Literature presented to Professor M. K. Pope* (Manchester, 1939), 193-95.
- 38 Paulus, *op. cit.*, II; 27ff; H. Pissard, *La guerre sainte en pays chrétien* (Paris, 1912), 121ff.
- 39 The crusade as an institution was already subjected to criticism in connection with the Third Crusade. See George B. Flahiff, "Deus non Vult: A Critic

- of the Third Crusade," in *Mediaeval Studies*, IX (1947), 162-188. But it was the misuse of the institution that gave rise to more and more criticism. For this see Palmer A. Throop, "Criticism of Papal Crusade Policy in Old French and Provençal," in *Speculum*, XIII (1938), 379-412; also by the same author, *Criticism of the Crusade: A Study of Public Opinion and Crusade Propaganda* (Amsterdam, 1940).
- 40 On Manuel Comnenus and the Second Crusade see F. Chalandon, *Jean II Comnène (1118-1443) et Manuel I Comnène (1143-1180)* (Paris, 1912), 263-315.
- 41 We have now a new edition with an English translation of Odo of Deuil. Odo of Deuil, *De profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, edited, with an English translation by Virginia G. Berry (New York, 1948).
- 42 Nicetas Choniates, *Historia* (Bonn, 1835), 88-89.
- 43 Odo of Deuil, *op. cit.*, 69, 79.
- 44 F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches von 565-1453*, II (Munich, 1925), 95; K. Zimmert, "Der deutsch-byzantinische Konflikt von Juli 1189 bis Februar 1190," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XII (1903), 42-77.



Economic History Association

Economic Factors in the Decline of the Byzantine Empire

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Reviewed work(s):

Source: *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Autumn, 1953), pp. 412-424

Published by: [Cambridge University Press](#) on behalf of the [Economic History Association](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2114773>

Accessed: 26/01/2013 22:54

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Cambridge University Press and Economic History Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The Journal of Economic History*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

Economic Factors in the Decline of the Byzantine Empire

IT IS now five hundred years since the Byzantine empire was brought to an end by the Ottoman Turks. Scholars today quite justly reject Gibbon's assumption that the Byzantine empire was, throughout its entire existence, in a state of decline. They have come to rank it, instead, as one of the great empires in history.¹ And this for good reasons. It endured for over a thousand years. Down to about the middle of the eleventh century it was the center of civilization in Christendom. It preserved the thought and literature of antiquity; it developed new forms of art; it held back the barbarians. It produced great statesmen, soldiers, and diplomats as well as reformers and renowned scholars. Its missionaries, aided by its diplomats and sometimes by its armies, spread the gospel among the pagan tribes, especially the Slavs, which dwelt along its frontiers and beyond. As a Czech historian has put it, Byzantium "molded the undisciplined tribes of Serbs, Bulgars, Russians, Croats even, and made nations out of them; it gave to them its religion and institutions, taught their princes how to govern, transmitted to them the very principles of civilization—writing and literature."² Byzantium was a great power and a great civilizing force.

Yet in a sense Gibbon was right. For the Byzantine empire did not come to an end as the result of a single blow as, for instance, the battle of Nineveh of 612 B.C. is said to have brought to an end the mighty Assyrian empire. The empire which Mohammed II destroyed on May

¹ Not only specialists but generally cultivated people have come to have a high regard for Byzantium. The Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen wrote in his book, *L'Arménie et le proche Orient* (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1928), p. 31: St. Sophia "is and will remain one of the most remarkable works of architecture, and if the Byzantine culture had created nothing but that, it would be sufficient to classify it among the greatest." And the philosopher A. N. Whitehead wrote in his *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), p. 104: "The distinction separating the Byzantines and the Mahometans from the Romans is that the Romans were themselves deriving the civilization which they spread. In their hands it assumed a frozen form. Thought halted, and literature copied. The Byzantines and the Mahometans were themselves the civilization. Thus their culture retained its intrinsic energies, sustained by physical and spiritual adventure. They traded with the Far East: they expanded westward: they codified law: they developed new forms of art: they elaborated theologies: they transformed mathematics: they developed medicine. Finally, the Near East as a centre of civilization was destroyed by the Tartars and the Turks."

² F. Dvornik, *Les Slaves byzance et Rome au IX^e siècle* (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1926), Vol. II.

29, 1453, had been wasting away for over three hundred years, although part of this time, notably during the period of the Comneni, it was not an insignificant force. By the time of the fall of Constantinople, however, the Morea, one or two islands in the Aegean, and Constantinople were all that had been left of its once widely extensive territories. Constantinople itself, which in the tenth century had a population of perhaps one million people, had been reduced to probably not more than 75,000 inhabitants.³ As a center of commerce it had long been eclipsed by Galata, the Genoese colony on the opposite side of the Golden Horn. The Byzantine emperors became puppets in the hands of the Italian commercial republics, notably Genoa and Venice, served the Ottoman sultans as vassals, or miserably toured the West begging for help in return for which they were ready to sacrifice the religious traditions of their people. What a far cry from the august position of their predecessors of the tenth century who challenged East and West and challenged them not without success! "I shall conquer your lands," wrote Nicephorus Phocas to the Caliph of Bagdad, "and I shall go as far as Mecca. . . . I shall conquer all the Orient and the Occident and I shall spread everywhere the religion of the cross."⁴ The same emperor declared to the ambassador of the German emperor, Otto I: "Do you want a greater scandal than that [Otto] should call himself emperor and claim for himself provinces belonging to our empire? Both these things are intolerable; and if both are unsupportable, that especially is not to be borne, nay, not to be heard of that he calls himself emperor."⁵ What brought the empire from this pinnacle of power down to the abject position in which we find it in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is one of the most interesting problems in history.

In the history of the Byzantine empire, war and religion were the two principal factors that molded the society of the empire and determined its external position.⁶ War was the normal state of things

³ Peter Charanis, "A Note on the Population and Cities of the Byzantine Empire in the Thirteenth Century," *The Joshua Starr Memorial Volume, Jewish Social Studies, Publication No. 5* (New York: Conference on Jewish Relations, Inc., 1953), pp. 137-39.

⁴ G. Schlumberger, *Un Empereur byzantin au dixième siècle: Nicéphore Phocas* (Paris, 1890), pp. 429 f.

⁵ F. H. Wright, trans., *The Works of Liudprand of Cremona* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1930), p. 249.

⁶ This statement, made by me in my study, "On the Social Structure of the Later Roman Empire," *Byzantion*, XVII (1944-45), 57, has been repeated by others. See, for instance, D. A. Zakythinos, "Les Institutions du Despotat de Morée. VI. Justice," *L'Hellénisme Contemporain*, Ser. 2, 4th year (1950), p. 206. A most amazing interpretation has been given to it recently by a Soviet scholar. He writes: "The American historian P. Charanis extracts from the Fascist

throughout its long existence. The external crisis, however, that particularly affected the evolution of its society was that of the seventh century.

The advances of the Saracens and the incursions of the Slavs and Bulgars reduced virtually the whole empire to a frontier province. To cope with this situation the emperors of the seventh century reorganized the provincial administration of the empire, introducing what is known as the *theme* system, the essence of which was the subordination of civil to military authority exercised in each province by the commander of the army corps stationed there.⁷ But with the establishment of the *theme* system is connected the establishment of another institution, the system of military estates. These military estates, small in size and granted to individuals in return for military service, became the opening wedge in the formation of a new class of free peasant proprietors. The soldiers themselves constituted the nucleus of this class, but others gradually were added. For while the eldest son of a soldier inherited his father's plot together with the obligation of military service, the rest of the family were free to reclaim and cultivate the land that was vacant.⁸ The free peasants, cultivating their own land, paying the taxes, and, if necessary, serving in the army, came to constitute the dominant element in the agrarian society of Byzantium. They became a bulwark of the state, lent to it new vigor, and enabled it eventually to recover its position in the Orient. By the end of the tenth century, Byzantium had become the most powerful state throughout the Christian-Moslem world.

The situation changed in the eleventh century. During the second half of that century the empire suffered a series of military reverses from which it never fully recovered. The most serious of these was the disastrous defeat at Manzikert (1071). The battle of Manzikert decided the fate of Asia Minor and conditioned the subsequent history of the Byzantine empire. But Manzikert was only a battle, and battles had been lost before without the serious consequences that followed Manzikert. What explains the decline that set in after it and

ideological arsenal the ancient glorification of war, carols its sham creative role; it is a pseudo scientific theory calling only to concur in the ideological preparation of a new war." A. P. Kazhdan, *Agrarnye otnosheniia v Vizantii XIII-XIV VV* (Moscow: Akademica Nauk SSSR, 1952), pp. 17-18. The translation is by G. Alef.

⁷ The latest work on the origin of the *theme* system with the essential bibliography is by A. Pertusi, *Constantino Porfirogenito de thematibus. Introduzione. Testo critico* (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1952), pp. 103-11.

⁸ For a discussion of this with the essential bibliography see Charanis, "On the Social Structure of the Later Roman Empire," *Byzantion*, XVII (1944-45), 42-49.

that would lead eventually to the disappearance of the empire were the conditions which came to prevail in the social and economic life of the empire in the eleventh century and later. Manzikert itself was the result of these conditions.

The dominant fact in the social and economic life of the empire in the eleventh century is the triumph of the landed military aristocracy and the decline of the soldiery-peasantry which had for centuries served as the bulwark of the state.

From the very beginning of its history the large estate had been a feature of Byzantine society. The complicated and burdensome fiscal administration affected by the reorganization of the empire following the political and economic crisis of the third century worked in such a way as to give impetus to the growth of the large estates. The society revealed by the papyri and the great legislative monuments of the fifth and the sixth centuries is a society dominated by these estates. *Coloni*, reduced to serfs, composed the vast majority of the agrarian population, although the free peasant proprietors did not disappear completely. The development of the soldiery-peasantry in the seventh century lessened the extent of the large estates, but did not eliminate them. By the end of the ninth century they had become larger and more numerous. Those who possessed them occupied important positions in the administration and used these positions to increase their holdings. This they did by absorbing, often through dubious means, the properties of the small peasants. Thus the small, free peasant proprietors began to disappear.⁹

The great emperors of the tenth century realized the dangerous social and political implications of this development and tried to check it. Every major emperor from Romanus Lecapenus to and including Basil II, with the exception of John Tzimeskes, issued more than one novel for this purpose. These emperors sought to preserve the free peasantry because they considered it an essential element for the health of the state. As Romanus Lecapenus put it in one of his novels:

⁹ For the essential bibliography see Charanis, "On the Social Structure and Economic Organization of the Byzantine Empire in the Thirteenth Century and Later," *Byzantino-slavica*, XII (1951), 94, n.2. To the works listed there the following should be added: D. A. Zakythinos, "Crise monétaire et crise économique à Byzance du XIII^e au XV^e siècle," *L'Hellénisme contemporain* (1948), pp. 50 f.; E. E. Lipsic, *Byzanz und die Slaven. Beiträge zur byzantinischen Geschichte des 6-9. Jahrhunderts*, trans. from the Russian by E. Langer (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger, 1951), pp. 5-105; Zakythinos, "La Société dans le despotat de Morée," *L'Hellénisme contemporain* (1951), pp. 7-28; Zakythinos, "Étatisme byzantine et expérience hellénistique," *Annuaire de L'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientale et Slave. Tome X: Mélanges Henri Grégoire*, II (1950), 667-80.

It is not through hatred and envy of the rich that we take these measures, but for the protection of the small and the safety of the empire as a whole. . . . The extension of the power of the strong . . . will bring about the irreparable loss of the public good, if the present law does not bring a check to it. For it is the many, settled on the land, who provide for the general needs, who pay the taxes and furnish the army with its recruits. Everything falls when the many are wanting.¹⁰

The strictest among the measures taken for the protection of the free peasantry was that issued by Basil II concerning the *allelengyon*, a measure which required the landed aristocracy to pay the tax arrears of peasants too poor to meet their own obligations. But with the death of Basil (1025) the effort to stop the growth of the large estates came to an end. His law concerning the *allelengyon* was repealed and the other measures, although kept in the books, were not enforced. The fate of the free peasantry was definitely decided.

Meanwhile, a similar fate befell the class of the enrolled soldiers, holders of the military estates. For the aristocracy, which, by one means or another, absorbed the estates of the small peasants, absorbed also those of the soldiers. The protection of the interests of these soldiers had been one of the deepest concerns of the emperors of the tenth century. Wrote Constantine Porphyrogenitus in the novel that he issued for the protection of the estates of the soldiers: "The army is to the state what the head is to the body He who neglects it neglects the safety of the state. . . . Therefore in promulgating our Constitution [on the military estates], we feel we are working for the welfare of all."¹¹ But in this as in the case of the small peasants the measures taken by the emperors of the tenth century were of no avail. It proved impossible to stop the aristocracy from absorbing the properties of the small, whether the latter were soldiers or not.

What consummated the depression of the enrolled soldiers, however, was the anti-military policy which some of the emperors of the eleventh century followed in order to reduce the power of the military magnates in the administration of the empire. Those who occupied the high military posts in the empire were also great landholders. Their wealth, plus the powers which they exercised as military commanders, made them extremely dangerous to the central government. This danger, indeed, was one of the principal reasons why Basil II issued

¹⁰ *Jus-Graeco-Romanum*, ed. Zachariae von Lingenthal (Leipzig, 1857), III, 246-47. On the efforts of the emperor to check the growth of ecclesiastical properties see Charanis, "The Monastic Properties and the State in the Byzantine Empire," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* (1948), IV, 53-64.

¹¹ *Jus-Graeco-Romanum*, III, 262 f.

the novel concerning the *allelengyon* to which reference has already been made. He had faced two formidable revolts, both headed by members of the powerful aristocracy, and it was only with difficulty that he survived. When, after 987, Basil was reconciled with Bardas Skleros, one of the powerful rebels, the latter advised him that, if he wished to preserve the imperial authority, he should permit no one of the aristocracy to prosper and should exhaust their means by heavy taxes.¹² Hence, the various measures he took, including that of the *allelengyon*, were designed not only to protect the poor peasants but also to crush the aristocracy. But on both the question of land and that of taxation the aristocracy triumphed.

One of the important reasons for the triumph of the aristocracy was the very strong hold that it had upon the military organization of the empire. If it could be shaken from this hold, it would lose in power and influence and would become more amenable to the wishes of the imperial government. And this is precisely what certain emperors of the eleventh century, notably Constantine IX Monomachos (1042–1055), Michael VI (1056–1057), and Constantine X Dukas (1059–1067), tried to do. The means of attack which they employed was to weaken the military organization by reducing the size of the army, thus depriving the aristocracy of its military commands. The great military triumphs of the tenth century, the crushing of the Saracens and the Bulgarians and the pushing of the frontiers to the Euphrates and the Tigris in the east and to the Danube in the Balkans, created a sense of security and the feeling that the maintenance of a powerful army was no longer necessary. With Constantine IX, peace became the keynote of the imperial foreign policy, and there began a systematic elimination of the aristocracy from the army while at the same time the development of a civil bureaucracy was promoted. But the aristocracy fought back, and a new struggle ensued, this time between the aristocracy as a military class and a new party of civil officials who came to dominate the imperial court.

The struggle plunged the empire into a series of civil wars that squandered its resources and manpower at a time when new and formidable enemies were making their appearance, both in the East and in the West. But the most serious result of the imperial policy was the deterioration of the army and the depression of the enrolled sol-

¹² M. Psellos, *Chronographie*, ed. and trans. into French by E. Renauld (Paris: "Les Belles Lettres," 1926), pp. 1–17. English trans. E. R. A. Sewter, *The Chronographia of Michael Psellus* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953), p. 23.

diers. By the time of Constantine X Dukas the profession of the soldier had lost much of its attraction and so, as a Byzantine historian puts it, "the soldiers put aside their arms and became lawyers or jurists."¹³ The same author, writing of the army that took the field in one of the expeditions against the Seljuks, states:

The army was composed of Macedonians and Bulgarians and Varangians and other barbarians who happened to be about. There were gathered also those who were in Phrygia [the *theme* Anatolikon]. And what one saw in them [the enrolled soldiers of the *theme* Anatolikon] was something incredible. The renowned champions of the Romans who had reduced into subjection all of the east and the west now numbered only a few and these were bowed down by poverty and ill treatment. They lacked in weapons, swords, and other arms, such as javelins and scythes. . . . They lacked also in cavalry and other equipment, for the emperor had not taken the field for a long time. For this reason they were regarded as useless and unnecessary and their wages and maintenance were reduced.¹⁴

The enrolled soldiers, depressed and forgotten, became more and more a minor element in the Byzantine army. The bulk of this army, in the eleventh century and later, came to be composed almost entirely of foreign mercenaries—Russians, Turks, Alans, English, Normans, Germans, Patzinaks, Bulgarians, and others. These mercenaries were swayed more by their own interests than by those of the empire.

Meanwhile, the development of two institutions, the *pronoia* and the *exkuseia*, added further to the wealth and power of the landed aristocracy, both lay and ecclesiastic. The *pronoia*¹⁵ was the principal means that the emperors of the second half of the eleventh century, but especially later, adopted to recuperate much of the deserted land, to reconstitute the class of soldiers with landed interests, and to reward many of their partisans. A *pronoia* was granted to an individual for a specific period of years, usually his lifetime, in return for military or other services rendered or to be rendered. It was never hereditary, unless it was specifically declared so by a special measure. It consisted usually

¹³ Cedrenus, *Historiarum Compendium* (Bonn, 1839), II, 652.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 668.

¹⁵ For the essential bibliography on the Byzantine *pronoia* see Charanis, "On the Social Structure and Economic Organization of the Byzantine Empire in the Thirteenth Century and Later," *Byzantino-slavica*, XII (1951), 97, n. 11. To the works listed there should be added the important work by G. Ostrogorsky, *Pronoia, A Contribution to the History of Feudalism in Byzantium and in South-Slavic Lands* (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Science, Special Editions, CLXXVI, Byzantine Institute, Vol. I, 1951). Unfortunately Ostrogorsky chose to write this book in Serbian. However we have now a lengthy summary of it in English: Ihor Ševčenko, "An Important Contribution to the Social History of Late Byzantium," *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States*, II (1952), 448–59.

of land, but it could be a river or a fishery. Some of the *pronoiae* were very extensive, others less so, but the general effect of all was to increase the power and influence of the aristocracy and to lessen the hold of the central government over the agrarian population. For the holder of a *pronoia* exercised over those who inhabited it important financial and judicial powers which were granted to him along with the land. He was expected to serve in the army and also to furnish troops according to the size of his *pronoia*. But when we first meet with the *pronoia* in the second half of the eleventh century, it was not primarily a military grant; it became so during the reign of Alexius Comnenus and those of his successors. The *pronoia* differed from the old military estate in that it was held by persons high in the social order, whereas the recipients of the latter were peasant soldiers. In a study which I devoted to the aristocracy of Byzantium in the thirteenth century I showed that many of the holders of *pronoiae* belonged to the great families of the empire, families that were related to each other and to the ruling dynasty.¹⁶ The extensive use of the *pronoia* contributed not only to the increase, relatively speaking, of the power and wealth of the aristocracy but also to the development of the appanage system and thus weakened the central administration.

The central administration was weakened also by the development of the *exkuseia*.¹⁷ The term, which derives no doubt from the Latin *excusatio* (*excusare*), refers to the fiscal and judicial immunities that the imperial government often granted, especially to monasteries. It was formerly thought that the *exkuseia* first appeared in the eleventh century, but it is now known to be older than that,¹⁸ and may have developed out of the various privileges granted to the Christian clergy in the fourth century. Its use on a wide scale, however, is associated with the eleventh century and later. As the monastic properties during this period were very extensive, the revenue that the imperial government lost by the grant of *exkuseiae* must have been considerable. At the same time the *exkuseia* contributed to increasing the wealth of members of the lay aristocracy, for the emperors of the second half of the eleventh century and later often rewarded their partisans by grant-

¹⁶ Charanis, "The Aristocracy of Byzantium in the Thirteenth Century," *Studies in Roman Economic and Social History in Honor of Allan Chester Johnson*, ed. by P. R. Coleman-Norton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 336-55.

¹⁷ For the essential bibliography on the *exkuseia* see Charanis, "The Monastic Properties and the State in the Byzantine Empire," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* (1948), IV, 65, n. 31.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 64-67. For a reference to *exkuseia* in the tenth century, 995, see F. Dolger, *Aus den Schatzkammern des Heiligen Berges. Textband* (Munich: Münchner Verlag [Bisher F. Bruckmann], 1948), p. 155, l. 3.

ing to them the revenues of monasteries, such grants being then known as *kharistikia*. And monasteries whose revenues were thus granted often enjoyed the privilege of *exkuseia*.

Thus the failure to enforce the measures that had been issued for the protection of the soldiery-peasantry and the various grants of privileges made to the aristocracy had made the large estates, by the eleventh century, the dominant features of the agrarian landscape of Byzantium. These estates were worked by tenant peasants, the *paroikoi* of the Byzantine texts, people who were personally free, but who were tied to certain obligations and corvées that curtailed their movement. Some free peasant proprietors continued to exist, but they had become hardly distinguishable from the *paroikoi*. Besides working for the lord, the *paroikoi* had allotments of their own for which they paid rent and performed various obligations and from which, after the passage of a number of years, they could not be evicted. These allotments were transmissible from father to son. These tenant peasants, weighed down by the heavy burden of taxation and numerous corvées, lost all feeling for the welfare of the state as a whole. It is well known that the peasantry of the interior of Asia Minor offered no resistance to the Seljuk Turks, whose establishment in Asia Minor after Manzikert started the empire on the road to general decline. In the twelfth century the Comneni, by utilizing every resource at their disposal, succeeded in bringing about a partial recovery of the political power of the state, but neither they nor their successors tried to check the economic decay of the agrarian population. In the fourteenth century the deplorable economic conditions of the population were a big factor in the social and political strife that shook the empire and opened the way for the rise of the Ottoman Turks.¹⁹ In the tenth century, as we have pointed out above, Romanus Lecapenus had declared in one of his novels designed to protect the free peasantry that the extension of the power of the strong and the depression of the many would "bring about the irreparable loss of the public good." His prediction had come true. The disappearance of the free peasantry, the increase in the wealth, privileges, and power of the aristocracy, and the consequent depression of the agrarian population constitute, I think, some of the principal factors in the decline of the Byzantine empire.

But the society of the Byzantine empire was not purely agrarian. Included in the empire were a number of cities—Constantinople and

¹⁹ On the social upheavals in Byzantium in the fourteenth century see Charanis, "Internal Strife in Byzantium in the Fourteenth Century," *Byzantion*, XV (1940-41), 208-30.

Thessalonica immediately come to mind—whose role in the economic life of the empire was by no means insignificant. The penury of the sources makes impossible a detailed analysis of the urban economy of Byzantium, but that it was comparatively highly developed there can be no doubt.²⁰

What characterized the urban economy of Byzantium during the great days of the empire was its strict regulation by the state. This regulation consisted of two elements: the strict control over foreign commerce²¹ and the organization of the domestic trades and professions into private and public guilds supervised by the government.²² The object of this regulation was both political and economic: political in that the government sought to assure for itself arms and an ample supply of manufactured goods—in the main, luxuries—not only for the imperial household but also for the use of its diplomacy in the form of presents to barbarian chieftains and other princes; economic in that the government sought to keep the great cities well provisioned with the necessities of life, assure the quality of goods, and prevent exorbitant prices. The urban economy was also an important source of revenue. All imports and exports were subject to a 10 per cent duty, and the professions and trades, besides being liable for certain taxes, also performed various liturgies.²³ The precise amount of this revenue, because of the fragmentary nature of the sources, cannot be determined, but it must have been considerable.²⁴

²⁰ There is really no systematic and exhaustive study on the commerce and industry of Byzantium. The latest general survey is that by S. Runciman, "Byzantine Trade and Industry," *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952). The chapter by R. S. Lopez in the same publication, entitled "The Trade of Medieval Europe: the South," also bears upon the commerce of Byzantium. For the industry and commerce of the Peloponnesus there is now the book by A. Bon, *Le Péloponnèse byzantin jusqu'en 1204* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951), pp. 119–53. On the silk industry the important study is by Lopez, "Silk Industry in the Byzantine Empire," *Speculum*, XX (1945), 1–43.

²¹ As an illustration of this one may consult the commercial treaty which the Byzantines concluded in the tenth century with the Russian Prince Igor: S. H. Cross, "The Russian Primary Chronicle," *Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature*, XII (1930), 159 ff. A new edition of Cross's translation of this chronicle will soon be published by the Mediaeval Academy of America.

²² The fundamental source for the guild organization in Byzantium remains the *Book of the Prefect* of which there is an English translation, A. E. R. Boak, "The Book of the Prefect," *Journal of Economic and Business History*, I (1929), 600 ff. For the essential bibliography see Charanis, "On the Social Structure and Economic Organization of The Byzantine Empire in the Thirteenth Century and Later," *Byzantino-slavica*, XII (1951), 149, n. 247.

²³ G. Rouillard, "Les Taxes maritimes et commerciales d'après des actes de Patmos et de Lavra," *Mélanges Charles Diehl* (Paris: Librairie Ernest Leroux, 1930), I, 277–89; John Danstrup, "Indirect taxation at Byzantium," *Classica et Mediaevalia*, VIII (1946), 139–67.

²⁴ For the twelfth century, we are told by the traveler Benjamin of Tudella, the daily revenues of Constantinople amounted to 20,000 nomismata. For the essential bibliography concerning the meaning of this figure and in general about the revenues of Byzantium see Charanis,

The regulation of urban economy was relaxed beginning with the last quarter of the eleventh century. The significant step in this development was taken in 1082 when Alexius Comnenus granted to the Venetians, in return for their alliance against the Normans of Sicily, various privileges among which the most important was that of trading freely, without the payment of any duty, in virtually all the cities of the empire, including the capital. These privileges, renewed by the emperors of the twelfth century, although not without reluctance,²⁵ rendered the Venetians virtual masters of the commercial life of the empire. In the thirteenth century, in an effort to lessen the influence of the Venetians, similar privileges were granted to the Genoese (the treaty of Nymphaeum, 1261), but that was the substitution of one exploiter for another. The Italian merchants, whether Genoese or Venetians, became so entrenched in Constantinople that they controlled the economy of that city and determined the price of even the daily necessities. According to the patriarch Athanasius (end of the thirteenth century), the fate of the Romans had completely passed into the hands of the Latins, "who," he complained bitterly to the emperor Andronicus II, "make fun of us and scorn us to the point that, full of overweening conceit, they take the wives of our compatriots as security for the wheat which they deliver to us."²⁶

Meanwhile, the guild organization which was such a strong feature of the urban organization of the tenth century had virtually ceased to exist by the end of the thirteenth century. This at least is the impression created by the letters of the patriarch Athanasius which, although not yet published, have been analyzed by two different scholars.²⁷ The patriarch complained to the emperor that false weights were used, that the wheat was hoarded, was often mixed with chaff or wheat that had rotted, and was sold at exorbitant prices. He urged the emperor to appoint a commissioner to supervise everything that concerned the provisioning of the capital. The emperor (Andronicus II) took cognizance of the complaints and ordered an investigation. He was especially anxious to determine who were those who exercised the trade of baker,

"Internal Strife in Byzantium during the Fourteenth Century," *Byzantion*, XV (1940-41), 224, n. 62. The nomisma was a gold piece which weighed about 4.50 gr.

²⁵ John Danstrup, "Manuel I's Coup against Genoa and Venice in the Light of Byzantine Commercial Policy," *Classica et Mediaevalia*, X (1948), 195-219.

²⁶ See n. 27.

²⁷ R. Guiland, "La Correspondence inédite d'Athanase, patriarche de Constantinople (1289-1293; 1304-1310)," *Mélanges Charles Diehl*, I (1930), 121-40; N. Bănescu, "Le Patriarche Athanase I et Andronic II Paléologue. État religieux, politique et social de l'Empire," *Académie Roumaine: Bulletin de la Section Historique*, 23, I (1942), 35 ff.

how many of them there were, and under what conditions were the ships, which brought the food supplies to Constantinople, sold and bought. Thus, at the end of the thirteenth century it was not officially known who were the bakers in Constantinople and how many of them there were. Nor were they supervised with the view of assuring the quality of and a fair price for their produce. Contrast this with what the *Book of the Prefect* says about the bakers as they functioned in the tenth century:

The bakers shall make their profits according to the amount of grain purchased at the order of the Prefect. They shall purchase the proper amount of grain by the nomisma from their assessor. When they have ground it and leavened it, they shall calculate their profit at a keration and two miliarisia on the nomisma.²⁸ The keration will be pure profit, while the two miliarisia will go for the support of their workmen, the food of their mill animals, the fuel for the ovens, and the lighting. . . .

Whenever there is an increase or decrease in the supply of grain, the bakers shall go to the Prefect to have the weights of their loaves fixed by the assessor in accordance with the purchase price of grain.²⁹

Obviously by the end of the thirteenth century the bakers' guild had completely broken down; there was not even a semblance of governmental control over the baker's trade. And what was true of this trade was probably also true of the others. The only indication of a trade organization in the fourteenth century was that of the mariners of Thessalonica. It has been suggested that this guild was organized by the mariners themselves in order to protect their interests, but more probably it was a continuation of an older organization which became more or less autonomous as the power of the central government declined in the fourteenth century. The guild of the mariners took the leadership in the terrible social upheaval that shook Thessalonica in 1345 and resulted in the slaughter of about one hundred members of the aristocracy.³⁰

It has been said that "Byzantium's weakness, which led to her fatal decline in the course of the eleventh century" was "her rigid, defensive attitude toward the outside world . . . embodied in the cultural and

²⁸ Subdivision of Byzantine money was as follows:

1 pound of gold = 72 nomismata

1 nomisma = 12 miliarisia = 24 keratia = 288 folleis

See further G. Ostrogorsky, "Die ländliche Steurgemeinde des byzantinischen Reiches im X Jahrhundert," *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial-und-Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, XX (1927), 63.

²⁹ I have used Boak's translation, pp. 616-17.

³⁰ On this see Charanis, "Internal Strife in Byzantium in the Fourteenth Century," *Byzantion*, XV (1940-41), 211 ff.

economic barriers she raised against all outsiders.”³¹ The economic barriers spoken of in this statement refer no doubt to the strict controls that Byzantium had exercised over commerce and industry. It is extremely doubtful if this indeed was Byzantium’s weakness. The simple observation that the period during which these controls were most rigidly enforced is the period of the greatness of the empire suggests the opposite, and this suggestion is reinforced by the further observation that the period of decline coincides with the breakdown of these controls. The power of a state and as a consequence its ability to maintain its position in the world is commensurate with its financial resources, the principal source of which is taxation. In Byzantium this source, seriously compromised by the disappearance of the free peasantry and the increase in the wealth, privileges, and power of the aristocracy was reduced almost to the vanishing point by the commercial privileges granted to the Italian republics³² and the consequent loss by Byzantium of control over its urban economy. This was Byzantium’s weakness that brought about its decline and final fall.

PETER CHARANIS, *Rutgers University*

³¹ A. R. Lewis, *Naval Power and Trade in the Mediterranean, A. D. 500–1100* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 253.

³² An idea of what happened to the revenues of Constantinople is given by the statement of the Byzantine historian Gregoras that, while the annual custom revenues of Constantinople had shrunk to about 30,000 nomismata, those of the Genoese colony of Galata went up to about 200,000 nomismata. This was about the middle of the fourteenth century. Nicephorus Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia* (Bonn, 1829–30), II, 842.

DUMBARTON OAKS

Ethnic Changes in the Byzantine Empire in the Seventh Century

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Reviewed work(s):

Source: *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, Vol. 13 (1959), pp. 23-44

Published by: [Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1291127>

Accessed: 26/01/2013 22:52

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

ETHNIC CHANGES
IN THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE
IN THE SEVENTH CENTURY

PETER CHARANIS

This study is in substance identical with a paper delivered
at the Symposium on "Byzantium in the Seventh Century"
held at Dumbarton Oaks in May 1957

THE Byzantine Empire was never in its long history a true national state with an ethnically homogeneous population. It is true that the conquests of the Arabs in the seventh century deprived the empire of great numbers of non-Greek-speaking elements and gave to it an aspect which appeared to be more Greek than had been the case before. Egypt and Syria, where a national consciousness and a literature in the native languages had begun to develop, were lost; so also was Africa with its Latin and Punic-speaking population. There remained Asia Minor, parts of the Balkan peninsula, the islands of the Aegean, including Crete, certain regions of Italy, and Sicily. Here the Greek-speaking elements were strong, but the ethnic homogeneity which they suggest was more apparent than real.

Let us first look at Asia Minor. No doubt, under Hellenistic and Roman domination, the native population of that very important peninsula had been deeply affected by Hellenism, but neither in language nor in culture, particularly in the isolated regions of the back country, was the victory of Hellenism complete.¹ The evidence for this is scattered and largely circumstantial, but it is unmistakable. The native languages survived long into the Christian era. We know that Phrygian, which in the first three centuries of our era witnessed a true renaissance,² was still spoken in the sixth century.³ The same was true of Lycaonian.⁴ Celtic, which, according to Jerome,⁵ was heard in Galatia in the fourth century, survived until the end of the fifth and probably beyond. So we may infer from a hagiographical text concerning a posthumous miracle of St. Euthymius, who died in 487. According to this text a Galatian monk who had lost his speech was cured by the saint, but at first he could

¹ For example, in the sixth century the city of Tralles was thoroughly Greek-speaking, but the back country was hardly impregnated by Hellenism, as is shown by the fact that it still remained predominantly pagan. Agathias, *Historiae* (Bonn, 1838), 102; E. W. Brooks, *Iohannis Ephesini historiae ecclesiasticae pars tertia*, CSCO (Louvain, 1936), 81, 125 (English trans. R. Payne Smith [Oxford, 1860], 159, 230).

² W. M. Calder, "Corpus Inscriptionum Neo-Phrygiarum," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 31 (1911), 161-215; 33 (1913), 97-104; 46 (1926), 22 ff. On page 164 of volume 31 Calder writes: "The existence of over sixty inscriptions of which no two are exactly alike, and all of which exhibit intelligent syntactical variation, is sufficient proof that Phrygian was not a moribund language surviving in a few fixed formulae, but was the everyday language of the uneducated classes at the period to which the texts belong." For a map indicating the Phrygian-speaking zone in Asia Minor about A. D. 250 see W. M. Calder, ed., *Monumenta Asiae Minoris antiqua*, VII: *Monuments of Eastern Phrygia* (Manchester, 1956), xlv. For a corpus consisting of the Neo-Phrygian inscriptions published up to 1928 see J. Friedrich, *Kleinasiatische Sprachdenkmäler* (Berlin, 1932), 128-140. Cf. Calder's remarks, *Monuments of Eastern Phrygia*, p. xxvii.

³ *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 31, 165; Karl Holl, "Das Fortleben der Volkssprachen in Kleinasien in nachchristlicher Zeit," *Hermes*, 43 (1908), 248. We are told concerning an Arian bishop Selinas that his father was a Goth, his mother a Phrygian, and that for this reason he used both languages. He also preached in Greek. Socrates, *Historia Ecclesiastica* V. 23. Migne, *PG*, 67. 648; Sozomen, *Historia Ecclesiastica*. VII.16. Migne, *PG*, 67.1468.

⁴ Life of St. Martha, *Acta Sanctorum*, May, V, 413C. Cf. Holl, *op. cit.*, 243-246. For the use of Lycaonian at the time of St. Paul, *Acts of the Apostles*, 14, 11.

⁵ Jerome, *Commentarium in Epistolam ad Galatas* II, 3 (Migne, *PL*, 26. 357). Cf. F. Stähelin, *Geschichte der kleinasiatischen Galater*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1907), 104; W. M. Ramsay, *A Historical Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians* (New York, 1900), 145-164; J. G. C. Anderson, "Exploration in Galatia cis Halym," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 19 (1899), 316-318.

speak only in his native tongue.⁶ The continuous use of Mysian is also attested. We are told about St. Auxentius, who lived during the first half of the fifth century, but whose biography was written at the beginning of the sixth century, that, as he had come from Mysia, he was barbarian in language.⁷ In Cappadocia the native language continued to prevail certainly throughout the fourth century, as we learn from Gregory of Nyssa⁸ and also from Basil, who says that the Cappadocians were saved from a certain heresy because "the grammatical structure of their native tongue did not permit the distinction between 'with' and 'and.'"⁹ In Cappadocia, too, there lived a people known as the Magusaeans, who scandalized the Christians by the tenacity with which they adhered to their strange practices, including marriage between brother and sister.¹⁰ In Isauria also the native tongue continued to be used. The evidence for this is a hagiographical text written after 596.¹¹

I have found no evidence later than the sixth century attesting the persistence of native languages in Asia Minor. The chances are, however, that these languages, at least some of them, continued to be used long beyond the chronological limits of our evidence, for languages do not die out overnight. The Phrygians, for instance, as we may infer from what we know of the background of Michael II, seem to have been only semi-Hellenized as late as the beginning of the ninth century. Michael, who is described as coarse, ill-educated, and contemptuous of Hellenic culture, was no doubt typical of the natives of Phrygia, many of whom may not have known any Greek at all.¹² We may suppose, then, with some reason, that there was no complete linguistic homogeneity in Asia Minor in the seventh century. This supposition is strengthened by the persistence of the native heresies, known from both ecclesiastical writers and epigraphy.¹³ Montanism was widespread in Phrygia, Lycaonia, and perhaps also in Cappadocia, Galatia, and Cilicia.¹⁴ Procopius states that

⁶ A. H. M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (Oxford, 1937), 122.

⁷ *Vita S. Auxentii*, Migne, PG, 114. 1428; Holl, *op. cit.*, 241 f.

⁸ *Contra Eunomium*, Migne, PG, 45. 1045.

⁹ *De Spiritu Sancto*, Migne, PG, 32. 208.

¹⁰ Saint Basil, *The Letters*, ed. and tr. Roy J. Deferrari, 4 (Cambridge, Mass., 1939) (Loeb Classical Library), 44-46; Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, ed. E. H. Gifford (Oxford, 1903), 1:352 (book VI, chap. 10).

¹¹ Holl, *op. cit.*, 243. In Cilicia, too, the native language was spoken at least until the fifth century. We are told by Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus, that an ascetic whom he knew personally spoke Greek though he was Cilician by race. We may infer from this that there were natives in Cilicia who did not speak Greek. Theodoret, *Religiosa Historia*, Migne, PG, 82. 1488.

¹² Theophanes Continuatus, (Bonn, 1838), 49. Cf. J. B. Bury, *A History of the Eastern Roman Empire from the Fall of Irene to the Accession of Basil I* (London, 1912), 78.

¹³ W. M. Calder, "The Epigraphy of the Anatolian Heresies," *Anatolian Studies Presented to Sir William Mitchell Ramsay* (Manchester, 1923), 59-91. For evidence of the persistence of some of the ancient heresies of Asia Minor as late as the seventh decade of the ninth century see C. Mango, *The Homilies of Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople. English Translation, and Commentary* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 279-282; 288-289. Photius speaks further (289) of "the ungodly ideas of those half-barbarous and bastard clans which had crept into the Roman government." The reference no doubt is to the iconoclasts whom apparently Photius did not consider completely Hellenized. Cf. Mango's note (289, note 16).

¹⁴ G. Bardy, "Montanisme," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, 10 (1929), 2368, for the early period. For a Montanist inscription of the sixth century see H. Grégoire, "Du nouveau sur la hierarchie de la secte montaniste d'après une inscription grecque trouvée près de Philadelphie en Lydie," *Byzantion*, 2 (1925), 329-336.

the Montanists in Phrygia destroyed themselves rather than abandon their heresy,¹⁵ but the evidence is that they continued to exist. They are mentioned in the Acts of the Council in Trullo (692), in which they are called *Phryges*. The same Acts refer to other heresies in Asia Minor, especially in Galatia, as being numerous, and mention some, all of long standing, by name.¹⁶ Montanists are known to have existed during the reign of Leo III.¹⁷ We also know that early in the ninth century the Paulician Sergius Tychikos corresponded with a certain Leo the Montanist.¹⁸ The reference to this correspondence is rather significant, for it indicates that the Montanists, who henceforth cease to appear in history, may have merged with the Paulicians.¹⁹ This would explain the apparent increase in the strength of the Paulicians in Phrygia and the consequent apprehensive attitude toward them of the ecclesiastical and imperial authorities of Constantinople.²⁰ Some of the Montanists may have merged with the Athinganoi, another strange sect of considerable importance both in Phrygia and Lycaonia.²¹ Michael II is said to have inherited from his parents the beliefs of the Athinganoi, and Nicephorus I was accused of being friendly to both them and the Paulicians.²² Early in the ninth century the Athinganoi were either exterminated or driven out of their homes, and some of them were settled on the island of Aegina where the natives referred to them as aliens.²³ This attitude toward them does not prove that their language was not Greek, since the term alien could very well have been applied to newly established settlers from another province. The fact, however, that the Gypsies, descendants of the foreign Zatt who had been settled in the Empire in 855, came to be called Athinganoi may indicate that the latter were distinguished by their strange language.²⁴

There is some basis for believing, therefore, that in the seventh century

¹⁵ Procopius, *Anecdota*, XI. 14; XI. 23.

¹⁶ Mansi, XI:984 (Canon 95).

¹⁷ Theophanes, *Chronographia*, ed. C. de Boor, I (Leipzig, 1883), 401. For other texts, J. Starr, *The Jews in the Byzantine Empire* (Athens, 1939), 91-92.

¹⁸ H. Grégoire, "Précisions géographiques et chronologiques sur les Pauliciens," *Académie royale de Belgique: Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, 5^e Sér., 33 (Brussels, 1947), 317.

¹⁹ Cf. F. C. Conybeare, *The Key of Truth. A Manual of the Paulician Church in Armenia* (Oxford, 1898), LXXIV; CLXXXV. Grégoire, *ibid.*, 301. There is some evidence to the effect that a community of Cathari continued to exist in Philadelphia, Lydia, as late as the thirteenth century. Grégoire, "Cathares d'Asie Mineure, d'Italie et de France," *Mémorial Louis Petit* (= *Archives de l'Orient chrétien*, I) (Paris, 1948), 144-145.

²⁰ Ignatius, *Vita Nicephori*, ed. C. de Boor, *Nicephori archiepiscopi Constantinopolitani opuscula historica* (Leipzig, 1880), 158-159.

²¹ Theophanes, I:495; Genesius, *Historia* (Bonn, 1834), 32; Theophanes Continuatus, 42. On the Athinganoi one may further consult Joshua Starr, "An Eastern Christian Sect: the Athinganoi," *The Harvard Theological Review*, XXIX, 2 (1936), 93-106.

²² Theophanes Continuatus, 42; Theophanes, I:488. Jews also are known to have existed in Asia Minor, as in Constantinople, but they do not appear to have been very numerous. Starr, *The Jews in the Byzantine Empire*, 88ff., 98f.; A. Sharf, "Byzantine Jewry in the Seventh Century," *BZ*, 48 (1955), III.

²³ *The Life of Saint Athanasia of Aegina, Acta Sanctorum, August, III, 170E.*

²⁴ M. J. De Goeje, *Mémoires d'histoire et de géographie orientale*, no. 3. *Mémoire sur les migrations des Tsiganes à travers l'Asie* (Leiden, 1903), 75. On the ancestry of the gypsies one may consult, in addition to the work of De Goeje, A. A. Vasiliev-H. Grégoire, *Byzance et les Arabes*, I (Brussels, 1935), 223-224; J. B. Bury, *op. cit.*, 40, note 1.

there still remained certain elements of the ancient native population of Asia Minor that had not been completely absorbed by Hellenism, either in language or in culture. But this point should not be too greatly stressed. The native elements were finally absorbed, though perhaps they retained some of their own traits. The administration, the army, the schools, but above all the official Church, with its insistence upon orthodoxy and its use of Greek, were powerful agents of Hellenization. The events of the seventh century, too, may have strengthened Hellenism in Asia Minor. We know that many Christians, the majority of whom were doubtless Greek-speaking, fled from Syria and Egypt when these territories were conquered by the Arabs.²⁵ We do not know exactly where they settled, though it is more than likely that many of them settled in Asia Minor. However, the settlement of new peoples, some of whom, notably the Slavs, will be mentioned in the course of this paper, was to complicate the ethnic composition of Asia Minor.²⁶

One of the most important developments in the Byzantine Empire toward the end of the sixth century and the beginning of the seventh was the rise to prominence of the Armenians. They were to maintain this position throughout the seventh and eighth centuries, while in the ninth and tenth centuries they improved it even further.

At the end of the sixth century the Byzantine Empire controlled the major part of Armenia,²⁷ but the events of the seventh century, in particular the rise of the Arabs, deprived it of this control,²⁸ though it still retained some Armenian-speaking lands. It was from these lands that the Empire drew its Armenian recruits, but many Armenians who entered its service also came from the Armenian regions under foreign control. Sometimes they came as

²⁵ P. K. Hitti, *Origins of the Islamic State* (New York, 1916), 180: "In the year 49 the Greeks left for the seacoast"; 194: They (the Greeks of Tripoli) "wrote to the king of the Greeks asking for relief through reinforcement or ships on which they might escape and flee to him. Accordingly, the king sent them many ships which they boarded in the night time and fled away." 195: "He [a certain Greek patrician] made his way together with his followers to the land of the Greeks"; 189: "The fact is that when Damascus was taken possession of, a great number of its inhabitants fled to Heraclius, who was then at Antioch, leaving many vacant dwellings behind that were later occupied by the Moslems"; 227: "At last they [the people and soldiers of Antioch] capitulated, agreeing to pay poll tax or evacuate the place. Some of them did leave; but others remained, and to the latter Abu-Ubaidah guaranteed safety, assessing one *dinar* and one *jarib* [of wheat] on every adult"; 231 f: "When the Moslem armies reached these towns [the Greek towns of Syria], their inhabitants capitulated, agreeing to pay poll tax or evacuate the place. Most of them left for the Byzantine Empire"; 348: "Some of its [Alexandria's] Greek inhabitants left to join the Greeks somewhere else." Hitti's book is a translation of the *Futuh al-Buldan* of al-Buladhuri.

²⁶ We may mention, for instance, the Goths who, in the early centuries of the Empire, were settled in Bithynia, in the territory which later formed the theme of Optimati. They were still there in the eighth century, though they seem to have been Hellenized. Theophanes, I:385; "Acta Graeca SS. Davidis, Symeonis et Georgii" *Analecta Bollandiana*, 18 (1899), 256. Alans seem to have settled in the Pontic regions of the Empire sometime between 662 and 666. P. Peeters, "A propos de la version arménienne de l'historien Socrate," *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales*, 2 (Brussels, 1934), 669, note 2. Vandals were settled in Asia Minor by Justinian. Procopius, *De bello Vandalico*, II 14, 17.

²⁷ Under the Emperor Maurice the Byzantine frontier in Armenia followed a line extending from Nisibis to lake Van, Maku, Dvin, Garni, and Tiflis. Nisibis, Maku, Dvin, Garni, and Tiflis did not belong to the Empire. P. Goubert, *Byzance avant l'Islam*, 1 (Paris, 1951), 290-295; cf. Ernst Honigmann, *Die Ostgrenze des byzantinischen Reiches von 363 bis 1071* (Brussels, 1935), 27 ff.

²⁸ The Arab domination of Armenia was established in the second half of the seventh century. H. Manandean, "Les invasions arabes en Arménie," *Byzantion*, 18 (1946-1948), 190.

adventurers, but more often as refugees. Thus in 571, following an unsuccessful revolt against the Persians, the Armenian Catholicos, a few bishops and numerous noblemen fled to Constantinople.²⁹ The leading men among these refugees, were, besides the Catholicos, Vardan Mamiconian and his retinue. There were also among them some Iberians (Georgians), headed by one Gorgonis, who had joined the Armenians in their unsuccessful revolt.³⁰ Vardan joined the Byzantine army; the rest seem to have settled in Pergamum, where an Armenian colony is known to have existed in the seventh century. From this colony sprang Bardanes who, under the name of Philippicus, occupied the imperial throne from 711 to 713.³¹ More Armenians immigrated after Armenia had fallen into the hands of the Arabs. Thus, about 700 a number of Nakharars with their retinues sought refuge in the Byzantine Empire, and were settled by the emperor on the Pontic frontier. Some of these later returned to Armenia but others remained.³² More Nakharars, completely abandoning their possessions in Armenia, fled to the Byzantine Empire during the reign of Constantine V Copronymus.³³ Still more came about 790. It is said they numbered 12,000, and they came with their wives, their children, their retinues and their cavalry. They were welcomed by the Emperor and were granted fertile lands on which to settle.³⁴ We are not told the location of the lands given to them. This Armenian immigration to the Byzantine Empire was to continue in the centuries to come.³⁵

The Armenians, however, did not always come willingly. They were sometimes forcibly removed from their homes and settled in other regions of the Empire. Justinian had already resorted to this measure, but the numbers involved were small, perhaps a few families.³⁶ Transplantations on a large

²⁹ John of Ephesus, trans. Smith, 125–126, Brooks, 61–62; Theophanes, I: 245.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Smith, 403, Brooks, 231–232; Theophanes of Byzantium, *Fragments* (Bonn, 1829), 485.

³¹ H. Gelzer, "Pergamon unter Byzantinern und Osmanen," *Abhandlungen der Königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin, 1903), 42f. Another Armenian colony may have existed at Pidra in the Anatolikon theme. It is known that Leo V, the Armenian, had immigrated there as a boy. Theophanes Continuatus, 6; Genesis, 10, 28. The exact location of Pidra is not known.

³² Ghevond, *Histoire des guerres et des conquêtes des Arabes en Arménie*, tr. from Armenian by G. V. Chahnazarian (Paris, 1856), 22, 33–34; cf. J. Laurent, *L'Arménie entre Byzance et l'Islam depuis la conquête arabe jusqu'en 886* (Paris, 1919), 184, note 4; J. Muyldermans, *La domination arabe en Arménie...* (Paris, 1927), 98–99.

³³ Ghevond, 129.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 162. In reporting this incident Asoghik deplores the fact that, whereas the nobility was able to flee, the poor had to stay and serve the Arabs. Stephen (Asoghik) of Taron, *Histoire universelle* (1^e partie), tr. from Armenian by E. Dulaurier (Paris, 1883) (*Publications de l'École des Langues Orientales Vivantes*, XVIII), 162.

³⁵ Mention should also be made of the Armenian Paulicians who were driven out of their homes some time before 661 and some of whom settled in the Pontic regions of the Empire, more specifically in the area at the junction of the Iris and Lycus rivers. Their settlements extended almost as far as Nicopolis (Enderes) and Neocaesarea (Niksar). These were regions where the Armenian element was already considerable. Comana, for instance, is referred to by Strabo (12, 3, 36) as an emporium of the Armenians. Cf. Grégoire, "Précisions géographiques et chronologiques sur les Pauliciens," 294f., 298f.; S. Runciman, *The Medieval Manichee* (Cambridge, 1947), 34. Our source for the expulsion of the Paulicians from Armenia is a discourse of the Catholicos John of Odsun (717–728). This event is said to have taken place during the Catholicate of Nerses who is apparently Nerses III (641–661). Grégoire, *op. cit.*, 300. The discourse of John of Odsun is also cited by Sirarpie der Nersessian, "Une apologie des images du septième siècle," *Byzantion*, 17 (1944–45), 70–71.

³⁶ Procopius, *De bello Gothico*, III 32, 7; cf. R. Grousset, *Histoire de l'Arménie des origines à 1071* (Paris, 1947), 242. Grousset's statement concerning vast transfers of Armenians to Thrace by Justinian is not borne out by his references.

scale took place during the reigns of Tiberius and Maurice. In 578 10,000 Armenians were removed from their homes and settled on the island of Cyprus.³⁷ "Thus," says Evagrius, "land, which previously had not been tilled, was everywhere restored to cultivation. Numerous armies also were raised from among them, and they fought resolutely and courageously against the other nations. At the same time every household was completely furnished with domestics, because of the easy rate at which slaves were procured."³⁸

A transplantation on a vaster scale was planned by Maurice, and partially carried out. Maurice, who may have been of Armenian descent, though this is extremely doubtful,³⁹ found the Armenians extremely troublesome in their own homeland. The plan which he conceived called for the cooperation of the Persian king in the removal from their homes of all Armenian chieftains and their followers. According to Sebeos, Maurice addressed the Persian king as follows: The Armenians are "a knavish and indocile nation. They are found between us and they are a source of trouble. I am going to collect mine and send them to Thrace; send yours to the East. If they die there, it will be so many enemies that will die; if, on the contrary, they kill, it will be so many enemies that they will kill. As for us we shall live in peace. But if they remain in their country, there will never be any quiet for us." Sebeos further reports that the two rulers agreed to carry out this plan, but apparently the Persians failed to cooperate. For when the Byzantine Emperor gave the necessary orders and pressed hard for their execution, many Armenians fled to Persia.⁴⁰ The Byzantines, however, did carry out the deportation, though only in part. In ordering this removal, Maurice's real motive was, no doubt, the fact that he needed the Armenians as soldiers in Thrace.

Further deportations and settlement of Armenians in the Byzantine Empire, especially in Thrace, are attested for the eighth century. During the reign of Constantine V Copronymus thousands of Armenians and monophysite Syrians were gathered by the Byzantine armies during their raids in the regions of Germanicea (Marash), Melitene, and Erzeroum, and were settled in Thrace.⁴¹ Others, also from the environs of Erzeroum, were settled along the eastern frontier. These, however, were subsequently seized by the Arabs and were settled by them in Syria.⁴² During the reign of Leo IV, a Byzantine raiding

³⁷ Theophylactus Simocatta, *Historiae*, ed. C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1887), 143; John of Ephesus, Smith, 412, 437, Brooks, 236, 252. Cf. Honigmann, *op. cit.*, 23.

³⁸ Evagrius Scholasticus, *Ecclesiastical History*, ed. J. Bidez and L. Parmentier (London, 1898), 215. The translation is taken from the English version of Evagrius which appeared in Bohn's *Ecclesiastical Library: Theodoret and Evagrius, History of the Church* (London, 1854), 444.

³⁹ N. Adontz has tried to prove the Armenian origin of Maurice: "Les légendes de Maurice et de Constantin V, empereurs de Byzance," *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales*, 2 (Brussels, 1934), 1-12. But see Goubert, *op. cit.*, 36-41.

⁴⁰ Sebeos, *Histoire d'Héraclius*, tr. from Armenian by F. Macler (Paris, 1904), 30-31. Cf. F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches*, I (Munich, 1924), p. 13, no. 108.

⁴¹ Nicephorus, *Opuscula Historica*, ed. C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1880), 65, 66; Theophanes, I:427, 429; Michael Syrus, *Chronique*, ed. and trans. J. B. Chabot, 2 (Paris, 1901), 518, 521, 523; Agapius of Menbidj, *Histoire universelle*, tr. A. A. Vasiliev, *Patrologia Orientalis*, 8 (1912), 544; Ghevond, *op. cit.*, 126-127.

⁴² Agapius of Menbidj, 531, 538; Dionysius I of Tell-Mahré, *Chronique*, tr. J. B. Chabot (Paris, 1895), 56-57. Cf. A. Lombard, *Etudes d'histoire byzantine. Constantin V, empereur des Romains (740-775)* (Paris, 1902), 35. Among the people involved were some Alans also.

expedition into Cilicia and Syria resulted in the seizure of thousands of natives, 150,000, according to one authority, who were settled in Thrace.⁴³ These, however, were chiefly Syrian Jacobites, though some Armenians may have also been among them. Nicephorus I used Armenians, along with other nationalities, in his resettlement of Sparta at the beginning of the ninth century.⁴⁴ Moreover, many individual Armenians are known to have come from Armenia and to have entered the service of the Byzantine state in both the seventh and eighth centuries. Occasionally, however, Armenians were driven out of the Byzantine Empire. We are told that the Emperor Philippicus, himself of Armenian descent, drove the Armenians out of his realm and forced them to settle in the regions of Melitene.⁴⁵ We do not know the reason for this; it may have been religious, but it had no consequence insofar as the role of the Armenians in the Byzantine Empire was concerned. That role was to grow in importance in the centuries to come.

Thus, the Armenians were very much in evidence in the Byzantine Empire in the seventh and eighth centuries. They came of their own volition as refugees or were forcibly removed from their homes, and they settled in various parts of the Empire, particularly in Thrace and on the eastern frontier. Also, despite the conquest of Armenia by the Arabs, a conquest which was virtually complete by the end of the seventh century, some Armenian-speaking lands still remained in the possession of the Empire. However, it was as soldiers and officers of the army that the Armenians exerted their greatest influence in Byzantium.

It is well known that the Armenian element occupied a prominent place in the armies of Justinian. Armenian troops fought in Africa, Italy, and along the eastern front. They were also prominent in the palace guard.⁴⁶ Procopius mentions by name no less than seventeen Armenian commanders, including, of course, the great Narses.⁴⁷ But the Armenians constituted only one among the different elements that made up the armies of Justinian. These elements included many barbarians: Erulians, Gepids, Goths, Huns, Lombards, Moors, Sabiri, Slavs and Antae, Vandals; a number of Persians, Iberians, and Tzani; and among the provincials, Illyrians, Thracians, Isaurians, and Lycaonians.⁴⁸

⁴³ Theophanes, I:451-52; Ghevond, *op. cit.*, 150; Michael Syrus, 3:2.

⁴⁴ P. Charanis, "The Chronicle of Monemvasia and the Question of the Slavonic Settlements in Greece," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 5 (1950), 154-155. In 792, following the suppression of a revolt among the Armenians, one thousand of them were removed from the Armeniac theme and were settled in Sicily and other islands: Theophanes, I:469.

⁴⁵ Theophanes, I:382; Michael Syrus, 2:482; Agapius of Menbidj, 500.

⁴⁶ Procopius, *De bello Persico*, II 21, 2; *De bello Vandalico*, II 24, 2; *De bello Gothico*, II 27, 16; III 6, 10; III 26, 24; III 27, 3, 10; *Anecdota* 24, 16.

⁴⁷ The names of these commanders are listed in the index of the Haury edition of Procopius under Armenians or Persarmenians. Some of these commanders, as for instance Gilacius, spoke only Armenian: *De bello Gothico*, III 27, 24. In the plot which led to the assassination of Gontharis, the bodyguard of Solomon, the conspirators communicated between themselves in Armenian: *De bello Vandalico*, II 28, 16.

⁴⁸ For Erulians: Procopius, *De bello Persico*, I 13, 20; II 24, 13, 41; *De bello Vandalico*, II 4, 28; II 14, 12; *De bello Gothico*, II 13, 18; III 33, 13; IV 26, 13; Agathias, *Historia* (Bonn, 1828), 57, 79, 148, 184. For Gepids: *De bello Gothico*, IV 26, 13. For Goths: *De bello Gothico*, I 16, 2; III 1, 6; *De bello Persico*, II 14, 10; II 18, 24; II 21, 4. For Huns, *De bello Persico*, I 13, 20; I 21, 11; I 12, 6; *De bello Vandalico*, I 11, 11-12; II 1, 5-10; *De bello Gothico*, I 5, 4; I 27, 2; IV 26, 13; Agathias, 60-67. For Lombards, *De bello Gothico*, III 39, 20; IV 26, 12; IV 33, 2, 3; Agathias, 184. For

Under the immediate successors of Justinian, the composition of the Byzantine army remained very much the same. "It is said," writes Evagrius, "that Tiberius raised an army of 150,000 among the peoples that dwelt beyond the Alps around the Rhine and among those this side of the Alps, among the Massagetae and other Scythian nations, among those that dwelt in Paeonia and Mysia, and also among the Illyrians and Isaurians, and dispatched them against the Persians."⁴⁹ The figure given by Evagrius may perhaps be questioned, but the rest of his statement cannot be doubted. It is confirmed by Theophanes, though the figure he gives is much smaller (15,000).⁵⁰ John of Ephesus reports that, following the breakdown of negotiations with Persia (575–577), a force of 60,000 Lombards was expected in the East.⁵¹ The same author states: "Necessity compelled Tiberius to enlist under his banners a barbarian people from the West called Goths...who were followers of the doctrine of the wicked Arius. They departed for Persia, leaving their wives and children at Constantinople."⁵² In Constantinople the wives of these Goths requested that a church be allocated to them, so that they might worship according to their Arian faith. Thus, it seems quite certain that the ethnic composition of the Byzantine army under Tiberius remained substantially the same as it had been during the reign of Justinian.

The situation changed in the course of the reign of Maurice, chiefly as a result of the Avaro-Slavic incursions of the Balkan peninsula. These incursions virtually eliminated Illyricum as a source of recruits and reduced the potential of Thrace. They also cut communication with the west and made recruitment there most difficult. The Empire had to turn elsewhere for its troops. It turned to the regions of the Caucasus and Armenia. In the armies of Maurice we still find some Huns⁵³ and also some Lombards;⁵⁴ Bulgars too,⁵⁵ but the Armenian element dominates. In this respect Sebeos is once more a precious source. In connection with the war which Maurice undertook against the Avars after 591 Sebeos writes: Maurice "ordered to gather together all the Armenian cavalry and all the noble Nakharars skilled in war and adroit in wielding the lance in combat. He ordered also a numerous army to be raised in Armenia, an

Moors, *De bello Gothico*, I 5, 4; III 1, 6; *De bello Persico*, II 21, 4; Agathias, 184. For Sabiri: *De bello Gothico*, IV 11, 22–26; Agathias, 177. For Slavs and Antae: *De bello Gothico*, I 27, 1–2; II 15, 18, 22; III 22, 3; Agathias, 186. For Vandals: *De bello Vandalico*, II 14, 17; *De bello Persico*, II 21, 4. For Persians: *De bello Gothico*, III 11, 37; IV 26, 13. For Iberians: *De bello Persico*, I 12, 11–13; I 22, 16; II 28, 1; *De bello Gothico*, I 5, 3; III 4, 10. For Tzani: *De bello Gothico*, IV 13, 10; Agathias, 109. For Illyrians: *De bello Gothico*, III 11, 11, 15, 16, III 12, 4; III 39, 9; IV 26, 10; *De bello Persico*, II 21, 4. For Thracians: *De bello Persico*, II 21, 4; *De bello Gothico*, II 5, 1; II 11, 5; III 6, 10; III 12, 4; III 39, 9; IV 26, 10. For Isaurians: *De bello Persico*, I 18, 5, 38–40; *De bello Gothico*, I 5, 12; II 11, 5; III 36, 7, 14; Agathias, 184. For Lycaonians, *De bello Persico*, I 18, 38–40.

Among the provincials, especially natives of Asia Minor, there was a strong dislike for military service; St. Basil wrote in one of his letters: "...a large number of persons are presenting themselves for the ministry through fear of the conscription." Basil, *Letters*, ed. Deferrari, I:344 (Letter 54).

⁴⁹ Evagrius, 209f.

⁵⁰ Theophanes, I:251.

⁵¹ John of Ephesus, Smith, 407, Brooks, 234.

⁵² *Ibid.*, Smith, 207, Brooks, 113.

⁵³ Theophylactus Simocatta, 67.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 104.

⁵⁵ Michael Syrus, 2:72.

army composed of soldiers of good will and good stature, organized in regular corps and armed. He ordered that this army should go to Thrace under the command of Musele (Moushegh) Mamiconian and there fight the enemy."⁵⁶ This army was actually organized and fought in Thrace. Mamiconian was captured and killed,⁵⁷ whereupon the raising of an Armenian force of 2,000 armed cavalry was ordered. This force, too, was sent to Thrace.⁵⁸ Earlier, during the Persian wars, important Armenian contingents under the command of John Mystacon operated on the eastern front.⁵⁹ In 602 Maurice issued the following edict: "I need 30,000 cavalrymen, as tribute, raised in Armenia. Thirty thousand families must be gathered and settled in Thrace."⁶⁰ Priscus was sent to Armenia to carry out this edict, but before he had time to do so the revolution that overthrew Maurice broke out, and the edict apparently was not enforced. It is interesting to observe the correlation between the number of cavalry and the number of families that were to be transplanted to Thrace. Each family was obviously intended to furnish one cavalryman, and no doubt each family was going to be given some land. Here we have, perhaps, an indication that Maurice sought to extend the system of military estates in Thrace.^{60a} But, however that may be, it is quite clear that under Maurice Armenia became the principal source of recruits for the Byzantine army.⁶¹ The same was true under Heraclius, himself of Armenian descent,⁶² though that Emperor also drew heavily on the people of the Caucasus—Lazi, Abasgians, Iberians—

⁵⁶ Sebeos, 35.

⁵⁷ Cf. Goubert, *op. cit.*, I:197.

⁵⁸ Sebeos, 36—37. Cf. Goubert, *op. cit.*, I:200; Dölger, *op. cit.*, 12, no. 94.

⁵⁹ Theophylactus Simocatta, 205, 216.

⁶⁰ Sebeos, 54—55. Cf. Goubert, *op. cit.*, I:209; Dölger, *op. cit.*, 16, no. 137.

^{60a} The widely accepted view which associates the increase of military estates throughout the Empire with the establishment of the theme system and places both of these developments in the seventh century has very recently been questioned: J. Karayannopoulos, "Contribution au problème des 'thèmes' byzantins," *L'hellénisme contemporain*, ser. 2, 10 (1956), 492—501; *Die Entstehung der byzantinischen Themenordnung* (= Byzantinisches Archiv, Heft 10) (Munich, 1959), 71—88. See also Paul Lemerle, "Esquisse pour une histoire agraire de Byzance: Les sources et les problèmes," *Revue historique*, 220 (1958), 43—70. Karayannopoulos contends that the spread of military estates and the establishment of the theme system were not related, that both developed gradually over a long period of time, and that no one emperor was responsible for either. However this may be, it is very probable, as this passage from Sebeos suggests, that the growth of military estates was connected with the shifting of population from one province to another and the resettlement of immigrant peoples for military purposes. As both of these practices were frequently resorted to in the seventh and eighth centuries, it is in those two centuries, but most probably in the seventh, that one should put the beginnings of the wide distribution of the military estates. This is not the place to discuss Lemerle's interpretation of the military estates.

⁶¹ Scholars have long recognized that the ascendancy of the Armenian element in the Byzantine Empire dates from the reign of Maurice. M. K. Patkanian wrote in 1866: "A partir de cette époque [the reign of Maurice] les chefs des milices arméniennes, en Thrace, commencèrent à jouer un rôle important dans l'armée grecque, parvinrent aux plus hauts grades militaires, et plusieurs d'entre eux montèrent même sur le trône des empereurs." M. K. Patkanian, "Essai d'une histoire de la dynastie des Sassanides, d'après les renseignements fournis par les historiens arméniens," tr. from Russian by Evariste Prud'homme, *Journal asiatique*, 7 (1866), 194, note 3. Armenian troops under Armenian officers were also stationed in Byzantine Italy during this period. Cf. H. W. Haussig, "Anfänge der Themenordnung," in F. Altheim—R. Stiehl, *Finanzgeschichte der Spätantike* (Frankfurt a. M., 1957), 106, note 76.

⁶² The father of the Emperor Heraclius, also named Heraclius, who served as general during the reign of Maurice, is said to have been a native of a city located in Armenia. Theophylactus Simocatta, *op. cit.*, 109—110. John of Nikiu calls the Emperor Heraclius a Cappadocian. *Chronique*, tr. H. Zotenberg (Paris, 1883), 431.

as well as on the Khazars.⁶³ It should also be observed that among the defenders of Constantinople against the Avars in 626 there were some Armenians.⁶⁴ As we have said, by the end of the seventh century Armenia was lost to the Arabs, but throughout that century the Armenians continued to be one of the dominant elements in the Byzantine army. The Armeniacs, whose territory in the seventh century included Armenian-speaking lands, were primarily Armenians.⁶⁵

The significance of the Armenian element in the Byzantine Empire is further illustrated by the number of persons of Armenian descent who came to occupy influential positions. They served as generals, as members of the imperial retinue, as governors of provinces. Under Heraclius the Armenian Manuel was named *praefectus augustalis* in Egypt.⁶⁶ Armenian generals served the same Emperor in the field. One of these, Vahan, was actually proclaimed Emperor by his troops just before the battle of Yermuk.⁶⁷ He later retired to Sinai and became a monk. Armenian princes in Constantinople were very influential. They even plotted to overthrow Heraclius and to place on the throne his illegitimate son, Athalaric.⁶⁸ In 641 it was the Armenian Valentinus, an Arsacid, who enabled Constans II to assume the throne following the death of his father. Valentinus was put in command of the troops in the East, but shortly afterwards, having failed in a plot to seize the throne for himself, he was executed.⁶⁹ Other Armenian generals are known to have served under Constans II. Two of these, Sabour, surnamed Aparasitgan,⁷⁰ and Theodore were commanders of the Armeniacs.⁷¹ After the violent death of Constans II, the Armenian Mizizius (Mjej Gnouni) was proclaimed Emperor, and though he was not able to maintain this position, he should be included among the emperors of Armenian descent who occupied the Byzantine throne.⁷² Later his son John felt strong enough to rebel against Constantine IV, but he, too, failed and was destroyed.⁷³ Many Armenians are known to have been prominent in the service of the Empire in the eighth century also. The Armenian Bardanes occupied the throne from 711

⁶³ Theophanes, I:304, 309, 316; Nicephorus, 15; Agapius of Menbidj 463. Cf. H. Grégoire, "An Armenian Dynasty on the Byzantine Throne," *Armenian Quarterly*, I (1946), 9.

⁶⁴ *Chronicon Paschale*, I (Bonn, 1832), 724. There was an Armenian colony in Constantinople during this time. F. C. Conybeare, "Ananias of Shirak (A.D. 600-650)," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 6 (1897), 572. Cf. P. Peeters, "A propos de la version arménienne de l'histoire de Socrate," *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales*, 2 (Brussels, 1934), 673.

⁶⁵ Theophanes, I:469.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, I:338; Michael Syrus, 2:425.

⁶⁷ Theophanes, I:318; 338. J. B. Bury considers him a Persian: *A History of the Later Roman Empire from Arcadius to Irene* (London, 1889), 2:263f. But cf. Lebeau-St. Martin, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, 11 (Paris, 1830), 208, note 2; 214; also A. Pernice, *L'Imperatore Eraclio* (Florence, 1905), 280.

⁶⁸ Sebeos, 93.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 103-4; 105. Cf. H. Manandean, *op. cit.*, 182. For the account given by the Greek sources cf. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire* (London, 1889), 2:283ff.

⁷⁰ Theophanes, I:348; Michael Syrus, 2:451 and note. 9. Cf. Laurent, *op. cit.*, 194, note 3.

⁷¹ Sebeos, 106. Cf. Manandean, *op. cit.*, 190ff.

⁷² Theophanes, I:352; Michael Syrus, 2:451. The Armenian version of Michael Syrus has Mejej in place of Mizizius. Langlois, who translated this version into French, remarks on this: "Méjej, en grec Mizizius, qui paraît, par son appellation, appartenir à la race ou famille des Gnouniens." V. Langlois, *Chronique de Michel le Grand, patriarche des Syriens jacobites, traduite pour la première fois sur la version arménienne du prêtre Ischôk* (Venice, 1868), 241 and note 6. Cf. Laurent, *op. cit.*, 193, note 4; Lebeau-St. Martin, *op. cit.*, 11:406, note 1.

⁷³ Michael Syrus, 2:455.

to 713. Artavasdos, son-in-law of Leo III and at one time general of the Armeniacs, also attempted to seize the crown, and for a time was actually master of Constantinople.⁷⁴ He was ably assisted by other Armenians, his cousin Teridates, Vahtan the patrician, and another Artavasdos.⁷⁵ During the brief period when he held Constantinople, he crowned his son Nicephorus, Co-Emperor and made his other son, Nicetas, general of the Armeniacs.⁷⁶ The Armeniacs, the vast majority of whom, as has been said, were Armenians, constituted Artavasdos' strongest supporters.⁷⁷ Other eminent Armenians are known to have served the empire under Constantine V Copronymus. Tadjat Andzevatzik, who came to Byzantium about 750, proved to be a successful commander in the course of Constantine's Bulgarian campaigns. Under Leo IV we find him as general of the Bucellarii.⁷⁸ He subsequently fled to the Arabs. Another Armenian, the prince Artavazd Mamiconian, who joined the Byzantine forces about 771, was general of the Anatolikon under Leo IV.⁷⁹ More Armenians are mentioned during the reign of Constantine VI and Irene. Bardas, one-time general of the Armeniacs, was involved in a conspiracy to have Leo IV succeeded by his brother Nicephorus and not by his son Constantine.⁸⁰ Another Vardas lost his life in the Bulgarian campaign which Constantine VI conducted in 792.⁸¹ Artasaras, or Artashir, was another Armenian general active during the reign of Constantine VI.⁸² Alexius Musele (Moushegh), drungarius of the watch and later general of the Armeniacs, seems even to have aspired to the throne. At least he was accused of entertaining this ambition and was blinded.⁸³ His family, however, achieved great distinction in the ninth and tenth centuries. Another great Byzantine family of Armenian descent, the Skleroi, made its

⁷⁴ Theophanes, I:386, 395, 414; Nicephorus, 59.

⁷⁵ Theophanes, I:418, 419, 420.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 417.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 418.

⁷⁸ Ghevond, *op. cit.*, 150, 153; Theophanes, I:451. Cf. Laurent, *op. cit.*, 193, note 3. Under Constantine V, a Constantine, son of the patrician Bardanes was put to death in 766 for conspiracy. Theophanes, I:438. A Bardanes was general of the Armeniacs in 772. Theophanes, I:445. As the name Bardanes is Armenian, these persons may have been Armenians.

⁷⁹ Ghevond, *op. cit.*, 134, 150; cf. Laurent, *op. cit.*, 193; Theophanes, I:451. Two other Armenians, Varaz-Tirots, general of the Armeniacs, and Gregory, son of Mousoulak, general of the Opsikion, served the Empire under Leo IV. Cf. N. Adontz, "L'âge et l'origine de l'empereur Basile I," *Byzantion*, 9 (1934), 242.

⁸⁰ Theophanes, I:454. Bardas' Armenian origin is indicated by his name.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, I: 468. I do not know on what basis Adontz refers to this Bardas as the father of Leo V the Armenian. N. Adontz, "Role of the Armenians in Byzantine Science," *The Armenian Review*, 3, no. 3 (1950), 64. Under Constantine VI, Irene, and Nicephorus I, we encounter a number of persons who bore the Armenian name Bardanes and who were probably Armenians: Bardanes, patrician and *domesticus scholarum*; Bardanes, general of the Thracians; Bardanes, called the Turk, general of the Anatolikon, who made an attempt to seize the throne; Bardanes, called Anemas, a spatharius. Theophanes, I:471, 474, 479-80, 482. Another Armenian, the patrician Arsaber was Quaestor under Nicephorus I. In the unsuccessful plot of 808 to overthrow Nicephorus, Arsaber had been chosen as the new emperor. Theophanes, I:483. Cf. J. B. Bury, *A History of the Eastern Roman Empire from the Fall of Irene to the Accession of Basil I* (London, 1912), 14. This Arsaber was the father of the Empress Theodosia, wife of Leo V the Armenian. Genesisius, 21. Another Armenian named Bardas a relative (σύγγαμβρος) of Leo V, was general of the Thracians during the reign of this Emperor. *S. Theodori Studitae Vita*, PG, 99, 300. Cf. Bury, *Eastern Roman Empire*, 68, 72. See further N. Adontz, "Sur l'origine de Léon V, empereur de Byzance," *Armeniaca*, II (1927), 9-10.

⁸² Theophanes, I:468, 469.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, I:466, 467, 468; cf. Lebeau-St. Martin, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, 12 (Paris, 1831), 355, note 3.

appearance in Byzantium at this time or soon thereafter. Leo Skleros, governor of the Peloponnesus at the beginning of the ninth century, is the first member of this family known to us.⁸⁴

It will be noted that most of these Armenians were associated at one time or another with the Armeniac theme. The turbulent, but very energetic, thematic corps of the Armeniacs is very much in evidence throughout the seventh and eighth centuries. It is the clearest indication of the prominence of the Armenian element in the Byzantine Empire during this period. It should be pointed out, however, that in general the Armenians who entered the service of the Empire embraced orthodoxy and so identified themselves with the interests of the Empire. Yet there were always Armenians within its borders who sought to maintain their own traditions.

The event which, as we have already observed, brought the Armenians into prominence was the collapse of Byzantine power in the Balkan peninsula and the consequent loss of the sources which in the earlier centuries had furnished the Empire with some of its best troops.

No doubt the most important ethnic change in the Balkan peninsula since ancient times was brought about by the incursions and the settlement of the Slavs. The circumstances and exact chronology of the Slavic settlements in the Balkan peninsula are still, despite the meticulous work of many scholars, a historical puzzle. The reason for this is, of course, the brevity and chronological vagueness of our sources. This vagueness is best illustrated by the compilation known as the *Miracula Sancti Demetrii*, the most important single text we possess on the settlement of the Slavs in the Balkan peninsula. No less than three serious studies of this text have been made in the last five years,⁸⁵ but they serve only to emphasize the difficulty of the problem since they offer different solutions to the crucial questions of chronology. The problem has been further confused by the nationalistic bias of certain scholars. The following facts, however, are sufficiently clear.

The first appearance of the Slavs in the Byzantine Empire can be dated no earlier than the sixth century.⁸⁶ Throughout this century, beginning with the reign of Justinian, Slavs repeatedly invaded the Balkan possessions of the Byzantine Empire. Not until the reign of Maurice, however, did any Slavs settle in these territories. Between the years 579–587 there took place the irruption of several barbarian waves led by the Avars, but consisting mostly

⁸⁴ Charanis, "The Chronicle of Monemvasia...", 145.

⁸⁵ P. Lemerle, "La composition et la chronologie des deux premiers livres des *Miracula S. Demetrii*," *BZ*, 46 (1953), 349–361; A. Burmov, "Les sièges de Thessalonique par les Slaves dans *Miracula Sancti Demetrii Martyris* et leur chronologie," *Annuaire de l'Université de Sofia. Faculté de Philosophie et Histoire. Livre I, histoire*, 47 (1952) (in Bulgarian), 167–215; F. Barišić, *Miracles de St. Démétrius comme source historique* (Académie Serbe de Sciences. Monographies CCXIX. Institut d'Etudes Byzantines, 2) (Belgrade, 1953). As I read neither Bulgarian nor Serbian, I have relied principally on the French résumé which both Burmov and Barišić give of their respective works. I have, however, with the help of my friend George Soulis, consulted certain sections of the Bulgarian and Serbian texts. Cf. also Ep. Chrysanthopoulos, "Τὰ Βιβλία Θαυμάτων τοῦ Ἁγίου Δημητρίου," *Θεολογία*, 24 (1953), 597–606; 25 (1954), 145–152; 26 (1955), 91–106, 293–309, 457–464; 593–619; 27 (1956), 82–94; 260–272, 481–496. This work has now appeared under the same title in book form: Athens, 1958. It is a serious study, but I find myself unable to agree with its main conclusions.

⁸⁶ Cf. F. Dvornik, *The Slavs. Their Early History and Civilization* (Boston, 1956), 34 ff.

of Slavs. The latter came in great numbers, and, as the troops of the Empire were engaged in the war with Persia, they roamed the country at will. They devastated Illyricum and Thrace, penetrated deep into Greece and the Peloponnesus, helped the Avars to take numerous cities, including Singidunum, Viminacium (Kostolac), Durostorum (Silistria), Marcianopolis, Anchialus, and Corinth, and in 586 laid siege to the city of Thessalonica, the first of a series of great sieges which that city was destined to undergo at their hands.⁸⁷ What is more, they came to stay. "The Slavonians," wrote John of Ephesus in 584, "still encamp and dwell in the Roman territories and live in peace there, free from anxiety and fear, and lead captives and slay and burn."⁸⁸ The counter-offensive launched by Maurice after 591, following the successful termination of the Persian war, had the effect, on the whole, of checking the repeated incursions of the Avars, who then seem to have transferred their operations farther west beyond the limits of Byzantine territory. The treaty of peace which the Empire concluded with them in 601 (the date is not absolutely certain) fixed the Danube as the boundary line between the two powers, but left the way open for the Byzantines to cross that river and chastise any Slavs that might appear dangerous.⁸⁹ There is no indication, however, that the Slavs who had penetrated into the Empire were forced to retire beyond the Danube, or that they did so of their own accord.

The settlement of the Slavs in the Balkan peninsula occurred mainly in the seventh century, more specifically during the disastrous reign of Phocas (602–610) and the early years of Heraclius. For the reign of Phocas there are no specific references in the sources to any Avaro-Slav invasions of Byzantine territory, but a general statement in Theophanes, apparently derived from Theophylact Simocatta,⁹⁰ leaves no doubt, despite a recent attempt to minimize its significance,⁹¹ that the Avars came repeatedly. For the reign of Heraclius our information is more explicit, though it leaves much to be desired, especially with regard to chronology. The Slavs had by now not only reached the Aegean, but also taken to the sea. "It happened . . .," we read in the *Miracula Sancti*

⁸⁷ Cf. H. Grégoire, "L'origine et le nom des Croates et des Serbes," *Byzantion*, 18 (1944–1945), 88–118; P. Lemerle, "Invasions et migrations dans les Balkans depuis la fin de l'époque romaine jusqu'au VIII^e siècle," *Revue historique*, 211 (1954), 281 ff; L. Hauptmann, "Les rapports des Byzantins avec les Slaves et les Avars pendant la seconde moitié du VI^e siècle," *Byzantion*, 4 (1927–28), 137–170. The siege of Thessalonica took place on Sunday, 22 September, in the reign of Maurice: *Miracula Sancti Demetrii*, Migne, PG, 116. 1288. This must have been either in 586 or 597, for these are the only two years during the reign of Maurice when 22 September fell on a Sunday. Considering the position of the Avars in the year 597, it seems unlikely that they could have besieged Thessalonica in that year. The year 586 is, therefore, to be preferred: Charanis, "On the Capture of Corinth by the Onogurs and its Recapture by the Byzantines," *Speculum*, 27 (1952), 347; Barišić, *op. cit.*, 60–64. Some scholars, however, have shown preference for the year 597. For a list of the scholars who have taken a position on this issue one way or another, Barišić, *op. cit.*, 10. To the list given by Barišić we may add Burmov (*op. cit.*, 183–185) and Lemerle ("La composition et la chronologie des deux premiers livres des *Miracula S. Demetrii*," 354) both of whom adopt the year 597.

⁸⁸ John of Ephesus, trans. Smith, 432.

⁸⁹ Hauptmann, *op. cit.*, 160 ff.

⁹⁰ Theophanes, I: 290; Theophylactus Simocatta, 308.

⁹¹ F. Barišić, "De Avaro-Slavis in Phocae imperatoris aetate," *Recueil des travaux de l'Acad. Serbe des Sciences*, XLIX: Institut d'Etudes Byzantines, 4 (Belgrade, 1956) (in Serbian with a Latin summary), 76–86. I have consulted the Serbian text with the help of Dr. Miloš M. Velimirović.

Demetrii, that "during the bishopric of John of blessed memory, the nation of the Slavs, a countless multitude, was aroused. This multitude was drawn from the Drogubites, Sagudates, Velegezetes, Vajunetes, Berzetes, and others. Having first invented ships hewn from single pieces of timber, they took to the sea with their arms and pillaged all Thessaly and the islands about it and those about Hellas. They also pillaged the Cyclades, all Achaea, Epirus, and the greater part of Illyricum, and parts of Asia."⁹² The precise date of this event is not known, although Barišić is probably right in placing it toward the end of 614.⁹³ A year or so later the same Slavs, under the leadership of a certain Hatzon, laid siege to Thessalonica. The city, however, withstood their assault, and they had to turn for help to the Khagan of the Avars. He came two years later, but to no avail. Meanwhile cities of the interior such as Naissus and Sardica had fallen to the barbarians. The narrative of this series of events leaves one with the definite impression that the Slavs who were involved in them had not come from afar, but were already settled in the Balkan peninsula, including the region of Thessalonica. Indeed, if we except the passages that deal with events of the sixth century, we find in the *Miracula* no distinct reference to invasions by Slavs coming from afar. The Slavs involved in the various attacks against Thessalonica were already settled in Macedonia. They had established themselves there in the period between the beginning of the reign of Maurice and the early years of the reign of Heraclius.

An episode described in the *Miracula* indicates that other invaders who were not Slavs settled in the region of Thessalonica later in the seventh century. This is the episode involving Kouver,⁹⁴ a Bulgar whom the Khagan of the Avars had placed at the head of a mixed group under his domination. This group consisted of the descendants of Christian natives whom the Avars had carried away many years previously (about sixty years before, we are told) and the Avars, Bulgars, and other barbarians under the domination of the Khagan with whom these Christians had intermarried. These people dwelt in the region of Sirmium, maintained the traditions of their Christian ancestors, and were anxious to return to their old homes. Kouver, exploiting this desire, induced them to revolt and, after defeating the Avars who tried to check him, directed his followers toward Thessalonica, and then moved them in the direction of Monastir, where we lose sight of them. The date of this event is uncertain, but I am inclined to agree with those who place it toward the end of the reign of Heraclius.⁹⁵ This seems to fit in with what we know of the history of the Avars during this time. Their power in the Balkan peninsula was then in a state of decline, which had begun after their unsuccessful siege of Constantinople in 626.⁹⁶ An attempt has recently been made to identify the followers of Kouver

⁹² *Miracula S. Demetrii*, 1325 ff; A. Tougard, *De l'histoire profane dans les actes grecs des Bollandistes* (Paris, 1874), 118–126.

⁹³ Barišić, *Miracles de St. Démétrius comme source historique*, 149.

⁹⁴ Tougard, *op.cit.*, 187–189.

⁹⁵ For instance Grégoire, "L'origine et le nom des Croates et des Serbes," 110 ff; Dvornik, *op. cit.*, 63, note 2. The retirement of the Avars from the Balkan peninsula to regions farther north is associated by the *Miracula S. Demetrii* with the successful rebellion of Kouver: Tougard, *op. cit.*, 189.

⁹⁶ For the latest views on the Avar siege of Constantinople in 626 see Barišić, "Le siège de Constantinople par les Avars et les Slaves en 626," *Byzantion*, 24 (1954, published in 1956), 371–395.

with the Croats and Serbs, who also made their appearance at about this time and who contributed decisively to the disintegration of the Avar power in the Balkan peninsula.⁹⁷ This suggestion is tempting, but in view of the obscurity of our sources, which may not have preserved the various names involved in their original form, the identification must be considered doubtful. The Croats and Serbs, representing the last Slavonic wave to reach the Balkans, came with the consent of Heraclius and settled in the upper territory of the peninsula, the Croats in Dalmatia as far as the Sava, the Serbs in the region of the Urbas and the Morava, the ancient Margus.⁹⁸

The Bulgar⁹⁹ and Avar invasions of the Balkan peninsula in the sixth and seventh centuries created a demographic crisis. The cities of the interior were plundered and destroyed, while vast stretches of the countryside were left desolate and empty of their inhabitants. Hundreds of thousands of natives, Illyrians, Thracians, and Greeks were deported; thousands of others were killed. Those deported were settled in the regions beyond the Danube, where, as we learn from the text concerning Kouver, they intermarried with the barbarians. Doubtless the vast majority of them were absorbed and lost their identity. Some, however, tried to preserve their traditions and, like the followers of Kouver, made an effort to return to the homes of their fathers. Others no doubt stayed behind. This may provide a clue to the solution of the riddle concerning the origin of the modern Rumanians. South of the Danube the virtual elimination of the native population facilitated the establishment of the Slavs. Their settlements covered the heart of the peninsula and extended to the Adriatic, the Aegean, and the Balkan mountains. They were numerous in the region of Thessalonica, a fact known not only from literary sources, but also from many place-names of Slavic origin.¹⁰⁰ Thrace, though often devastated by the Slavs, escaped their occupation, but even there they established some settlements, as, for instance, near Vizya.¹⁰¹ The native Illyrians and Thracians of the occupied regions retired into the mountains, where they remained unnoticed till the eleventh century, when they emerged as Albanians and Vlachs. The ethnic composition of the heart of the Balkan peninsula was thus transformed. The coming of the Bulgars into the region between the Danube and the Balkan mountains during the reign of Constantine IV,¹⁰² though of great political importance, had hardly any ethnic consequences,

⁹⁷ Grégoire, "L'origine et le nom des Croates et des Serbes," 116ff. But see above, p. 16ff.

⁹⁸ Constantine Prophyrogenitus, *De administrando imperio*, ed. Gy. Moravcsik and R. J. H. Jenkins (Budapest, 1949), 122 ff. Cf. Grégoire, *ibid.*, 88 ff.

⁹⁹ The depopulation of the Balkan peninsula began with the invasions of the Bulgars (Utigurs and Kotrigurs) during the reign of Justinian. Thousands of inhabitants were deported beyond the Danube. Some of them managed to return. It is said, for instance, that as a result of the war between the Utigurs and the Kotrigurs, incited by Justinian about 550, "many tens of thousands of Romans," who had been previously captured by the Kotrigurs and transferred to the regions west of the Don, succeeded in escaping and returning to their native land. Procopius, *De bello Gothico*, IV 19, 1-2. We are also told that Justinian settled two thousand Kotrigurs with their wives and children in Thrace. Procopius, *De bello Gothico*, IV 19, 7.

¹⁰⁰ Max Vasmer, *Die Slaven in Griechenland* (Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, nr. 12) (Berlin, 1941), 202 ff.

¹⁰¹ Tougaard, *op. cit.*, 156.

¹⁰² Theophanes, I:356-359.

except that perhaps the Bulgars left the imprint of their character upon the Slavs, by whom they were eventually absorbed.

Slavs also settled in the Greek peninsula proper. This fact is quite evident, and no serious scholar has ever questioned it. What has been disputed is the precise date and the magnitude of the settlement. The sources, which are lacking in detail, give the impression that the country was flooded by the Slavs and that they overwhelmed every region.¹⁰³ We know that the Velegezetes who took part in the piratical expedition of 614, an expedition to which we have already referred, settled in Thessaly.¹⁰⁴ It is quite possible that the Vajunetes, who took part in the same expedition, eventually moved to Epirus, a region which is known from other sources to have been invaded by the Slavs. We also know by name two tribes which eventually settled in southern Peloponnesus. The Slavs likewise penetrated into Attica and into Locris and, we may assume, also into Boeotia, although we are given no specific indication of their settling there in the seventh century. Further, we are told that western Peloponnesus was completely occupied by the Slavs. If we now turn to the place-names of Slavic origin, we find that, according to Vasmer, they are most numerous in Epirus and western Greece (558), western and central Peloponnesus (387), and in Thessaly, including Phthiotis (230). They are least numerous in Attica (18), Argolis (18), Boeotia (22), Corinth (24), and Phokis (45).¹⁰⁵ The Slavic origin of some of these names has been questioned,¹⁰⁶ and some reserve has been shown concerning the historical inferences that may be drawn from them,¹⁰⁷ but even if we make due allowance for these observations, they remain nevertheless very significant. Indeed, they confirm what we know from the literary sources which, despite their fragmentary nature, clearly indicate that the regions of Greece most affected by the Slavic invasions were Thessaly, western Peloponnesus, and Epirus; those least affected were central Greece, including Attica, and eastern Peloponnesus.

Slavs, then, not only settled in Greece, but did so in considerable numbers. Though the date of this settlement has been a subject of dispute, the evidence points to the period which extended from just before the beginning of the reign of Maurice to the early years of the reign of Heraclius. That more Slavs may have come later in no way alters this fundamental conclusion. The settlement

¹⁰³ For a brief summary of the sources, Vasmer, *op. cit.*, 11-19. See also Charanis, "The Chronicle of Monemvasia and the Question of the Slavonic Settlements in Greece," 141-166. The latest literature is discussed *ibid.*, 164-166. The following works have appeared since: A. Bon, *Le Péloponnèse byzantin jusqu'en 1204* (Paris, 1951), 27-64; P. Charanis, "On the Slavic Settlement in the Peloponnesus," *BZ*, 46 (1953), 19-103; A. Maricq, "Note sur les Slaves dans le Péloponnèse," *Byzantion*, 22 (1952), 337-348; Lemerle, "Invasions et migrations dans les Balkans...", 305f. In connection with the Slavonic settlements in Greece there has been considerable discussion concerning the precise geographical meaning of the term "Hellas." On this problem see Charanis, "Hellas in the Greek Sources of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Centuries," *Late Classical and Mediaeval Studies in Honor of Albert Mathias Friend, Jr.* (Princeton, 1955), 161-176.

¹⁰⁴ Tougard, *op. cit.*, 166, 176.

¹⁰⁵ Vasmer, *op. cit.*, 20-76; 128-174; 85-110; 120-123; 126-127; 118-120; 123-125; 113-118.

¹⁰⁶ D. Georgakas, "Beiträge zur Deutung als Slavisch erklärter Ortsnamen," *BZ*, 41 (1942), 351-381; Σλαβική επίδραση στο τοπωνυμικό της Ἡπείρου, Εἰς Μνήμην Χρίστου Σούλη (1892-1956) (Athens, 1956), 149-161.

¹⁰⁷ D. Zakythinis, Οἱ Σλάβοι ἐν Ἑλλάδι (Athens, 1945), 72-82.

of Slavs in Greece does not, however, mean that the Greek population was completely obliterated. Despite the Slavic flood, the Greeks held their own in eastern Peloponnesus, in central Greece, including Attica (a region which is known to have been a theme as early as 695), and, of course, in the islands. A number of strongholds are known to have remained in the hands of the Byzantines. In the Peloponnesus there was Monemvasia in the south and Corinth in the north.¹⁰⁸ In central Greece there was Athens, where, if we may believe a hagiographical text, a Cappadocian conversed with philosophers and rhetoricians in the eighth century;¹⁰⁹ And farther north there was Thessalonica. These strongholds, even Thessalonica, were not great urban establishments in the seventh century, nor for that matter in the eighth, but they were to serve as centers for the pacification, absorption, and eventual Hellenization of the Slavs in Greece. Thessalonica in particular may be called the savior of Greece from the Slavs, for had she succumbed to their repeated attacks in the sixth and seventh centuries, the chances are that Greece would have been completely inundated by them. In the end, the Slavs in Greece proper were absorbed and disappeared from history. Fallmerayer's statement that there is no real Hellenic blood in the veins of the modern Greeks cannot, therefore, be accepted.

The Slavic penetration of Greece affected also the ethnography of Sicily and southern Italy. Scholars have noted that whereas about A.D. 600 Sicily "contained a considerable Latin element," by 650 it "had become completely Greek in language, rite, and culture."¹¹⁰ The explanation for this, it was thought, lay in the influx of a considerable number of Greek-speaking elements from Syria and Egypt as a result first of the Persian and then of the Arab conquests. But for this, with the exception of one or two texts referring to a few individuals, there is no evidence. The evidence that exists is of a different nature.¹¹¹ We

¹⁰⁸ Monemvasia was founded by Lacedaemonian refugees at the time of the invasion of the Peloponnesus by the Slavs during the reign of Maurice. Charanis, "The Chronicle of Monemvasia . . .," 148. On Corinth and Athens during the seventh century see Charanis, "On the Capture of Corinth by the Onogurs and its Recapture by the Byzantines," 343-350; "The Significance of Coins as Evidence for the History of Athens and Corinth in the Seventh and Eighth Centuries," *Historia*, 4 (1955), 163-172.

¹⁰⁹ Life of St. Stephen of Surozh, ed. V. Vasil'evskij, *Russko-vizantijskij izsledovanija*, II (St. Petersburg, 1893), 75: Ξενιτευθεὶς δὲ τῆς πατρίδος εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπέδραμεν· εἶχε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαν τοῦ προσκυνῆσαι καὶ κατασπᾶσθαι τὸν ναὸν τῆς Θεομήτορος. Εὐρὼν δὲ ἐκείσε ἐνθαγενεῖς τοῦ τόπου καὶ πατρίους φιλοσόφους τε καὶ ῥήτορας, πάντας προσομιλήσας καὶ διαλεχθεὶς οὐκ ὀλίγα, ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει ἐπέστρεψε.

¹¹⁰ L. White, *Latin Monasticism in Norman Sicily* (Cambridge, Mass., 1938), 17.

¹¹¹ See my paper "On the Question of the Hellenization of Sicily and Southern Italy during the Middle Ages," *The American Historical Review*, 52 (1946), 74-77. But see further O. Parlangeli, *Sui dialetti romanzi e romaici del Salento (Memorie dell'Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere. Classe di Lettere, Scienze Morali e Storiche, ser. III, XXV-XXVI)* (Milan, 1953). 141f. For a contrary opinion see Stam. C. Caratzas, *L'origine des dialectes néo-grecs de l'Italie méridionale* (Paris, 1958), 47-61. The arguments of Caratzas against the view expressed here, especially since he accepts the testimony of Arethas of Caesarea, leave me absolutely unconvinced. See also, S. G. Kapsomenos, Ἡ μαρτυρία τοῦ λεξιλογίου γιὰ τὴν ἐπιβίωσιν τοῦ ἑλληνισμοῦ στὴν μεσεμβρινὴ Ἰταλία, Πεπραγμένα τοῦ Θ' Διεθν. Βυζαντινολ. Συνεδρίου, 3 (Athens, 1958), 299-324. Besides the lexical material, which constitutes the basis of his work, Kapsomenos examines also the historical evidence, but his examination is very superficial. The question of the survival of Greek in southern Italy is briefly touched upon by E. Pulgram, *The Tongues of Italy. Prehistory and History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 50. He is inclined to agree with those who claim the continuity of ancient Greek, but refers also (50, note 7) to B. Migliorini who, in his as yet unpublished work, *The Italian Language*, suggests a compromise: "the two factions are not really so far apart since even Rohlf's admits that the hold of Greek had become very tenuous by the time it was in fact invigorated through fresh Byzantine immigration." Cf. my paper (75, 84) where I make this observation.

know that at the time of the great Avaro-Slav invasion of the Peloponnesus during the reign of Maurice many Peloponnesians fled and sought refuge elsewhere. We are specifically told that among these Peloponnesians, many Lacedaemonians settled in Sicily, while the people of Patras found new homes in the territory of Rhegium in Calabria. And although documentation is lacking, it is not improbable that other Greeks, too, from Epirus, central Greece, and western Peloponnesus went to Sicily or Italy at that time. As the Slavs occupied virtually all the western part of the Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians who succeeded in fleeing could find no nearer haven than Sicily or Italy. That Greek-speaking elements from Syria and Egypt may also have settled in Sicily and southern Italy cannot, of course, be ruled out, but such evidence as there is clearly indicates that the bulk of the settlers came from Greece, particularly from the Peloponnesus, during, and as a result of, the great Avar and Slav invasions of the late sixth century and perhaps later. It is interesting, too, to observe that as a result of the changes which took place in the Balkan peninsula and in Italy during this time, the effective jurisdiction of the papacy was reduced to lands where the Greek-speaking element was very considerable. This fact explains the predominance of Greek-speaking orientals among the popes of the seventh and eighth centuries. It is well known that of the thirteen popes who occupied the pontifical throne from 678 to 752 eleven were Greek-speaking.

The ethnography of Asia Minor also was to some degree affected by the coming of the Slavs. In their various raids the Slavs touched upon Asia Minor,¹¹² but there is no evidence that they settled there of their own volition. They were brought to Asia Minor by the Byzantine emperors for political and military reasons; political, because the emperors wanted to reduce the pressure that the Slavs were exerting in the Balkan peninsula, especially in the region around Thessalonica; military, because they wanted to enroll these Slavs in their armies. There are for the seventh century two references in our literary sources to the establishment of Slavic colonies in Asia Minor. The first tell us that in the course of an expedition which the Saracens made into "Romania" in 665, five thousand Slavs went over to them and were settled by them in Syria.¹¹³ "Romania" means Asia Minor in this context, and although we are not explicitly told that the Slavs in question were settled there, the chances are that they formed a military colony which had been established in those parts. The second reference is more explicit. We are told that in 688 Justinian II "made an expedition against Sclavinia and Bulgaria . . . and sallying forth as far as Thessalonica, seized many multitudes of Slavs, some by war, others with their consent . . . and settled them in the region of the Opsikion theme," i.e., in Bithynia.¹¹⁴ From among these Slavs Justinian raised an army of 30,000, which he led against the Arabs (A.D. 692). Twenty thousand of these Slavs—probably an

¹¹² Tougaard, *op. cit.*, 118.

¹¹³ Theophanes, I:348.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 364; Nicephorus, *op. cit.*, 36. Justinian's expedition to Thessalonica is also attested by an inscription that has been edited by A. A. Vasiliev, "An Edict of the Emperor Justinian II, September 688," *Speculum*, 18 (1943), 1-13. But cf. Grégoire, "Un édit de l'empereur Justinien," *Byzantion*, 17 (1944-1945), 119-124a.

exaggerated figure—deserted to the enemy, an act of betrayal which so angered Justinian that he killed the remaining 10,000 together with their wives and children. Formerly I expressed the view that Justinian had destroyed the entire Slavic colony in Bithynia,¹¹⁵ but a more attentive reading of the text, as A. Maricq has pointed out,¹¹⁶ does not bear out this conclusion. The Slavic colony in Bithynia not only survived,¹¹⁷ but was, in the following century, augmented by another great settlement¹¹⁸ and perhaps by others besides.¹¹⁹ In the beginning of the ninth century a Slav of Asia Minor very nearly ascended the throne; the view, however, that his uprising was an expression of Slav nationalism is a figment of the imagination.¹²⁰ The Slavs of Bithynia still existed in the tenth century,¹²¹ though they were eventually absorbed and lost their identity.

But let us return to the Balkan peninsula. The settlement of the Slavs in that area virtually eliminated the Latin-speaking element from the Byzantine Empire. The Latinized Illyrians and Thracians were killed or deported, or else retired into the mountains, where they lived unnoticed for centuries. It is true that the Empire still clung to Ravenna, Rome, and Naples, had a foothold in southern Italy, controlled all of Sicily, and did not lose Carthage until the very end of the seventh century. Here the Latin-speaking element was dominant, although in Sicily and southern Italy Greek had begun to gain the upper hand. But these were peripheral regions which did not play a significant role, in spite of the importance that the Byzantine emperors attached to retaining them. It had been otherwise with Illyricum and Thrace. Illyricum had been for a long time the best recruiting ground for the Byzantine army. Some of its ablest officers had come from there as well as from Thrace. The loss of Illyricum meant the elimination of the most important Latin-speaking element of the Empire. In the central regions of the Empire there was, thenceforth, no significant segment of the population that spoke Latin, and Latin had to surrender its position as the language of the administration and of the army. Under Heraclius Greek became the official language of the state. Latin ceased to be studied and was eventually forgotten.¹²² An emperor of the ninth century referred to it as a "barbarous Scythian language."¹²³ In the meantime developments in the west gave to the papacy a western orientation, and so there evolved the conditions which were to bring about the separation of the Latin and the Greek worlds.

¹¹⁵ Charanis, "The Slavic Element in Byzantine Asia Minor in the Thirteenth Century," *Byzantion*, 18 (1946-1948), 74. According to Michael Syrus (2:470) the number of Slavs who deserted to the Arabs numbered only about seven thousand. Cf. Maricq, *op. cit.*, 349.

¹¹⁶ Maricq, *loc. cit.*

¹¹⁷ I am now inclined to agree with Ostrogorsky that the seal which refers to the Slavs in Bithynia dates from 694/95 and not from 650 as I had formerly thought. Cf. G. Ostrogorsky, *Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates* (Munich, 1952), 107, note 1.

¹¹⁸ Nicephorus, 68f.; Theophanes, I:432.

¹¹⁹ Theophanes Continuatus, 50. But cf. Charanis, *op. cit.*, 73.

¹²⁰ Charanis, *op. cit.*, 79-80.

¹²¹ Charanis, *op. cit.*, 80-81.

¹²² On the status of Latin in the Eastern Roman Empire one may consult the important work of H. Zilliacus, *Zum Kampf der Weltsprachen im oströmischen Reich* (Helsinki, 1935). It was only gradually, however, that Latin was eliminated as the language of the army. It was still in use at the end of the seventh century. Cf. A. Pertusi, "La formation des thèmes byzantins," *Berichte zum XI. Internationalen Byzantinisten-Kongress* (Munich, 1958), 25-26 and note 129.

¹²³ Michael III in a letter to Pope Nicholas I: *Nicolai Papae Epistolae et Decreta*, Migne, *PL*, 119. 932.

Among the many scholars who have attempted to determine the causes of this estrangement only a few have given due weight to the occupation of the Balkan peninsula by the Slavs. In reality this was one of the most important causes.¹²⁴

In his account of the revolt of Thomas the Slavonian, the historian Genesius, himself of Armenian descent,¹²⁵ lists a variety of peoples from whom the army of the rebel had been drawn; Saracens, Indians, Egyptians, Assyrians, Medes, Abasgians, Zichs, Vandals, Getae, Alans, Chaldoi, and Armenians, as well as adherents of the heretical sects of the Paulicians and Athinganoi.¹²⁶ Even if the identity of all these nations is not entirely clear,¹²⁷ the mere enumeration of them illustrates vividly the multi-racial character of the Byzantine Empire. I speak here of the ninth century, but the same could be said of both the preceding and the following periods. Greeks, including the Hellenized natives of Asia Minor, Armenians, Slavs, peoples from the Caucasus, obscure tribes such as the Mardaites whom Justinian II removed from Lebanon and settled in the Empire (probably in the region of Attalia),¹²⁸ remnants of the Huns, Bulgars, and Turks—all these nationalities were represented in the population of the Empire. The Greeks no doubt predominated, but some of the others, as, for instance, the Armenians and the Slavs, were both important and numerous. But, despite the multi-racial nature of the Empire, two forces tended to give it unity. The first was orthodoxy; the other was a common language. Both were Greek, and to the extent that they were Greek the Empire also was Greek. But in another sense the Empire was neither Greek nor Roman. It was above all Christian, and in it, if we may use the words of St. Paul, there was "neither Jew nor Greek," but "all one in Christ Jesus."¹²⁹

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

¹²⁴ Prof. F. Dvornik has repeatedly emphasized the importance of this factor. See his recent work, *The Slavs. Their Early History and Civilization*, 44–45. Cf. also above, p. 10 ff.

¹²⁵ C. de Boor, "Zu Genesios," *BZ*, 10 (1901), 62–65.

¹²⁶ Genesius, 33.

¹²⁷ Vasiliev-Grégoire, *Byzance et les Arabes*, I:31, note 2. Cf. F. Hirsch, *Byzantinische Studien* (Leipzig, 1876), 131.

¹²⁸ Theophanes, I:363, 364; Agapius of Menbidj, 497; Michael Syrus, 2:469. Cf. Honigmann, *op. cit.*, 41; J. Morelli, *Bibliotheca manuscripta graeca et latina*, I (Bassano, 1802), 217. In the ninth and tenth centuries we find Mardaites also in the Peloponnesus, at Nicopolis in Epirus, and Cephalonia: Theophanes Continuatus, 304, 311; Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De ceremoniis*, I (Bonn, 1829), 665.

¹²⁹ Gal. III 27, 28.



Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History

The Transfer of Population as a Policy in the Byzantine Empire

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Reviewed work(s):

Source: *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jan., 1961), pp. 140-154

Published by: [Cambridge University Press](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/177624>

Accessed: 26/01/2013 22:53

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Cambridge University Press and Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Comparative Studies in Society and History*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

THE TRANSFER OF POPULATION AS A POLICY IN THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE *

In his account of the revolt of Thomas the Slavonian (820) against the Emperor Michael II (820–829) the Byzantine historian Genesius lists a variety of peoples from whom the armies of the rebel had been drawn: Saracens, Indians, Egyptians, Assyrians, Medes, Abasgians, Zichs, Vandals, Getae, Alans, Chaldoi, Armenians, adherents of the heretical sects of the Paulicians and the Athenganoi.¹ Some of these peoples are well known; the identity of others, despite efforts made to determine it, is by no means certain.² But in any case, their listing by the Byzantine historian illustrates vividly the multi-racial character of the Byzantine Empire. This was in the ninth century, but the situation was no different for the period before, and it would not be different for the period after. The Byzantine Empire was never in its long history a true national state with an ethnically homogeneous population. If by virtue of its civilization it may be called Greek, it was never, except perhaps during the very last years of its existence, an empire of Greeks.

There is nothing particularly new in this statement, for the Byzantine Empire, which, as is well known, was the continuation of the pagan Roman Empire, was made up of lands inhabited by peoples of different racial origins and cultural traditions. To be sure the conquests of the Arabs in the seventh century deprived the Empire of great numbers of non-Greek speaking elements and gave to it an aspect which appeared to be more Greek than had been the case before Egypt and Syria, where a national consciousness and a literature in the native languages had begun to develop, were lost; so also was Africa with its Latin and Punic-speaking population. There remained Asia Minor, parts of the Balkan peninsula, the Islands of the Aegean, including Crete, certain regions of Italy, and Sicily. Here the Greek-speaking elements were strong, but the ethnic homogeneity which they suggest was more apparent than real.³

* Other studies of population transfer will follow as sequels to this article.—Ed.

¹ Genesius, *Historia* (Bonn, 1834), p. 33.

² A. A. Vasiliev—H. Grégoire, *Byzance et les Arabes*, I (Brussels, 1935), pp. 31, note 2. Cf. Hirsch, *Byzantinische Studien* (Leipzig, 1876), p. 131.

³ Cf. Peter Charanis, "Ethnic Changes in the Byzantine Empire in the Seventh Century", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 13 (1959), pp. 25-44.

The native peoples of Asia Minor, for instance, were not, at least as late as the beginning of the ninth century, as thoroughly Hellenized as is generally believed. This is shown not only by the fact that some of the native languages as, for instances, Phrygian, Isaurian, and perhaps also Celtic continued to be spoken past the sixth century, but also by the persistence well into the ninth century of certain strange heretical sects native to Asia Minor as the Athenganoi, the Sabbatians, the Tetraditai, and others.⁴ But more important were the ethnic changes brought about by the arrival of new peoples as, for example, the Slavs, and by certain practices of the imperial government, notably the recruitment of barbarians for the army and their settlement in the Empire, and the transfer of peoples from one region of the Empire to another. It is the latter practice that I would like to examine in this essay.

Inherited from the pagan Roman Empire this practice was frequently resorted to throughout the duration of the Byzantine Empire. We need not here trace its origin or give examples of its use during the early centuries. Justinian certainly resorted to it. We know that he settled Vandals in Asia Minor and Kotrigurs, a Bulgar people, in Thrace.⁵ Meanwhile, a number of Goths had been settled in Bithynia, in the territory which later formed the Optimate theme. They were still there at the beginning of the eighth century, though by then they were at least partly Hellenized.⁶ Justinian also removed Armenians from their homeland and settled them elsewhere in the Empire, but the numbers involved were small.⁷

Transfers on a larger scale were resorted to by the immediate successors of Justinian. In 578, when Tiberius was Emperor, 10,000 Armenians were removed from their homes and settled on the island of Cyprus.⁸ A transplantation on a still vaster scale was planned by Maurice, Tiberius' successor, and was partially carried out. Maurice, who may have been of Armenian descent, though this is extremely doubtful,⁹ aimed at nothing less than the

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-28.

⁵ Procopius, *De bello Vandalico*, II 14, 17 for Vandals; *De bello Gothico*, IV 9, 6 for Kotrigurs.

⁶ Theophanes, *Chronographia*, edited by C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1883), 1:385; *Acta Graeca SS. Davidis, Symeonis et Georgii*, in *Analecta Bollandiana*, 18 (1899), p. 256.

⁷ Procopius, *De bello Gothico*, III 32, 7; Cf. R. Grousset, *Histoire de l'Arménie des origines à 1071* (Paris, 1947), p. 242. Grousset's statement concerning vast transfers of Armenians to Thrace by Justinian is not borne out by his references.

⁸ Theophylactus Simocatta, *Historia*, ed. C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1887), p. 143; John of Ephesus, *Historia ecclesiasticae pars tertia*, tr. into Latin by E. W. Brooks (Louvain, 1936), pp. 236, 252; English trans. by R. Payne-Smith (Oxford, 1860), pp. 412, 437; Evagrius Scholasticus, *Ecclesiastical History*, ed. J. Bidez and L. Parmentier (London, 1898), p. 215. Cf. E. Honigmann, *Die Ostgrenze des byzantinischen Reiches von 363 bis 1071* (Brussels, 1935), p. 23. Two years earlier, during the reign of Justin II, Sabiri and Albanians were moved on this side of the Cyrus river (in the region of the Caucasus) in order to make certain that they would not be friendly with the Persians. Menander Protector, *Excerpta ex historia* (Bonn, 1829), p. 394.

⁹ N. Adontz has tried to prove the Armenian origin of Maurice: "Les légendes de

removal of virtually all the Armenians from their homeland. According to Sebeos, the Armenian historian who is one of our principal sources for this period, Maurice addressed the Persian king as follows:

The Armenians are a knavish and indocile nation. They are located between us and they are a source of trouble. I am going to collect mine and send them to Thrace; send yours to the East. If they die there, it will be so many enemies that will die; if, on the contrary, they kill, it will be so many enemies that they will kill. As for us, we shall live in peace. But if they remain in their country, there will never be any quiet for us.

Sebeos further reports that the two rulers agreed to carry out this plan, but apparently the Persians, in the end, failed to cooperate. For when the Byzantine Emperor gave the necessary orders and pressed hard for their execution, many Armenians fled to Persia. The Byzantines, however, did carry out the deportation, though only in part.¹⁰ In 602 the same Emperor issued the following edict: "I need 30,000 cavalymen, by way of tribute, raised in Armenia. Thirty thousand families must be gathered and settled in Thrace." Priscus, one of the generals of Maurice, was sent to Armenia to carry out this edict, but before he had time to do so, the revolution that overthrew Maurice broke out, and the edict apparently was not enforced.

No doubt, the most important ethnic change in the Balkan peninsula since ancient times was brought about by the incursions and the settlement of the Slavs late in the sixth and early in the seventh century.¹¹ The settlements of the Slavs covered the heart of the peninsula and extended to the Adriatic, the Aegean, and the Balkan mountains. They were numerous in the region of Thessalonica, a fact known not only from literary sources, but also from many place-names of Slavic origin. Thrace, though often devastated by the Slavs, escaped their occupation, at least for several centuries, but even there they established some settlements, as, for instance, near Vizya. The native Illyrians and Thracians of the occupied regions retired into the mountains, where they remained unnoticed until the eleventh century, when they emerged as Albanians and Vlachs. Slavs also settled in Greece proper, particularly in Thessaly, western Peloponnesus, and Epirus.

Except for the *Miracula Sancti Demetrii*, a compilation of the seventh century which relates the successful resistance of Thessalonica against the

Maurice et de Constantin V, empereurs de Byzance", *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales*, 2 (Brussels, 1934), pp. 1-12. But see P. Goubert, *Byzance avant l'Islam*, I (Paris, 1951), pp. 36-41.

¹⁰ Sebeos, *Histoire d'Héraclius*, tr. from Armenian by F. Macler (Paris, 1904), pp. 30-31. Cf. F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches*, I (Munich, 1924), p. 13, no. 108.

¹¹ For what follows see Charanis, "Ethnic Changes . . .", 36-43; also by the same author, "The Slavic Element in Byzantine Asia Minor in the Thirteenth Century", *Byzantion*, 18 (1946-1948), pp. 69-83.

Slavs who tried several times to take it, we have virtually no information concerning the efforts, if any, made by Byzantium to bring the Slavs under its effective jurisdiction. We do know, however, that in 657–658 Constans II, the Emperor of Byzantium, made an expedition into Sclavinia (by Sclavinia here the region of Thessalonica is probably meant) and “took away prisoners and subdued the land”. We know also that in 665 five thousand Slavs deserted to the Saracens when the latter made an incursion into Asia Minor and were settled by them in Syria. As there is no evidence to the effect that Slavs settled in Asia Minor on their own volition, the Slavs of Asia Minor who deserted to the Arabs in 665 must have been settled there by the Byzantine authorities most probably following the expedition of Constans II into Sclavinia to which reference has just been made.

A transfer of Slavs from the Balkan peninsula into Asia Minor on a larger scale was affected by Justinian II. We are told that in 688 Justinian II “made an expedition against Sclavinia and Bulgaria . . . and rallying forth as far as Thessalonica, seized many multitudes of Slavs, some by war, others with their consent . . . and settled them in the region of the Opsikion theme”, *i.e.*, in Bithynia. From among these Slavs Justinian raised an army of 30,000, which he led against the Arabs (A.D. 692). Twenty thousand of these Slavs—this figure is doubtless an exaggeration—deserted to the enemy, an act of betrayal which so angered Justinian that he killed the remaining 10,000 together with their wives and children.

Justinian II was responsible for other population transfers. In 688 he removed the Mardaites, a Christian people of unknown ethnic origin, from the region of the Amanus mountains and settled them elsewhere in the Empire. We find them in the tenth century living in Attaleia in Pamphylia, in the Peloponnesus, in the island of Cephalonia and in Epirus, serving the Empire as sailors.¹² In 691 Justinian II removed the Cypriots, together with their archbishop and other ecclesiastics, and settled them in the region of Cyzicus. The new settlement was called Justinianoupolis. Not long afterwards, however, the Cypriots returned to their homeland and as a consequence their settlement near Cyzicus was abandoned.¹³ The same Emperor is said to have settled Scythians in the mountainous regions of the Strymon River in eastern Macedonia.¹⁴ The term Scythian was used by the Byzantines to designate the various Turkish peoples with whom they came in contact;

¹² Theophanes, *op. cit.*, 1: 363, 364; Michael Syrus, *Chronique*, tr. from Syriac by J. B. Chabot, II (Paris, 1901), p. 469; Theophanes Continuatus (Bonn, 1838), pp. 304, 311; Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De Ceremoniis*, I (Bonn, 1829), p. 665; J. Morellii, *Bibliotheca Manuscripta Graeca et Latina*, I (Bassani, 1802), pp. 217, 218.

¹³ Mansi 11: 961; Theophanes, *op. cit.*, 1: 365; Michael Syrus, *op. cit.*, 2: 470.

¹⁴ Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De thematibus*, ed. A. Pertusi (Rome, 1952), pp. 88 f. Cf. B. A. Panchenko, “Pamiatnik Slavian v Vifinii VII.v”, *Bulletin de l'Institut archéologique russe à Constantinople*, 8 (Sofia, 1903), p. 53. Panchenko considers these Scythians Turks, and identifies them with the Vardariotae Turks.

it was also sometimes used to designate the Slavs. The Scythians referred to in this instance, however, must have been a Turkish people, for the general policy of Justinian II was to weaken rather than strengthen the Slavs in Macedonia.

More transfers were made in the course of the eighth century. During the reign of Constantine V Copronymus (741–775), thousands of Armenians and monophysite Syrians were gathered by the Byzantine armies during their raids in the regions of Germanicea (Marash), Melitene, and Erzeroum, and were settled in Thrace.¹⁵ Others, also from the environs of Erzeroum, were settled along the eastern frontier. These, however, were subsequently seized by the Arabs and were settled by them in Syria.¹⁶ The same emperor removed a number of people from the islands and Greece (755) in order to repopulate Constantinople which had suffered grievously by the plague of 746.¹⁷ But more important was his transfer of Slavs from the Balkan peninsula to Asia Minor. The Slavs involved numbered, according to one chronicle, 208,000. They were settled in Asia Minor about the Artanas River, a little stream which flows into the Black Sea west of the Sangarius and not far from the Bosphorus.¹⁸ Another big transfer was made during the reign of Leo IV (775–780). The people involved were chiefly Syrian Jacobites, though some Armenians may have also have been among them. They had been seized by the Byzantines in a raiding expedition into Cilicia and Syria and settled in Thrace. According to an oriental source, they numbered 150,000.¹⁹ Some years later (792) about a thousand soldiers, probably Armenians, were removed from the Armeniac theme and were settled in Sicily and other islands following the suppression of a revolt which had broken out among the Armeniacs, an army corps which consisted chiefly of Armenians.²⁰

Theophanus the Confessor in his account of the reign of Nicephorus I (802–811) puts the emphasis on what he calls the ten oppressive measures of that Emperor. The first of these measures was an order to have Christians from every province of the empire transplanted to Sclavinias. Theophanes considers this forced emigration worse than imprisonment. Some of those

¹⁵ Theophanes, *op. cit.*, 1: 427, 429; Michael Syrus, 2: 518, 521, 523; Nicephorus, *Opuscula Historica*, ed. C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1880), pp. 65, 66; Ghevond, *Histoire des guerres et des conquêtes des Arabes en Arménie*, tr. from Armenian by G. V. Chah-nazarian (Paris, 1856), pp. 126–127.

¹⁶ Agapius of Menbidj, *Histoire universelle*, tr. A. A. Vasiliev, *Patrologia Orientalis*, 8 (1912), pp. 531, 538; Dionysius I of Tell-Mahré, *Chronique*, tr. J. B. Chabot (Paris, 1895), pp. 56–57. Cf. A. Lombard, *Etudes d'histoire byzantine. Constantine V, empereur des Romains (740–775)* (Paris, 1902), p. 35. Among the peoples involved were some Alans also.

¹⁷ Theophanes, *op. cit.*, 1: 429.

¹⁸ Nicephorus, *op. cit.*, 68 f. Cf. Charanis, "The Slavic Element in Byzantine Asia Minor . . .", pp. 76 ff.

¹⁹ Theophanes, *op. cit.*, 1: 451–52; Chevond, *op. cit.*, p. 150; Michael Syrus, *op. cit.*, 3: 2.

²⁰ Theophanes, *op. cit.*, 1: 469.

involved, he says, wept over the graves of their fathers and considered the dead more blessed than the living. Others preferred to hang themselves rather than abandon the soil of their birth. The order, however, was carried out and its execution required about six months, from September to Easter, which in that year (810) fell in March.

Despite the brevity of this statement, its meaning is quite clear. A considerable number of people were, by order of Nicephorus, removed from their homes and were settled in regions of the Empire which were inhabited predominately by Slavs. Theophanes does not locate these regions, but we learn from another source that one of them was western Peloponnesus. Nicephorus, we are told, rebuilt the city of Patras and settled it with Greeks brought there from Calabria for this purpose. He also rebuilt and resettled the city of Lacedaemon, using for this purpose various peoples brought from Asia Minor, including some Armenians. The peoples transferred to western Peloponnesus were Orthodox Christians and no doubt predominantly Greek speaking, for the object of Nicephorus was to Christianize the Slavs who since the reign of Maurice had dominated the western Peloponnesus.²¹

Quite different were the people involved in the transfer which was ordered by Michael I (811-813). Known as Athinganoi, they were adherents of a strange sect characterized by an exaggerated levitical purity, an indulgence in astrological, demonic, and magical pursuits, and the observance of the seventh day as the Sabbath. At the beginning of the ninth century the Athinganoi were to be found chiefly in Phrygia and Lycaonia, where another heresy, that of the Paulicians, had made considerable progress. Removed from their homes by order of Michael I, they were apparently settled in the European provinces of the Empire, for some years later we find some of them in the island of Aegina.²² The Athinganoi eventually disappeared but not before they gave their name to a foreign people, the ancestors of the Gypsies, who are definitely known to have existed in Byzantium during the first half of the eleventh century and perhaps as early as the ninth.²³

The imperial authorities turned also against the Paulicians in Asia Minor, but the ultimate effect of their measures was to drive them towards the mountainous regions of the eastern frontier where they fortified themselves in certain localities, the most famous of which was Tefrike.²⁴ There they

²¹ On all this see Charanis, "Nicephorus I, The Savior of Greece from the Slavs (810 A.D.)", *Byzantina Metabyzantina*, I (1946), pp. 75-92.

²² Charanis, "Ethnic Changes in Seventh-Century Byzantium", p. 27.

²³ P. Peeters, "Histoires monastiques géorgienne", *Analecta Bollandiana*, 36-37 (1917-19), pp. 102-103. Cf. M. J. De Goeje, *Mémoires d'histoire et de géographie orientale*, 3: *Mémoire sur les migrations des Tsiganes à travers l'Asie* (Leiden, 1903), p. 75. Who one may ask, are the Tzingoi mentioned by the Arab astronomer Apomasar (Abû Ma'shar Ja'far ibn Muhammed ibn 'Umar al-Balkhî, d. 886) as translated into Greek probably in the tenth century?: *Catalogus Codicum Astrologorum Graecorum*, V, 3 (Brussels, 1910), p. 54.

²⁴ H. Grégoire, "Précisions géographiques et chronologiques sur les Pauliciens", *Aca-*

leagued themselves with the Arabs and so became a menace to the Empire, at times even threatening its territorial integrity. The Paulicians were a religious sect and as such probably included elements of different ethnic origins, but the majority were no doubt Armenians. When finally during the reign of Basil I (867–886) their strongholds were taken and razed to the ground, their army defeated and their leader killed (872), they were forced to abandon their homes and were settled elsewhere in the Empire. We know that some of them were settled in southern Italy, in the regions under the jurisdiction of the Empire.²⁵ But not all the Paulicians were removed from the eastern regions of the Empire, for we find that in the tenth century the Emperor John Tzimiskes transferred a considerable number of them from Asia Minor to Thrace, settling them in the region around the city of Philippopolis.²⁶ They were no doubt predominantly Armenians. Meanwhile, other Armenians had been settled in Crete following the recovery of that island from the Saracens in 961.²⁷ And some years later, perhaps in 988, Basil II removed a number of Armenians from the eastern provinces and settled them in Macedonia.²⁸ The Armenians settled in Crete and in Macedonia were not Paulicians.

The annexation of Armenia, completed by the middle of the eleventh century, led to further transfers of Armenians into the older as well as the newly acquired regions (non-Armenian) of the Empire. Armenians began to move in the direction of the Empire towards the beginning of the tenth century and were responsible for the integration into its administrative system of certain deserted regions along the eastern front, as those, for instance, which came to constitute the theme of Lycandos.²⁹ During the second half of the tenth century, Armenians were encouraged and perhaps forced to move from their homes in order to repopulate the various towns captured from the Arabs as, for instance, Melitene, captured in 934, Tarsus, captured in 965, Antioch, captured in 969, and others, which had suffered considerable losses in population as the result of the departure of most of the Moslems. We know, for instance, that Armenian and Syrian Jacobites were used by

démie royale de Belgique: *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, 5e Ser., 33 (Brussels, 1947), pp. 294 f.; S. Runciman, *The Medieval Manichee* (Cambridge, 1947), pp. 26–46.

²⁵ H. Grégoire, "La carrière du premier Nicéphore Phocas", *Prosphora eis Stilpona P. Kyriakiden* (Thessalonica, 1953), p. 251.

²⁶ Cedrenus, *Historiarum compendium* (Bonn, 1839), 2: 382; Anna Commena, *Alexiad*, 2 (Bonn, 1878), pp. 298 f.

²⁷ Leo Diaconus, *Historia* (Bonn, 1828), p. 28.

²⁸ Stephen (Asoghik) of Taron, *Histoire universelle* (deuxième partie), tr. from Armenian by F. Macler (Paris, 1917), p. 74.

²⁹ Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De administrando imperio*, ed. Gy. Moravcsik and tr. R. J. H. Jenkins (Budapest, 1949), pp. 238–240 (Bonn, pp. 227–228); *De thematibus*, ed. A. Pertusi (Rome, 1952), pp. 75–76, 143–146 (Bonn, 32–35); Honigsmann, *op. cit.*, 64; H. Grégoire, "Notes épigraphiques, VII", *Byzantion*, 8 (1933), pp. 79 ff.

Nicephorus Phocas to repeople Melitene which had become virtually deserted.³⁰

It was the annexation of Armenia which intensified this movement and gave to it the aspect of a mass migration. For as the Byzantines annexed the various Armenian territories, they transferred their princes elsewhere in the Empire and these princes took along with them, besides their families, a numerous retinue, consisting primarily of their nobility and the latter's following. So numerous indeed was the nobility that followed their princes that their going is said to have emptied Armenia of the most valiant elements of its population. The Greeks, wrote Matthew of Edessa, "dispersed the most courageous children of Armenia. . . . Their most constant care was to scatter from the orient all that there was of courageous men and valiant generals of Armenian origin."³¹ Of the actual number involved in this displacement no figure can be given. The national Armenian historian, Tchamitchian, puts those who followed Senacherim, one of the displaced Armenian princes, at 400,000, and this figure has been repeated by others,³² but there is nothing in the existing sources which bears this figure out. All that we have is the figure given by a medieval Armenian historian, who says that Senacherim was followed by 16,000 of his compatriots, not counting the women and children.³³ But whatever the final figure, there can be little doubt that the number of Armenians who left their homes and settled elsewhere in the Empire was a large one. The repeated raids of the Seljuk Turks which began in earnest about this time increased this number still more. The chroniclers who report this migration no doubt exaggerate in their descriptions, but their accounts, after allowance has been made for this exaggeration, remain nevertheless impressive. Armenians by the thousands were forced to leave their homeland and went to settle in Cappadocia, in Cilicia, and in northern Syria.

Meanwhile other peoples were transferred or were settled in different regions of the Empire. In 834, for instance, several thousand Persians (seven thousand according to one account, fourteen thousand according to another,

³⁰ On the westward expansion of the Armenians, Stephen (Asoghik) of Taron, *op. cit.*, p. 141; German translation of this work, H. Gelzer and A. Burckhardt (*Scriptores sacri et profani*, 4) (Leipzig, 1907), p. 196; Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography*, tr. from Syriac E. A. W. Budge (Oxford, 1932), 1:169; Honigsmann, "Malatya", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, III (London, 1936), p. 194. Cf. M. Canard, *Histoire de la dynastie des Hamdanides de Jazîra et de Syrie* (Paris, 1935), p. 736.

³¹ Matthew of Edessa, *Chronique*, tr. from Armenian by E. Dulaurier (Paris, 1858), pp. 113, 114.

³² M. Tchamitchian, *History of Armenia* (in Armenian), II (Venice, 1785), p. 903. I consulted Tchamitchian's work with the help of Professor Sirarpie Der Nersessian. M. Brosset in Lebeau-Saint-Martin, *Histoire du Bas-empire*, 14 (Paris, 1838), p. 211; Fr. Tournebize, *Histoire politique et religieuse de l'Arménie* (Paris, 1900), p. 124.

³³ Continuator of Thomas Ardzrouni, *Histoire des Ardzrouni*, tr. from Armenian, M. Brosset, *Collection d'historiens Arméniens*, I (St. Petersburg, 1874), p. 248.

thirty thousand according to still another) under the leadership of Babek and Nasr, who was subsequently christened Theophobos, fled to the Byzantine Empire, joined the Byzantine army, and became Christian. In 838 these Persians revolted; thereupon, the Emperor Theophilus dispersed them, settling them in the different themes of the Empire.³⁴ Towards the beginning of the tenth century, the exact date is not known, Turks, subsequently known as Vardariotae, were settled near the Vardar River, apparently not far from Thessalonica.³⁵ Other Turks are known to have dwelled near Ochrida in the region of the Rhodope mountains, though the circumstances and the date of their establishment are not known.³⁶ A Turkish colony established before 1025 was also located in Thrace, for it already existed during the reign of Basil II.³⁷ In 941 the entire Arab tribe of the Banū H'abid, discontented apparently with the Hamdanides, emigrated from the region of Nisibis in Mesopotamia and came to settle in the Byzantine Empire. The new arrivals numbered 12,000 horsemen and brought with them, besides their families, their slaves, flocks, and all their transportable goods. They were followed in addition by many of their neighbors. Once in Byzantine territory, they embraced Christianity, enrolled in the Byzantine army, and in return were given lands, animals, clothes, and even some precious objects.³⁸

Bulgarians too were transferred from one region of the Empire to another, especially after the destruction of the first Bulgarian kingdom by Basil II. We know, for instance, that Bulgarians settled in the various Thessalian fortresses were removed and were settled in the district of Voleron, located apparently in what is now western Thrace in the neighborhood of Alexandropolis.³⁹ Others, originally from western Macedonia, were settled in the

³⁴ H. Grégoire, "Manuel et Théophobe ou la concurrence de deux monastères", *Byzantion*, 9 (1934), pp. 183-222.

³⁵ H. Gelder, "Ungedachte und wenig bekannte Bistümerverzeichnisse der orientalischen Kirche", *Byz. Zeitschrift*, 2 (1893), p. 46. Concerning the origin of these Turks: G. L. Fr. Tafel, *De Thessalonica eiusque agro* (Berlin, 1839), pp. 70-74 (Persians); R. Janin, "Les Turcs Vardariotes", *Echos d'Orient*, 29 (1930), p. 444 (Persians); Panchenko, *op. cit.*, p. 53 (Turks, the Scythians whom Justinian II settled); P. Kyriakides, *Byzantinae Meletae*, II-V (Thessalonica, 1937, cover 1939), pp. 251 ff. (Magyars); V. Laurent, "O Bardariôtôn etoe Tourkôn. Perses, Turcs asiatiques ou turcs hongrois?", in *Recueil dédié à la mémoire du Professeur Peter Nikou* (Sofia, 1939), pp. 275 ff. (A mixture of Persians, Hungarians, and Turks from Asia Minor.)

³⁶ Anna Comnena, *op. cit.*, 1: 199. Ochrida is to be distinguished from Ochrida, the ancient Lychnidus. On the location of Ochrida, Kyriakides, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-52; C. J. Jireček, *Die Heerstrasse von Belgrad nach Constantinople und die Balkanpässe* (Prague, 1877), p. 97.

³⁷ *Life of Athanasius of Mount Athos*, ed. by I. Pomiâlovskii (St. Petersburg, 1895), p. 92; Cf. "Vie de S. Athanase l'Athonite", ed. by L. Petit, *Analecta Bollandiana*, 25 (1906), p. 72.

³⁸ Ibn H'auqal, tr. M. Canard, in H. Grégoire-A. A. Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, II, 2 (Brussels, 1950), p. 420; Cf. Canard, *Histoire de la dynastie des H'amdaniides . . .*, pp. 737-738.

³⁹ Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, 2: 453, 461. On the location of Voleron, Kyriakides, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

regions of the lower Danube, whose population by the end of the eleventh century came to be made up of a mixture of peoples, including some Pechenegs.⁴⁰ Bulgarians may have also been settled in Asia Minor in the eleventh century, for a biography of a saint who thrived during that century mentions a Bulgarian town located in the region of Ephesus.⁴¹ Bulgarians had been settled in different parts of the empire by Michael I (811–813),⁴² but whether or not the Bulgarian town near Ephesus was a survival of these settlements is a matter which cannot now be determined. Farther down, in the southwestern corner of Asia Minor there existed in the tenth century a colony inhabited by a people called Mauroe (Blacks) whose rough behavior towards the natives betrayed their alien character and the recent origin of their settlement.⁴³ Who these Mauroe were is not known, but they may have been, as Rudakov suggests, Arabs from Africa who were settled there in order to serve in the navy.⁴⁴

Transfers of population are attested for the later centuries, though the Empire declined politically and lost its important territories. In the twelfth century Pechenegs were settled in Macedonia,⁴⁵ Serbs in Bithynia,⁴⁶ near Nicomedia, and perhaps also Armenians brought there from Cilicia.⁴⁷ In the thirteenth century the emperors of Nicaea settled Cumans both in their European as well as in their Asiatic provinces.⁴⁸ Michael VIII Palaeologus brought Tzacones—ancient remnants of the Lacedaemonians—from the Morea in order to repeople Constantinople following its recovery from the Latins in

⁴⁰ Michael Ataliates, *Historia* (Bonn, 1853), p. 204.

⁴¹ *De Sancto Lazaro, monacho in monte Galesio, Acta Sanctorum*, Novembris 3 (Brussels, 1910), p. 537.

⁴² Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, 2: 52.

⁴³ *Vita S. Pauli Junioris in Monte Latro*, ed. Jacobus Sirmondus, *Analecta Bollandiana*, 11 (1892), pp. 138–140.

⁴⁴ A. P. Rudakov, *Sketches of Byzantine Culture based on Evidence drawn from Greek Hagiography* (in Russian) (Moscow, 1917), p. 56. I consulted this book with the help of Cyril Mango.

⁴⁵ John Zonaras, *Epitomae historiarum*, III (Bonn, 1897), pp. 740 f.

⁴⁶ Nicetas Choniates, *Historia* (Bonn, 1835), p. 23. These Serbs were doubtless the inhabitants of the *servochoria* which are mentioned in the *Partitio regni graeci* at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Cf. G. L. Fra. Tafel and G. M. Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig*, I (Vienna, 1856), p. 475.

⁴⁷ A large colony of Armenians is known to have existed in the Troad at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Although nothing is known of the circumstances of its establishment, it may have been the result perhaps of the transfer of Armenians from another region as that, for instance, which was effected by John II Comnenus when he took Anazarbus in 1138. Cf. Gregory the Priest, *Chronique*, tr. Dulaurier, *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Document Arménien*, I (Paris, 1869), p. 619.

⁴⁸ Gregoras, *Historia*, I (Bonn, 1829), p. 37. See further, Charanis, "On the Ethnic Composition of Byzantine Asia Minor in the Thirteenth Century", *Prospora eis Stilpona P. Kyriakiden* (Thessalonica, 1953), pp. 140–141. For a Cuman settlement before 1195, G. Rouillard et P. Collomp, *Actes de Lavra* (Paris, 1937), p. 125. For the date of the document containing this information, F. Dölger, "Zur Textgestaltung der Lavra-Urkunden und zu ihrer geschichtlichen Auswertung", *Byz. Zeitschrift*, 39 (1939), pp. 34 f.

⁴⁹ Pachymeres, *Historia*, I (Bonn, 1835), p. 188.

1261.⁴⁹ The same Emperor settled a number of Turks, followers of the Seljuk Sultan Izzedin Kaikaus II in the Dobrogea. These, according to some authorities, still survive in the present day Gagauses who live in the neighborhood of Varna and far to the north. Descendants of the followers of Izzedin were settled in Verroia in Macedonia where we still find them during the later part of the fourteenth century. Others, including descendants of Izzedin himself, found their way into Morea, established themselves there, and intermarried with the Byzantines. The famous family of the Melikitae, whom we find in the fifteenth century, were apparently an offshoot of these Turks.⁵⁰ At the same time other peoples, as for instance Albanians, were settled in the Morea.⁵¹ Meanwhile, numerous Latins, a subject which I shall not elaborate here, had come to Byzantium, beginning with the eleventh century, either as mercenaries or merchants or conquerors.

Thus, throughout its duration, the Byzantine Empire made it a matter of policy, for reasons of state, to transfer peoples from one region to another within its borders and also to accept for settlement barbarians who came to it or were invited or seized by it for that purpose. Foremost among these reasons of state was the military. There is little doubt that the transfers affected by Tiberius, by Maurice, by Justinian II, by Basil II, and by others were resorted to because the elements involved were needed for the army in some particular spot. It was indeed these transfers and settlements of new peoples which enabled the Empire to reorganize its armies and so survive the crisis of the seventh and eighth centuries and then take the offensive.

Besides the military there were also economic reasons for these transfers. Indeed, the military and economic reasons were often related. The historian Evagrius writes concerning the transfer of the 10,000 Armenians to Cyprus in 578: "Thus land which previously had not been tilled was everywhere restored to cultivation. Numerous armies also were raised from among them

⁵⁰ The literature on the Gagauses is considerable. I cite here some of the more important works: G. D. Balashev, *The Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus and the Establishment with his aid of the state of the Gagauses on the Western Coast of the Black Sea* (in Greek) (Sofia, 1930); A. Manof, "Who are the Gagauses?" (in Greek), *Epeteris Hetaereias Byzantinôn Spoudôn*, 10 (1933), pp. 381-400; P. Mutafciev, *Die angebliche Einwanderung von Seldschuk-Türken in die Dobrudscha im XIII. Jahrhundert* (Sofia, 1943). But see V. Laurent, "La domination byzantine aux bouches du Danube sous Michel VIII Paléologue", *Revue Historique du Sud-Est Européen*, 22 (1945), pp. 194 ff.; also G. I. Bratianu, "Les Roumains aux bouches du Danube", *ibid.*, pp. 199 ff.; P. Wittek, "La descendance chrétienne de la dynastie Seldjouk en Macédoine", *Echos d'Orient*, 33 (1934), pp. 409, 412; Wittek, "Yazijioghlu 'Ali on the Christian Turks of the Dobruja", *Bulletin of the Society of Oriental and African Studies*, 14 (1952), pp. 639-668; V. Laurent, "Une famille turque au service de Byzance: les Mélikès", *Byz. Zeitschrift*, 49 (1956), pp. 349-368. I have not seen the work by E. M. Hoppe, "Die türkischen Gaggauzen-Christen", *Oriens Christ.*, 41 (1957), pp. 125-137.

⁵¹ On the settlement of Albanians and other peoples in the Peloponnesus (the Morea) see now D. A. Zakythinis, *Le Despotat grec de Morée*, II: *Vie et Institutions* (Athens, 1953), 20-45.

and they fought resolutely and courageously against the other nations. At the same time every household was completely furnished with domestics, because of the easy rate at which slaves were procured.”⁵² The Armenians settled in Macedonia by Basil II about 988 were brought there, we are told by the Armenian historian who reports the incident, in order to serve as a bulwark against the Bulgarians and also to help increase the prosperity of the country. Justinian II no doubt removed the Cypriots to Cyzicus in order to rehabilitate the country which had been terribly devastated by the Arabs. The repeopling and economic rehabilitation of the country were no doubt the reasons for the numerous transfers made in the eighth century. The same factors were operative in the movement of peoples, particularly the Armenians, in the tenth century.

There were other purposes served by the transfers of population. They helped in the recovery and Byzantinization of certain regions which had been occupied by the barbarians. The transfers made by Nicephorus I, for instance, laid the basis for the eventual absorption of the Slavs in Greece. They served or were intended to serve for the elimination of certain troublesome heresies as the Athenganoi and also the Paulicians, though in the latter case military objectives were also involved. They served finally to remove recalcitrant elements which, if left in their homeland, might have become serious sources of trouble. This was no doubt the principal reason for the removal of the Paulicians in the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries and of the Armenian princes and their retinues in the eleventh. It was also a factor in the transfer of Slavs from the Balkan peninsula to Asia Minor in the seventh and eighth centuries.

There is no doubt that transfers of population and the settlement of new peoples were major factors in the military and demographic revival and economic prosperity of the empire. Transfers of population contributed also to the elimination of heretical groups as the Athenganoi and the absorption of barbarians as the Slavs in Greece. But in at least two instances the policy of transfer had disastrous consequences and contributed to the decline of the Empire. I am referring to the removal of the Paulicians and the Armenian princes and their retinues.

It will be recalled that Paulicians were settled in Thrace in the eighth century and again in the tenth. In transplanting the Paulicians to Thrace the aim of the Byzantine authorities was “firstly to drive them out of their strong cities and forts which they held as despotic rulers, and secondly to put them as trustworthy guards against the inroads of the Scythians by which

⁵² Evagrius Scholasticus, *op. cit.*, p. 215. The translation is taken from the English version of Evagrius which appeared in Bohn's Ecclesiastical Library: Theodoret and Evagrius, *History of the Church* (London, 1854), p. 444.

the country of Thrace was often oppressed".⁵³ It was doubtless hoped also that they would be absorbed by the indigenous inhabitants and so disintegrate as a heretical sect. But the outcome was quite different. Not only did they hold tenaciously to their beliefs, but converted also many of the indigenous inhabitants who for various reasons were dissatisfied with the Byzantine administration. By the end of the eleventh century Philippopolis and the surrounding country was almost entirely inhabited by them. "All the inhabitants of Philippopolis", writes Anna Comnena, "were Manicheans, except a few . . . They increased in number until all the inhabitants around Philippopolis were heretics. Then another brackish stream of Armenians joined them and yet another."⁵⁴

Inimical to Byzantium from the beginning, the Paulicians became so still more as the result of measures taken by the imperial authorities to suppress them. They showed this enmity in the most dangerous way, by cooperating with its enemies whenever the opportunity offered itself. Thus in 1086 it was the Bogomiles, an offshoot of the Paulicians of Philippopolis, who urged the Pechenegs and Cumans to invade the Empire, an invasion which repeated several times devastated Thrace and came close to overwhelming the Byzantine capital. The energy and diplomacy of Alexius I Comnenus saved the situation.⁵⁵ A century later when Frederick Barbarossa passed by Philippopolis on his way to the Holy Lands during the Third Crusade, the Paulicians there welcomed him as liberator, and while the Greek inhabitants fled, they sought to give him provisions, guards, and information.⁵⁶ And again in 1205 the Paulicians of Philippopolis conspired with John Asan of Bulgaria to turn the city over to him.⁵⁷ Thus the enmity of the Paulicians no doubt contributed to the breakdown of the political authority of Byzantium in the Balkans, though in this there were other and more important factors involved.

In displacing the Armenian princes and their retinues in the eleventh century the object of the Byzantine authorities was to assure the peaceful control of the newly acquired Armenian lands by removing the elements that might be a source of trouble. This was, as I have already observed, traditional Byzantine policy which had often worked. This time, however, it proved to be one of the major factors in the breakdown of Byzantine

⁵³ Anna Comnena, 2: 298: I have used the translation of E. A. S. Dawes, *The Alexiad of the Princess Anna Comnena* (London, 1928), p. 385.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 2: 299 f.; Dawes, 385.

⁵⁵ P. Charanis, "The Byzantine Empire in the Eleventh Century", *A History of the Crusades*, I, ed. M. W. Baldwin (Philadelphia, 1955), pp. 214 f.

⁵⁶ Nicetas Choniates, *op. cit.*, pp. 527, 534.

⁵⁷ Geoffroi de Ville-Hardouin, *La conquête de Constantinople*, ed. and tr. into modern French by M. Natalis de Wailly (Paris, 1872), p. 239. For a general account in English on the Paulicians and Bogomiles: S. Runciman, *The Medieval Manichee: A Study of the Christian Dualistic Heresy* (Cambridge, 1947); D. Obolensky, *The Bogomiles: A Study in Balkan Neo-Manichaeism* (Cambridge, 1948).

authority in Asia Minor. For the displacement of the Armenians coming as it did at a time when their homeland was being subjected to the repeated raids of the Seljuks had removed the element which, fighting for its native land, might have checked these raids and so prevented the occupation of Asia Minor by the Seljuks.

But more important, the displacement of the Armenians weakened the position of the Empire in the regions to which they were removed. For in some of these regions, as for instance in Cappadocia, their settlements disturbed the social and ethnic complexion and so created serious tension, while in others, as for instance Cilicia and northern Syria, the new settlers were ready to start separatist movements the moment the opportunity presented itself. What particularly contributed to the development of tension between the Armenian element and the rest of the population were the ecclesiastical problems which the annexation of the Armenian lands and the consequent dispersion of the Armenians had created. There had always been heretical groups in the Empire, but Orthodoxy, as it finally crystalized, had come to prevail as one of the unifying forces of the Empire—the Greek language and the imperial tradition were the other two—but now for the first time since the loss of Egypt and Syria in the seventh century there was a powerful religious minority, dominant in certain regions of the Empire, very strong in others. Both Church and state were very much concerned about this situation and, as a consequence, brought pressure to bear upon the Armenians to accept the orthodox point of view. But the Armenians, whose cultural and national development was strongly associated with their religious beliefs and practices resisted stubbornly, and the efforts of the Byzantine church to bring them in line only served to increase the tempo of this resistance.⁵⁸ Greeks and Armenians came to dislike each other intensely. This dislike at times turned into bitter hostility and found expression in atrocious deeds as, for instance, that of Kagik, the dispossessed king of Ani, who had the Greek bishop of Caesarea seized and put into a sack together with his large dog and then had his men beat bishop and dog until the enraged animal tore his master to pieces.⁵⁹ But more serious than these outbursts was the effect that this hostility had upon the army. The battle of Mentzikert which determined the fate of Asia Minor and in the long run the fate of the Near East for centuries was lost by the Byzantines at least in part because the Armenian contingents deserted.⁶⁰ Still less perhaps was the loyalty of the Armenian civil population. In any case, just before the battle

⁵⁸ On the attempts of the Byzantines to have the Armenians accept the orthodox point of view and the Armenian resistance to these attempts see the brief but excellent account of Speros Vryonis, Jr., "Byzantium: The Social Basis of Decline in the Eleventh Century", *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*, 2 (1959), pp. 169 ff.

⁵⁹ Matthew of Edessa, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-154.

⁶⁰ Michael Syrus, *op. cit.*, 3: 169; Attaliates, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

of Mentzikert the Byzantine Emperor had to take special measures in order to protect his army from the hostile acts of the Armenian civil population.⁶¹ As later generations of Armenians acknowledged, the hostility between Greek and Armenian was one of the most important factors in the breakdown of Byzantine authority in Asia Minor.⁶²

The Byzantine Empire, as it has been observed at the beginning of this essay, remained throughout its long history a multi-national state. One of the factors which made it so was the transfer of peoples from one region of the Empire to another and the settlement of new ones, a practice which was traditional with the Byzantines. It may be said, however, that despite its multi-national character, three forces tended to give it unity. One was Orthodoxy, the other a common language, and the third the imperial tradition. The first and the second were Greek and to the extent that they were Greek the Empire was Greek also. The third was Roman, and to that extent the Empire was also Roman. But in another sense the Empire was neither Greek nor Roman. It was above all Christian, and in it, if I may use the words of St. Paul, there was "neither Jew nor Greek", but "all one in Christ Jesus". The official definition given to this oneness "in Christ Jesus", however, was not accepted by all, and the efforts made by the imperial authorities to have it accepted created tensions, tensions which in the end contributed to the political disintegration of the Empire, its decline and final fall. In this disintegration two important steps may be noted. The first was in the seventh century when the monophysitic natives of Egypt and Syria offered little resistance to the conquest of these regions by the Arabs. The second was in the eleventh century when the tension between Greeks and Armenians facilitated the establishment of the Turks in Asia Minor. In both instances the source of the trouble lay in the failure of these peoples to accept the decisions of the Council of Chalcedon (451) and the efforts of the imperial government to impose these decisions upon them.

PETER CHARANIS

Rutgers, the State University

⁶¹ Atlalates, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

⁶² F. Macler, "Erzeroum ou topographie de la haute Arménie", *Journal Asiatique*, 11th series, 13 (1919), p. 223. Macler quotes an Armenian writer of the seventeenth century who says in effect: The Armenians hated the Greeks, the Greeks hated the Armenians and so God sent the Turks to punish both.



PEETERS

A NOTE ON THE ETHNIC ORIGIN OF THE EMPEROR MAURICE

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Source: *Byzantion*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1965), pp. 412-417

Published by: Peeters Publishers

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44170146>

Accessed: 20-05-2019 00:02 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Peeters Publishers is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Byzantion*

A NOTE ON THE ETHNIC ORIGIN OF THE EMPEROR MAURICE

Nicholai Adontz was no doubt the foremost scholar in the study of the role of the Armenian element in the Byzantine empire. Time and time again by the most meticulous examination of the sources, both Greek and Armenian, he tried to show that many of the great personalities in the political and military life of the empire were in reality Armenian or of Armenian descent ⁽¹⁾. Some of his conclusions have been definitely accepted ; some are still in a state of controversy. To this latter category belongs his view that among the great personalities of Armenian origin who served the empire we must also include the emperor Maurice ⁽²⁾.

This view had been expressed before, but it was Adontz who called it to the attention of the scholarly world. He was, of course, aware of the literary tradition, both Greek and Armenian, which held Maurice to have been Armenian, but he chose to concentrate his study on the place of origin of the Byzantine emperor.

On the place of origin of Maurice there are conflicting traditions. A whole array of sources, Greek, Latin, Oriental, make Arabissus in Cappadocia his home ; on the other hand there is an Armenian tradition which has him come from Taron, while another makes him a native of Ošákan, near Ejmiacin, roughly about fifteen miles to the west of Lake

(1) For a partial listing of Adontz's studies on the role of the Armenians in the Byzantine empire see P. CHARANIS, *The Armenians in the Byzantine Empire* (Lisbon, 1963), 62.

(2) N. ADONTZ, *Les légendes de Maurice et de Constantin V, empereurs de Byzance*, *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles*, II (= *Mélanges Bidez*, I), (1934), 2-12.

Sevan in the province of Ararat. The Taron tradition, according to Adontz, may very well be a confusion with that relating to the origin of Basil I, but that about Ošákan is much more serious. On the other hand Arabissus as the original home of Maurice has too much backing by the sources to be entirely rejected. Adontz, therefore, comes to the conclusion that the family of Maurice originally came from Ošákan and that at some time they moved to Arabissus where Maurice was born. Coming from Ošákan, Armenian country, they were, of course, Armenians, but it is quite possible that at Arabissus they may have intermarried with other elements. Adontz, indeed, concedes this possibility, but insists on the Armenian origin of Maurice's father. Accordingly, Maurice was at least half-Armenian, but half-Armenian on his father's side. Henri Grégoire, who in matters pertaining to Armenians in the Byzantine empire usually followed his distinguished colleague, accepted this conclusion ⁽¹⁾.

It was not long, however, before the view of Adontz was seriously challenged. In a long article, which may be described as a monograph, P. Goubert, who may now be described as the special historian of the reign of Maurice, offered several arguments why the view of Adontz cannot be accepted ⁽²⁾. In the first place he refers to and analyzes a whole array of sources which make Arabissus the original home of Maurice and concludes that the testimony of these sources cannot be lightly rejected. He cites the passage in Paul the Deacon which states that Maurice was the first emperor of Greek origin to ascend the throne. Paul the Deacon, who was a contemporary of Charlemagne, may have considered Maurice a Greek simply because he was born in Asia Minor and followed on the throne a series of emperors who came originally from the Latin re-

(1) H. GRÉGOIRE, *Sainte Euphémie et l'empereur Maurice*, *Le Muséon*, 59 (1949) (= *Mélanges L. Th. Lefort*), 2.

(2) P. GOUBERT, S.J., *Maurice et l'Arménie. Note sur le lieu d'origine et la famille de l'Empereur Maurice*, *Échos d'Orient*, 39 (1940), 383-413. See also by the same author, *Byzance avant l'Islam*, I (Paris, 1951), 34-41. I shall dispense with the necessity of giving all the references to the sources. They may be found in the work of Goubert.

gions of the Balkan peninsula. For this reason Goubert does not insist too much on the significance of his statement. Still, he admits the possibility of a Latin father and a Greek mother. Continuing his examination, Goubert next analyzes the names borne by the various members of the family of Maurice and finds that none of them was of Armenian origin. He refers to the distrust and hostility which Maurice bore towards the Armenians and points out that the important Armenian historian, Sebeos, who was almost a contemporary, nowhere says that Maurice was Armenian in origin. On the other hand, another contemporary closer to the reign of Maurice, the ecclesiastical historian Evagrius, who wrote, of course, in Greek, states that Maurice derived his name and origin from old Rome ⁽¹⁾. Goubert considers the statement of Evagrius decisive and concludes that there was nothing Armenian about Maurice, that he was of Latin origin with the possibility that his mother may have been a Greek.

When I wrote my study on the Armenians in the Byzantine empire, I tended to follow Goubert and consequently rejected Adontz's view that Maurice was Armenian in origin ⁽²⁾. Having re-studied the problem, I no longer hold this view. Goubert's arguments are by no means conclusive. That Maurice was a native of Arabissus there can be, I think, no doubt, but in the sixth century one could be a native of Arabissus and still be of Armenian origins for, as Goubert himself admits, there was by then a considerable number of Armenians in the region where Arabissus was located. The silence of Sebeos is of no great significance, for the same writer fails to notice the fact that Heraclius was of Armenian origins. Nor is the fact that everyone in the family of Maurice bore a Greek or Roman name an indication of the ethnic origin of the family for, as I have pointed out elsewhere, in the Graeco-Roman east a Greek or Roman name was by no means an

(1) The exact text of Evagrius: *Χειροτονεῖ δὲ τῆς ἐφ᾽ αὐτοῦ στρατηγὸν Μανυρίκιον, ἔλκοντα μὲν γένος καὶ τοῦνομα ἐκ τῆς προεσβυτέρως Ῥώμης, ἐκ δὲ τῶν προσεχῶν πατέρων Ἀραβισσὸν πατρίδα ἐπιγραφόμενον τοῦ Καππαδοκῶν ἔθνους*. EVAGRIUS, *Ecclesiastical History*, ed. J. BIDEZ and L. PARMENTIER, (London, 1898), 214.

(2) *Op. cit.*, 14.

indication of the ethnic origin of the person who bore it (1). There is no doubt that Maurice distrusted the Armenians, but at the same time he admired their war-like qualities. This only means that he had some knowledge of their defects and qualities and he may have had this knowledge because he was one of them. In any case, it does not necessarily follow, as Goubert would like to have us believe, that Maurice's distrust of, and hostility toward, the Armenians is evidence to the effect that he himself was not Armenian.

There is, of course, the passage in Evagrius which on the face of things appears decisive, but this decisiveness may be more apparent than real. In Byzantium, where the prestige of Rome was high, many a family which had achieved some distinction may have tried to show that by origin it was connected with the old city. There is some evidence for this, although this evidence belongs to later centuries. As an example, we may give the tradition concerning the origin of the great family of the Phocades (2). According to this tradition, the Phocades of the tenth century were an old family, descendants of the great house of the Fabii, who, it was said, had originally been brought to Constantinople, along with other distinguished families, by Constantine the Great. Legends such as this must have begun early, fostered by families which achieved distinction, but which, like the Phocades of the tenth century, were of obscure origin. It is very probable indeed that the passage in Evagrius concerning the ethnic origin of Maurice may reflect the existence of such a legend. Maurice's family may not have been by origin entirely obscure — his mother had a brother who served as bishop of Arabissus — but what gave it distinction was the career of Maurice himself. Since the foundation of Constantinople, Maurice, with the exception of Zeno — and Zeno was not particularly distinguished — was the only emperor who came from Asia

(1) *Ibid.*, 38.

(2) ATTALIATES, *Historia* (Bonn, 1853), 217 ff. Cf. CHARANIS, *op. cit.*, 39. For other examples see F. DÖLGER, *Rom in der Gedankenwelt der Byzantiner*, *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 56 (1937), p. 9, n. 16. This article is reprinted in F. DÖLGER, *Byzanz und die europäische Staatenwelt* (1953), 70-115.

Minor. All the others had originally come from the Latinized regions of the Balkan peninsula, Pannonia, and Spain. This is something that may have bothered Maurice's immediate family and so led them to propagate the notion that they were originally from Rome. Goubert's argument that the latinizing tendencies of Maurice's immediate family offers another indication that they were originally from Rome may indeed prove the opposite.

But more decisive than the arguments offered here against the Roman origin of Maurice is the existence of the Greek tradition to the effect that he was Armenian. To the texts cited by Goubert, I may add another, the anonymous Chronicle published by Franz Cumont in 1894 and made famous by the fact that it gives the precise date of the first Russian attacks against Constantinople ⁽¹⁾.

The Greek texts which report this tradition are, of course, late, removed by several centuries from the reign of Maurice ; but they must derive from an earlier source, no longer extant. In any case, whatever the source, the origin of this tradition needs to be explained. Goubert has indeed attempted to explain it, but his explanation appears to me unsatisfactory. What he says in effect is this : Maurice was a native of Arabissus ; Arabissus was located in that part of Cappadocia which during the sixth century was a part of the province known as Armenia II and then during the reign of Maurice as Armenia I. And so Maurice, a native of Armenia I, an artificially created administrative unit, could be called Armenian. The explanation is too superficial. Byzantine chroniclers often erred, often confused their material, and often used archaic ethnic appellations. They refer to Cappadocians, Phrygians, Mysians, *etc.*, long after these peoples ceased to be identifiable ethnic entities. But with the Armenians it was much different. They were a vital, living ethnic group, very much in evidence with whom Byzantium had important relations both externally and internally. And so

(1) Franz CUMONT, *Anecdota Bruxellensia. I. Chroniques byzantines du manuscrit 11376* (Gand, 1894), 29 : *Μαυρίκιος ... τῷ γένει Ἀρμένιος*.

when Byzantine chroniclers refer to someone as Armenian, it is a matter that cannot be dismissed lightly, especially when it finds some corroboration in the Armenian literary tradition. This is, of course, the case in the matter of the ethnic origin of Maurice. Goubert, in rejecting the texts, both Greek and Armenian, which give to Maurice an Armenian origin, gives what he considers solid evidence why he does so. But this evidence may be given as it has been given here, an interpretation which does not support his view. In other words it is not decisive as against the testimony of the texts which he rejects.

Maurice must be accepted, therefore, as the first Byzantine emperor of a series of emperors, some of whom gave lustre to the political and military life of the empire, to have been of Armenian origin. But while accepting this, one should never forget that in Byzantium the ethnic origins of a person was of no significance, provided he integrated himself into its cultural life. In other words, provided he had become à Greek — not a Greek, of course, as of the classical period but a Greek nevertheless, one who had come to share Greek culture as that culture had evolved through the centuries (1). Isn't this in the final analysis how Isocrates defined a Greek?

Rutgers University.

Peter CHARANIS.

(1) Cf. CHARANIS, *op. cit.*, 57.

DUMBARTON OAKS

The Monk as an Element of Byzantine Society

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Reviewed work(s):

Source: *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, Vol. 25 (1971), pp. 61-84

Published by: [Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1291304>

Accessed: 26/01/2013 22:55

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

THE MONK AS AN ELEMENT OF BYZANTINE SOCIETY

PETER CHARANIS

This paper was read at the Symposium on "Byzantine Society,"
held at Dumbarton Oaks in May 1969.

A perusal of the third edition of the *Bibliotheca Hagiographica Graeca*¹ reveals some ninety persons, inhabitants of the Byzantine Empire from the beginning of the seventh century to the end of that Empire in the fifteenth, who achieved sainthood. Of those ninety, at least seventy-five had been monks. This statistic by itself shows the importance which Byzantine society attached to the monastic life. In Byzantium, the monk—at least as a projected ideal—embodied the aspirations of his society as a whole. That is why he, as a living being, was a vital element of that society and the monastery a characteristic feature of the Byzantine landscape.

That monastic establishments in the Byzantine Empire throughout the duration of its existence were very numerous is a matter which admits of no doubt. A considerable number of them, though unquestionably only a very small fraction of the total, have been identified and their general emplacement determined. Hans-Georg Beck, in a remarkable book²—apparently restricting himself to monasteries about which something definite can be said—lists 160 monasteries which existed at one time or another during the history of the Empire after the end of the sixth century. Beck's list is admittedly and necessarily incomplete, and to it can be added a considerable number of known monasteries located in every region of the Empire, including Cappadocia, where, according to one scholar, the number of rock-cut monasteries astonishes the traveller. It has been possible to revise Beck's list upward to include a total of 241 monasteries by adding monastic establishments drawn from other lists and by eliminating monasteries mentioned by Beck but appearing elsewhere in our documentation,³ or presumed to be included in such general estimates as that

¹ Revised and enlarged by François Halkin (Brussels, 1957), 3 vols.

² *Kirche und theologische Literatur in byzantinischen Reich* (Munich, 1959), 207–27.

³ In making this revision, the following references have been used. Hélène Ahrweiler, "L'Histoire et la géographie de la région de Smyrne entre les deux occupations turques (1081–1317), particulièrement au XIII^e siècle," *Travaux et mémoires*, 1 (1965), 92–98; V. Laurent, *Le corpus des sceaux de l'Empire byzantin*, V, 2, *L'Eglise* (Paris, 1965), 147–222; Gabriel Millet, "Les monastères et les églises de Trébizonde," *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, 19 (1895), 419–59. Millet describes six monastic establishments located in the region of Trebizond. In a discourse delivered by Joseph, metropolitan of Trebizond (1364–1367), we read that in Trebizond the monasteries and the houses for virgins were densely populated and those who lived in them not easily enumerated: *Fontes Trapezuntini* I, ed. A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus (St. Petersburg, 1897), 58: *μοναὶ δὲ καὶ παρθενοῦν διαβεβοημέναι κατάπυκτοι καὶ πλῆθος λαοῦ οὐκ οὐκ ῥαδίως ἀριθμητόν*. G. de Jerphanion, *Une nouvelle province de l'art byzantin. Les églises rupestres de Cappadoce*, I, 1 (Paris, 1925), 43–52; Nicole and Michel Thierry, *Nouvelles églises rupestres de Cappadoce, Région du Hasan Dağı* (Paris, 1963), 21, 22, 24–25, 26, 31, 35, 41, 175 ff.; J. Lafontaine-Dosogne, "Nouvelles notes cappadociennes," *Byzantion*, 33 (1963), 139, 142, 144, 158, 167, 173, 174, 180; J. Hackett, *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus* . . . (London, 1901), 329 ff.; George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, I (Cambridge, 1940), 272 f.; Cyril Mango and Ernest J. W. Hawkins, "The Hermitage of St. Neophytos and Its Wall Paintings," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 20 (1966), 204; Antoine Bon, *Le Péloponnèse byzantin jusqu'en 1204* (Paris, 1951), 143 ff.; Dion. A. Zakythinos, *Le Despotat grec de Morée*, II (Athens, 1953), 295 ff. Of the numerous monasteries located on the islands, Beck's list includes only three, the famous monastery of John the Theologian on Patmos, and two located in Cyprus. No monastery in pre-Venetian Crete and Epirus is mentioned and there is no reference to Skripou and Sagmata in Boetia. On Cretan monasteries, see St. Xanthoudides, *Ἡ Ἐνετοκρατία ἐν Κρήτῃ καὶ οἱ κατὰ τῶν Ἐνετῶν Ἀγῶνες τῶν Κρητῶν* (Athens, 1939), 8–9. For a general reference to Epirote monasteries, see G. L. Tafel and G. M. Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staats-*

of R. P. B. Menthon, who says that the number of monasteries which at one time or another had been built on, or around, Mt. Olympus in Bithynia numbered no less than 100.⁴

Generally speaking, the Byzantines founded their monasteries on mountains or on ground difficult of access. So it was that with the loss of the eastern provinces in the seventh century, the rugged terrain of Cappadocia, the mountains of Auxentios, Olympus, Sigriane, Galesion, and Latros—all located on the western coastal regions of Asia Minor—became great monastic centers. Both Olympus and Latros early came to be known as the holy mountains.⁵ In Europe the great monastic center, beginning with the second half of the tenth century, was, of course, Mt. Athos,⁶ but other high places such as Ganos⁷ on the Propontis coast of Thrace, Papikion,⁸ near the present Komotini in western Thrace, Cithaeron in Attica,⁹ and finally, beginning with the fourteenth century, the Meteora in Thessaly,¹⁰ were also important centers.

But monasteries were founded in cities, too. It may be said, indeed, that Constantinople was the greatest monastic center of the Empire. R. Janin has identified 325 monasteries (including nunneries) which, at one time or another in the course of the Empire, were located in the Byzantine capital and its European suburbs.¹¹ The monastic establishments located in Thessalonica and its immediate surroundings no doubt numbered more than the twenty-four which have been identified.¹² Monasteries existed in other cities as, for instance, Amori-

geschichte der Republik Venedig, I (Vienna, 1856), 470 ff., 490 f. On the church and monastery in Skripou, see M. Sotiriou, "Ὁ ναὸς τῆς Σκριποῦς Βοιωτίας," *Ἀρχαιολογικὴ Ἐφημερίς* (1931), 119–57. For a good illustration of the church, see M. Chatzidakis, A. Tassos, and Ph. Zachariou, *Byzantine Monuments in Attica and Boeotia* (Athens, 1956), pl. 1. On Sagmata: A. H. S. Megaw, "The Chronology of some Middle-Byzantine Churches in Athens," *Annual of the British School at Athens*, 32 (1931–32), 95.

⁴ *Une terre de légendes. L'Olympe de Bithynie. Ses saints, ses couvents, ses sites* (Paris, 1935), 8–9.

⁵ On Mt. Olympus as a monastic center, Menthon's work (note 4) remains fundamental. On Latros as a holy mountain, see Ahrweiler, *op. cit.*, 91 and note 123. See also P. L. Bokotopoulos, "Ἄλτρος," *Ἐπετηρίς Ἑταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν*, 35 (1966–67), 69–106.

⁶ The literature on Mt. Athos is very extensive. For a sound general survey with references to the basic bibliography, see E. Amand de Mendieta, *La presqu'île des Caloyers. Le Mont-Athos* (Bruges, 1955). For the latest detailed study on Mt. Athos, see John P. Mamalakes, *Τὸ Ἅγιον Ὄρος (Ἄθως) διὰ Μέσου τῶν Αἰώνων* (Thessalonike, 1971). This publication has just reached me and I have not therefore had the time to examine it with care, but at first glance it appears to be a very solid work. For a collection of documents relating to it as a monastic center, that by Ph. Meyer is still basic: *Die Haupturkunden für die Geschichte der Athosklöster* (Leipzig, 1894).

⁷ On Ganos, see Laurent, *op. cit.*, 152.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 159.

⁹ Chr. A. Papadopoulos, "Ὁ ὁσιος Μελέτιος ὁ νέος," *Θεολογία*, 13 (1935).

¹⁰ For a general account on the Meteora, one may consult D. M. Nicol, *Meteora. The Rock Monasteries of Thessaly* (London, 1963).

¹¹ *La géographie ecclésiastique de l'Empire byzantin. Première partie. Le siège de Constantinople et le patriarchat oecuménique. III. Les églises et les monastères* (Paris, 1953), p. 4 for the figure 325, but all monasteries of Constantinople whose existence could be established are treated in the book. On the monks in Constantinople about 451, see now G. Dagron, "Les moines et la ville. Le monachisme à Constantinople jusqu'au Concile de Chalcedon (451)," *Travaux et mémoires*, 4 (1970), 229 ff.

¹² John Cameniatēs, *De excidio Thessalonicensi* (Bonn, 1838), 494. Cf. P. N. Papageorgiou, "Ἐκδρομὴ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ πατριαρχικὴν μονὴν τῆς ἁγίας Ἀναστασίας τῆς Φαρμακολουτρίας . . ." *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 7 (1898), 59; O. Tafrali, *Topographie de Thessalonique* (Paris, 1913), 192–202; *idem*, *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle* (Paris, 1913), 99–101; M. Th. Lascaris, "Ἄσολ καὶ μοναὶ Θεσσαλονίκης τὸ 1405 εἰς τὸ ὁδοιπορικὸν τοῦ ἐκ Σμολένσκ Ἰγνατίου," *Τόμος Κωνσταντίνου Ἀρμενοπούλου ἐπὶ τῇ ἐξακοσιετηρίδι τῆς Ἐξαβίβλου αὐτοῦ* (1345–1945) (= *Ἐπιστημονικὴ Ἐπετηρίς*, 6 (Thessaloniki, 1952), 319–27.

on, where Father Laurent is tempted to locate a monastery dedicated to the forty-two martyrs of Amorion, whose existence became known to him through a seal which he has recently published.¹³ That Amorion was indeed a monastic center of some significance is indicated by other sources. Michael Syrus, in relating the capture of Amorion by the Arabs in 838, writes: "The monasteries and nunneries were so numerous that more than a thousand virgins, not to speak of those who were massacred, were led away into captivity."¹⁴ Trebizond was another center and later, during the period of the Palaeologi, Mistra, the capital of the despotate of Morea, also became a center of monastic establishments.¹⁵

Roughly 700 monasteries are involved in the lists and estimates to which references have been made. This number as a total is not really very important, for it represents only a fraction of the monastic establishments which at one time or another existed in the Byzantine Empire. What is important is that there are approximately 700 Byzantine monasteries (really fewer, because Menthon's estimate of the Mt. Olympus monasteries includes only a few about which some information can be given) whose history is somewhat known to us, and, as a consequence, it is possible to form some idea concerning the ups and downs of Byzantine monastic establishments.

The number of these establishments varied from century to century. An analysis of Janin's list reveals ninety-two monasteries known to have existed in the capital in the sixth century. No documentation past that century exists for seventy of these monasteries. Of the remaining twenty-two, one is said to have existed until the beginning of the eighth century;¹⁶ six are attested to have been destroyed by Constantine V;¹⁷ the documentation for three others does not go beyond the beginning of the seventh century;¹⁸ one is not referred to after the sixth century until its reconstruction by Saint Luke the Stylite in the tenth century;¹⁹ five are said to have continued into the tenth century;²⁰ there is a reference to one as still existing in 1025;²¹ one is still found to exist at the beginning of the thirteenth century;²² and four endure into the fourteenth century.²³ In only a few cases, however, is the documentation such as to remove all doubts that these monasteries had a continuous existence to the date of the last reference to them. As for new foundations erected in the course of the seventh and eighth centuries, there are only two in Janin's list. One of the two may have been founded earlier, but the first certain reference to its existence

¹³ Laurent, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 3), 197-98.

¹⁴ Michael Syrus, *Chronique de Michel le Syrien, Patriarche Jacobite d'Antioche (1166-1199)*, ed. and trans. J.-B. Chabot, 3 (Paris, 1905), 100.

¹⁵ On the monasteries of Mistra, see Zakythinos, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 3), 296 ff.

¹⁶ Janin, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 11), 15 ff.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 9, 86 ff., 103 f., 285, 335, 446.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 395, 462, 344.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 65.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 59, 283, 293, 335.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 460.

²² *Ibid.*, 281.

²³ *Ibid.*, 100, 201, 233, 326.

dates it as of 695;²⁴ the other is said to have been founded by the wife of Leo III.²⁵ Beck's list reveals a similar pattern among monasteries located in the provinces.

The inference that may be drawn from this information is that a decline in the number of monastic establishments began sometime in the seventh century and continued into the eighth. The meagerness of the sources for this entire period may prompt the question whether the decline is more apparent than real. The answer is that it may, indeed, be only apparent for the seventh and the early part of the eighth century, if the matter is restricted to the territories left under the jurisdiction of the Empire following the events of the seventh century; but that it is real as it pertains to the second half of the eighth century, certainly up to 775. This is the period when the throne was occupied by Constantine V, the only Byzantine sovereign who tried to effect nothing less than the eradication of monasticism from the Empire.²⁶ He cajoled and persecuted, promising rewards to monks who would abandon the monastic garb and subjecting the others to every kind of humiliation. Monks holding nuns by the hand were paraded in the Hippodrome; many were forced to marry; many more were sent into exile; some were even put to death. Monasteries were destroyed or sold or were transformed for other uses. Books relating to the monastic life were burned.²⁷ The chroniclers stress especially the measures against monks and nuns taken by the governor of the Thracian theme, as a result of which not a single one is said to have survived in that province.²⁸

The antimonastic measures of Constantine V were related, of course, to his iconoclastic policy, for the monks had proven the most obdurate opponents of that policy. It is probable, however, that other factors of a demographic nature contributed to his consideration. It is generally agreed that beginning with 541 the Byzantine Empire entered into a demographic crisis which lasted over two centuries.²⁹ The crisis was particularly acute during the reign of Constantine V. That Constantine was aware of this crisis is shown by the fact that he tried to do something about it. He settled thousands of Slavs (according to one chronicle, 208,000) in Asia Minor and thousands of Syrians and Armenians, seized by the raiding of regions under Moslem rule, in Thrace.³⁰ Thousands of his own subjects, moreover, made chastity a cardinal principle of their own lives as well as an ideal to propagate, obviously a serious matter in its demographic implications. It is not unreasonable to suppose, therefore, that

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 511.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 486. On page 471 there is a reference to a monastery which existed in 729, but nothing more is said about it.

²⁶ J. Pargoire, *L'église byzantine de 527 à 847* (Paris, 1923), 308.

²⁷ Theophanes, *Chronographia*, ed. C. de Boor, I (Leipzig, 1883), 442–43; Nicephorus, *Opuscula historica*, ed. C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1880), 71–72, 74; Cedrenus–Scylitzes, *Historiarum compendium*, II (Bonn, 1839), 14–15.

²⁸ Theophanes, *ibid.*, 445–46; Cedrenus–Scylitzes, II, 15–16. See further: Alfred Lombard, *Constantin V, empereur des Romains (740–775)* (Paris, 1902), 149–69.

²⁹ Peter Charanis, "Observations on the Demography of the Byzantine Empire," *Proceedings of the XIIIth International Congress of Byzantine Studies* (Oxford, 1967), 445 ff.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 456, 457.

this matter helped to turn Constantine's hostility against the monks—a hostility first aroused by their obdurate opposition to his iconoclastic policy—into a determination to eradicate monasticism itself.

Constantine failed. No sooner had he died than the monastic establishments began to flourish as never before, ushering in what a scholar has called the golden age of Byzantine monasticism.³¹ For the period from about 780 to 1200 there are references in Janin's list to 159 monasteries located in Constantinople and its European suburbs. Seventy-five of these monasteries had come into existence in the course of the ninth century and in the last years of the eighth; twenty-six, forty-three, and fifteen more appear in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries respectively. Meanwhile, twenty-eight have disappeared from the sources by the end of the ninth century, twenty-nine by the end of the tenth, and twenty-four more by the end of the eleventh. The number of monasteries which can be definitely attested to in Constantinople for each of the centuries in question stands at seventy-five for the ninth century, seventy-three for the tenth, eighty-seven for the eleventh, and seventy-eight for the twelfth.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these figures. They show first that sometime close to the year 780 there began a period of feverish activity in the founding of monasteries; that it was particularly intense during the ninth century but continued into the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries. The figures show further that individual monastic establishments often did not last. Finally, they indicate that fewer monasteries were founded in the tenth century than in either the ninth or the eleventh.

This third point is precisely what would be expected on the basis of other sources. The legislation of Nicephorus II Phocas prohibiting new monastic establishments, later repeated in somewhat different terms by Basil II, obviously had some effect,³² as indicated by these numbers. It by no means follows, of course, that all of the monasteries which dropped out of the sources actually ceased to exist. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to assume that at least some of them did, especially if the total number of disappearances is substantial. Furthermore, that individual monastic establishments did indeed cease to exist is attested to by the very text of the legislation of Nicephorus II Phocas, which speaks of many monasteries in decay.³³ Additional evidence is supplied by various references to individual monasteries which became deserted.

One such monastery was that of the Thessalonians located on Mt. Athos. A document dated 1169 says of it that "it was formerly well peopled," but that it no longer existed, "its walls and habitations having fallen into ruins." This was the monastery which in 1169 was granted to Russian monks established since 1142 in another Athonian monastery called Xylourgou. These monks repopled the abandoned Thessalonian monastery, dedicated it to St.

³¹ V. Laurent, *La vie merveilleuse de Saint Pierre d'Atroa* († 837), *Subsidia Hagiographica*, 29 (Brussels, 1956), 35.

³² On these legislations, see Charanis, "The Monastic Properties and the State in the Byzantine Empire," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 4 (1948), 56f., 63f.

³³ *Ibid.*, 56f.

Panteleimon, and made it the center of their operations. The enterprise endured; it is the well-known Roussikon which still exists on Mt. Athos.³⁴

Incursions by enemies, lack of adequate resources (or their despoilation by laymen put in charge of their management), and the attraction of other monasteries were the principal reasons why monasteries were abandoned. The movement of monks from one monastery to another was a comparatively easy matter in the Byzantine Empire, despite numerous regulations—renewed and emphasized from time to time—designed to make such movement difficult.³⁵ Unlike the West, Byzantium had no monastic orders.

The first conclusion drawn from our figures—that at about 780 the founding of monasteries began at a zealous pace, that it intensified especially in the ninth century, and that it continued throughout the tenth, eleventh, and into the twelfth century—is indisputable. It finds confirmation in the list of provincial monasteries compiled by Beck and in references to important persons who are said to have founded new monasteries. A perusal, for instance, of Cedrenus-Skylitzes and other chroniclers reveals no less than eighteen such founders—nine who lived in the ninth century,³⁶ five who lived in the tenth,³⁷ and four who lived in the eleventh.³⁸ Included in these figures are nine sovereigns: Irene, Michael I, Theophilus, Basil I, Leo VI, Romanus I Lecapenus, Romanus III Argyrus, Michael IV, and Constantine Monomachus.³⁹ The list is incomplete and does not include founders known from other sources as, for instance, the monastic *typica*.

Monasteries, of course, continued to be founded after the twelfth century and on down to the end of the Empire, while many of the old ones remained in existence. There was, indeed, a veritable revival of monastic establishments in western Asia Minor under the Lascarids.⁴⁰ Five of the monasteries of Mt. Athos were founded in the fourteenth century.⁴¹ In Thessalonica, at least eighteen monasteries still existed in the fourteenth century. One of them, the Nea Moni, was founded sometime between 1350 and 1374.⁴² Just before Constantinople fell in 1453 there were at least eighteen monasteries still standing in the city.⁴³ To this later period belong, of course, the monasteries built in Mistra and on the Meteora in Thessaly, and, although these were fewer in number than had been the case earlier, their relative numerical significance was just as great, if not greater, because the territorial extent of the Empire had been very much

³⁴ On all this, see A. Soloviev, "Histoire du monastère russe au Mont-Athos," *Byzantion*, 8 (1933), 213–38.

³⁵ On this, see E. Herman, "La 'stabilitas loci' nel Monachismo Bizantino," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 21 (1955), 115–42.

³⁶ Cedrenus-Skylitzes, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 27), II, 108; II, 118–19; II, 241; II, 269; II, 31. Theophanes, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 27), I, 478; I, 494; I, 481.

³⁷ Cedrenus-Skylitzes, *op. cit.*, II, 275; II, 263; II, 265. Theophanes Continuatus (Bonn, 1838), 365, 366.

³⁸ Cedrenus-Skylitzes, *op. cit.*, II, 488; II, 497; II, 513; II, 593.

³⁹ Theophanes, *op. cit.*, I, 478; I, 494; Cedrenus-Skylitzes, *op. cit.*, II, 31; II, 108; II, 241; II, 313; II, 497; II, 513; II, 593. Theophanes Continuatus, *op. cit.*, 365. What Theophilus had founded was a home for the aged, but the foundation was transformed into a monastery.

⁴⁰ Ahrweiler, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 3), 91 ff.

⁴¹ Amand de Mendieta, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 6), 32 f.; cf. Beck, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 2), 220 f.

⁴² Tafrahi, *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle*, 99 ff.; cf. Lascaris, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 12), 319 ff.

⁴³ Janin, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 11), 4.

reduced. At the same time, there was a serious decline in the population and economic resources of the Empire. It is this decline which explains why so many monasteries located in Constantinople seem to have disappeared.

Meanwhile, the mentality which for centuries had nurtured monasticism and was in turn nurtured by it continued to prevail. From the death of Constantine V in 775 to the end of the Empire, no significant change took place in that sphere. New issues of a spiritual nature or of ecclesiastical jurisdiction—particularly the question of union with Rome—in which the monks were involved did indeed appear, and the effects of these issues on the political life and internal peace of the Empire were very serious, but this only confirms what has just been said about the changelessness of the reciprocal relationship between the general mentality and monasticism throughout this period.

To the question of how many monks may have existed in the Byzantine Empire at any one period after the sixth century no final or definite answer can be given. There are, however, some figures with which to work. It is said that the monastery of Photeneidos on Mt. Olympus numbered one hundred and eighty monks at the time of Theodore Studite.⁴⁴ Another monastery located not far from Photeneidos housed more than two hundred monks.⁴⁵ Saccudion, also a Bithynian monastery, was founded by Plato, the uncle of Theodore the Studite, and almost from the very beginning attracted to its doors more than one hundred monks.⁴⁶ Studium, at the time Theodore became its abbot (799), housed only twelve monks.⁴⁷ Under his direction it is said the number increased to one thousand.⁴⁸ The accuracy of the latter figure has been questioned by a modern scholar on the grounds that it cannot be reconciled with the fairly modest dimensions of the monastery's church. He suggests the possibility of an error on the part of the biographer of Theodore, who is the source for this figure, or, what is more likely, that the number includes, besides the monks of Studium itself, those of other monasteries more or less under the jurisdiction of Studium.⁴⁹ These are large numbers, but they are not characteristic of the Byzantine monastic establishment in general, as is shown by the examples given below.

A monastery for women located in Lycia at the beginning of the seventh century housed forty nuns.⁵⁰ Balentia in Lydia, an establishment founded by Peter of Atroa, had no more than fifteen monks.⁵¹ Polychronion, a monastery located in the environs of Mt. Olympus, contained about seventy monks when Methodius, the brother of Cyril, was its abbot.⁵² When Athanasius founded Lavra on Mt. Athos in 963, it was stipulated that it should have eighty

⁴⁴ Beck, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 2), 209.

⁴⁵ Menthon, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 4), 157.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 162.

⁴⁷ *Vita S. Theodori Studitae* in Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, 99, col. 145.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 148.

⁴⁹ D. Julien Leroy, "La vie quotidienne du moine studite," *Irénikon*, 27 (1954), 26 and note 4.

⁵⁰ John Moschus, *Pratum Spirituale* in Migne, PG, 87, col. 2997.

⁵¹ V. Laurent, *La vie . . .* (as in note 31, *supra*), 165–67.

⁵² Fr. Dvornik, *Les légendes de Constantin et de Méthode vues de Byzance* (Prague, 1933), 385 (chap. iv); cf. 211.

monks. By the reign of Constantine Monomachus in the eleventh century, the population of Lavra had increased from one hundred to seven hundred,⁵³ though the latter figure might include the inmates of the *metochia* under Lavra's jurisdiction. In 1083, the Athonian monastery of Xenophon, which was founded about 1010, housed fifty-five monks,⁵⁴ a relatively large number, according to a modern scholar.⁵⁵ The monastery which the historian Michael Attaliates founded in Constantinople in 1078 was intended to have seven monks, but because of the difficulties of the times he was able to recruit only five. He provided, however, that this number might in the future be increased in proportion to any increase in the resources of the monastery.⁵⁶ Irene Ducas, wife of the Emperor Alexius, fixed at twenty-four the number of nuns for the nunnery which she founded sometime before 1118. In the event that the resources of the institution increased, the number of nuns might be raised to a maximum of forty. At the same time Irene put under the jurisdiction of her nunnery a much smaller establishment, with a complement of four nuns.⁵⁷ The monastery of the Pantocrator, according to the *typikon* issued in 1136 by its founder, the Emperor John II Comnenus, was to house a maximum of eighty monks. Also under its jurisdiction were six other monasteries, two of which were to be inhabited by eighteen monks each, two by six each, one by sixteen, and the last by twelve.⁵⁸ The number of monks to be housed by the monastery of the Kosmosotira, founded about 1152 near Aenos by the Sebastocrator Isaac, the brother of John II, was not to exceed seventy-four.⁵⁹ The monastery of St. Mamas, reconstructed about 1147 after it had been allowed to fall into ruins by the *charistikarii* to whom it had been granted from time to time, was to have twenty monks.⁶⁰ The number of monks of the Elegmon, an old monastery located in the diocese of Nicaea which was reconstructed about 1162, was fixed at twenty.⁶¹ The Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus reconstructed two monasteries: St. Demetrius in the capital and that of the Archangel Michael on Mt. Auxentios. The number of monks to be housed by the first was fixed at thirty-six;⁶²

⁵³ Meyer, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 6), 114.

⁵⁴ Louis Petit, *Actes de l'Athos*, I. *Actes de Xenophon* (= Appendix of *Vizantiiskij Vremennik*, 10 [1903]), 22.

⁵⁵ Laurent, *Le corpus...* (as in note 3, *supra*), 149.

⁵⁶ F. Miklosich and J. Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi*, 5 (Vienna, 1887), 311.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 337, 372.

⁵⁸ A. Dmitrievsky, *Opisanie Liturgicheskikh Rukopisei*, I. *Typika* (Kiev, 1895), 671, 675 ff.

⁵⁹ L. Petit, "Typikon du monastère de la Kosmosotira près d'Aenos (1152)," *Bulletin (Izvestija) de l'Institut archéologique Russe à Constantinople*, 13 (1908), 21.

⁶⁰ Dmitrievsky, *op. cit.*, 1: 702–15; S. Eustratiades, "Τυπικὸν τῆς ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει μονῆς τοῦ ἁγίου μεγαλομάρτυρος Μάμαντος," *Ἑλληνικά*, 1 (1928), 256–311. On the "charisticium" defined as a grant of a monastery to a layman for the economic exploitation of its properties, see G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, trans. J. Hussey, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1968), 372 f.; Charanis, "Monastic Properties..." (as in note 32, *supra*), 72 ff.; E. Herman, "Ricerche sulle istituzioni monastiche bizantine. Typika ktetorika, caristicari e monasteri 'liberi,'" *OCP*, 6 (1940), 293–375; P. Lemerle, "Un aspect du rôle des monastères à Byzance: Les monastères donnés à des laïcs, les charistiaires," *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. d. Inscr. et Belles-Lett.* (1967), 9–28; H. Ahrweiler, "Charisticariat et autres formes d'attribution de fondations pieuses au Xe–XI^e siècles," *Recueil des travaux de l'Institut d'études byzantines*, 10 (1967), 1–27.

⁶¹ Dmitrievsky, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 58), 725.

⁶² H. Grégoire, ed. and trans., "Imperatoris Michaelis Palaeologi de Vita Sua," *Byzantion*, 29–30 (1959–60), 473.

those to be housed by the second were not to exceed forty.⁶³ Placed under the jurisdiction of St. Demetrius were eighteen other monasteries in Constantinople, Bithynia, and Thrace. The number of the inmates of each was likewise fixed, totalling, according to my calculations, one hundred and fifteen monks, though the total given by the document is higher.⁶⁴ The Athonian monastery of Zographou is said to have had twenty-six monks during the reign of Michael VIII.⁶⁵ Two nunneries, one founded by Michael's wife, the other by his niece, were restricted in the number of nuns they could have, the first to fifty,⁶⁶ the second to thirty.⁶⁷ The Nea Moni of Thessalonica, founded sometime before 1376, was restricted to nineteen inmates.⁶⁸ Finally, and this takes us back to the eleventh century, St. George, a monastery established in Thebes by Meletios the Younger (who was a Cappadocian native and, like many other ascetics, achieved sanctity) had twelve monks when Meletios left it.⁶⁹ Symbolon, a monastic establishment on Mt. Cithaeron in Attica, to which Meletios moved and which he subsequently enlarged, housed during his regime one hundred monks.⁷⁰ In addition to enlarging Symbolon, Meletios built in the same general region a number of smaller monasteries—twenty-two, according to one of his biographers, twenty-four, according to another—each housing from eight to twelve monks.⁷¹

What inferences may be drawn from these figures is a matter for speculation. It may be meaningful, however, to determine an average number of monks for each of the monasteries in the three groups of the Mt. Cithaeron, the Pantocrator, and the St. Demetrius, giving averages of sixteen, twenty-two, and eight, respectively. However, from an average involving all the monasteries for which we have figures it is difficult to derive any meaning at all, both because the monasteries in question spanned several centuries, and because they were not stable in the number of their inmates. When Studium came under the direction of Theodore, it had no more than twelve monks.⁷² Were the monks who soon raised this figure to one thousand new initiates, or were they inmates from other houses? The indications are that many of them were or had been inmates of other houses.⁷³ Certainly many of the monks of Saccudion, numbering, as has already been said, over one hundred, must have followed their leader to

⁶³ Dmitrievsky, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 58), 780.

⁶⁴ Grégoire, *op. cit.*, 473–74.

⁶⁵ Sp. Lampros, "Τὰ Πάτρια τοῦ Ἀγίου ὄρους," *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων*, 9 (1912), 159.

⁶⁶ Hippolyte Delehaye, *Deux typica byzantins de l'époque des Paléologues* (Brussels, 1921), 109.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁶⁸ V. Laurent, "Une nouvelle fondation monastique des Choumnos: La Nea Moni de Thessalonique," *Revue des études byzantines*, 13 (1955), 116–17. Cf. *idem*, "Ecrits spirituels inédits de Macaire Choumnos († c. 1382)," *Ἑλληνικά*, 14 (1955), 54, where (probably a misprint) the figure is sixteen.

⁶⁹ Papadopoulos, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 9), 106.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 109.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 109f. Cyril Mango called to my attention an inscription published in volume 33 (1914) of the *Ἑλληνικὸς Φιλολογικὸς Σύλλογος ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει*, which refers to a monastery located in Nicaea. The editor dates the inscription as of 591, but it no doubt belongs to a much later period. According to this inscription (p. 138), this monastery had forty-two monks. This monastery has not been taken into account in the calculations which follow. See also *Postscriptum*.

⁷² *Vita S. Theodori Studitae* (*supra*, note 47), col. 145.

⁷³ Leroy, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 49), 27, note 3.

Constantinople. About 977 the monastery of St. Mamas was virtually uninhabited, but under the direction of Symeon, known as the New Theologian, who became its abbot, the number of its inmates was increased to well over thirty.⁷⁴ By 1147 it had again fallen into desuetude, with only two remaining monks, who, since their monastery had fallen into ruins, wandered from place to place.⁷⁵ In less than a century after Lavra had been founded its complement of monks had reached seven hundred, though at one time it had been only one hundred.⁷⁶ This increase may have been due to the acquisition by Lavra of Kellia as well as of lesser monasteries. In 1334 the Athonian monastery of Koutlounousion had thirty monks and apparently was still growing. Some years earlier it had only twelve.⁷⁷

If a curve were drawn on the basis of our first set of figures, those monasteries that would be out of line would be the three Bithynian monasteries, and Studium, Lavra, and Symbolon on Mt. Cithaeron. Symbolon presents no problem, because the number of its inmates lends itself to the computation of an average. Lavra and Studium may be explained in the manner we have suggested above. As for the three Bithynian monasteries, the large numbers of their inmates might have been a late development, the result of the return to Bithynia of numerous monks who had been dispersed during the iconoclastic persecutions. In any case, if we are right in suggesting that Studium grew at the expense of other monasteries, then the number of inmates of these others must necessarily have declined. This must certainly have been the case with Saccudion, and there is no reason to suppose that it may not have been so with the other two Bithynian monasteries.

Putting aside the monastic establishments that supported one hundred or more monks, there remain roughly ninety-four monasteries about the number of whose inmates something is known: one had eighty monks; one, seventy-four; one, fifty-five; one, fifty; two, forty; one, thirty-six; two, thirty; two, between thirty and twenty; and the rest under twenty. The inference that may be drawn from these figures is that the vast majority of the Byzantine establishments housed between ten and twenty monks. This inference finds confirmation in the actual averages which we have been able to compute for three groups of monasteries—the one centering around Symbolon in Attica, the Pantocrator group, and the St. Demetrius group.

What follows is speculative, but may approach actuality. It has been said on good authority that some few years before the fall of Constantinople, in 1453, there still stood in the Byzantine capital eighteen monasteries.⁷⁸ These were famous monasteries, especially noted by travellers. Nothing is known, I believe, about the number of monks which each housed at this time. It would be no exaggeration to suppose, however, that they may have housed, on the average,

⁷⁴ Irénée Hausherr, ed. and trans., *Vie de Syméon le Nouveau Théologien* (Rome, 1928) (= *Orientalia Christiana*, 12, no. 45), 46, 50.

⁷⁵ Dmitrievsky, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 58), 1: 711.

⁷⁶ Meyer, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 6), 157.

⁷⁷ *Archives de l'Athos*, II. *Actes de Koutlounous*, ed. Paul Lemerle (1945), 81.

⁷⁸ Janin, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 11), 4.

as many as thirty each. This figure is, to be sure, out of line with what we have suggested for the vast majority of Byzantine monasteries, but these eighteen were particularly important ones, and, in any case, it is not inconsistent with the minimum figure suggested by Janin.⁷⁹ If this figure were accepted, there would have been a total of five hundred and forty monks in the eighteen monasteries, by no means an impossible number. In a city whose population at the time was about fifty thousand,⁸⁰ the existence of five hundred and forty monks would produce a ratio of slightly more than one monk per one hundred inhabitants, a proportion which seems to have obtained also in Thessalonica toward the end of the fourteenth century.⁸¹

In the course of the centuries the Byzantine Empire underwent many changes—in territorial extent, size of population, economic power, and administrative machinery. But throughout these centuries its world view, its general intellectual style, sustained no fundamental change. This was particularly true, as has already been stated, of its attitude toward monastic life. It is not unreasonable to suppose, therefore, that the ratio of monks to the general population remained more or less the same throughout the centuries.

The population of the Empire at any one period of its existence is not known, and, given the nature of the sources, it is not likely ever to be known. For about the year 1000, E. Stein has estimated a population of approximately 20,000,000; another scholar has put it at 15,000,000.⁸² For reasons which have been explained elsewhere,⁸³ the latter figure is probably too low, but we may use it as a conservative representation of reality. Applying to this figure the ratio of monks to the general population of Constantinople on the eve of its fall, we may say that in the year 1000 there were in the Byzantine Empire slightly more than 150,000 monks and over 7,000 monastic establishments. This estimate may be too low. Nicephorus II Phocas, in his famous novel prohibiting new monastic establishments, speaks of *myriades* of monasteries already in existence, and Basil II, in his, conveys the idea that in many of the villages located in every theme of the Empire there existed establishments which could be called monasteries.⁸⁴ And, for purposes of comparison, the situation which obtained in Crete in 1632 may be cited. In that year there were 376 monasteries and 4,000 monks in Crete, whose total population then was 200,000.⁸⁵ These figures yield an

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 5: "Si certains couvents ont compté plusieurs centaines de moines, comme celui de Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Studius, la plupart n'en avaient guère que trente ou quarante."

⁸⁰ A. M. Schneider, "Die Bevölkerung Konstantinopels in XV. Jahrhundert," *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse* (1949), 236–37. I took Schneider's figure in order to be on the conservative side. My own estimate, expressed some years ago, of the population of Constantinople at this time is 75,000. See Charanis, "A Note on the Population and Cities of the Byzantine Empire in the Thirteenth Century," *The Joshua Starr Memorial Volume* (New York, 1953), 139.

⁸¹ According to one source, the population of Thessalonica at about 1423 numbered 40,000; according to another, it numbered 25,000. See Charanis, *ibid.*, 141 and note 23. At the end of the fourteenth century, there still stood in Thessalonica and environs about nineteen monasteries. Cf. Tafrali, *Tessalonique au quatorzième siècle*, 99–102. Cf. Lascaris, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 12), 320–27.

⁸² Charanis, "Observations..." (as in note 29 *supra*), 446.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 446f.

⁸⁴ *Idem*, "Monastic Properties..." (as in note 32 *supra*), 56f.; 63f.

⁸⁵ Xanthoudides, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 3), 162.

average of slightly less than eleven monks per monastery and a ratio of two monks per one hundred inhabitants. The vast majority of the Byzantine monks fell, generally speaking, within the age group of twenty-five to forty-five; from any point of view the most productive period of life.

His aggregate number, some degree of organization, occasional articulate leadership, a philosophy which emphasized simplicity, kindness, love—these were the factors which made the monk an influential element in Byzantine society.⁸⁶ But it was another, mystical quality that gave him special status and formed his image. By the condition of his life he had come very close to the Lord; had, so to speak, touched His garments, and thereby absorbed certain powers which the Lord possessed and which He alone could transmit. The monk's prayers thus became much more effective than the prayers of ordinary folk, and the effectiveness of a monk's prayers was often the principal reason why many laymen founded new monasteries or endowed old ones. In every monastic *typikon* there is the important provision that the monks of the house should pray on behalf of the founder and intercede in favor of his soul when he is dead. And, since the effectiveness of that prayer depended on the way of life of the monk, his life was carefully regulated so that there would be no deviations from the commandments of the Lord, the strict observance of which brought the monk very close to the Lord. Legends circulated that monks had the power to heal the diseased, even to restore life to the dead, to drive evil spirits from one's soul, and to prophesy about one's future.⁸⁷

This matter of prophecies at times even affected politics. Everyone knows the story of the ascetic of Philomelion and the visit to him by Bardanes, the powerful general of Nicephorus I, who contemplated the overthrow of his master. Bardanes, accompanied by three associates—a man by the name of Leo, another, Michael, and a third, Thomas—visited the hermit and inquired of him whether his projected attempt to seize the throne would succeed. The hermit's response was at first rather obscure, but when he saw Bardanes' companions he became specific: "The first and second of these men," he said, "will possess the empire, but thou shalt not. As for the third, he will be merely proclaimed, but will not prosper and will have a bad end." Bardanes failed, but Leo eventually became emperor, as did Michael also. The third, Thomas, better known as Thomas the Slavonian, was proclaimed emperor and even crowned, but after a long and vigorous attempt in the end failed actually to seize the throne.⁸⁸ In the form in which it has been transmitted, the prediction was no doubt, to

⁸⁶ Brief, sound accounts of Byzantine monasticism: Beck, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 2), 120 ff.; J. M. Hussey, "Byzantine Monasticism," in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, 4. *The Byzantine Empire*. Pt. II, *Government, Church and Civilisation* (Cambridge, 1967), 161–84; Olivier Rousseau, "Le rôle important du monachisme dans l'Eglise d'Orient," in *Il Monachesimo Orientale* (= *Orientalia Christiana Analecta*, 153) (Rome, 1958), 31–55.

⁸⁷ The mentality which permeates the *Pratum Spirituale* of John Moschus characterizes virtually all Byzantine hagiographical texts. Peter of Atroa (Laurent [*supra*, note 31], 119), to give one example, restored life to the dead. On saintly monks as healers, see H. J. Magoulias, "The Lives of the Saints as Sources of Data for the History of Byzantine Medicine in the Sixth and Seventh Centuries," *BZ*, 57 (1964), 127 ff.; cf. Charanis, "Some Aspects of Daily Life in Byzantium," *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 8 (1962–63), 66 ff.

⁸⁸ Genesius, *Historia* (Bonn, 1834), 8.

use the expression of J. B. Bury,⁸⁹ *post eventum*, but it is not at all unlikely that it may have been based on a prophecy actually made to one of the persons involved. Well known also is the story of the encounter in Patras between Basil the Macedonian and the wealthy lady Danelis, an encounter which gave to Basil the economic foundation for his future. Basil had entered the cathedral church of St. Andrew and while there was greeted by a monk who showed him unusual honor. The widow Danelis heard about the episode and asked the monk why it was that he had acted thus toward a stranger, and an unworthy one to boot, whereas at no time had he ever distinguished by any special act herself, her son, or her grandson. "It was not a chance fellow that I saw," the monk replied, "but the future emperor of the Romans annointed by Christ."⁹⁰ But one can never know with certainty the inner motives of men. Danelis was a widow, and the unusual care, gifts, and honors which, immediately after this episode, she bestowed on Basil may require another explanation; the prophecy was perhaps an invention designed to cover something else. Nevertheless, the point is that prophecies were very common, that they influenced people, and that the prophets were almost always monks.

In his memoirs Michael Psellos refers to those who have scorned the world in order to lead a life of meditation as the "true philosophers."⁹¹ The reference is, of course, to monks, but not to monks who claimed to have the power to foretell the future or to alter the course of nature and thus to influence people as they wished. He has nothing but contempt for such men. "These men," he writes elsewhere in the same work, "model themselves on the Divine . . . Some of them utter prophecies with the assurance of an oracle, solemnly declaring the will of God. Others profess to change natural laws, cancelling some altogether and extending the scope of others; they claim to make immortal the dissoluble human body and to arrest the natural changes which affect it . . . I know their kind and I have often seen them. Well, these were the men who led the empress (Theodora) astray, telling her she would live forever, and through their deceit she very nearly came to grief herself and brought ruin on the whole Empire as well."⁹² Anna Comnena, in a somewhat different context, expresses much the same view.⁹³ Anna is speaking of her father, but her words would apply to anyone, including monks. She writes: "The Emperor was unable to say to the paralytic, 'Rise up and walk!' or to bid the blind to see, and him who had not feet to walk. This was only in the power of the Only Begotten Son, who for our sakes became man and lived this life here below for the sake of men." Anyone who claimed to do the things that only the Lord could do was ob-

⁸⁹ *A History of the Eastern Roman Empire* . . . (London, 1912), 12, note 1.

⁹⁰ *Vita Basilii*, in Theophanes Continuatus (Bonn, 1838), 226–28. On Danelis, see Steven Runciman, "The widow Danelis," *Etudes dédiées à la mémoire d'André M. Andreadès* (Athens, 1940), 425–31.

⁹¹ *Chronographia*, ed. E. Renauld (Paris, 1926), I, 73. English trans. E. R. A. Sewter, *The Chronographia of Michael Psellus* (London, 1953), 72 f.; cf. F. Dölger, "Zur Bedeutung von Φιλόσοφος und Φιλοσοφία in Byzantinischer Zeit" in his *Byzanz und die Europäische Staatenwelt* (Speyer am Rhein, 1953), 199. The article was originally published in *Τεσσαρακονταετηρίς Θεοφίλου Βορέα*, 1 (Athens, 1940), 125–36.

⁹² Psellus (Renauld), 2: 80 f.; Sewter, 204.

⁹³ *Alexiade*, ed. B. Leib (Paris, 1937–1945), 3: 216. English trans. Elizabeth A. S. Dawes, *The Alexiad of the Princess Anna Comnena* . . . (London, 1928), 410.

viously a fake, and Anna knew too much medicine to believe otherwise. In this context, however, in fairness to the Byzantine monk, it should be said that he did not neglect the remedies that medicine had to offer, that the monastery was often the only place where a peasant could go to receive, besides the blessings of the monk, practical medical advice for the treatment of his ailments.⁹⁴

"Nothing was more democratic," a modern scholar has written, "than the recruitment of monasteries. Coarse peasants rubbed shoulders with the greatest lords."⁹⁵ The statement can be illustrated by specific source references. Here, the Lives of saints are of the greatest usefulness, although their accuracy is not always unquestionable. Ioannikes, a monk of some prominence during the first half of the ninth century, was a peasant by origin who, from the age of seven to about nineteen, when he entered the army, earned his living by tending hogs.⁹⁶ Peter of Atroa was most probably of similar origins.⁹⁷ Peasant, too, were the origins of Paul of Latmos and his brother, the monk Basil.⁹⁸ Euphymius the Younger came from a family of soldier-peasants,⁹⁹ and the parents of Neophytus of Cyprus were farmers.¹⁰⁰ The vast majority, if not all, of those who came to Meletios the Younger on Mt. Cithaeron were certainly peasants. Lampros is of the opinion that most were brigands;¹⁰¹ his opinion has been disputed by another Greek scholar, or rather ecclesiastic, but there is really no evidence one way or the other.¹⁰² Brigands did often become monks.¹⁰³ Peasants themselves, according to the novel of Basil II prohibiting new foundations, were often founders of small monastic establishments which were usually absorbed by the larger ones.¹⁰⁴

Saints' Lives are laudatory in character, and usually tend to give their heroes a noble origin. There is no reason to doubt, however, the noble origin of Plato and his nephew Theodore, the famous Studite,¹⁰⁵ or that Theophanes, the chronicler, was of good family.¹⁰⁶ When Alexius Musele, under the Emperor Theophilus, decided to become a monk, he bore the title Caesar.¹⁰⁷ Some years earlier, during the reign of Michael II, another high officer of administration chose to abandon the world and embrace monasticism; he is known in hagio-

⁹⁴ Magoulas, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 87), 127 ff.; Ph. Koukoules, Βυζαντινὸν βίος καὶ πολιτισμὸς (Athens, 1955), 6: 100 ff. Cf. Charanis, "Some Aspects of Daily Life . . ." (as in note 87 *supra*), 66–67.

⁹⁵ Louis Bréhier, "L'Enseignement classique et l'enseignement religieux à Byzance," *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses*, 21 (1941), 59–60. The internal administration of monasteries as it related to the absence of privileges was not always democratic: E. Jeanselme and L. Oeconomos, "La Satire contre les Higoumènes," *Byzantion*, 1 (1924), 317–39; Koukoules, *ibid.*, 6: 84 ff.

⁹⁶ *Vita S. Joannicii a. Saba monacho*, ed. J. Vanden Gheyn in *ActaSS.*, Nov., II, 1 (1894), 333–83.

⁹⁷ He was born in a village in Asia Minor of apparently obscure parents: Laurent, *La vie . . .* (as in note 31 *supra*), 69.

⁹⁸ *Vita S. Pauli Iunioris*, ed. H. Delehay (= Th. Wiegand, *Milet*, Band III, Heft I: *Der Latmos* [Berlin, 1913]), 106. Paul and his brother Basil were relatives of Ioannikes; *ibid.*, 105.

⁹⁹ Petit, "Vie et office de Saint Euthyme le jeune," *Revue de l'Orient chrétien*, 8, no. 2 (1903), 168–205.

¹⁰⁰ Mango and Hawkins, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 3), 123.

¹⁰¹ Sp. Lampros, "Ἡ Ἑλλάς ἐπὶ τῶν Βυζαντινῶν," *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων*, 18 (1924), 199.

¹⁰² Chr. A. Papadopoulos, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 9), 111.

¹⁰³ John Moschus, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 50), 3004–5, 3032–33; cf. Menthon, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 4), 141.

¹⁰⁴ Charanis, "Monastic Properties . . ." (as in note 32 *supra*), 63.

¹⁰⁵ *Vita S. Theodori Studitae* (as in note 47 *supra*), 116.

¹⁰⁶ *Vitae*, ed. C. de Boor in Theophanes *Chronographia*, II (Leipzig, 1885), 4, 14, 28, 30.

¹⁰⁷ P. Charanis, *The Armenians in the Byzantine Empire* (Lisbon, 1963), 25.

graphy as Saint Anthony the Young.¹⁰⁸ The father of Ignatius had been an emperor.¹⁰⁹ Michael Maleinos, the uncle of Nicephorus Phocas, belonged to the aristocracy.¹¹⁰ Athanasius, the founder of Lavra on Mt. Athos, came from a rich family from the Pontus.¹¹¹ Nicephorus himself was expected to embrace monasticism, and the quite different direction in which the course of events led him proved very painful to his ascetic friends, particularly Athanasius.¹¹² Saint Luke, the New Stylite, one of the more famous ascetics of the tenth century, is said also to have been of wealthy origin.¹¹³ The parents of Symeon, the New Theologian, were very well-to-do, possessing a library of their own. Symeon's uncle was an influential figure in the imperial court and was eager to launch his youthful nephew into a career of administration, but the young man's thoughts ran in a different direction.¹¹⁴

These men, and others who might have been cited, embraced the monastic life on their own volition. There were others high up the social ladder who were forced to do so, in the vast majority of cases for political reasons. These persons were usually unsuccessful rebels, or suspected of contemplating some plot, or perhaps the subject of a prophecy that they would reach the throne. Rather than being put to death, such people were relegated to a monastery, there to pass the rest of their lives in peace and tranquillity. The list, too long for detailed analysis—and such an analysis is not necessary—¹¹⁵ includes twelve former emperors¹¹⁶ and a number of imperial princesses,¹¹⁷ the latter no doubt forced to take the vows for dynastic reasons. Interdynastic marriages, at least in the middle Byzantine period, were very rare.¹¹⁸ If imperial princesses were to be allowed to marry, they would have had to marry Byzantine potentates, which was too dangerous for the ruling monarch. Virtually all the former emperors who were confined to a monastery accepted their new fate with equanimity. Three of them, Michael IV, Isaac I Comnenus, and John VI Cantacuzenus, may actually have wished it. It was illness, of course, that pushed Michael IV out of the throne and sent him to a monastery. About his predilection for the monastic life, however, there is little doubt. Throughout his reign he had shown special regard for the genuine monks, the ones Psellos calls philosophers. "What land and sea," Psellos writes, "did he not thoroughly

¹⁰⁸ S. Halkin, "Saint Antoine le Jeune et Pétronas le Vainqueur des Arabes en 863 (d'après un texte inédit)," *Analecta Bollandiana*, 62 (1944), 188; cf. Menthon, *op. cit. (supra, note 4)*, 141 ff.

¹⁰⁹ Michael I (811–813).

¹¹⁰ Petit, "Vie de Saint Michel Maléinos . . .," *RevOrChr*, 7 (1902), 550 f.

¹¹¹ Meyer, *op. cit. (supra, note 6)*, 22.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 103 f.

¹¹³ A. Vogt, "Vie de S. Luc le Stylite," *Analecta Bollandiana*, 28 (1909), 16–17; F. Vanderstuyf, "La vie de saint Luc le Stylite (897–979). Text grec édité et traduit," *Patrologia Orientalis*, 11 (1915), 200; H. Delehay, *Les saints stylites* (= *Subsidia Hagiographica*, 14) (Brussels, 1923), 195–237; Menthon, *op. cit. (supra, note 4)* 121–25.

¹¹⁴ Hausherr, *op. cit. (supra, note 74)*, 2, 4, 12.

¹¹⁵ For examples: Theophanes, *op. cit. (supra, note 27)*, I, 469, 479, 483; Cedrenus, *op. cit. (supra, note 27)*, II, 128, 172, 277, 281, 297, 302, 311, 342, 351, 478, 497, 511, 535, 550, 561.

¹¹⁶ R. Guiland, *Etudes byzantines* (Paris, 1959), 34–37.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 44–45.

¹¹⁸ Cf. *Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando Imperio*, ed. and trans. Gy. Moravcsik and R. J. H. Jenkins, rev. ed., *Dumbarton Oaks Texts*, I (Washington, D. C., 1967), 70–72.

search, what clefts in the rocks, what secret holes in the earth, that he might bring to the light of day one who was hidden there? Once he had found them, he would carry them off to his palace. And then what honor did he not pay them, washing their dust-covered feet, even putting his arms about them and gladly embracing their bodies, secretly clothing himself in their rags and making them lie down on his imperial bed, while he cast himself down on some humble couch, with a hard stone for a pillow."¹¹⁹ Illness, too, was the initial factor which eventually led Isaac Comnenus to abandon the throne and then to enter a monastery. Once he became a monk, he conducted himself with all humility, performing various menial chores, including that of a doorman.¹²⁰ In the case of John Cantacuzenus, it was not illness but frustration, a realization perhaps of the havoc he had wrought in his efforts to put himself on the throne, that led him to abandon the imperial seat in favor of monasticism.¹²¹ It was during his long life as a monk that Cantacuzenus composed his *Memoires* and other writings. Michael VII, when forced from the throne, embraced monasticism and subsequently became bishop of Ephesus. Eventually, however, he abandoned his see and returned to the monastery, where he worked the fields with his own hands.¹²²

It is, of course, a familiar fact that the Byzantine Empire, in its ethnic composition, was not purely Greek; that it included within its borders a number of other peoples. This fact was reflected in the monastic population of the Empire. The various national monasteries which were early established in Constantinople disappeared with the loss of Egypt and Syria.¹²³ Later, other monasteries of a more or less national character, such as the Slavic monasteries on Mt. Athos, made their appearance. The point to stress, however, is that there were elements other than Greek in the population of the general monastic establishments. From the ninth century there were Georgians in at least three monasteries or hermitages on Mt. Olympus. The Georgians who founded the Athonian monastery of Iviron about 980 had sojourned for some time on Olympus.¹²⁴ Iviron eventually housed Slavs in addition to Georgians. Saint Mary the Younger, who founded a monastic establishment in Thrace, was Armenian by origin.¹²⁵ Armenian monks are met with on Mt. Galasion.¹²⁶ We are told that Saint Euthymius the Younger, while sojourning on Mt. Athos, had

¹¹⁹ Psellos, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 91), Renauld, I, 73; Sewter, 73. The language of the translation is that of Sewter.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, Renauld, II, 132; Sewter, 247; Cedrenus (as in note 27 *supra*), II, 647ff. Cf. Guillard, *op. cit.*, 34f.

¹²¹ Guillard, *ibid.*, 35; D. M. Nicol, *The Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus) ca. 1100-1460: A Genealogical and Prosopographical Study*, Dumbarton Oaks Studies, XI (Washington, D. C., 1968), 86; V. Parisot, *Cantacuzène homme d'état et historien*... (Paris, 1845), 285ff.

¹²² Guillard, *op. cit.*, 36f.

¹²³ R. Janin, "Les monastères nationaux et provinciaux à Byzance (Constantinople et environs)," *Echos d'Orient*, 32, no. 172 (Oct.—Dec., 1933), 429-38.

¹²⁴ P. Peeters, "S. Hilarion d'Ibérie," *AnalBoll*, 32 (1913), 253; *idem*, "Histoires monastiques géorgiennes," *ibid.*, 36-37 (1917-19), 17, 19; *idem*, "Un colophon géorgien de Thornik le moine," *ibid.*, 50 (1932), 364, 365. Cf. Cedrenus (as in note 27 *supra*), II, 487-88. Cf. D. M. Lang, *Lives and Legends of the Georgian Saints*... (London, 1956), 154ff.

¹²⁵ P. Peeters, "Une sainte arménienne oubliée. Sainte Marie la Jeune († 902-903)" in his *Recherches d'histoire et de philologie orientales* (= Subsidia Hagiographica, 27) (Brussels, 1951), 1: 129-35.

¹²⁶ *De Sancto Lazaro, monacho in Monte Galesio*, *ActaSS*, Nov., 3 (1910), 542.

as his constant companion a certain Armenian hermit by the name of Joseph. The biographer of Euthymius apparently did not like Armenians, for he says: "This Joseph, though Armenian by race, was not a stealthy and crafty man. He was simple, candid and guileless."¹²⁷ When all is said and done, however, it should be emphasized that Byzantine monastic establishments—leaving out of consideration the Georgian, Armenian, and Slavic provinces—whatever their composition, ended by becoming Greek, unless special circumstances affected the situation. This statement finds confirmation in the *typikon* which the Georgian Gregory Pacourianos issued in favor of the monastery which he founded and richly endowed at Petritzos (Bačkovó in Bulgaria), then, of course, a Byzantine province. Pacourianos founded the monastery for fellow Georgians and made it a point to specify that no Greek should ever be admitted, because Greeks, he said, had a way of taking things over.¹²⁸

What was it that turned a Byzantine away from the world to embrace monasticism? The question admits of no single answer. Monasticism was an established way of life, and, as such, drew men and women to it. But there were surely specific reasons which varied from individual to individual. Peasants were drawn to monasteries because there they could better their lot.¹²⁹ This was most probably the reason why so many of them flocked around Meletios on Mt. Cithaeron. Some shocking experience, some disappointment in life may perhaps have moved others. Ioannikes is said to have decided to leave the army and become a monk after he had seen so many of his comrades lying dead on the battlefield in Bulgaria in 795.¹³⁰ A similar story is told about a certain Nicholas, a soldier in the army of Nicephorus I when that emperor led his last expedition into Bulgaria. Nicholas had a dream to the effect that the battlefield would be strewn with Roman bodies, and when the next day he saw that this was indeed the case, he decided to leave the army and become a monk.¹³¹ He eventually achieved sainthood. Musele, the Ceasar under Theophilus and for a time heir apparent to the throne, may have decided to become a monk because with the birth of Michael, he saw his chances for accession destroyed.¹³² It is said of a certain person who achieved high position in the army under Theophilus that he saw, while praying, how vain all things in the world were, and thereupon renounced his military career and became a monk.¹³³ He, too, achieved sainthood. Euthymius the Younger never allowed himself to forget the saying of the Lord: "And everyone who has left houses or brothers or sisters or father or mother or children or lands, for my name's sake will receive a

¹²⁷ Petit, "Vie et office . . ." (as in note 99 *supra*), 184.

¹²⁸ Louis Petit, "Typikon de Grégoire Pacourianos pour le monastère de Pétritzos (Bačkovó) en Bulgarie," *VizVrem*, 11 (Suppl. 1) (1904), 44.

¹²⁹ This was most probably the reason why Paul of Latros and his brother Basil embraced monasticism. Cf. *Vita S. Pauli* . . . (as in note 98 *supra*), 106.

¹³⁰ *Vita S. Joannicii* . . . (as in note 96 *supra*), 337–38.

¹³¹ Léon Clugnet, "Histoire de Saint Nicolas, soldat et moine. Texte Grec," *RevOrChr*, 7 (1902), 319–20. St. Luke, the new stylite, is said to have had the same experience: Vogt, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 113), 8. Another high official is said to have become a monk as the result of the wrecking of the fleet which he commanded. *Vita S. Arsenii*, ed. H. Delehaye, in Wiegand, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 98), 171–72.

¹³² Charanis, *The Armenians* . . . (as in note 107 *supra*), 25.

¹³³ Menthon, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 4), 135.

hundred fold and inherit eternal life.”¹³⁴ Symeon the New Theologian read a great deal of the ascetic literature, including the spiritual ladder of John Climacus.¹³⁵ This was perhaps what decided him to become a monk. General environment, too, may have played a role. The household of Theodore the Studite when he was young was run by his mother as though it were a monastery.¹³⁶ All these reasons, of course, apply to those who took the vows on their own volition. As for those who were forced to do so, their vows apparently were not binding. A certain John, for instance, a favorite of Romanus II, was allowed by the Patriarch Polyeuctos to abandon monastic life on the grounds that he had been forced into it by Constantine VII.¹³⁷

The degree and extent of literacy in the Byzantine Empire constitute a problem which is not likely ever to be settled, but the matter may perhaps be somewhat different in the case of the monks. That monks should be able to read was an expectation which became part of the tradition from the very beginning of organized Christian monasticism. Pachomius had ruled that anyone who was ignorant when he entered a monastery should first have to learn the rules that he must observe. He would then be given twenty psalms, or two epistles of the Apostle, or a part of another book of the Scriptures to learn. If he did not know how to read, he had to learn by studying three times a day with the one who was capable of teaching him.¹³⁸ Thus illiterates might enter a monastery, but as monks they could not remain illiterate. The matter of reading skill found general acceptance in Byzantine monasticism and was expressed in law.¹³⁹ Theodore the Studite put it very clearly: “It should be known that on days when we perform no physical labor the librarian strikes a gong once, the brothers gather at the place where the books are kept, and each takes one, reading it until late. Before the bell is rung for evening service the librarian strikes again, and all come to return their books according to the list. If anyone is late with his book, he is subject to a penalty.”¹⁴⁰ We find the same regulations expressed in almost the same language in a document relating to the monastery of Lavra on Mt. Athos.¹⁴¹ Reading was done, of course, from religious books,¹⁴² in Byzantine monastic circles there was definite hostility to profane literature.¹⁴³

This obligation to read was the reason why monasteries collected libraries and in many cases included among the ranks of the brethren a calligrapher.¹⁴⁴ These libraries constituted, relatively speaking, important collections of books

¹³⁴ Petit, “Vie et office . . .” (as in note 99 *supra*), 177, 181.

¹³⁵ Hausherr, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 74), 12.

¹³⁶ Alice Gardner, *Theodore of Studium, his life and times* (London, 1905), 14–17.

¹³⁷ Cedrenus (as in note 27 *supra*), II, 339.

¹³⁸ As cited by G. Bardy, “Les origines des écoles monastiques en Orient,” *Mélanges Joseph de Ghellinck*, I, *Antiquité* (Gembloux, 1951), 295.

¹³⁹ *Corpus Juris Civilis*, 3: *Novellae*, ed. R. Schoell (Berlin, 1854), 669 (Nov. CXXXIII, 2).

¹⁴⁰ Theodore Studite, “Constitutiones Studitanae,” PG, 99, col. 1713; Dmitrievsky, *Τυπικα* (as in note 58 *supra*) 1: 233. I used the translation of Nigel G. Wilson, “The Libraries of the Byzantine World,” *Greek-Roman and Byzantine Studies*, 8 (1967), no. 1, 63.

¹⁴¹ Dmitrievsky, *ibid.*, 255.

¹⁴² Bréhier, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 95), 64, 65.

¹⁴³ P. Van Den Ven, *La vie grecque de S. Jean le Psichaitte*, ext. *Le Muséon*, N.S., 3 (1902), 17. Cf. Dvornik, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 52), 29–30; Bury, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 89), 440–41.

¹⁴⁴ See, for instance, Meyer, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 6), 129.

and were used by scholars for their enlightenment.¹⁴⁵ It is said of a certain intellectual, for instance, that he went about visiting the various monasteries searching in their libraries, and so arrived at the level of knowledge which he finally achieved.¹⁴⁶ It would be a mistake, however, to infer from all this that the Byzantine monks of organized establishments were all and always literate. Persons are known by name who were illiterate when they became monks, but subsequently learned to read. St. Neophytus of Cyprus, for instance, learned not only to read, but also to write.¹⁴⁷ There are others, however, who remained illiterate even as acknowledged monks. One of these, Gerasimus, became patriarch in 1320.¹⁴⁸ It is difficult not to suspect that the majority of those who followed Meletios on Mt. Cithaeron were illiterates to begin with and never learned to read. There is a provision which the reader encounters in some of the monastic *typika* to the effect that some of the monks were to occupy themselves exclusively with the offices of the Church, the service of the liturgy, while others were to perform merely menial tasks. Thus, in the *typikon* issued by the Sebastocrator Isaac in 1152 in favor of the monastery of the Kosmosotira which he founded near Aenos, it is specified that fifty of the monks housed therein must occupy themselves exclusively with liturgical services; twenty-four others, however, were to perform various manual tasks.¹⁴⁹ So it was also in the *typikon* issued by Michael VIII Palaeologus in favor of the monastery of St. Demetrius. The *typikon* calls for a complement of thirty-six monks: fifteen to occupy themselves exclusively with liturgical matters, twenty-one with various manual tasks.¹⁵⁰ To infer from this that the monks whose duties were strictly liturgical were those who knew how to read, while the others were probably illiterate is by no means unreasonable. This inference finds some confirmation in a monastic document of about 1164 which bears the signatures of twenty-eight monks. Of these twenty-eight, seventeen actually signed their own names; eleven affixed their signature by a symbol. Among the latter, two were tenders of the vineyards, one was a gardener, and one a doorkeeper.¹⁵¹ It may be that in some Byzantine monasteries monks who were able to read predominated, while in others the opposite held true. In any case, the central point is that there were many monks who could read in the Byzantine organized monastic establishments.

To read is not necessarily to be educated. The Byzantine monk, with some notable exceptions, remained essentially an uneducated man. He read his Scriptures or chanted the psalms and adhered to tradition.¹⁵² Nor did any Byzantine

¹⁴⁵ Wilson, *op. cit.*, 53–80. Wilson used O. Volk, *Die byzantinischen Klosterbibliotheken von Konstantinopel, Thessalonike und Kleinasien* (Diss. Munich, 1955). I was not able to get access to this work.

¹⁴⁶ Cedrenus (as in note 27 *supra*), 2: 170.

¹⁴⁷ Mango and Hawkins, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 3), 123. Ioannikes learned to read after he became a monk: *Vita S. Joannicii* . . . (as in note 96 *supra*), 340.

¹⁴⁸ Nicephorus Gregoras, *Byzantina historia* (Bonn, 1829), 292.

¹⁴⁹ Petit, "Typikon du monastère . . ." (as in note 59 *supra*), 21.

¹⁵⁰ Grégoire, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 62), 173.

¹⁵¹ Dmitrievsky, *Typika* (as in note 58 *supra*), 1: 709–10.

¹⁵² The synod which examined the ascetic Theodore of Coloneia, whom John Tzimiskes had nominated to become patriarch of Antioch, found that he was completely ignorant of all profane learning, but was well instructed in things divine; Leo Deaconus, *Historiae* (Bonn, 1828), 100–101.

monastic establishment ever become a major educational center. The monastic schools which are occasionally mentioned in the sources were purely elementary establishments, places where young boys left in the care of the monasteries were taught how to read in order that they might be able to read the Scriptures.¹⁵³ Such young boys were often dedicated to monasteries by their parents, or were assigned to them in some other way. Anna Comnena, for instance, says of her father: "The children who had lost their parents and were afflicted with the bitter evil of orphanhood he distributed among his relations or others who, as he knew, led a well-conducted life, or sent them to the abbots of the holy monasteries with orders to bring them up, not as slaves, but as free children and allow them a thorough education and instructions in the Holy Writings."¹⁵⁴

"Monks are of service for neither war nor any other necessity . . . they have appropriated the greater part of the earth. On a pretext of giving everything to the poor they have, so to speak, made everyone poor." This statement is by Zosimus,¹⁵⁵ the fifth-century "pagan" historian, and its intent is obviously hostile. Monks are, of course, not useful as soldiers and by reason of their vows cannot participate in the process of procreation. These considerations have been touched upon elsewhere in this paper, and the suggestion bears repeating that these may have been the reasons why Constantine V sought to put an end to monasticism.

The question of giving to the poor is another matter, and here we shall have to divest ourselves of the hostility of Zosimus. The dispensation of charity, a function early assumed by the church, in due course was also assumed by monastic establishments. This function was not simply a matter of giving alms to the poor or of offering shelter to the weary traveller. It was that, of course, but it was something more. Throughout the history of the Byzantine Empire, there were various establishments designed to take care of the needs of a variety of unfortunate people. There were houses for the poor, for the old, for orphans; there were hostels and hospitals. A great many of these establishments were associated with monasteries; maintained, managed, and directed by the monks. This matter has been thoroughly discussed by Dr. Constantelos in the book which he has recently published,¹⁵⁶ and, as a consequence, we need not here enter into details. There is one hospital, however, which has always struck my fancy and about which I would like to make some remarks.

That hospital is the one attached to the monastery of the Pantocrator which the Emperor John II founded in Constantinople in the twelfth century, more exactly in 1136.¹⁵⁷ This hospital was a remarkable institution. Its fifty-odd beds

¹⁵³ Leroy, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 49), 42; Bréhier, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 95), 63-64.

¹⁵⁴ Anna Comnena, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 93), Leib, 3: 214; Dawes, 409. The translation used is that of Dawes.

¹⁵⁵ *Historia Nova*, ed. L. Mendelssohn (Leipzig, 1887), 244; *idem*, *Historia Nova: The Decline of Rome*, trans. James Buchanan and Harold T. Davis (San Antonio, 1967), 217. I use the words of the translators.

¹⁵⁶ Demetrios J. Constantelos, *Byzantine Philanthropy and Social Welfare* (New Brunswick, 1968), xxviii, 356.

¹⁵⁷ Dmitrievsky, *Typika* (as in note 58 *supra*), 682ff.; cf. Charanis, "Some Aspects of Daily Life . . ." (as in note 87 *supra*), 68f.

were divided into five sections or wards, each ward directed by two physicians and open to specific types of cases. One was given to general medical service, where acute ailments were treated; it consisted of twenty beds. Another, containing ten beds, was devoted to surgery, where care of wounds, fractures, and cases involving surgical intervention was undertaken. A ward consisting of twelve beds was open only to women for the treatment of diseases and irregularities peculiar to their sex, while another of eight beds housed patients who suffered from eye ailments. Finally, there was a psychiatric ward, where epilepsy and various mental disorders were treated. There was, in addition, what could be called an outpatient department, where the ailing came, were examined, and—their ailments diagnosed and treatment prescribed—returned home to come back sometime later for a check-up. The staff consisted of thirty-six physicians of various grades, including several women, and some nurses. Attached to the hospital was also a professor of medicine, whose presence there gave it something of the character of a medical school. There were also a number of service establishments. These included a pharmacy, a mill, a bakery, a kitchen, a laundry, and bathing houses. The bathing establishment must have been in frequent use, for it was prescribed that patients should be made to take two baths a week. The laundry, too, must have been a busy place, for upon entering the hospital the patient was provided with hospital clothes, while his own were taken away, washed and ironed, and returned to him when he was dismissed. The medicine practiced in this hospital was no doubt that of Galen, but its organization seems remarkably modern.

The remark of Zosimus that the monk “appropriates the greater part of the earth,” was, of course, a rhetorical exaggeration. Nevertheless, a competent modern authority on the internal history of the Byzantine Empire has estimated that at the end of the seventh century, about one-third of the usable land of the Empire was in the possession of the church and the monasteries.¹⁵⁸ For a time, the iconoclastic movement checked the growth of monasticism, and by confiscations considerably reduced the property holdings of monasteries. But once the movement was over, monasteries grew greatly in number, and their properties increased. Original endowments, subsequent gifts by the pious, purchases, and downright encroachments on the property of others were the principal sources for this increase. The property amassed was beyond measure, and the major sufferers were the peasant proprietors and eventually the State itself. There were emperors—we have treated this matter elsewhere in detail—who tried to check this evil. Some even resorted to confiscations. But, in the end, the monks won. As the Empire approached its end, much of its usable land was in the possession of monasteries.¹⁵⁹ The monks did not bring about the decline of the Byzantine Empire; they did, however, create economic and social conditions which helped to bring it about.

¹⁵⁸ V. G. Vasilievsky, “Materials for the Study of the Byzantine State,” *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnago Prosveshcheniia*, 202 (St. Petersburg, 1879) (in Russian), 162. I consulted this work some time ago with the help of Mrs. Nathalie Scheffer.

¹⁵⁹ On all this, see my study, “Monastic Properties . . .” (as in note 32 *supra*), 51–118.

The monk was an omnipresent ingredient of Byzantine society. Nothing short of a thorough overhauling of that society, a complete change in its constituents, could have altered his position. He furnished the Church with its bishops and patriarchs. According to Bréhier, between 705, when Cyrus—a hermit of Amastreia who had predicted to Justinian II his restoration to the throne—became patriarch, and 1204, when Constantinople fell to the Latins, forty-five of the fifty-seven patriarchs were monks.¹⁶⁰ The situation was not much different in the period that followed. In Byzantium, the populace respected and admired the monk and frequently turned to him in time of need. Emperors loved him, shared their table with him, sought his blessing, and when on the point of launching some important undertaking, often consulted him.¹⁶¹ Monks were considered to be a spiritual force upon which the very safety of the Empire depended. This matter was clearly expressed by Alexius III of Trebizond in the chrysobull which he issued in 1364 in favor of the monastery at Soumela. He said that he relied for the defense of his Empire more upon spiritual than material weapons; that he placed greater faith in monasteries than in fortresses.¹⁶² This seems wrong, of course. What he needed were more fortresses and the manpower to garrison them, and this was how some of the emperors of the past, however fond of monks they may have been, would have viewed the matter. Yet, when account is taken of the situation as it then actually existed, he may have been right. For the monastery as an institution survived the general catastrophe, and in due course helped the Christian peoples of the Balkan peninsula to regain their dignity.

Postscriptum

Harun-ibn-Yahya, an Arab prisoner held in Constantinople sometime during the second half of the ninth century, mentions six monasteries located in the environs of Constantinople. One of them, he says, had a population of 500 monks; another, 1,000; the other four together, 12,000. The accuracy of these figures is, to say the least, highly questionable: A. A. Vasiliev, "Harun-ibn-Yahya and his Description of Constantinople," *Seminarium Kondakovianum*, V (1932), 161.

¹⁶⁰ Bréhier, *Le monde byzantin*, 2. *Les institutions de l'Empire byzantin* (Paris, 1949), 483.

¹⁶¹ Leo IV is said to have been a friend of the monks: Theophanes, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 115), I, 449. Petronas visited Latros to consult and obtain the blessings of the monks before launching his expedition against the Arabs: Cedrenus, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 27), II, 163; Halkin, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 108), 218–19. Leo VI shared his table with monks: Theophanes Continuatus, 365f. Romanus I is said to have honored the monks: Cedrenus, *ibid.*, II, 320. Constantin VII visited Mt. Olympus and sought the blessings of the monks; Cedrenus, *ibid.*, II, 337. Constantin X Ducas is referred to as a lover of monks: Cedrenus, II, 652. Reference has already been made to Michael IV as a lover of monks.

¹⁶² Miklosich and Müller, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 56), 5: 276f. Cf. G. A. Soteriou, *Αἱ Μοναὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ ἡ ἔθνικὴ αὐτῶν δράσις κατὰ τοὺς βυζαντινοὺς χρόνους* (Athens, 1936).

DUMBARTON OAKS

Cultural Diversity and the Breakdown of Byzantine Power in Asia Minor

Author(s): Peter Charanis

Reviewed work(s):

Source: *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, Vol. 29 (1975), pp. 1-20

Published by: [Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1291367>

Accessed: 26/01/2013 22:55

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

CULTURAL DIVERSITY
AND THE BREAKDOWN
OF BYZANTINE POWER
IN ASIA MINOR

PETER CHARANIS

The following paper is substantially the same as that delivered at the Symposium on "The Decline of Byzantine Civilization in Asia Minor, Eleventh—Fifteenth Century," held at Dumbarton Oaks in May 1974.

IN the seventh century the Roman Empire, which we may now call the Byzantine Empire, lost Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and its Mesopotamian and Armenian possessions. By the end of that century, the Arabs were in control of all of Armenia and in 708 they took Tyana. A zone, varied in width, with one end located on the coast of the Black Sea some distance to the east of Trebizond, and the other end on the Mediterranean east of Seluceia on the Calycadnus, extended along the upper reaches of the Lycus east of Nikopolis and of the Halys east of Sebasteia, and along the Taurus mountains, and thenceforth for some two hundred and fifty years constituted the frontier of the Byzantine Empire in Asia Minor. Byzantium had been able to retain effective control over the western regions and, excepting Cilicia, the central plateau of Asia Minor.¹ Although the Empire lost the greater part of its possessions in the Balkan peninsula, the retention of Asia Minor finally saved it, and enabled it to reestablish itself as a great power. Byzantine Asia Minor, at least among the Arabs, became synonymous with the Byzantine Empire.²

Norman Baynes, who believed that the essential condition of the prosperity of the Byzantine Empire was its possession of Asia Minor, refers to the latter as "that reservoir alike of money and of men."³ Asia Minor was, of course, rich in natural resources and was in possession of the techniques developed in the ancient world for their exploitation.⁴ But the extent of the abundant supply of money—usable wealth is a more appropriate expression—depends upon a large and thriving population, and on this question of the size of the population of Byzantine Asia Minor the sources permit no categorical answer.

It has been estimated that the regions which came to constitute Byzantine Asia Minor had a combined population of about 11,800,000 toward the end of the second century A.D. This estimate, the compiler adds, "probably errs by being too small."⁵ In the third century the population of these regions suffered a decline, but this decline was checked sometime in the fourth century, and by the end of the fifth there was a recovery. A new demographic crisis began in 541 with the outbreak of the first of a series of deadly pestilences which would plague Asia Minor, particularly its western region, which was also its most populous, throughout the sixth, seventh, and part of the eighth centuries. During the same period, Asia Minor was subjected on an almost annual basis to devastating raids by the Persians and, especially, by the Arabs. It may be taken as certain, therefore, that from about the middle of

¹ On the Byzantine frontiers in Asia Minor, the principal book remains, of course, E. Honigmann, *Die Ostgrenze des byzantinischen Reiches* (Brussels, 1935), 43 ff.

² D. J. Georgacas, *The Names for the Asia Minor Peninsula and a Register of Surviving Anatolian Pre-Turkish Placenames* (= Beiträge zur Namenforschung, n.f. 8) (Heidelberg, 1971), 69 f., 77.

³ *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays* (London, 1955), 92.

⁴ T. R. S. Broughton, "Roman Asia Minor," in T. Frank, ed., *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, IV (Baltimore, 1938), 599 ff.; D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (Princeton, 1950), II, 34 ff.

⁵ Broughton, *op. cit.*, 815.

the sixth century the number of its inhabitants began to decline, and that the decline continued, sometimes less, sometimes more, throughout the seventh and eighth centuries.⁶ The emperors were aware of this and tried to remedy the situation by settling new peoples. The anti-monastic measures of Constantine V may also have had a demographic basis.⁷ By the beginning of the ninth century the situation began to improve. The information for this is meager, but it is known at least that Asia Minor was no longer subjected to the almost continuous Arab raids which, in the preceding centuries, contributed so much to the thinning of its population. There are a few references to the existence of some fairly large and prosperous cities; there was an increase in the number of episcopal sees;⁸ and, as Ostrogorsky remarks, the insatiable drive of the landed aristocracy in the tenth century for more land presupposes a certain degree of abundance of agricultural labor.⁹ J. C. Russell, whose estimate of ancient and medieval populations is notoriously low, puts the population of Byzantine Asia Minor around A.D. 800 at about 8 million.¹⁰ There is no solid basis for Russell's figure or, indeed, for any figure; nevertheless the impression is strong that by the end of the ninth century and during the tenth century Byzantine Asia Minor was a well-populated land. Ibn Hauqal, the tenth-century Arab geographer who considered the Byzantine Empire much inferior in population and wealth to Maghrib, the realm of the Fatimes in North Africa, says about the western regions of Asia Minor: "The territory which separates the two cities [Attaleia and Constantinople] is fertile and well peopled. From the suburbs of Attaleia and its flourishing and very productive rural districts to the straits of Constantinople the traffic is uninterrupted all along the route."¹¹ The population of Asia Minor was not, of course, evenly distributed throughout the peninsula. Regions of the central plateau were certainly not as densely populated as the great river valleys.

Broughton's estimate of the population of Asia Minor in the second century A.D., which I gave at the beginning of this paper, was based on various features of Asia Minor: the extent of its fertile valleys, its forests and mountains, and the wetness or dryness of its climate. But the factor which entered most heavily into his calculations was the existence of a considerable number of cities, some with a population running into tens or, in several instances, hundreds of thousands of people.¹² In the period which followed through the end of the sixth century, these cities underwent significant changes, both in their administration and in the size and quality of their populations. They

⁶ P. Charanis, *Studies on the Demography of the Byzantine Empire. Collected Studies* (London, 1972), study I, pp. 9, 10, 11, 13. Cf. H. Ahrweiler, "L'Asie Mineure et les invasions Arabes (VII^e-IX^e siècles)," *RH*, 227 (1962), 13ff.

⁷ P. Charanis, "The Monk as an Element of Byzantine Society," *DOP*, 25 (1971), 66f.

⁸ *Idem*, *Studies on the Demography*, study I, p. 13.

⁹ G. Ostrogorsky, "Das Steuersystem im byzantinischen Altertum und Mittelalter," *Byzantion*, 6 (1931), 233.

¹⁰ *Late Ancient and Medieval Population* (= *TAPS*, n.s. 48, pt. 3) (Philadelphia, 1958), 148.

¹¹ Ibn Hauqal, *Configuration de la Terre*, French trans. J. H. Kramers and G. Wiet (Paris, 1964), I, 196f.

¹² Broughton, *op. cit.*, 815.

continued, nevertheless, to constitute an important element of the geography of Asia Minor.¹³

The irruption of the Arabs in the seventh century and the disturbances which they caused in Asia Minor in the course of that and the next two centuries did not leave the cities of that peninsula unaffected. In the opinion of some scholars, these cities declined to such an extent that for all practical purposes they may be said to have ceased to exist. This opinion has been based largely on numismatic and archaeological evidence drawn from only two or three sites, and as a consequence its general import has been questioned on this and on other grounds.¹⁴ There is information, however, drawn from Moslem geographers, which seems to support it.

Ibn Hauqal, whom I have already cited in another connection, says, concerning the number of cities in the Byzantine Empire: "Despite its territorial extent, the continuity of its duration, and its condition, rich cities are less numerous in the Byzantine Empire; in fact, the largest part of it is made up of mountains, of citadels and of fortresses, of troglodytic villages, and of small towns with houses cut into the rocks or dug underground."¹⁵ And the author of the *Hudūd al-ʿĀlam*, a geographical compilation composed in Persian around 982 and drawn from earlier Arab geographers, writes: "In the days of old cities were numerous in Rūm..., but now they have become few. Most of the districts...are prosperous and pleasant, and have (each) an extremely strong fortress..., on account of the frequency of the raids... which the fighters for the faith...direct upon them."¹⁶ The inference seems clear: in the course of their penetrations of Asia Minor over a period of about two hundred years, the Arabs brought ruination upon the cities of that peninsula.

That the Arabs captured, devastated, and, in some instances, left in ruins important Byzantine cities in Asia Minor is known, of course, from other sources, both Arab and Greek. A perusal of the Byzantine chroniclers and the Arabic sources translated by Brooks, and by Vasiliev, Grégoire, and Canard has revealed the following cities which at one time or another in the course of

¹³ For a general survey of the cities of Asia Minor to the end of the reign of Justinian, see A. H. M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1971), 28–225. For the Byzantine city in general in the sixth century, see D. Claude, *Die byzantinische Stadt im 6. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1969).

¹⁴ The question has been discussed by G. Ostrogorsky, "Byzantine Cities in the Early Middle Ages," *DOP*, 13 (1959), 45–66; cf. Charanis, *Studies on the Demography*, study I, p. 7. The excavations at Sardis and the publication of the Byzantine coins found there have revived the issue; see G. E. Bates, *Archaeological Exploration of Sardis. Byzantine Coins* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 1–3: "The coins give a fairly precise date for the final destruction of Sardis. The evidence of widespread destruction and burning, the presence in the burned layers of larger numbers of Byzantine copper coins dating from 491 to the year 616 and not thereafter, and the lack of signs of reconstruction argue for the destruction of the city no earlier than 616.... It is thought that for some years the Persian armies were engaged in extensive raiding of western Asia Minor. There is thus the probability that Sardis was captured and destroyed by one of these raiding armies in 616.... I conclude that the city was destroyed in 616.... Coins found thus far provide no evidence of substantial resettlement after 616 until at least the end of the tenth century." But see P. Charanis, "A Note on the Byzantine Coin Finds in Sardis and their Historical Significance," *Επ.Ερ.Βυλ.Σπ.*, 39–40 (1972–73), 175–80.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, I, 194f.

¹⁶ *Hudūd al-ʿĀlam*, trans. and commentary by V. Minorsky (London, 1937), 157.

the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries were captured by the Arabs: Abydus, Acroinon, Amaseia, Amisus, Amorion, Ancyra, Antioch in Pisidia, Caesarea, Cyzicus, Heracleia in Cappadocia, Ikonion, Laodiceia Catacecaumene, Nicomedia, Nyssa, Synada in Phrygia, Thebasa in Lycaonia.¹⁷

Let us look more closely, however, into the testimony of the Moslem geographers. Ibn Hauqal was a propagandist for the Fatimides of North Africa.¹⁸ He attributed the successes of the Byzantine Empire against Islam in the tenth century not to its strength, but to the weakness of the Moslems. In his opinion the Byzantine Empire was poor, its resources considerably less than was generally believed among the Moslems.¹⁹ His statement, therefore, that the Byzantine Empire had few rich cities, because it puts the emphasis on the rich, loses some of its significance, and in the final analysis is irrelevant to the broader question of how numerous were the cities in the Byzantine Empire. Ibn Hauqal, however, does speak of the existence of numerous fortresses, which were not isolated structures built here and there throughout the countryside. They were fortified, inhabited localities whose population often ran into thousands. Amorion, for instance, often referred to as a fortress, may have had a population of about 40,000 just before its devastation by the Arabs in 838.²⁰ Besides, the reference to "troglodytic villages and towns with houses cut into the rocks or dug underground" indicates that Ibn Hauqal may have had in mind those parts of Asia Minor which were never famous for their cities. The situation elsewhere in Asia Minor was apparently different, as Ibn Hauqal himself implies elsewhere in his book where he says that in the regions between Attaleia and Constantinople the traffic was never interrupted.

The testimony of the author of the *Hudūd al-ʿĀlam*, too, cannot be accepted on its face value because it is contradicted by another reference drawn from the same compilation. This other reference immediately follows the listing of the themes of the Empire such as Arab geographers knew them to have been about 845, and reads: "Each of these provinces (themes) is vast and has numerous towns, villages, castles, fortresses, mountains, running waters, and

¹⁷ E. W. Brooks, "The Arabs in Asia Minor (641-750), from Arabic Sources," *JHS*, 18 (1898), 193, 194, 198, 199; *idem*, "Byzantines and Arabs in the Time of the Early Abbasids," *EHR*, 15 (1900), 734, 740, 745; Theophanes, *Chronographia*, ed. C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1883), I, 345, 351, 353, 354, 382, 390, 395, 404, 411; Ibn Hauqal, *op. cit.*, I, 190 ("Ankara, grande ville en ruines"); Ibn Khordadbeh, *apud* H. Gelzer, *Die Genesis der byzantinischen Themenverfassung* (Leipzig, 1899), 83 ("la ville, actuellement ruinée, de Nicomédie"); A. A. Vasiliev, H. Grégoire, and M. Canard, *Byzance et les Arabes*, I (Brussels, 1935) (Amorion and Ancyra). See also Ahrweiler, *op. cit.*, 30ff.

¹⁸ M. Canard, *Miscellanea Orientalia* (London, 1973), study II ("L'impérialisme des Fatimides et leur propagande," originally published in 1947).

¹⁹ Ibn Hauqal, *op. cit.*, I, 195: "L'empire byzantin apparaît à beaucoup de musulmans cultivés et d'auteurs d'ouvrages comme très différent de ce qu'il est en réalité. En effet, il est dans une situation précaire; sa puissance est insignifiante, ses revenus sont médiocres, ses populations d'humble condition, la richesse y est rare, ses finances sont mauvaises et ses ressources sont maigres... l'empire byzantin n'approche pas l'importance du Maghreb ni sa puissance..."

²⁰ Charanis, *Studies on the Demography*, study I, p. 8, where the sources, on the basis of which this estimate has been made, are given. I am told by those who have seen the existing ruins of Amorion that these ruins indicate a city too small to have had a population of 40,000. It must be pointed out, however, that Amorion was destroyed and rebuilt several times, and as a consequence the existing ruins most probably do not indicate at all the size of the city which existed in 838 before it was destroyed by the Arabs.

amenities.”²¹ This reference precedes the one which says that the cities in Rūm had become few; it does not necessarily follow, however, that the conditions which it describes antedated those described by the latter reference. Moreover, there is this additional notice inserted at the end of the text relevant to the internal situation of the Byzantine Empire: “And these provinces, with large villages, and whatever there is (in them) of towns, are such as we have represented them and shown on the Map...” This text, according to the editor, is awkward: the words “villages” and “towns” ought to come in reverse order.²² The text should read, therefore: “And these provinces, with large towns, and whatever there is (in them) of villages, are such as we have represented them and shown on the map.” In his references to towns in Byzantine Asia Minor, the author of the *Hudūd al-‘Ālam* is obviously confused, probably because he drew them from different sources. These references do indicate, however, that at least by the second half of the ninth century there were not a few towns in Asia Minor. This is not to say, of course, that the Arabs had inflicted no permanent damage. Indeed, there were cities which failed to survive their depredations, or, if they did survive, were reduced to villages.²³

I have listed above the Byzantine cities in Asia Minor which at one time or another had been captured by the Arabs, not one of which was held by them for any length of time. Whatever damage they did was repaired, at least to some extent, by the Byzantine authorities, rebuilding some cities from the ground, although sometimes on a lesser scale, as was the case with Amorion after its destruction in 838. In a homily probably delivered in 864, at the time of the inauguration by the Emperor Michael III of the Palatine church of Our Lady of the Pharos, the Byzantine Patriarch Photius declared that the Emperor “re-erected subject cities which have long lain low, and built others from the foundations, and repopled others, and made the boundaries secure for the towns.”²⁴ This homily was delivered before, and addressed to, the Emperor; hence allowance should be made for rhetorical exaggerations. It is known from inscriptions, however, that Michael III, probably about 858–59, reconstructed Ancyra and also restored Nicaea.²⁵ Ancyra had been restored once before by Nicephorus I.²⁶ A number of cities not only survived the disturbances caused by the Arabs, but continued to be centers of commerce and industry of some importance. These included Attaleia, Ephesus, Smyrna, Nicaea, Nicomedia, Prusa, Heracleia Pontica, Amastris, and Trebizond.²⁷ Attaleia and Trebizond are particularly noted by Ibn Hauqal for their

²¹ *Hudūd al-‘Ālam*, 156f.

²² *Ibid.*, 157 and note 2.

²³ Cf. Ahrweiler, *op. cit.*, 30ff.

²⁴ C. Mango, *The Homilies of Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople*, DOS, III (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 185 and note 3.

²⁵ H. Grégoire, “Inscriptions historiques byzantines,” *Byzantion*, 4 (1927–28), 437–49. For Nicaea, see A. M. Schneider and W. Karnapp, *Die Stadtmauer von Iznik* (Nicaea) (Berlin, 1938), 51–52; A. M. Schneider, “The City Walls of Nicaea,” *Antiquity*, 12 (1938), 441.

²⁶ Cedrenus, *Historiarum Compendium*, Bonn ed. (1839), II, 34.

²⁷ For these and other towns, see S. Vryonis, Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley–Los Angeles, 1971), 10ff.

importance as sources of revenue.²⁸ About the size of the population of these cities nothing definite can be said. The population of Amorion on the eve of its devastation by the Arabs in 838 might have numbered close to 40,000, and Nicaea is said to have been well-peopled.²⁹ In general, however, these cities were relatively small, though no smaller perhaps than the central settlement of most of the cities of antiquity. Their population consisted of soldiers, ecclesiastics, the landed magnates of the surrounding countryside, peasants, and, of course, some craftsmen and merchants. In some cities, Attaleia and Trebizond, for instance, there were foreign merchants, while in others, notably Amorion, Attaleia, Ephesus, Nicomedia, and Synada, there dwelled also a number of Jews.³⁰

Perhaps the most important function of the Byzantine city in Asia Minor was to serve as an outlet for the surrounding countryside and to offer it protection. Society in Asia Minor, as elsewhere in the Byzantine Empire, was predominately agrarian, with agriculture and animal-tending its most important economic activities and the principal sources of revenue for the state. The upheavals of the seventh century seriously affected the countryside, bringing about, among other things, important changes in its social structure. There are aspects of these changes which are by no means clear; but on the main point, that they involved the conversion of the majority of the peasantry into independent proprietors cultivating their own land, there can be little doubt.³¹ For in contrast to the situation which obtained before the seventh century, it is the independent peasantry which dominated the agrarian scene in the period which followed. This point is made clear by a passage in the novel which the Emperor Romanus I issued in 934, precisely for the protection of the independent peasantry against the encroachments of the rich. The passage reads: "It is not through hatred and envy of the rich that we take these measures, but for the protection of the small and the safety of the Empire as a whole.... The extension of the power of the strong... will bring about the irreparable loss of the public good, if the present law does not bring a check to it. For it is the many, settled on the land, who provide for the general needs, who pay the taxes and furnish the army with recruits. Everything fails when the many are wanting."³²

²⁸ Ibn Hauqal, *op. cit.*, I, 192.

²⁹ "Niqiya; this is a large city in which there are many inhabitants": A. A. Vasiliev, "Harun-ibn-Yahya and his Description of Constantinople," *SemKond*, 5 (1932), 154, who says (note 30) that Niqiya here is Iconium, but Canard (Vasiliev, Grégoire, and Canard, *Byzance et les Arabes* [*supra*, note 17], II, 2, 383 note 3) suggests that it may be Nicaea or possibly Nacolein (*ibid.*, 434), southeast of Dorylaeum. But see Theophanes Continuatus, Bonn ed. (1838), 464, where Nicaea is referred to as rich and populous.

³⁰ J. Starr, *The Jews in the Byzantine Empire 641-1204* (Athens, 1939), 30, 109, 119, 121, 186, 191. Cf. Ahrweiler, *op. cit.*, 6 notes 6 and 7; Vryonis, *op. cit.*, 12. The Jewish communities in Asia Minor, however, could not have been very large, for the total Jewish population of the Empire does not appear to have exceeded 15,000; see Starr, *op. cit.*, 34ff.

³¹ The literature on this point is considerable. For references, see P. Charanis, *Social, Economic and Political Life in the Byzantine Empire. Collected Studies* (London, 1973), study III (originally published in 1945); *idem*, *Studies on the Demography*, study IV (originally published in 1963).

³² Zepos, *Jus* (Athens, 1931), I, 208-9. The novel is said to have been issued in September, 8th indiction, the year 6443 after the creation of the world; thus A.D. 934. For another date (928), *ibid.*, 206 note 6.

The text is quite clear. The "many," those who pay the taxes, provide for the general needs, and furnish the army with recruits, are the independent peasantry. They had been in existence already for some time and had rendered the Empire productive and prosperous. The prosperity of Asia Minor in the ninth century mentioned by Arab geographers was no doubt the work of this peasantry, among whom we must include the soldier-farmers who constituted the thematic armies.

Ancient Asia Minor comprised a variety of nationalities. The conquests of Alexander the Great brought it under Greek influence to a greater extent than ever before. Its Hellenization, promoted by the Seleucids and the Attalids, was further encouraged by the Romans, who brought the entire peninsula under their effective jurisdiction. Cicero called the Lycians Greeks,³³ and Strabo says that in his time Lydian had ceased to be spoken in Lydia itself, although it was still used along with Pisidian and Greek in Cibyra.³⁴ Greek, which in early Roman times was very much restricted to the towns and among the natives tended to be spoken only by the rich and the educated, in time spread into villages and hamlets and became the speech of the poor and the uneducated. No less an authority on Hellenism in Asia Minor than Louis Robert has this to say:

"The Greek culture was general in Lycaonia and in Phrygia, in the second and third centuries and during the Later Empire. The use of the Greek language was not at all restricted to a thin layer of the population, the upper class. The very 'coarseness' of many of the monuments—dedications and epitaphs—shows it, as well as the large number of these monuments, their density, and the variety of the social conditions, from freedmen to slaves, of those who executed them.... The dedications, so numerous and interesting, and the epitaphs were not drawn for a thin layer of rich citizens of the towns, but... for the peasants, well to do or poor, of the villages and hamlets."³⁵

The dissemination of the Greek language among every layer of the native population of Asia Minor did not necessarily mean, of course, that the native languages ceased to be spoken. The question as to what extent these languages continued in use was most thoroughly studied by Karl Holl, who, with the exception of one or two references which were added later, had collected the relevant texts.³⁶ Chronologically, these texts fall within the first six centuries of the Christian era and refer to the following languages: Cappadocian, Celtic, Isaurian, Lycaonian, Mysian, and Phrygian. It may be presumed, therefore, that these languages were still spoken, at least to some extent, until the end of the sixth century. It is conceivable that some of these languages may have

³³ Cicero, *The Verrine Orations*, IV, 10.21, Loeb (London, 1928), II, 304: *Lycii, Graeci homines*. Cf. W. M. Ramsay, *The Historical Geography of Asia Minor* (London, 1890), 19: "the græcising process had progressed very far in Lycia early in the first century B.C."

³⁴ Strabo, *The Geography*, XIII, 4.17, Loeb (London, 1960), XIII, 192.

³⁵ In his review of *MAMA*, VII, in *Hellenica*, 13 (1965), 53–54.

³⁶ "Das Fortleben der Volkssprachen in Kleinasien in nachchristlicher Zeit," *Hermes*, 43 (1908), 240–54; P. Charanis, "Ethnic Changes in the Byzantine Empire in the Seventh Century," *DOP*, 13 (1959) (= *Studies on the Demography*, study II), 25–26 and the references given there. See also Vryonis (*op. cit.*, 44–48), who is right, I think, in questioning (46f.) the validity of one of the texts cited by Holl.

lingered on for some time longer, for languages do not die suddenly. How much longer cannot be known, but the chance that any one of them survived much beyond the eighth century is very slim indeed. One more point: in the very early centuries of Christianity there appeared a number of heresies in Asia Minor. By the end of the eighth century, however, some of these heretical groups disappeared; others lost their vitality and merged with other sects which showed up later. Holl's view, therefore, that the adherents of these heresies were native speakers, and as a consequence their existence should be taken as proof of the continued use of native languages, however valid it may be for the Early Christian centuries, has no significance for the later period.³⁷

There is, however, another aspect of the linguistic evolution of Byzantine Asia Minor than the final and absolute triumph of Greek over the ancient native languages of the peninsula. Between the foundation of Constantinople and the end of the eighth century, Asia Minor underwent some changes in its ethnic composition, brought about by the settlement of new peoples. Goths were settled toward the end of the fourth century and Vandals and perhaps more Goths in the sixth.³⁸ When the Arabs took Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, many orthodox Christians fled to the Byzantine Empire and were settled most probably in Asia Minor.³⁹ Toward the end of the seventh century Justinian II removed the Mardaïtes from Lebanon and settled some of them in the region of Attaleia.⁴⁰ The same Emperor also settled thousands of Slavs in Bithynia. More Slavs, 208,000 according to one chronicler, were brought over into Asia Minor in 762, where they landed on the Black Sea coast of Bithynia, but apparently were later dispersed throughout Asia Minor.⁴¹

The Slavs, as they finally achieved some stability as settlers in Byzantine Asia Minor, may have numbered perhaps close to 300,000.⁴² No figures can be given for the other new settlers. In general, however, they seem to have been relatively few, numbering into hundreds, in some cases into thousands, but most probably never into tens of thousands. To be sure, the Mardaïtes

³⁷ Charanis, "Ethnic Changes," 26f., where I agree with Holl. But actually there is no evidence to indicate that any of these heretical groups survived much beyond the sixth century and, if they did so, that their language was not Greek. Cf. Vryonis, *op. cit.*, 59f., where Holl's view is questioned.

³⁸ E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, French trans. J. R. Palanque (Paris, 1959), 194-95; Procopius, *De bello Vandalico*, II, 14.17, Loeb (London, 1916), II, 330f.

³⁹ Charanis, "Ethnic Changes," 28 and note 25. See also Mgr. A. Scher, ed., *Histoire Nestorienne (Chronique de Séert)*, PO, XIII (Paris, 1919), 627: "La plupart des habitants de ces régions [Syria] se réfugièrent à l'intérieur de l'empire grec, laissant leurs propriétés." The sources do not state that these refugees came to Asia Minor, but Asia Minor, with Attaleia as a port of landing, was the most likely place. In the ninth century many Christians came to Attaleia from Palestine: Συλλογή παλαιστωνης και συριακης αγιολογίας, ed. M. A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus (= Pravoslavnyj palestinskij sbornik', XIX, 3 [57]) (St. Petersburg, 1907), 193; cf. F. Halkin, "Saint Antoine le Jeune et Pétronas le vainqueur des Arabes en 863," *AnalBoll*, 62 (1944), 188.

⁴⁰ Theophanes, *op. cit.*, I, 363; Honigsmann, *op. cit.*, 41; K. Amantos, Μαρδαίται, in *Ἑλληνικά*, 5 (1932), 130-36.

⁴¹ On the settlement of Slavs in Asia Minor, see P. Charanis, "The Slavic Element in Byzantine Asia Minor in the Thirteenth Century," *Byzantion*, 18 (1946-48) (= *Studies on the Demography*, study VII and author's preface); *idem*, "Ethnic Changes," 42-43.

⁴² This is a liberal estimate which I base on the figure 208,000, the number of Slavs living in Asia Minor in 762, and some indefinite elements.

who had been removed from Lebanon are said to have numbered 12,000, but not all of them definitely settled in Asia Minor.⁴³ There were still in the seventh, eighth, and early part of the ninth century Armenians in Byzantine Asia Minor, but as a people they were restricted to Little Armenia, with Comana the westernmost point of their influence. The famous Armenian-Byzantine family of the Skleroi were originally natives of this part of Byzantine Asia Minor. Only two Armenian colonies, at Pergamon and at Priene, are known to have existed in western Asia Minor during this period.⁴⁴

The language spoken by the new settlers when they were first brought over into Byzantine Asia Minor was, of course, their native tongue. The Christians, who may have come from Syria and Egypt following the conquests of these lands by the Arabs, were no doubt orthodox and, as a consequence, most probably Greek speakers. The Mardaites, too, were orthodox, and whatever the language they spoke when they first came they eventually abandoned in favor of Greek.⁴⁵ The Goths are not mentioned again until the beginning of the eighth century when they are referred to as Graeco-Goths, a sure indication that by then they had become Greek speakers.⁴⁶ There is no mention of the Vandals until 820 when they are said to have been included in the army of Thomas the Slavonian when he rebelled against Michael II.⁴⁷ There is much which relates to the ethnic composition of Thomas' army which may have had no relevance at all to the actual situation,⁴⁸ but if the Vandals mentioned in that army were indeed descendants of the Vandals whom Justinian had settled in Asia Minor, the chances are that they spoke Greek. For the original Vandals had not been settled in some isolated spot but in the cities, where they enrolled in the army and adopted Orthodoxy. This means that they circulated in groups where Greek was spoken, and in time, if not they themselves, certainly their descendants must have become Greek speakers.

The Slavs, too, began to yield very early to the process of Hellenization. Thomas the Slavonian is said to have been eloquent, no doubt in Greek, for the reference is in connection with his public career.⁴⁹ The monk Ioannikes (754–846), keeper of hogs, soldier, and finally monk, was, as Speros Vryonis has shown, a Hellenized Slav.⁵⁰ In the case of Thomas the army, and in the case of Ioannikes the army and the Church, were the forces which contributed to Hellenization. But the milieu also played an important role. Isolated from the general body of Slavdom, converted early to Christianity, and exposed to the Greek language and letters, the Slavs of Asia Minor in

⁴³ See *supra*, note 40.

⁴⁴ P. Charanis, *The Armenians in the Byzantine Empire* (Lisbon, 1963), 13, 16, 19f. On the origin of the family of the Skleroi, see *idem*, "The Chronicle of Monemvasia and the Question of the Slavonic Settlements in Greece," *DOP*, 5 (1950) (= *Studies on the Demography*, study X), 147, 152.

⁴⁵ Honigsmann, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 1), 41.

⁴⁶ Theophanes, *op. cit.*, I, 385; "Acta Graeca SS. Davidis, Symeonis et Georgii," *AnalBoll*, 18 (1899), 256.

⁴⁷ Genesisius, *Historiae*, Bonn ed. (1834), 33.

⁴⁸ Cf. P. Lemerle, "Thomas le Slave," *TM*, 1 (1965), 265 note 36.

⁴⁹ Genesisius, *op. cit.*, 32; cf. Lemerle, *op. cit.*, 265.

⁵⁰ "St. Ioannicius the Great (754–846) and the 'Slavs' of Bithynia," *Byzantion*, 31 (1961), 245ff.

time abandoned their language and became Greek speakers.⁵¹ The process of Hellenization was not, of course, completed overnight, but by the end of the ninth century it must have gone very far.⁵² By this time, except in some districts on the eastern frontier including those newly settled by Armenians, Greek, which for centuries had been the language of the state, of the army, of the Church, and of the educated, had become the everyday speech of virtually everyone throughout Byzantine Asia Minor.

Orthodoxy, perhaps more than the Greek language, gave to the Byzantine Empire the principal element of its cultural character. Orthodoxy, however, was also not shaped overnight. Monophysitism, which in the fifth and sixth centuries shook the Oriental provinces of the Empire, touched Asia Minor but did not affect it profoundly.⁵³ Iconoclasm originated in Constantinople and of course it affected Asia Minor, but the accuracy of the belief that it was caused by social and cultural factors peculiar to Asia Minor has not been demonstrated.⁵⁴ There is really no proof that the two bishops of Asia Minor, Constantine of Nacoleia and Thomas of Claudiopolis, who are said to have influenced Leo III, were themselves moved by hostility to the icons indigenous to their provinces.⁵⁵ The statement of the Patriarch Germanus in his letter to Thomas of Claudiopolis that Thomas' iconoclastic measures had thrown entire cities and a multitude of peoples into a state of turbulence implies the existence of strong sentiment in favor of the cult of images rather than the opposite.⁵⁶ The cult of images had by then made decisive progress in Asia Minor, more perhaps than in any other region of the empire.⁵⁷ It may be, therefore, that the Iconoclasm of bishops Constantine and Thomas involved nothing more than the personal reactions, based on the Old Testament prohibition of images, of these two bishops against this progress, with no reference at all to any other conditions.⁵⁸ The issue of Iconoclasm was fought in Con-

⁵¹ F. Dvornik, *Les Slaves, Byzance et Rome au IX^e siècle* (Paris, 1926), 102; Charanis, "The Slavic Element" (*supra*, note 41), 77ff.

⁵² In the tenth century, there were Slavs in Bithynia whose ability to communicate in Slavic with Slavs settled in the Peloponnesus, with the object of inflicting damage on the Empire, caused some concern. These Slavs were enrolled soldiers, not numerous, and most probably in no way related to the Slavs who had settled in Bithynia in the eighth century. See the review of my article, "The Slavic Element in Byzantine Asia Minor" (*supra*, note 41), by G. Soules in *Επ.Ετ.Βυζ.Σπ.*, 19 (1949), 339.

⁵³ Monophysitism made some progress in Asia Minor early in the sixth century when Severus was bishop of Antioch, but with the deposition of Severus in 518 a decline set in which ended eventually in the extinction of Monophysitism in Asia Minor; see E. Honigsmann, *Evêques et évêchés monophysites d'Asie antérieure au VI^e siècle*, CSCO, 127, *Subsidia*, 2 (Louvain, 1951), 108ff.

⁵⁴ See, for instance, A. Grabar, *L'iconoclasm byzantin: Dossier archéologique* (Paris, 1957), 93ff.; Ahrweiler, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 6); P. Lemerle, *Le premier humanisme byzantin* (Paris, 1971), 31ff.

⁵⁵ On the possible role of these bishops, see G. Ostrogorsky, "Les débuts de la Querelle des Images," *Mélanges Charles Diehl* (Paris, 1930), I, 235-38.

⁵⁶ PG, 98, col. 184.

⁵⁷ On the progress of image-worship by the end of the seventh century, see the brilliant study by E. Kitzinger, "The Cult of Images in the Age before Iconoclasm," *DOP*, 8 (1954), 85-150.

⁵⁸ "In short, as far as one can judge, the Asia Minor bishops merely appealed to some obvious anti-idolatry passages in Scripture, and were probably moved to action by the honor, in their opinion excessive, paid to icons": S. Gero, *Byzantine Iconoclasm during the Reign of Leo III, with Particular Attention to the Oriental Sources*, CSCO, 346, *Subsidia*, 41 (Louvain, 1973), 105. (My statement on Iconoclasm was written before I had read Gero's book.) See also P. Brown, "A Dark-Age Crisis: Aspects of the Iconoclastic Controversy," *EHR*, 88 (1973), 26; "It is not surprising that the crisis was

stantinople and in Asia Minor, but this carries no special significance because for all practical purposes Constantinople and Asia Minor constituted virtually the entire effective territorial extent of the Greek Church. Unlike Monophysitism, which continued to persist in the provinces, where it was strong, Iconoclasm, despite the rigorous measures taken to enforce it, was eliminated, a sure indication that its roots were not deep. By the end of the ninth century all vestiges of Iconoclasm disappeared; the icon returned to stay, rooting itself more deeply in Asia Minor than in any other region of the Empire.

There is, however, another side to the religious situation in Byzantine Asia Minor. Early Christian Asia Minor was as much a mosaic of sects as of nationalities though, of course, sects and nationalities were not synonymous. W. M. Calder, who devoted a special study to the epigraphy of these sects, has very well described the situation. "Anatolia," he wrote, "was indeed notorious in the early Church as a hot-bed of heresies; here heresy flourished luxuriantly; heretical churches established themselves freely all over the peninsula, and heretical leaders competed with the orthodox bishops for the headship of many Christian communities."⁵⁹ A number of these heretical groups are known by name. The size of each of them is impossible to determine, but they continued to exist, at least some of them, for a long time. The Novatians, Montanists, and Tetradites are mentioned in canon 95 of the Council in Trullo (692).⁶⁰ The same canon refers to "many heresies whose origin was Galatia." The Montanists are said to have existed until the reign of Leo III, when they chose to destroy themselves rather than submit to the baptism which Leo III had ordered them to undergo.⁶¹ The Tetradites continued to exist much longer. They are mentioned by Theophanes,⁶² who says that they were tolerated by the Emperor Nicephorus I, and again by Photius in one of his homilies where he speaks of their conversion to Orthodoxy.⁶³ The Encratites and the Apotactites, though mentioned in canon 95 of the Council in Trullo, most probably had ceased to be active sometime before then. The Novatians apparently merged with the Montanists and disappeared with them early in the eighth century.⁶⁴

In the meantime, however, two new heresies made their appearance: the Athinganoi and the Paulicians. The Athinganoi, by virtue of their beliefs, constituted a strange sect, mentioned for the first time in the compilation

first felt in western provinces of Asia Minor. This was not because Iconoclasm had strong local roots in these areas. Far from it: it was Iconodulism which had the local roots. . . ." The idea that the iconoclastic emperors sought to eliminate the image of Christ in order to enhance the value of their own as the symbol of their authority on earth continues to have its adherents: L. W. Barnard, "The Emperor Cult and the Origins of the Iconoclastic Controversy," *Byzantion*, 43 (1974), 13-29.

⁵⁹ "The Epigraphy of the Anatolian Heresies," *Anatolian Studies presented to Sir William Mitchell Ramsay* (London, 1923), 60.

⁶⁰ Mansi, XI, 984.

⁶¹ Theophanes, *op. cit.*, I, 401. For other texts, Starr, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 30), 91-92.

⁶² Theophanes, *op. cit.*, I, 496.

⁶³ Homily XVII, Mango, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 24), 279-96.

⁶⁴ On these heresies, see further J. Gouillard, "L'hérésie dans l'empire byzantin des origines au XII^e siècle," *TM*, 1 (1965), 299-312. Cf. Charanis, "Ethnic Changes," 26-27; Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism* (note 27 *supra*), 55-60.

of the presbyter Timothy at the beginning of the seventh century and again by the Patriarch Germanus in the first half of the eighth century.⁶⁵ By the beginning of the ninth century, the Athinganoi, originally located in Phrygia, increased to such a degree, probably by merging with other sects, that they spread into Lycaonia.⁶⁶ Michael II was said to have inherited from his parents the beliefs of the Athinganoi, and Nicephorus I was accused of being friendly to both them and the Paulicians.⁶⁷ During the reign of Michael I the imperial authorities were persuaded to take action against the Athinganoi; they were either exterminated or driven out of their homes, and some were settled on the island of Aegina where the natives referred to them as aliens, a term which in this instance can only mean that they were not indigenous to Aegina.⁶⁸ The Athinganoi do not, thereafter, disappear entirely from the records, but as an active heresy they ceased to be of any significance.⁶⁹

The Paulicians constituted a sect which was brought to Byzantine Asia Minor from Armenia. There are points in the history of the sect and its beliefs which are by no means clear; scholars differ widely about these points and also about the nature of the sources.⁷⁰ But on the salient points of interest to this discussion, there is general agreement both in the sources and among those who have studied them. The first Paulicians came to the Armenian regions of the Armeniakon theme, settling around Koloneia sometime during the second half of the seventh century. There they spread their faith, winning many converts. During the second half of the eighth century, one of their leaders moved to Antioch in Pisidia, where he possibly made converts to Paulicianism, but on this point the sources give no information. The Paulicians suffered persecutions under Constantine IV and Justinian II, and quite possibly also under Philippicus (711–13), but for the rest of the eighth century they were apparently tolerated. The sect spread throughout the districts of Koloneia and Neo-Caesarea, but under Michael I and perhaps also Leo V they were subjected to the same persecution which was directed against the Athinganoi; many were killed, but many more fled to the Arabs who permitted them to establish their own stronghold. The final blow was struck in 843 under Theodora, regent for Michael III. It is said that 100,000

⁶⁵ Timothy, Presbyter of Constantinople, *De Receptione Haereticorum*, PG, 86, col. 33; Germanus, Patriarch of Constantinople, *De Haeresibus et Synodis*, PG, 98, col. 85.

⁶⁶ Theophanes, *op. cit.*, I, 495; Genesis, *op. cit.*, 32; Theophanes Continuatus, 42.

⁶⁷ Theophanes, *op. cit.*, I, 488; Theophanes Continuatus, 42.

⁶⁸ *The Life of Saint Athanasia of Aegina*, *Acta SS, August*, III (1867), 170E. On the Athinganoi, see J. Starr, "An Eastern Christian Sect: the Athinganoi," *HTHR*, 29,2 (1936), 93–106; Gouillard, *op. cit.*, 304–7, 309–12.

⁶⁹ Gouillard, *op. cit.*, 315–16.

⁷⁰ The Greek texts on the Paulicians have now been brought together in a critical edition with a French translation by Ch. Astruc, W. Conus-Wolska, J. Gouillard, P. Lemerle, D. Papachrysanthou, and J. Paramelle, *TM*, 4 (1970), 3–227. Furthermore, Nina G. Garsoian has analyzed the Armenian texts and reconstructed the history of the Paulicians in Armenia and in Byzantine Asia Minor: *The Paulician Heresy: A Study of the Origin and Development of Paulicianism in Armenia and the Eastern Provinces of the Byzantine Empire* (The Hague–Paris, 1967). The most recent reconstruction of the history of the Paulicians in Byzantine Asia Minor is that of P. Lemerle, who gives in addition a summary of the literature on the subject: "Histoire des Pauliciens d'Asie Mineure d'après les sources grecques," *TM*, 5 (1973), 1–144. My own account and, of course, my own judgment are based on these works.

died on that occasion, and their properties were confiscated; those who survived sought asylum among the Arabs, joining their coreligionists who had previously found refuge there. Thereafter, the struggle against the Paulicians became purely military, since by then they had become a foreign power. When in 872 Tephrike, their most powerful stronghold, was captured and destroyed by the Byzantines, their role in the life of Byzantine Asia Minor came to an end. "With the destruction of Tephrike," writes Nina Garsoian, "the history of the Paulicians within the imperial provinces of the East comes to an end, and the subsequent history of the sect must be sought in the Balkans or beyond the Euphrates in its homeland of Armenia."⁷¹ With the end of Paulicianism soon after the suppression of Iconoclasm and the virtual disappearance of every other heresy, Byzantine Asia Minor became the center of Orthodoxy.

It is now time to collate this series of long notes, the objective of which by now should have become quite clear. They show that by the end of the ninth century Asia Minor had sufficient manpower, and a social structure in which there was some motivation for the masses, to enable it effectively to exploit its resources, so that it became the principal source of men and money for the state. They show further that by the end of the same century Asia Minor was shaped into the new nation of the *Romioi*, composed of Hellenistic, Roman, and other elements, with the Greek language and Orthodoxy as the two dominant ingredients of its culture. These economic, social, and cultural features of Asia Minor evolved in the midst of war as powerful factors in the successful struggle for survival, and were still more powerful in the wars of expansion which, by the end of the first quarter of the eleventh century, turned the Empire into the greatest power in Europe and the Near East.

The Arabs, writes Marius Canard, "refused to see in the victories of the Byzantines anything other than the result of a weakening of the spirit of Islam, of the negligence and immorality of its sovereigns. . . . But the decadence of the Abbasids was only a secondary factor in the development of events, only an auxiliary for the Byzantines. It was in itself that Byzantium found again the source of its strength. This revival of vigor which animated the empire in the tenth century was the work of a few men of worth: emperors, ministers, generals; it was also the work of the people themselves. . . imbued with the same religious faith and the grandeur of the Roman imperial idea, and organized politically, socially, and economically at least as solidly as its adversary. This people did not just live lazily on its ancient foundation; like its civil and military institutions which never ceased to improve, it rejuvenated itself and evolved. In the victorious resistance to the empire of the Caliphs, much of the credit must go to the people of Anatolia and to the Armenian element which had immigrated to the empire. . . ."⁷²

⁷¹ Garsoian, *op. cit.*, 130. There are indications, however, that some Paulicians continued to live in Byzantine Asia Minor, but their numbers could not have been significant. Cf. Lemerle, "Histoire des Pauliciens," 109–10.

⁷² *Histoire de la Dynastie des H'amdanides de Jazîra et de Syrie* (Paris, 1951), 718–19.

The population of Byzantine Asia Minor as it had evolved by the end of the ninth century did not last much beyond the end of the tenth century. Its decadence is indeed one of the primary aspects of the social life of Asia Minor in the eleventh century. Ostrogorsky, in one of his more recent studies on the agrarian structure of the Empire, has analyzed three documents, each of which, in his opinion, represents a stage in the evolution of that society:⁷³ the *Farmer's Law*, compiled toward the end of the seventh or the beginning of the eighth century; the *Treatise on Taxation*, a document of the second half of the tenth century; and the *Tax Register of Thebes*, belonging to the second half of the eleventh century. There would be no question at all about the validity of Ostrogorsky's arguments if the documents he analyzed were all specific and referred to one and the same locality. This is not the case, and as a consequence the validity of his analysis may be argued, but there can be no question at all concerning his final conclusion: that by the end of the eleventh century the independent peasantry virtually ceased to exist, because their property had been absorbed by the landed magnates and they had been reduced to a state of dependency. The process of this absorption had already begun toward the end of the ninth century when the landed magnates, the titled aristocracy, and those who occupied the important military and political offices of the state appear in the records as one class, the *δυνατοί* (the powerful) of the Byzantine legal texts. This process occurred throughout the Empire, but the majority of the magnates were from Asia Minor and it was there that their estates were located. These estates were vast, in one instance extending as far as 71.5 miles.⁷⁴ The emperors of the tenth century tried hard to check this process, but in the end they failed.

The fate of the independent peasantry also befell the soldier-farmers who for centuries had made up the thematic armies, the core of the military organization of the Empire. Their estates were also absorbed by the landed magnates and they were reduced to dependency. The effect of this was, of course, to undermine the strength of the thematic armies. Meanwhile, a series of blows against the military leaders, virtually all of whom were magnates of Asia Minor, weakened the source from which the state had been drawing its army and administrative officers.

The first blow was struck by Basil II, one of the most military of the Byzantine emperors. Basil had barely managed on two different occasions to save his throne from two of the most powerful magnates of Asia Minor, one a Skleros and the other a Phocas, two families which had distinguished themselves in the military and administrative life of the Empire. He resolved, therefore, to destroy the political and military influence of the magnates as a class in two ways: by confiscating their properties and confining them in the capital, and by taxation. When after 987 Basil was reconciled with Bardas

⁷³ G. Ostrogorsky, "La commune rurale byzantine. Loi agraire—traité fiscal—cadastre de Thèbes," *Byzantion*, 32 (1962), 139–66.

⁷⁴ E. Honigmann, "Un itinéraire arabe à travers le Pont," *AIPHOS*, 4 (1936) (= *Melanges Franz Cumont*, I), 270f.

Skleros, one of the magnates who had tried to seize his throne, the latter advised him that if he wished to preserve the imperial authority he should permit none of the magnates to prosper and should exhaust their means by heavy taxation.⁷⁵ In 1002, by instituting the law on the *allelengyon*, which required magnates to pay the tax arrears of peasants too poor to meet their own obligations, Basil tried to put this advice into effect.⁷⁶ After the death of Basil the law on the *allelengyon* was repealed, but a certain distrust of the military persisted. This is strikingly illustrated by the fact that in 1026, when Alexius of Studium was patriarch, a synodal decision was obtained pronouncing anathema against all rebels and excommunicating priests who might admit them to communion.⁷⁷ This distrust eventually became a government policy when every effort was made to eliminate the military from the administration of the state. This policy was indeed the characteristic feature of the reigns of Constantine IX Monomachus and, after the short interval when the military once more controlled the throne during the reign of Isaac Comnenus, of Constantine X Ducas.⁷⁸

The decadence of the soldier-farmers and the blows struck against the military so undermined the strength and prestige of the Byzantine army that to serve in it ceased to be attractive. The profession of soldier, which in the great days of the ninth and tenth centuries carried prestige, honor, and position, had no longer any value and so, as Cedrenus explains, "the soldiers put aside their arms and became lawyers or jurists."⁷⁹ The same author, writing of the army that took the field against the Seljuks in 1071, says: "The army was composed of Macedonians and Bulgarians and Cappadocians, Uzi, Franks and Varangians, and other barbarians who happened to be about. There were gathered also those who were in Phrygia (Θέμα ἀνατολικῶν). And what one saw in them was something incredible. The renowned champions of the Romans who had reduced into subjection all of the east and the west now numbered only a few and these were bowed down by poverty and ill treatment. They lacked in weapons, swords, and other arms, such as javelins and scythes...they lacked also in cavalry and other equipment, for the emperor had not taken the field for a long time. For this reason they were regarded as useless and unnecessary and their wages and maintenance were reduced."⁸⁰ The thematic armies of Asia Minor were for all practical purposes replaced by mercenaries drawn from among foreign peoples: Russians, Turks, Alans, English, Normans, Germans, Pechenegs, and Bulgars, who were strangers to the cultural traditions of the Empire and were likely to be swayed,

⁷⁵ Michael Psellos, *Chronographie*, ed. and French trans. E. Renauld (Paris, 1926), I, 17ff.

⁷⁶ Skylitzes, *Synopsis Historiarum*, ed. I. Thurn (Berlin, 1973), 347; cf. F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches*, I (Munich, 1924), 102, no. 793.

⁷⁷ Zepos, *Jus*, I, 273.

⁷⁸ Cf. Charanis, "On the Social Structure of the Later Roman Empire," *Byzantion*, 17 (1944-45), 54f.; *idem*, "The Byzantine Empire in the Eleventh Century," in *A History of the Crusades*, eds. K. M. Setton and M. W. Baldwin, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 1969) (= Charanis, *Social, Economic and Political Life* [*supra*, note 31], study XVI), 195f.

⁷⁹ *Historiarum Compendium*, II, 652.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 668.

as indeed they were, more by their own private interests than by those of the Empire.⁸¹ The harm which they did was much greater than the services they rendered. The Uzi, for instance, deserted to the enemy at the battle of Mantzikert, which greatly contributed to the defeat of the Byzantine forces.⁸² And among the Norman chieftains in the service of the Empire in Asia Minor, Hervé deserted to the Turks in 1057, Crispin openly rebelled in 1068, and Roussel of Bailleul, after playing a dubious role at Mantzikert, tried to carve out a principality for himself in Asia Minor.⁸³ The Seljuk Turks who established themselves in the various cities in central and western Anatolia had come there as mercenaries in the service of Byzantine generals during the period of the civil wars which followed Mantzikert.⁸⁴

The Byzantine defeat at Mantzikert was the immediate and direct cause of the breakdown of Byzantine authority in Asia Minor. The depressed conditions of the Byzantine army and the dubious role of the mercenaries were the two factors most responsible, at least from the Byzantine side, for the Byzantine defeat. These two factors, however, were the product of a much more fundamental development: the breakdown in the solidarity of the people of Asia Minor. That solidarity had been forged from two elements: a social structure in which the agrarian population consisted predominantly of a free and independent peasantry, and a relative cultural uniformity characterized by Greek as the language of daily speech and Orthodoxy as the accepted religion of the land. I have already stated that the changes in the social structure which took place in the course of the tenth and eleventh centuries undermined the strength of the army and contributed greatly to its deterioration, and that this deterioration was an important factor in the Byzantine defeat at Mantzikert and its disastrous aftereffects.⁸⁵ Equally damaging, however, if indeed not more so, was the breakdown of the cultural uniformity which had gone into building the solidarity of the people of Asia Minor.

⁸¹ Already at Mantzikert the mercenary forces occupied a very important position in the Byzantine army: C. Cahen, "La compagne de Mantzikert d'après les sources musulmanes," *Byzantion*, 9 (1934), 629. After Mantzikert the mercenaries dominated almost completely. The armies of Alexius Comnenus, for instance, were composed of Russians, Turks, Alans, English, Franks, Germans, Bulgarians, and others: Zepos, *Jus*, I, 317; P. Lemerle, A. Guillou, and N. Svoronos, *Archives de l'Athos. V: Actes de Lavra*, I (Paris, 1970), 218, 243. Cf. H. Grégoire, "Les corps de troupe de l'armée d'Alexis Comnène," *Byzantion*, 14 (1939), 280-83; J. Shepard, "The English and Byzantium: A Study of their Role in the Byzantine Army in the Later Eleventh Century," *Traditio*, 29 (1973), 51-92.

⁸² Charanis, "The Byzantine Empire in the Eleventh Century," 192.

⁸³ For a good monograph on these Normans as Byzantine mercenaries, see G. Schlumberger, "Deux chefs normands des armées byzantines au XI^e siècle," *RH*, 16 (1881), 289-303; L. Bréhier, "Les aventures d'un chef normand en Orient," *Revue de cours et conférence de la faculté des lettres de Paris*, 20 (1911), 172-88.

⁸⁴ Charanis, "The Byzantine Empire in the Eleventh Century," 201.

⁸⁵ In an extremely interesting article, "Byzantium, 1081-1204: An Economic Reappraisal," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, ser. 5, vol. 20 (1970), 31-52, M. F. Hendy has tried to show that Byzantium was much more prosperous in the eleventh and twelfth centuries than it had been before. He puts the emphasis on the expansion of commerce and industry and points to the development of towns during this period. "Byzantine economic life was expanding rapidly throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries; and that despite the beginnings of political reverses under the Angeli (and mercenaries and magnates notwithstanding), this expansion may have only come to an end with the Fourth Crusade" (p. 52). It should be observed, however, that the development Hendy discusses was associated with the European provinces of the Empire, not with Asia Minor. Cf. Charanis, *Studies on the Demography*, study I, pp. 15-16.

The wars of expansion during the tenth and early part of the eleventh centuries brought under the jurisdiction of the Empire in Asia Minor extensive territories inhabited, in the words of a native Cappadocian, by "alien nations with strange religion and tongue."⁸⁶ These peoples, Semites, Armenians, and Georgians, separated from the Empire for centuries, were strangers to the cultural tradition which had evolved in Byzantine Asia Minor and were by no means inclined to accommodate themselves to it. This was particularly true of the Armenians, many of whom had found their way, either voluntarily or by force, into regions of Asia Minor, beyond their native land which was now under the domination of Byzantium.⁸⁷ As a result, the position of the Empire was weakened in the regions where, for instance in Cappadocia, their settlement disturbed the social and ethnic complexion and so created serious tensions,⁸⁸ or, for instance in Cilicia, the new settlers were ready to start separatist movements the moment the opportunity presented itself. The ecclesiastical problems created by the annexation of the Armenian lands and the dispersion of the population particularly contributed to the tension between the Armenians and the rest of Asia Minor. For the first time since the loss of Egypt and Syria in the seventh century, there was a powerful religious minority, dominant in certain regions of Asia Minor, very strong in others. Both Church and State were very much concerned about this situation and, as a consequence, pressured the non-orthodox population, especially the Armenians, to accept the orthodox point of view. But the Armenians, whose cultural and national development was strongly associated with their religious beliefs and practices, resisted stubbornly. The Armenians were also embittered by the trickery sometimes used by the Byzantines to obtain concessions from their princes, and by the way the latter had been removed from their native land and settled elsewhere in Asia Minor. This bitterness at times reached a degree of intensity that provoked atrocious acts; for example, that of Kagik, the deposed King of Ani, who had the Greek bishop of Caesaria seized and put into a sack with his large dog, and then had his men beat them until the maddened animal tore his master to shreds. Kagik did this ostensibly because the bishop had named his dog "Armenian,"⁸⁹ but in reality because he had come to hate the Greeks and the Greek Church, perhaps with some justification.

Armenians had been in the service of the Empire for centuries and had served remarkably well; indeed, in a sense, they made the Empire.⁹⁰ But the Armenians, at least those who had achieved high position, had accepted

⁸⁶ S. Vryonis, Jr., "The Will of a Provincial Magnate, Eustathius Boilas (1059)," *DOP*, 11 (1957), 264.

⁸⁷ Charanis, *The Armenians in the Byzantine Empire* (*supra*, note 44), 28 ff.

⁸⁸ On these tensions, see further S. Vryonis, Jr., "Byzantium: The Social Basis of Decline in the Eleventh Century," *GRBS*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1959) (= *idem*, *Byzantium: its Internal History and Relations with the Muslim World. Collected Studies* [London, 1971], study II), 168 ff.

⁸⁹ Matthew of Edessa, *Chronique*, trans. from Armenian by E. Dulaurier (Paris, 1858), 152–54.

⁹⁰ Charanis, *The Armenians in the Byzantine Empire*, 57: "one may refer to the Byzantine empire of these two centuries (ninth and tenth) as Graeco-Armenian; 'Graeco' because, as always, its civilization was Greek, 'Armenian' because the element which directed its destinies and provided the greater part of the forces for its defense was largely Armenian or of Armenian origin."

Byzantine culture and identified themselves with its interests. They became members of the *Romioi*. This was not the case, however, with the Armenians of the eleventh century. Not in the least integrated, these Armenians had no attachment to the Empire, nor did they care for its culture. Both as soldiers and as civilians they proved to be dubious subjects. In the expedition which resulted in the battle of Mantzikert, Romanus IV Diogenes, the Byzantine emperor, had to take special measures to protect his troops from the attacks of the Armenian civilian population,⁹¹ and in the battle itself the Armenian contingents deserted the Byzantine cause.⁹² After the battle, Armenians founded principalities of their own in what had been Byzantine territories, and Armenians helped the Danishmends to seize Sebasteia and Melitene.⁹³

The collapse of Byzantine power in Asia Minor was the result of a combination of forces: the vigor and the methods of operation of the external enemy; the changes in the social structure of Byzantine Asia Minor; the deterioration of the Byzantine thematic armies; the absence of aggressive leadership in Byzantium;⁹⁴ and finally, but by no means least in significance, the breakdown of the cultural cohesiveness of Byzantine Asia Minor.

Rutgers University

⁹¹ Attaliates, *Historia*, ed. Bonn (1853), 135.

⁹² Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, trans. J. B. Chabot, III (Paris, 1905), 169; cf. Attaliates, *op. cit.*, 113.

⁹³ Irene Melikoff, *La geste de Melik Danismend, Etude critique du Danismendname. I: Introduction et Traduction* (Paris, 1960), 90, 126, especially 129.

⁹⁴ The efficiency of the Byzantine army "depended upon the quality of its generals. Constantinople was happy during some centuries to have a series of excellent commanders, such as for instance the generals of Justinianus, Belisarius and Narses in the 6th century, the Isaurian emperors in the 8th century, John Curcuas, the members of the Phocas family and the Sclerus families, John Tzimiscus, and Basil II Bulgaroctonos in the 9th to 11th centuries. Ultimately we must not forget the emperors of the Komnenian dynasty": Ada B. Hoffmeyer, "Military Equipment in the Byzantine Manuscript of Scylitzes in Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid," *Gladius*, 5 (1966), 22. No such statement can be made for the critical period between the death of Basil II in 1025 and the accession to the throne of Alexius I Comnenus in 1081. The failure of Byzantium during this period was in part at least the failure of leadership. Cf. Charanis, "The Byzantine Empire in the Eleventh Century" (*supra*, note 78), 194ff.